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FOREWORD 
The attempt to write a fore-word is a humbling experience; 
one is confronted with the realization - not for the first time, but 
perhaps more vividly - of his absolute inter-relatedness, and conse- 
quently, his utter dependence upon the multitudes of persons and events 
that have shaped him. The thesis itself is an attempt to articulate 
the authenticity, the value of those factors. More specifically, it 
is my attempt to express theologically what has been expressed to me 
primarily in non-theological terms, e.g., being loved, a sense of dig- 
nity, and the importance of "being". Often those expressions were 
not merely non-theological, but contradictory to traditional theolog- 
ical formulation and doctrine. And although much of the polemic tone 
has been sublimated for the sake of academic suitability, hopefully 
some of the "passion" remains. For, it was a reactionary passion that 
prompted the pursuit of this writing. 
Canon Roland C. Walls, in his amazing patience and insight, 
introduced me to a rather obscure Rather of the Church, St. Irenaeus, 
realizing that in him I might discover an alternate structure of the 
relation between God and the world. For that introduction and for his 
many hours of care-fill conversation, I express my gratitude. Rev. 
D.W.D. Shaw, Who served as my second advisor, is the one to whom credit 
is due for whatever stylistic precision and organizational value there 
is. That the thesis is only an approximation of Wnll's hopes, and 
Shaw's concern for exactitude is due to my own limitations. 
Finally, to my wife, Mary, belongs the major credit. Apart 
from her patient Impatience I might never have completed the work. 
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THE IMAGO DEI - A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
a. Marking the Wav 
The so- called theologies of hope tender a strange and unsettling sound; 
they suggest that in spite of what has been said to the contrary the primary 
orientation of the Christian faith is forward. 
1 
This new sound understandably 
threatens the comfort and malaise of the multitudes of quiet, yet disheartened 
and disenchanted Christians - those who seem inclined to capitulate in the face 
of worldly, secular nihilism. Carl Braaten articulates the theme of hope 
thus: "The essence of a thing is neither in its past nor in its present but 
in its future. Man is an experiment in the laboratory of a history whose goal, 
according to the Christian hope, is new life in a new world. "2 But, are there 
warrants for such hope? Is the traditional theology of the church, especially 
in respect to man, compatible with "hope" which takes historical creaturely 
existence so seriously? This is the subjective concern of this thesis in 
respect to which the imago Dei will be studied. 
This thesis is not a theology of hope; neither is it a defence of that 
theological motif. Yet, it presupposes the validity of the "sound ", believing 
that it is consonant with the central theme of Scripture, i.e. God's gracious 
relationship with man. Our major and unifying theme will be that of the 
1It should be pointed out that the future of which we speak is not the 
future of heaven; hope's future connotes more concrete historical implicates. 
2Carl E. Braaten, The Future of God, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 
p. 46. 
2. 
imago Dei. Man was created in the image of God; the image in which man was 
created is the God who said both: "I am the Alpha" and also "I am the Omega ". 
(Rev. 1:8)1 The separation of the verse is to indicate that whereas theology 
has generally affirmed man's creation into the image of Him who is the Alpha, 
concentrating on the creation of man in the beginning, theology has been reticent, 
especially in the West, to speak of man in the image of Him who is the Omega. 
This reticence seems to be a necessary and logical concomitant of Western 
theology's concept of creation and fall. The major proposition of this thesis 
is that an adequate (i.e., personal and eschatological) interpretation of the 
imago Dei concept is the proper perspective from which to develop a particular 
theology -anthropology (Karl Barth's "The- anthropologÿ).2 Conversely, a parti- 
cular concept of Paradise and of the subsequent incursion of sin seems to 
necessitate and predetermine one's understanding of the imago Dei, and of 
course, also one's Christology. If the,major theme and problem is sin, the 
"solution" can only be applicable on that basis, and in those terms. Therefore 
sin becomes the center around which theology gravitates. God is required, in 
order to conform to the problem, to be of a certain nature, and Christology 
is similarly predetermined. 
There appear to be two variants relative to the interpretation of the 
image of God in man, and they relate generally to the two major portions or 
families within the Christian Church: Western- Augustinian, and Eastern -Iren- 
aean. The alternative pre- suppositions appear to be responsible for the 
consequent differences related to Christology, anthropology, eschatology and 
history. Somewhat oversimplified, it may be said that the Western family has 
1All Scripture references are from the Jerusalem Bible, except those 
in quotations, or where otherwise indicated. 
2 "The- anthropology" is a term which Karl Barth used to describe "... 
the commerce and communion between God and man." - The Humanity of God, 
trans. Thomas Wieser, (London: Collins, 1961) p. 11. 
3. 
tended to concentrate on the majesty of God and a minimization of man, while 
the Eastern segment has emphasized God's anthropological orientation. It is 
not implied, however, that either consideration necessarily excludes the other. 
A comprehensive treatment of the two "models" will be given in Chapters I and 
II. 
A consideration of the image of God concept will provide a focus in 
this thesis around which several representative theologians will be evaluated. 
Further, we will attempt to indicate wherein particular and apparently pre- 
determined interpretations of the God -man structure of relation presupposed the 
conclusion. 
An underlying question of the thesis is this: is man in God's image 
to be understood primarily from the perspective of sin? Or conversely, is sin, 
as a related but secondary factor, to be understood in relation to man in God's 
image? What, in other words, is the primary point of reference? If theology 
begins with conclusions already established about that which is common to man, 
and if that factor is the "wrongness" of man, then obviously the "religious" 
question will be centered about God's response to man's problem. If, on the 
other hand, God is understood as the One who is always creating man - with a 
view toward his future - the primary focus will not be sin but rather the act- 
ivity of God and His work on man's behalf. The first structure tends to mini- 
mize the role of man; indeed, man has, in that system, abrogated any role 
whatever. He is primarily the passive object in the hands of the omnipotent 
God who works in the world as often in spite of man as in conjunction with him. 
If the first minimizes man's responsibility, the second admittedly maximizes 
man's involvement and participation in becoming what God, from eternity, intend- 
ed for man to become. 
4. 
Attendant upon the above question is the interpretation of the 
biblical creation narrative. Contemporary theology nearly unanimously 
agrees that Paradise is mythological and does not require or allow a literal - 
historical interpretation. However, one might reasonably expect that such 
agreement would necessitate a shift both in terminology and conclusions. 
That such a shift is strikingly absent will be illustrated. Such illustra- 
tion will further support the proposition that contemporary Western theology 
continues to interpret the image concept in terms of a particular (and erro- 
neous?) understanding of evil which predetermines its theological conclusions, 
its attitude toward the image concept, its soteriology and anthropology, none 
of which seem consonant with a teleological interpretation of Scripture or 
history. It does not appear self -evident that God has finalized His creation. 
Consequently, it may be asserted that every instance of His activity in the 
world is historically serious and purposive, that His concern for man is re- 
flected within the life of man within the structures, of creaturely historical 
existence, and finally, that whatever form or expression God's activity assumes 
it never excludes man. Suggestions that God works in ways, though often beyond 
the understanding of man, which exclude man are to be challenged. Theories 
that assert that the "fall" of man deprived him of participation in God's 
process of completion are disputable. 
If, as Braaten says, "man is an experiment in the laboratory of 
history ...," let it be understood that man is not simply and entirely God's 
experiment as though with dumb clay; man may be an experiment, but he is 
also co- worker with God. It may even be possible to suggest that God is 
himself the willing co- object, i.e., that He so willingly and completely parti- 
cipates in the present and future of man that He incorporates Himself into 
the experiment which is the creation of the world. 
5. 
If it is necessary to conduct theology from the perspective of sin 
and evil, then one might expect nearly universal agreement among theologians 
concerning the Old Testament narratives of creation and fall. A necessary 
prerequisite for a catastrophic incursion of sin would seem to be an elaborate 
narrative regarding the beatific bliss of Eden. One might also expect the 
creation narratives to offer grandiose descriptions of the pre -fallen inhabi- 
tants of the Garden. If the writers of the Old Testament were impressed with 
God's completion of a perfect world, it seems curious that the subject assumes 
such insignificant treatment in the literature. That the writers seem not 
to have been greatly impressed may be worthy of consideration. The post- 
exilic narrative, so profound, is apparently the product of a mentality that 
was oblivious to such expectations. What is so obviously paramount to the 
author is the absolute supremacy of the God of Israel. The intention of the 
narrative is to re- affirm Israel's faith and trust in a God whose lordship 
preceded creation itself. The narrative is more theological than cosmological. 
However, we need not therefore conclude that whatever cosmological implications 
and references there are are to be minimized or ignored; rather, they are to 
be appreciated within the context of an affirmation of faith. Creation is 
doxological. 
It is perhaps unfortunate that the creation narrative stands as it does 
at the beginning of the Scripture. Implicit in its location is the suggestion 
that creation and fall are the necessary prerequisites for an understanding of 
God's relationship to man. Rather, as we shall see, it was His loving and 
saving relationship with His people that served as a foundation for the under- 
standing of creation and fall. 
One other series of questions remains to be raised before we turn to 
a brief treatment of the creation -fall material from the perspective of Old 
Testament theology. The questions themselves emanate from a definite series 
6. 
of presuppositions which are not always adequately articulated. If, for 
to are 
instance,^ God is ascribed the attributes of omnipotence and goodness the 
question or challenge ordinarily proceeds thus: why, then, has He created 
a world in which there is evil? But, omnipotence and goodness by themselves 
do not constitute a sufficient foundation upon which to debate theodicy. 
Assumed, but not articulated, is the assumption that God desired to create 
something better than we now experience; that does not necessarily follow 
from those two attributes. That which we call evil is not necessarily and 
obviously incompatible with a belief in, or the existence of, an all- powerful 
and good God. 
The subject of theodicy will be an important theme of this thesis, 
though with a somewhat different series of questions, and upon the basis of 
several re- evaluated attributes of God. Underlying this subject will be the 
conviction that God is loving, that God in love created the world and the 
world for man, and that He has committed Himself to the successful completion 
of this world's and man's history. Further, our conviction is that such con- 
clusion and completion is effected not in any way apart from, or in contradic- 
tion to man whom He has created. This subject is inherently related to our 
use of the concept: imago Dei. 
b. The Creation Narrative: Its Function 
Consistent with the doxological flavor of the creation account of 
Genesis 1 is the apologetic note and function. Israel, from the earliest 
days of her occupation of the land, was aware that she was living in the 
closest proximity with inhabitants whose religious allegiance was totally in- 
compatible to her own developing monotheism. The carefully articulated cre- 
ation narrative served as a written expression that from the moment of creation 
there was no possibility of accommodation. Jahweh was Creator. Jahweh was 
Lord. There could be no other beside Him. By His "word" alone were all 
things brought into being: 
7. 
... the God of Genesis 1 is not one of the forces of nature, such 
as the power of fertility. He is not to be equated with anything 
in the realm of nature. He is transcendent, standing over against 
the world, source of all life within it, and yet sharply distingu- 
ished from the world. It was only by some such doctrine of crea- 
tion which would effectively relate God to the world, to the seasons 
and the crops, yet at the same time avoid any thought of the deifi- 
cation of Nature, that Hebrew faith could effectively answer the 
challenge which the settlement in Canaan brought to the exclusive- 
ness of Jahweh.l 
1Robert Davidson, The Old Testament, Knowing Christianity, ed. William 
Neil, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), pp. 52 -53. And cf. Th. C. 
Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, trans. n.n., (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1958), p. 187: "Israel's belief in God itself did not ... origi- 
nate in these . reation narrative reflections, but it preceded them, for 
it was born from the spiritual experience of God's activity directed towards 
the people and the individual; Israel met its God as a Living God, who 
revealed Himself in the history of the people and in.the life of the individual; 
Israel came to know God as the Saviour and the Leader, the Redeeming God." 
And cf. Ibid., p. 143: "A correct understanding of the doctrine of the 
Creation, a doctrine which figures especially in the Priestly Code, can only 
be attained on the basis of the Old Testament belief in Jahweh, the Saviour - 
God, who stands in a Covenant- relation with His people. For God, the 
Creator, is the same God whom Israel has come to know in its history as the 
Saviour and the God of the Covenant. This element also dominates the con- 
ception of the relationship between God and man at the Creation." Accepting 
that this creation narrative is established within and upon the Covenant 
faith, we ought to be especially dubious about assuming that the subsequent 
"fall" story of Gen. 3 was intended to assert a new and different doctrine, 
i.e., the so- called "brokeness ". We will have to discover another way of 
utilizing Gen. 3; as traditionally interpreted in the West its function has 
been to speak of an historical distortion to which God subsequently addressed 
Himself. This is doing theology vis -a -vis sin, and it is similarly the 
orientation of the church's anthropology. 
Because it is so critical to understand the creation and fall 
narratives within their soteriological context, we also include the following 
material from Evode Beaucamp, The Bible and the Universe, trans. David Bal- 
hatchet, (London: Burns & Oates, 1963) p. 86: "... Wherever the fact of the 
creation is evoked in the Bible, it is always placed in relation with one 
aspect or other of the drama of salvation. It is not as if there were the 
creation on one side and the redemption on the other; one and the same purpose 
animates the universe and with it, history, which takes root ab initio: 
'Who hath wrought and done these things, calling the generations from the 
beginning ?' (Is. 41:4) 'In the beginning was the Word ... All things were 
made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made. In him was 
life: and the life was the life 5ic7 of men' (John 1:1 -4). However, all 
that Israel was conscious of in the first instance, was its election, and the 
idea of creation was merely an extension of it into the most remote past." 
And cf. Ibid., passim pp. 99 -114. 
8. 
It seems advisable at this point to consider "word" creation as 
interpreted by Old Testament theology. We will not be concerned at this 
juncture with deriving any scientific explanations relative to the creation 
of the universe; we will concentrate exclusively upon the doxological- 
theological signification of "word" creation. The propriety of this ap- 
proach is affirmed by Von Rad: "These sentences [referring to Gen. 2 
cannot be easily overinterpreted theologically: "1 Therefore we will con- 
sider "word" creation as a suitable environment established for the subse- 
quent creation of man in the imago Dei. 
Creation by the "word" will, by implication, introduce the subject of 
God's ótherness" versus His "relatedness ". The otherness of God is an issue 
which will be discussed insofar as it impinges upon the treatment of the 
image and likeness of man's creation. It seems appropriate at this point 
to comment briefly on the subject before treating it specifically in the con- 
text of "word" creation. We are inclined to suggest that anyone, whether God 
or other, who is purported to be totally, absolutely, and radically other 
must necessarily be unknown and unknowable. If, however, that which is 
"other" chooses to reveal itself it no longer remains radically, but only re- 
latively other. Then, having asserted its former degree of otherness becomes 
at best purely academic. Alternates, to insist on radical similarity might 
suggest exact and complete identification; this, in reference to the God - 
man relationship, would be preposterous, at least outside Christological 
formulations related to the incarnation. As it is possible to assert the 
relative otherness and similarity between man and man, so also it would seem 
possible to assert the same between man and God. However, this equation is 
1Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks, (London: SCM, 1961), 
p. 46. 
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only approximate, and is not to be understood as an exact parallel. We do 
not wish to imply that the structures of similarity and otherness that apply 
within the human situation are exactly applicable to the relationship between 
the Creator and the creature. That relationship will demand and receive its 
own appropriate fabric. We will attempt to illustrate that such a fabric of 
relationship is a primary intention of the creation narrative. It appears 
somewhat pointless and even pernicious to defend and circumscribe the other- 
ness of God in the face of God's intention and activity to demonstrate to man 
his loving presence in the world. 
Returning to the subject of creation by the "word ", we note Von Rad's 
comment in his Genesis that: "The idea of creation by the word preserves first 
of all the most radical essential difference between Creator and creature. "1 
However, even this "radical essential difference" is almost immediately quali- 
fied. What Von Rad is emphasizing at this point is the difference between the 
doctrine of Priestly narrative and the current and popular pagan creation myths. 
P, employing the tern "word ", makes it clear that God is not creator by fiat, 
nor by a creative process of emanation; He is creator by the "word ". Von 
Rad establishes the same point in his Old Testament Theology: 
... if the world is the product of the creative word, it is therefore, 
for one thing, sharply separated in its nature from God himself - it 
is neither an emanation nor a mythically understood manifestation of 
the divine nature and its power. The only continuity between God 
and his work is his word. Still, it would be quite wrong to take 
this important concept in the main negatively, that is as a delimit- 
ing definition. If the world was called into being by the free will 
of God, then it is his very own possession, and he is its Lord.2 
1Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 49 -50. 
2Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, trans. D.M.G. Stalker, 
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1962), I, 143. 
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The nature of the world and the nature of God are separate and 
distinct; there is no equation of essence or substance. However, while 
creation by the "word" serves to highlight the dissimilarity, there is no 
inherent suggestion that this tends toward, requires, or allows an inclina- 
tion toward antagonism in the relationship between creator and creation. 
Vriezen discusses the same subject and has some instructive material 
to offer. Regarding the debate concerning relatedness and otherness he 
suggests that this is what may be called a "critical- theological" idea, in- 
volving the imago Dei concept as a symbol of relationship. Yet he insists 
upon the essential inequality of the partners of the relationship. While this 
is not a critical facet of our thesis, it seems proper to express our own posi- 
tion. Juxtaposing two. sentences from Vriezen will high-light the antinomy: 
first, on the one side, "... The Old Testament message is founded upon the 
certainty of the relationship between the holy God and man. "1 And: "... 
Communion between the Holy One and man is the essential root -idea of the Old 
Testament message concerning God, ... "2 Second, on the other side, "In the 
Bible God and man are fundamentally and absolutely distinct, because God essen- 
tially precedes nature and is superior to it, however much He may reveal His 
power in nature. "3 Are these two constructs logically and necessarily con- 
tradictory? Indeed, there is the temptation to claim the discovery of another 
paradox. 
Even though Vriezen did not articulate the same problem, nor apparently 
recognize the issue from this particular point of view, nevertheless he does not 
avoid the subject. While he continues to insist that there is no equality be- 
tween the "partners ", (nor would we) he also says, 
1Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, p. 145. Hereafter: 
Outline O.T. Theology. 
2lbid., p. 134. 31bid., p. 144. 
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... The Old Testament is by no means behind naturalism in its 
spiritual appreciation of man and especially in acknowledging the 
communion between God and man; on the contrary, it is especially 
in this latter aspect that the Old Testament reveals its peculiar 
nature by taking absolutely seriously this communion between God 
and man as well as the absolute divinity of God.l 
Earlier in the same work Vriezen had stated that the communion or relationship 
between man and God in fact exists "... as the gift of God's work of revela- 
tion, only as the grace of God... ".2 Unless it could be demonstrated that 
such grace and intention of God has been withdrawn or excised from the world 
and man, this critical doctrine deserves a place of distinction. 
The most apparent antagonism inherent in the creation narrative is 
that which exists between creation and chaos, God and nothingness. "In the 
beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. 1:1). Yet, if we 
adopt an entirely chronological reading of the text, we are confronted in the 
very next verse ( "the earth was a formless void ") with the existence of that 
which is certainly contrary to the ascription "good ". One may realize here 
that the purpose of the narrative transcends a purely chronological presentation 
of cosmogenesis; it is, as already mentioned, a theo -doxological material. 
starve 
When that standard is applied as an interpret ve key the conjunction of the 
first two verses offers an edifying insight. The suggestion that the narra- 
tive's intention is to provide a foundation and framework within which to dis- 
cern the God -man relationship is further corroborated. The chaos as that 
against which God waged war was a central doctrine of the Manicheans, and be- 
fore them the Platonists. But at the time of this writing there was a tenden- 
cy, however inchoate, to recognize God as the creator ex nihilo. Gen. 1:2 
Vriezen, Outline O.T. Theolog,y, P. 144. 
2Ibid., p. 134. 
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... teaches one to understand the marvel of creation ... from the 
viewpoint of its negation; thus it speaks first of the formless 
and the abysmal out of which God's will lifted creation and above 
which it holds it unceasingly. For the cosmos stands permanently 
in need of this supporting Creator's will. We see here that the 
theological thought of ch. 1 moves not so much between the poles 
of nothingness and creation as between the poles of chaos and cos- 
mos. It would be false to say, however, that the idea of creatio 
ex nihilo was not present here at all (v. 1 stands with good reason 
before v. 2:), but the actual concern of this entire report of cre- 
ation is to give prominence, form, and order to the creation out 
of chaos .1 
The material above further substantiates the proposition that the 
intent of the narrative is primarily directed toward the articulation of a 
God -man structure of relation. Conversely, much theology has maintained 
that the function of the creation narrative is to serve as a foundation for 
the fall. Often the "fall" has been painted so large that it becomes effec- 
tually impossible to recognize the splendour, the intention, and most import- 
antly, the continuous (and unbroken ?) relationship that God has effected with 
men. 
Another related subject will be seriously considered, even though 
without elaboration at this point it may appear either indefensible or obvious, 
depending on one's presuppositions. It is this: the "fall" does not repres- 
ent an historical event. Explicit, therefore is the rejection of an actual 
and historical Paradise. Whether there is, in fact, another perspective com- 
patible with church doctrine and Scripture will be a primary question under- 
lying this thesis. 
Von Rad, Genesis, p. 49. And cf.: "Because of vs. 1 which precedes 
the mention of chaos, we cannot say that it was uncreated, that is, that it 
was found by God as pre -existent. On the other hand, it is hardly possible 
to conceive of the idea of a created chaos, for what is created is not chaotic. 
Still, the theological function of vs. 2 in the total picture is of particular 
importance, for chaos is the great menace to Creation - it is indeed a primeval 
experience of man, and every statement of the Creation belief has continually 
to prove itself over against it." Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, p. 144. 
13. 
c. The Shape and Scope of Imago Dei 
If it could be asserted that Gen. 1 and 2 primarily reflect a future 
and eschatological orientation, one might on that basis be permitted to suggest 
that the imago Dei theme similarly denotes a proleptic intention. This would 
free the concept from its accustomed negative connotations, allowing it to 
resume its place as a term of honor, dignity, intention, and goal, commensur- 
ate with the "crown of God's creation." Von Rad states that not only does 
"word" creation specify difference and distance between Creator and creature, 
as previously indicated, but also that creation by the "word ", i.e., "and God 
said" (in vss. 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 20, and 26) "... gives the world a suscep- 
tibility to God's word, which will have eschatological significance. "1 
The paramount function of the narrative, it seems, is that of encour- 
agement, hope, confidence. Soteriology was a cornerstone of Israel's faith, 
and it was not until a creation doctrine could be formulated which was compat- 
ible and supportive of that key doctrine that she was inclined to produce one.2 
An earlier creation formulation, or series of formulations, namely those of 
Deutero -Isaiah, affirm this orientation. Especially instructive are: Isaiah 
42:5; 43 :1; 44:24b -28; and 54:5 which reads "For now your creator will be 
your husband, his name, Jahweh Sabaoth; your redeemer will be the Holy One of 
Israel, he is called the God of the whole earth." God who was known as the 
lVon Rad, Genesis, p. 50. Cf. Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 
I, p. 136: "Probably the sole reason for the lateness of the emergence 
of a doctrine of creation was that it took Israel a fairly long time to bring 
the older beliefs which she actually already possessed about it into proper 
theological relationship with the tradition which was her very own, that is, 
with what she believed about the saving acts done by Jahweh in history. 
Israel only discovered the correct theological relationship of the two .rea- 
tion and soteriology7 when she learned to see Creation too as connected theo- 
logically with the saving history." 
2For expansion of this theme cf. Vriezen, Outline 0.T. Theology, 
pp. 184 -85. 
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one who saved His people also came to be known as He who had created. 
Creation enhanced salvation; salvation was not predicated upon creation, 
or "fall ". Referring again to Von Rad: 
... It is extremely likely that this soteriological understanding 
of Creation also lies at the basis of the creation stories of J 
and P. In neither of these documents of course is Jahweh's work 
in Creation considered for its own sake: instead it is incorpor- 
ated within a course of history leading to the call of Abraham and 
ending with Israel's entry into Palestine.' 
Salvation, soteriology - what is signified? What, for Israel, was 
the direction and focus implied, and the content of salvation? The orien- 
tation, focus, direction, and instrumentation are concerns attendant upon our 
treatment of the imago Dei theme. If Israel's understanding is similar to 
what seems characteristic of Western theology's perspective, namely, a restor- 
ation and return to that primal bliss of Eden, then of course it would be in- 
appropriate and ultimately illegitimate to appeal there for encouragement and 
substantiation. 
Israel's entry into Palestine, mentioned above, is not a- typical of 
the primary focus of Old Testament soteriology; salvation predominantly 
signified a land and people conformation, and the history of that land and 
those people was regarded to be the sphere within which God was at work, re- 
vealing Himself as one whose very presence was a saving presence. Sigmund 
Mowind l's statement is pertinent: "To say ... that God reveals himself 
really means, according to the Bible, that he gives himself. ... He gives 
himself in and by his creative and saving (re- creative) work. "2 
1Uon Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, p.138. And cf. Von Rad, 
Genesis, p. 99: "... the theological consequences of the .reation -fall story 
... have eschatological meaning, even though not according to their obvious 
meaning to the Jahwist. It is not accidental that the primeval history so 
earnestly considers the themes of eschatology and apocalyptic (Paradise, prime- 
val man, peace among the animals, abundance of water, etc.). In any case, be- 
yond both Old Testament protology and eschatology is Jahweh's revelation, 
Yahweh the God of Israel." 
2Sigmund Mowinckel, The Old Testament as Word of God, trans. Reidar 
B. Bjornard, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), P. 41. And cf. Ibid., pp. 36 -37: 
"The revelation of God is a history of revelation. This is the main view of 
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However much the Christian church is justified in "spiritualizing" and adding 
"heavenly" eschatological dimension to the sometimes- considered primitive and 
undeveloped theology of the Old Testament, it would seem ill -advised to sacri- 
fice or surrender this coloration of eschatology. Again, to refer to Mowinc- 
kel who has emphasized the word of God being an historical event, we quote: 
All this also implies that the history of revelation in reality is 
also history of salvation. The plan of God is ultimately His plan 
of salvation; the intent of creation is salvation, the full reali- 
zation of God's oal; 'all things were created through him and for 
him.' (Col. 1:16.1 
Although a thorough treatment of the subject has not been offered 
what has been included will hopefully suffice to substantiate this "trend" 
or perspective as regards the Old Testament soteriological orientation. 
What has been maintained is that the direction of Israel's attitude toward 
the God- nation relationship is future and hope oriented. And this relation- 
ship, while not always what it should and could have been, was one in which 
Israel could comfortably and conscientiously stand. And furthermore it was 
of such a nature that the nation could assume an attitude of dignity and pride, 
appreciating that she was privileged to participate with God in a history in 
which her actions and decisions were not disregarded or despised. Israel, at 
the Old Testament. It is significant that the Old Testament ties its ideas 
concerning the origin of the sacred places and the sacred acts to historical 
persons, or at least to persons whom ancient Israel held to be historical. 
By this they mean: It is in the real, daily world that God shows himself and 
is active, not in the misty world of myth and prehistoric time.... It is 
history that is the miracle, the miracle that reveals Yahweh - at the same 
time that which is his'work and that which 'unveils', 'reveals' his essence, 
plan, and will." 
1Mowinckel, The Old Testament as Word of God, p. 40. And cf. pp. 37 -38: 
"Eschatology, the ideas concerning the 'last things' is also an expression of 
the same belief: that God has a purpose, that he has a plan to be realized, 
a goal to be reached, and that all the occurrences in history point toward 
this. Even if the goal is realized through a divine miracle, the historic 
realities are the means of the miracle. In harmony with.this view faith for 
the Old Testament is the ability to see the creative work of God in history." 
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least in her most faithful moments, was cognizant that as a nation she was 
the subordinate participant; but Israel nonetheless was a participant. The 
creator God, as history's lord, directed and controlled history, but not in a 
manipulative sense; He, to use a word from Mowinckel, "interfered ", which is 
simply another way of saying "acted ". 
... faith must use the word 'interfere'. This, too, mythically 
expresses God's sovereign relationship to his work. It also 
expresses something else: namely, that my sin cannot destroy God's 
goal or frustrate his achievement of it. Even if my sin crosses 
and hinders his plan, he is, figuratively speaking, man enough to 
'relink the chain of events,' to make the situation created by my 
sin into a new starting point, to give it a positive meaning. This 
is what we mean when we say that God interfered in my life. 
If it will be granted that creation's focus is not only but also being 
historically actualized according to the interpretation developed above,2 a 
significant and essential foundation for a re- evaluation of the imago Dei 
theme has emerged. One would be inclined to anticipate a more favorable and 
optimistic treatment than is usually afforded. At least the question might 
be entertained: will the allusions to Paradise, perfection, harmony, bliss, 
and tranquility permit a futurist interpretation? Can one assert that Eden 
never "was" in the realized historical sense of the term? And if not, what 
is meant by primal or original perfection, not only of the world, but espec- 
I 
ially of man? Similarly, what is the signification of imago Dei in Gen. 1:27 
in respect to the fall? One wonders why so much theological argumentation has 
centered on the "lost ", "injured ", or "depraved" image if the image never was 
other than it is now, at least not other in the sense of enjoying an original 
quality of perfection, subsequently lost? Even more important, perhaps, is 
the entire scope of the treatment of sin and evil, a scope which assumes a 
1Mowinckel, Old Testament as Word of God, p. 51. 
2Cf. supra, pp.14 -15, n.2. 
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different configuration depending on the nature of answers given to the above 
questions. Might the much -debated, practically pernicious "doctrine" of 
original sin mean simply the sin associated with man's origin? What is the 
relationship of the image of God in man to the reality of evil, its source and 
origin, its function and future? These questions characterize the scope of 
the thesis. 
Before returning to the more specific treatment of creation and image 
from within the Old Testament framework, another facet of the subject merits 
comment, i.e., creatio continua. Recalling what Mowinckel has already said 
on the subject of revelation being the work and presence of God himself in 
history, it is interesting to note how he associates revelation and creation: 
Creation and revelation are correlative terms, or rather: realities. 
Creation in the Bible is not a once terminated act. For the old 
Israel, God's coming in the cultus of the festival was a repetition 
and a continuance of creation just as it also repeated history: 'My 
Father is working still,' Jesus says. As God unveiled himself and 
his plan in Creation, so he continues to reveal himself in history.1 
Von Rad apparently disagrees with Mowinckel respecting the "completion" 
or "continuation" of creation,2 but it may be that the disagreement is more 
apparent than actual. Von Rad's concern in the context of his discussion 
was to affirm and emphasize God's powerful and intimate involvement in creation 
1Mowinckel, Old Testament as Word of God, p. 40. But cf. Von Rad, 
Genesis, p. 61 for material illustrative of contrary opinion: Regarding Gen. 
2:1 -3, the rest "... testifies negatively first of all ... that the world is 
no longer in process of being created. It was not and is not incomplete but 
it has been 'completed' by God. Even more, that God has 'blessed', 'sanc- 
tified' ('to sanctify' means to separate exclusively for God), this rest, 
means that P does not consider it as something for God alone but as a concern 
of the world. The way is being prepared, therefore, for an exalted good, 
actually the final, saving good." ... "thus at creation God prepared what will 
benefit man in this life, what in fact will be necessary for him, yes, that 
which one day will receive him eschatologically in eternity." The Sabbath 
rest "... is as tangibly 'existent' protologically as it is expected eschato- 
logically in Hebrews (Heb., ch. 4)." (Ital. mine). 
2Cf. supra, n. 1. 
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itself; he was not discussing creation in reference to its history, or history 
as the stage of man's activity in the created order, which was one of the 
intentions of Mowinckel. That Von Rad placed "completed" within quotation 
marks in the phrase, creation "has been 'completed' by God ", is at least an 
indication that he intended to indicate something other or more` than what a 
simple meaning of the word would suggest. That "other" or "more" may be that 
which Mowinckel asserts, namely, that creation as a continuing event demands 
real and actual change and transformation under the hand of God. 
Von Rad, in spite of somewhat ambiguous terminology, i.e., that the 
Sabbath rest is "'existent' protologically" and "expected eschatologically ", 
seems to deny the initial interpretation of "completed" creation. It would 
certainly be more in consort with a dynamically oriented interpretation of the 
narrative than one which is statically fixed and finished. One might accept 
the validity, though not necessarily the advisability, of the terminology of 
completion and perfection if what is intended and implied is that God's creation 
is not devoid or deprived of that which is necessary to accomplish His purpose. 
That is to say, that creation is perfect in respect to its created capacity 
to respond to God. We appreciate Von Rad's statement that the goodness 
ascribed to creation is "less an aesthetic judgement than the designation of 
purpose, correspondence. "1 
The so- called perfection of creation, therefore, seems to apply to its 
purpose and function; it is perfect in respect to its created ability to in- 
creasingly apprehend its creator, and also in respect to its conformability 
Von Rad, Genesis, p. 50. And cf. also p. 59: "When faith speaks of 
creation, and in so doing directs its eye toward God, then it can only say that 
God created the world perfect. The statement itself, however, is not judicious 
at all; the cosmos in its created splendour would then have to be thoroughly 
and clear as crystal to men. The question of its riddles and troubles is now 
answered, after the redactor's theological coupling of the documentary sources, 
by the Yahwistic chapter of the Fall, with its strong aetiological orientation." 
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subject to the impulses of its God. Such a view of creation emphatically 
implies movement; the world is destined; it is going somewhere. Man, in 
God's image, assumes a critical significance in this moving sphere. And the 
imago Dei is, in a sense, a clue to the conclusion. 
The subject of creatio continua raises the question of evolution, and 
r 
it appears that contemporary theologians have adopted one of more of the varia- 
tions of that theory. But on the other hand it also seems that evolution 
presents a subtle embarrassment to the Christian whose desire it is to retain 
his theories and doctrines of creatio ex nihilo, Paradise and fall. That is 
to say, there seems to be intellectual affirmation of the first theory (evolu- 
tion) but a "faith" affirmation of the second (Paradise and fall), and that the 
two are often treated in such a way as to seem to be mutually contradictory. 
The question is this - will the biblical doctrine of creation allow some form 
of evolution? Are they potentially compatible? If evolution may tentative- 
ly be defined as a God -initiated, man- participative, purposive movement toward 
a God -determined goal, both questions will apparently allow an affirmative 
answer. On the other hand, those who deny any significance of man's parti- 
cipation will reject both the definition and the affirmative answer. Never- 
theless, that will be our operating definition of evolution, and we will pre- 
suppose the compatibility of biblical creation and evolution.1 
1However relatively insignificant a theme evolution will be in this 
thesis, it should be noted that one eminent Old Testament scholar substantiates 
this thrust: "This word ¿volutio7 in Christian circles has often been felt 
to be the very opposite of a history of revelation and salvation directed by 
God. But this is incorrect. The word itself does not indicate that what 
takes place is through immanent powers; the word merely signifies continuous 
direction toward a goal. If it is true that history is movement, direction, 
and destination toward a goal, something dynamic and not static, then it pre- 
supposes evolution. In fact, it is impossible to conceive of an orderly 
coherence in that which takes place without using the idea of evolution... . 
Evolution means organic coherence, linear movement, in that which takes place. 
The idea of evolution, therefore, finds full positive content only through 
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Consequently, we are inclined to question the propriety of doctrines 
which maintain that God's goal for creation was either: one, once actually 
and concretely realized in Paradise, or two, that the intended goal in the 
mind of God will in any way be accomplished in the future in a manner which 
tends to disregard the participation and responsibility of man who is in the 
imago Dei. Vriezen states the point succinctly: 
God is not only the God of history, who acts with and on behalf 
of man, but He is also the God who allows the man whom He has 
called to share in His activity by His Spirit or Word. God performs 
nothing without revealing His decree to His servants, the prophets 
(Amos 3:7), the prophet is allowed to be a witness of God's work 
in history. It is even possible to speak of a 'pathetic' theology. 
It has previously been stated that the creation narrative, and indeed 
the entire first eleven chapters of Genesis, are most properly interpreted 
within the context of soteriology. It has also been indicated that Israel's 
understanding of salvation was a necessary prerequisite to the development of 
her doctrine of creation, and specifically the creation of man in the imago Dei. 
If it will be granted, therefore, that a prior understanding of salvation pre- 
conditioned Israel's understanding of creation, it may be possible to re- 
evaluate the function and scope of the image concept within both creation and 
fall accounts.2 
the idea of teleology - in the idea that the line points toward a goal. 
Such an idea is not at all contradictory to Christian faith in God; on the 
contrary, it is demanded by faith in God. That which faith must demand is 
that the goal and direction be willed, wrought, and guided by God, that the 
'coherences' and 'natural' relationships be the means by which God effects 
his goal, even though in most instances it is impossible to indicate exactly how 
they fit into the plan of divine guidance or what God's plan is with just 
these things." Mowinckel, Old Testament as Word of God, pp. 49 -50. 
Vriezen, Outline 0.T. Theology, p. 137. 
2Cf. Evode Beaucamp, The Bible and the Universe, p. 84: "The mere 
placing of the priestly account of the creation at the beginning of the 
Bible would be sufficient evidence to warrant the supposition that it is 
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Basically, the creation narratives served to reinforce Israel's 
ever -growing confidence that her God, Jahweh, was not only her tribal god, 
but the God of all gods, Lord of all lords. And it was within this faith 
that she endeavored to establish a theological foundation upon which to 
understand man. It seems extremely unlikely that Israel, at this time 
or at any other, entertained the questions which have since fascinated 
more philosophically oriented thinkers regarding the creation of the world 
ex nihilo.' Nevertheless, her creation narrative is far from primitive 
and naive. 
meant as an introduction to the drama of salvation. But there is more to 
it than this: in its very purport, it is bound up with history as P sees 
it. In the latter, God's plan develops in successive, irreversible 
stages, from Adam to the flood, from Noe to Abraham, to finish with the 
time of Israel's election. From one period to the next, the sin of mankind 
can be seen increasing in prevalence, at the same time as God confirms his 
plan of salvation and strengthens his covenant with the chosen portion of 
humanity. ... The episode is not finally rounded off, for whereas the work 
of the first six days ends with a reference to the coming of evening and of 
morning, no such mention occurs after the seventh day. On the other hand, 
the initial work is not to be done afresh; it points the way up a pyramid, 
the summit of which is man, and it concludes with the Creator resting, 
his work achieved." 
1Creatio ex nihilo as a theme will be treated in this paper only 
insofar as it is introduced by the sources. While it has intrigued and 
perplexed theologians since Irenaeus it does not for the reason of its 
extensive discussion become a theological issue; it will not be considered 
in this paper other than from within the philosophical and metaphysical 
perspectives, and then only by way of commentary. It is entirely beyond 
the scope and intention of this thesis to comprehensively treat it, and 
even if considered it would contribute little to the subject of the imago 
Dei and the theological -doxological emphasis which we will try to sustain. 
Norman Pittenger's remark is appropriate here: "... the creation stories in 
Genesis are a way of saying that at the back of everything, there is God's 
continuing activity. In that sense he is the beginning; and the old doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo can be interpreted in that sense or in no meaningful 
sense at all." Norman Pittenger, God's Way With Men, (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1969), P. 43. Or again when he says: "Creation as a theologi- 
cal doctrine has to do with the dependence of all that is not God upon God's 
activity, not with a particular moment in the past." Ibid., p. 43. 
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Old Testament theologians call specific attention to the careful 
selection of the words of the narratives. The importance attached to the 
choice of "word" as related to creation has been noted. Gerhard Von Rad 
also emphasizes the significance and importance which should be recognized in 
the narrator's choice of the verb "to create ", bara. He points out that 
except for its use in verse 1 of Genesis 1, which is a summary introduction, 
it is reserved for the creation of man as distinct from other forms of life.l 
That point is significant inasmuch as it seems consistent with our discussion 
of the significance of "word" creation. Certainly, unless the narrator had 
intended to relate something specific about the creation of man, the normal 
construction would have sufficed, namely, "God spoke ... ". There is consequen- 
tly a man -world distinction implied in bara, and there is a uniqueness attri- 
buted to the creature so created.2 Whatever else may have been implied by the 
author's choice of bara, this much seems quite,clear: there is a closeness and 
kinship established between man and God implicit as a consequence of bara 
which far surpasses God's relationship with any other form of creation. 
1It is not implied however that the use of í1r1 ].is restricted 
exclusively to the creation narrative, nor even to the creation of man. 
Cf. William Gesenius, Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon To The Old Testament 
Scriptures, trans. Samuel P. Tregelles, (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, 
1885), where it is noted that an Z is also used in reference to the creation 
of Israel, Is. 43 :1, 15: Jer. 31:22, in addition to its derivations which 
are not specifically related even to creation. 
2I appreciate this particular emphasis of Von Rad; it serves to 
protect the imago Dei from attempts to denigrate its importance. The 
imago Dei, within this context of unique relationship, ascribes a share 
of the weight and responsibility to God in whose image man is created. 
Von Rad also says: "Compared with creation by word, bara, ('create') points 
without doubt to a direct relationship between creature and creator. Life 
came into being not only by a word of command, but it derives from a more 
direct creative act of God. Moreover, this newly created life is the 
object of the divine blessing, i.e., these living creatures are the recipients 
of a life -giving, divine power by virtue of which they themselves are capable 
of passing on the life they have received by means of their on procreation." 
Von Rad, Genesis, p. 54. 
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It may of course be objected at this point that P's explicit intention 
was to glorify the intimacy of the God -man relationship in the "beginning" 
specifically to illustrate the heinousness of that crime which destroyed the 
primal bliss. And if it could be shown that this was in fact his intention 
arive 
then it would follow that sin is indeed the valid interprete principle, and 
that Western- Augustinian theology has rightly insisted upon that particular 
orientation. Furthermore, if P is, as it were, preparing the stage for the 
"fall ", he has chosen a very effective technique. However, while concrete 
imagery was a frequent vehicle for the Hebrew to express abstract concepts, 
it would not be reasonable for the Hebrew to tread so dangerously near the 
brink of that which could so effectively destroy the anthropological factor 
of his theology. The people, the land, the nation, history itself, - all this 
was essential to the Hebrew understanding of the God -man relationship. If sin 
and not salvation, if rebellion and not restoration, if lost Paradise and not 
promised land were the real themes of the narrative, the author has inadvert- 
ently destroyed the foundation of his hope and faith.1 
The very terms employed by P in reference to man's creation in God's 
image exemplify the highly exalted position of man within the order of creation 
and at the same time his closest possible relationship with God. According to 
Von Rad the two words: 
... y 'image', 'statue', 'a work of plastic art', and 71(1)0'T 
'likeness', 'something like' - the second interprets the first 
by underlining the idea of correspondence and similarity - refer 
to the whole of man and do not relate solely to his spiritual and 
intellectual being: they relate equally if not first and foremost, 
to the splendour of his bodily form... . 
1It is acknowledged that "salvation" and "restoration" do indeed ordin- 
arily denote a "from- what -to- what" construct, and it is not implied that Israel 
was not also keenly aware of that- from -which she was saved. But nevertheless, 
as explicated above (pp.14 -16) the predominant orientation of Israel was 
salvation for, toward the future to which God had elected her. 
2Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, pp. 144 -45. In that section we 
also note these sentences: "Actually, Israel conceived even Jahweh himself as 
having human form. But the way of putting it which we use runs in precisely 
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One might infer that this reflects a somewhat naive and primitive level of 
P's theological insight, but beyond that, and more importantly, it is appar- 
ent that within the narrative itself there is no foundation to suggest that 
man in the imago Dei was either then or subsequently to become other than God 
had intended in terms of the "shape" of his relationship with God. By "shape" 
is meant structure and form; the Hebrew holistic understanding of man did not 
allow for a compartmentalized relationship. The Hebrew knew well of sin and 
its ramifications, but he did not conclude that sin had transformed the "shape" 
of communion. More will be said about sin and the "fall" very shortly, but 
it remains for us to discuss the imago Dei from a functional and essential 
point of view. 
Apart from recognizing the distance between creature and creator 
in the narrative, it would be difficult to read Genesis-1 without recognizing 
another distance: the disequality between man and the rest of creation. Man's 
creation in God's image indicates this bi -polar distinction. David Cairns 
calls it a "stereoscopic concept ", saying that nature, man, and God "... are 
now revealed in the light of a new dimension of depth. God is far above 
nature and man, but man, in his own lesser degree, has been lifted out of the 
plane of nature by virtue of his special relationship to God. "1 It should be 
noted that it is man's special relationship to and with God that sets him 
apart, and conversely that it is not his elevation within creation that makes 
him distinct and unique. Functionally speaking, man does not assume or achieve 
his communion with God by means of his lordship or dominion over the natural 
the wrong direction according to Old Testament ideas, for, according to the 
ideas of Jahwism it cannot be said that Israel regarded God anthropomorphi- 
cally, but the reverse, that she considered man as theomorphic." There are 
obvious hints here of the Eastern Church's doctrine of "deification ", and 
perhaps also some relationship with de Chardin's "hominization" of man. 
1David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, (London: SCM, 1953), p. 19. 
Hereafter: Image. 
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order, but his dominion derives from his God -likeness which is a gift of 
creation. Whatever dominion man realizes derives from the peculiarity of 
his creation. The dipolar distinction of man's relationship to God and 
creation also implies a dipolar function of the imago Dei. Adam's "image" 
places him under God, and sets him therefore over the world.l But his being 
set over the world is secondary; it is not the essence of the image, but 
simply the consequence. The essence is more than that. 
It is this "more than" that is the essential characteristic of the 
imago Dei, and both here and subsequently we will bear in mind the distinction 
between the essence of the image and its function, which is derivative. The 
essence is personal relationship which is fashioned into the nature of man as 
that which is essential for communion with the personal God. David Cairns 
states it well: " In my view, the essential thing about the image in 'P' is 
1This functional motif is clearly seen in the following: "Man in the 
image of God is set over the animal world. This does not mean that man's 
being in God's image only means that he rules the animal world, the latter is, 
in fact, the important consequence of the former: because man stands in a 
special relationship to God he is entrusted by God with dominion over the world." 
Vriezen, Outline O.T. Theology, p. 208. A slightly different emphasis is seen 
in Von Rad: "P only becomes clear and explicit when it speaks about the purpose 
of the image of God in man, that is, the function committed to man in virtue 
of it, namely his status as lord in the world. ... God set man in the world 
as the sign of his own sovereign authority, in order that man should uphold and 
enforce his - God's - claims as lord. Earthly monarchs too have the habit of 
setting up images of themselves in their kingdom as signs of their sovereign 
authority - it was in that sense that Israel thought of man as the represen- 
tative of God. ... What is crucial about man's image is his function in the 
non -human world. Thus, through the image of God in man Creation, in addi- 
tion to coming from God, receives a particular ordering towards God." Von 
Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, pp. 146 -47. And cf. Von Rad: dominion 
"... is not considered as belonging to the definition of God's image; but it 
is its consequence, i.e., that for which man is capable because of it." Von 
Rad, Genesis, p. 57. 
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man's personal nature, his link with God, his dignity above the other creatures, 
... ".1 Throughout this thesis the link relationship, this personal communion 
theme will occupy a central position of importance. 
It has been shown that the imago Dei concept was employed by P primar- 
ily to indicate the unsurpassable and indelible kinship that exists between 
God and man. However, the words kinship, relationship, communion, fellowship, 
by which one may attempt to express the God -man relationship seem inadequate 
to convey both the sense of indestructgbility and intimacy which seems to be 
inherent in the image concept. They are fragile words and tend toward senti- 
mentality which is inappropriate and inadequate. A strong word is required, 
one which will denote inseparable relationship. The significance of the 
word bara (supra, pp. 22f) which implies intimacy of relationship, is a 
foundation on which it may be allowable to suggest that the essence (not with 
"substance" connotations) of the imago Dei constitutes a relationship of co- 
inherence. The use of co- inherence in this context does not imply any affin- 
ity with perichoresis, or inter- penetration or the cognates which have been 
employed within Trinitarian doctrinal formulations. To "inhere" means "to 
exist, abide, or have its being, as an attribute, quality, etc., in a subject 
or thing. "2 To "co -" inhere, therefore, denotes: to exist with, abide with, 
or have its being with, as an attribute, quality, etc., in a subject or thing. 
1Cairns, Image, p. 23. And cf. p. 21: "We can agree with Von Rad, 
when he says that 'P' is trying to express the mystery that man is like God, 
and that he is to be described as a creature whose being came, not from below, 
but in its origin points to the upper region." However, the use of words like 
"from below" and "upper region" may not be well -chosen. The quotation from 
Cairns in the text is an interesting expression when one remembers his close 
affiliation with the theology of Emil Brunner who would agree with the statement, 
but hurriedly minimize its significance in the light of man's fall from his 
"link with God ". 
2The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, 1944. 
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Some may object to the choice and use of this word and insist that it suggests 
too much, especially insofar as it may be implied that man exists with God as 
an attribute or quality. However, it may be appropriate to consider the 
possibility that the imago Dei very nearly approximates even that degree of 
intimacy. God's relatedness with the world and specifically with man is of 
critical interest and importance, and in that context the word "co- inherence" 
will be employed. 
d. The Thesis: Its Course and Concern 
While as Vriezen points out, Israel was cautious about using father- 
child terminology to describe the relationship between God and man because of 
the pagan connotation, 
Yet, [he says7 the expression 'the image of God' is intended to depict 
the same intimate relationship as between father and child, as becomes 
evident in Gen. 5:3, where Adam's son is said to be in the likeness 
and after the image of his father.' 
This is the theme of intimacy which we would hope to maintain in the face of 
anything within the history and experience of man which might tend to minimize 
its theological centrality. It will be indicated in Chapter I that it was 
this theme that St. Irenaeus endeavored to maintain, partly by means of his 
concept of recapitulation. In that sense there is an affinity between his 
position and that which has been expressed in the foregoing material. 
On the other hand it will become clear that the emphasis of St. Augus- 
tine and his orientation is significantly different. He proceeds from the 
conviction that the "original" harmony, which he accepts as historical and 
actual, was radically disturbed by man's freely chosen rebellion. It will 
be shown that in his theology the primary residual goodness of man after the 
"fall" was more a metaphysical than a relational quality; Augustine maintained 
Vriezen, Old Testament Theology, I, p. 146. 
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that whatever "was" was good, i.e., that as long as anything existed it 
participated in being and consequently was good. This metaphysical good- 
ness however, seems a poor shadow when compared with the intention of P's 
imago concept, Irenaeus' recapitulation, or finally what is indicated in the 
term "co- inherence ". Augustine will be criticized in respect to what seems 
to be a misinterpretation of the so- called "original" intention of the 
creation narrative. It would be unjustified to evaluate Augustine in 
respect to what he must necessarily have believed about the creation of the 
world, or again, in respect to his "biblicism ". Yet, criticism seems appro- 
priate regarding one of his primary theological presuppositions, namely, 
that sin is the appropriate criterion against which to characterize the 
God -man structure of relation. 
In conclusion it may be asked whether or not the image survived the 
"fall" insofar as Old Testament theologians are concerned. That it did, of 
course, has already been strongly suggested. It is unnecessary to thoroughly 
review what has been described as the soteriological context of the creation - 
fall narrative; it will suffice to say again that Israel was absolutely and 
firmly convinced that Jahweh was her Saviour -God. It would be difficult to 
understand why Israel may have written or retained an account of her beginnings 
which so obviously focused on the image as a symbol of co- inherence (our term) 
if the subsequent intention had been to jettison the theme. Von Rad directs 
attention to Gen. 5:3, the birth of Adam's son in his father's image and 
likeness, and draws this conclusion: 
This means that God authorised man to transmit this, his supreme 
dignity, along the way of continuing procreation of the generations. 
So it cannot be said that the image of God is lost - all the less 
as its existence still comes into account in the days of Noah (Gen.9:6b).1 
on Rad, Old Testament Theology, I., p. 147. This quotation con- 
tinues: "... Certainly, the story of the Fall tells of grave disturbances 
in the creaturely nature of man. But as to the way in which these affected 
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But whereas the image is not said to have been lost or destroyed, 
the narrator of the creation -fall story surely intended to relate something 
of its status by means of the images of the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil, of the shame of nakedness, the angelic gate- keepers at Eden, and God's 
game of hide -and -seek. What, in fact, is the intention of these negative 
images? It seems apparent that we will never completely exhaust the possible 
implications of the stories, and perhaps the fact that there are so many 
variant theories competing with and against each other for common acceptance 
should at least make us a bit more modest than heretofore has been the case. 
History of doctrine seems overflowing with conflicting interpretations appar- 
ently having only this in common: competition to surpass each other in multi- 
plying the implications of man's first rebellious and pernicious choice. 
One gets the impression that the intention has been to glorify and 
magnify God by means of the denigration of man. Von Rad is illustrative in 
his comment that the "tree" symbolizes not only the moral factor of man's 
decision, but refers to all things. The choice confronting man therefore, 
had cosmic implications. And, says Von Rad, "by wanting to be like God, man 
stepped out from the simplicity of obedience to God. "1 
the image of God in man, the Old Testament has nothing explicit to say." 
Perhaps not too much should be argued from silence, but nevertheless such a 
critical concept as the God -man nexus which the imam Dei suggests would very 
likely have been explicitly rejected had Israel subsequently reformulated her 
understanding. That the Old Testament "has nothing explicit to say" I inter- 
pret to mean that the image concept was retained, even though we grant that 
the phrase itself did not enjoy great prestige. 
-Von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, p.. 155. The complete context 
of the quotation is: "With a father's disposition God had purposed every 
conceivable kindness for man; but his will was that in the realm of knowledge 
a limit should remain set between himself and mankind." Knowledge of good 
and evil "... signifies at one and the same time knowledge of all things and 
the attainment of mastery over all things and secrets, for here good and evil 
is not to be understood one -sidedly in a moral sense, but as meaning 'all 
things'. By endeavoring to enlarge his being on the godward side, and seeking 
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Perhaps by stating it another way one could avoid some unnecessary 
errors and misleading conclusions. It may better be expressed: by always 
and continually depreciating the value and intention of God's co- inherence, 
man has never experienced "the simplicity of obedience to God." "Wanting to 
be like God" and other similar phrases that suggest that man's chief sin is 
a conscious attempt to usurp that which properly belongs only to God will be 
considered beginning with the Augustine material. The past tense is inapt 
to articulate man's less - than -paradisial condition. Unless there was in 
fact an historic Paradise it seems improper and misleading to say that "man 
stepped out ". One cannot step out of something that does not exist, and to 
suggest that man did step out from something that has been described in such 
sublimely splendid terminology unjustifiably and unnecessarily accuses man of 
colossal perversion. However, in spite of these objections, we appreciate 
Von Rad's statement that Adam's choice has more - than -moral implications: Adam's 
sin impinges upon the totality of life. It is that totality which should be 
specified in the interpretations of the creation -fall narratives; it is that 
all -inclusiveness which allows for the fullest and most complete utilization 
of the imago Dei theme as a symbol of the God -man co- inherence. Conversely, 
a Godlike intensification of his life beyond his creaturely limitations, that 
is, by wanting to be like God, man stepped out from the simplicity of obedience 
to God. He thereby forfeited life in the pleasant garden and close to God." 
While we appreciate Von Rad's insight we cannot appreciate the tone of this 
interpretation dependent as it is upon the retention of the mythological frame- 
work. The specific objection is the obvious implication that all this is 
presented as an historical happening: a man living in simplicity, God with a 
father's disposition creating a situation (tree) to illustrate the differentia- 
tion between Creator and creature, and finally man stepping out from simplicity, 
the garden, and closeness to God. This quality of interpretation seems both 
uninformative and misleading. It is this kind of exegesis-that allows Wingren 
to say: "Man stands in the middle of the line of conflict as the cause of the 
conflict between God and the Devil." - Gustav Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, 
trans, Ross Mackenzie, (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p. 40. Ital. mine. 
Less speculatively and avoiding devils, the Von Rad style of interpretation 
leads David Cairns to write: "Man has not lost a supernature through sin, 
but his divinely -given nature has become unnatural and inhuman." Cairns, 
Image, p. 82. Cairns' statement is itself a quotation from Emil Brunner, 
Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939) p. 94. 
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however, the historicizing of the narrative tends not only toward naive and 
inadequate conclusions, but also, treating the narrative as actual event 
reverses the soteriological perspective from that of hope and promise to that 
of sin and despair. Carl Braaten aptly concludes: 
The myth of the fall of Adam has misshaped the structure of 
Christian theology, not primarily because it was for so long 
taken as real history, but for two other reasons: first, because 
it was taken as an explanation of the origin of evil in the human 
race, and second, it was viewed as a 'fall' from an originally 
perfect condition. 132, Mankind is struggling in history to catch 
up where it once stood in the figure of Adam. Eden is a paradise 
of archetypes; everything that happens later, so far as it is true, 
good, and beautiful, is an imitation and repetition of the original 
state of mankind.' 
The implications of the creation fall narrative are nearly as 
extensive as theology itself; consequently we have attempted to define the 
limits, stating those themes which will be considered as well as those omit- 
ted. The brevity of this introduction makes it unnecessary to repeat material 
already discussed, but a summary may be beneficial. 
The imago Dei has become for Western theology primarily a symbol 
of either melancholy or disdain. For the Hebrew it was a symbol of the most 
intimate God -man relationship which we have called co- inherence. For most 
of the church Paradise lies behind, and our thoughts of it are tinged with 
memories of shame; for Israel Paradise was ahead, and she looked forward in 
hope. 
Our brief analysis has supported the proposition, stated as simply 
as possible, that man is destined by God for a good end. Hope itself appears 
to be a universal symbol of this very attitude. The imago Dei, in our opinion, 
is that symbol's theological counterpart. But the imago theme, in order to 
clarify and enlarge upon so- called secular hope, needs to be reinterpreted; 
1Braaten, The Future of God, pp. 44 -45. 
32. 
it needs to be freed from opinions which remain from the theological season 
when creation and fall were treated as literal history. 
Our theme is: "The Imago Dei: An Historical and Critical Examination ". 
The major characteristics of our own interpretation of the imago Dei theme 
have been articulated above; our final chapter will be an attempt to con- 
struct and present what we believe to be a dogmatically sound and systemati- 
cally justifiable re- interpretation of the theme. This will not be done de 
novo; rather it will evolve from a critical evaluation of the historical 
interpretations of the image motif. 
The word "Historical" is chosen to indicate that our method will be 
to select and evaluate theological systems of various historical epochs, i.e., 
Patristic, Scholastic, Reformation and Contemporary. The word "Critical" 
requires explanation. We do not wish to imply that our explication will be 
negative in the main, or that we have presupposed the conclusion. Rather, 
we will endeavor to allow each theologian to speak for himself, reserving, as 
much as is possible, our own presuppositions, i.e., those noted above. Our 
intention, therefore, is primarily to pose the question: what does, e.g., 
Augustine teach in respect to the imago Dei? Necessarily, the question it- 
self will require an explication of various related themes and doctrines, e.g., 
creation, fall, sin, etc., which seem to impinge rather directly on the imago 
Dei theme. Therefore, although we will include doctrines other than the 
imago Dei specifically, it should be noted that we will not presume to study 
any such peripherally related themes exhaustively. 
Further, it should be realized that our method will not require a 
comparison and contrast of the systems under consideration. Whatever com- 
parative conclusions mentioned are for the purpose of clarification and under- 
standing; they are not for the purpose of ascertaining relative value. Quite 
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obviously, and admittedly, our own tentative presuppositions will "control" 
and circumscribe first the body of material selected for study, and finally 
even the conclusions derived. Whether the questions themselves are the "real" 
questions, i.e., the authentic questions of theology; whether they are formu- 
lated properly; whether they sufficiently lead us into the respective systems; 
- these are the primary considerations upon which the reader is invited to 
make his assessment. The secondary consideration - yet, nearer to the writer's 
personal objective - is ultimately to lay a foundation for hope in terms of the 
imago Dei. This requires: a. that we should carefully study and consider our 
own doctrinal substructure; b. that we remain judiciously, yet courageously 
susceptible to the possibility of either major or minor revision; and c. that 
we learn that all theological formulation is penultimate. "No definitions 
made by the Church in via are in themselves final or irreformable, however 
faithfully they serve to mediate to mankind the final authority of God for 
practical purposes. "1 




ST. IRENAEUS - A CRITIQUE BASED ON THE IMAGO DEI 
God has created and destined this world for a good purpose and 
end, and the imago Dei is a symbol which may imply God's co- inherence with 
creation, and specifically with man in the accomplishment of His aim - 
these are the presuppositions indicated and preliminarily established in 
the Introduction. A consideration of the theological insights of St. 
Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, (c. 130 - c. 202) will serve to further clarify 
and also to expand upon the stated presuppositions. An examination of 
St. Irenaeus' treatment of the imago Dei will be the organizing and 
limiting motif; only those portions of his work that bear a close 
relationship to man and his relationship to God in whose image he is 
created will be explored. The material available for study is relatively 
sparse, consisting of Irenaeus' five -volume work entitled Five Books of S. 
Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, Against Heresies,1 some Fragments in that same 
volume, and a short work entitled Proof of the Apostolic Preaching.2 
It becomes immediately apparent in the reading of St. Irenaeus 
that he was not a systematic theologian. Consequently, the attempt to 
explicate his doctrine of man, for instance, must necessarily be accom- 
plished by a process of separation and extraction. This, on the other 
hand, illustrates the relationships which are intrinsic, i.e., God and 
1trans. John Keble, (Oxford and London: James Parker and Co.; 
London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons, 1872). Hereafter: A.H. 
2Ancient Christian Writers, XVI, ed. Johannes Quasten and Joseph 
C. Plumpe, trans. Joseph P. Smith, (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press; 
London: Longmans, Green, 1952). Hereafter: Proof. 
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creation, creation and man, and especially man in the imago Dei. The 
interpretative "problem ", therefore, becomes at the same time a principle 
of interpretation. The material will be approached thematically, with 
careful appreciation of the contextual setting, and will include Irenaeus' 
concepts of God, His initial creation, the creation of man, his involve- 
ment in and with sin, man's growth and development, and finally, 
recapitulation, These are the major concepts which will be considered 
apart from which it is impossible to fully appreciate Irenaeus' profound 
contribution to the imago Dei theme. 
a. God 
a,l. Creator ex nihilo - 
Irenaeus' statements of God's creation of the world out of nothing 
are not many, but they are explicit, emphatic, and of sufficient quality 
to reveal his interpretation and its function. One of the critical 
doctrines of the Gnostics against whom Irenaeus was writing was the dualist 
theory that matter was in and of itself evil, and consequently that God 
could not have produced or created it. The relative paucity of explicit 
references in Irenaeus to creatio ex nihilo which St. Augustine , for 
instance, utilizes as a major category in the refutation of dualism, may 
in part be explained by the recognition that Irenaeus appears almost 
impatient to shift the debate from metaphysical and philosophical categories 
into the more personal and religious ones of the Creator's relationship 
to that which He has created. Perhaps the clearest expression of 
Irenaeus' affirmation of creatio ex nihilo, yet one that is devoid of the 
more customary expressions of relational terms is this: 
cf. Infra, Chapter II. 
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,..creatures must have the origin of their being from some great 
cause; and the Origin of all is God, since It Itself was not made 
by anyone, but by It were made all things whatsoever. Therefore, 
first one must believe that there is one God, the Father, who made 
and fashioned everything, and brought being out of nothing, and 
while holding all things, is alone beyond grasp. But in 'all 
things' is included this world of ours, with man in it; so this 
world too was created by God.1 
Actually, even here is noted the presence of what may be called 
"relational" terminology. It is not emphatic, but the words, "holding 
all things" are significant. God's preservation of His creation, implied 
by "holding ", is closely associated with his concept of the work of His 
"Hands" and will be discussed later. Irenaeus recognized that creatio 
ex nihilo was a doctrine that specified difference,2 specifically that 
between Creator and creature. The "difference" Caltera) he asserts, 
between those things "... which were made, from Him Who established them ..." 
is that the latter is "... unmade, and without beginning, and without end, 
and wanting nothing, ...sufficient unto Himself, .., bestowing on all 
other things the very gift of existence: ... " On the other hand, he 
continues, that which has been made by Him has a beginning, is liable to 
dissolution, is subject to and dependent upon its Creator, and endowed 
with the sense to realize the difference between Creator and creature.3 
1Proof., 4. 
2The signification of the terms distinction and difference may 
in other contexts be quite irrelevant. But, because our intention is 
to establish with some precision the structure of the God -man relation- 
ship we will differentiate the terms thus: "distinction" conveys impli- 
cations of disjunction, division, partition; it would be appropriately 
employed to specify the relation between, perhaps, natural and super- 
natural. Difference, on the other hand, will be used to denote other- 
ness, being not the same, particularity, e.g., the relation between "I" 
and "Thou!'. 
3A_H., III, viii, 3. 
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The "difference" is also noted in terms of power: "... although 
men have not power to make anything out of nothing ¿e nihilo I, ..., God 
on the contrary excels men in this first of all, that Himself devised the 
material of His work, which did not exist before. "1 The "power" motif is 
not a much -emphasized one in Irenaeus, apparently because it tends toward 
impersonal constructions which he seems to find unsatisfactory. This is 
not to suggest that Irenaeus ignores the Creator - creature differential, 
but it is to assert that his inclination is far more directed to speaking 
of their interaction, and God's co- relation to, or co- inherence2 with man, 
than it is to specify their disjunction. 
Power, inherent in God, created in man, is related -to the difference 
between that which is originate and that which is unoriginate. Men are 
created, says Irenaeus, by the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God, and 
these inhere in the Glory of God. However, even the Glory of God is 
understood by Irenaeus as that for which man is first created, and con- 
tinually being prepared. A critical facet of "power" is that of 
continuance; by the grace of God man is granted "everlasting continuance ", 
and this in turn is related to the power of the Unoriginate which man 
receives from God. Subjection is therefore appropriate for man, and it 
is that, at least in part, by which man reflects his proper stance before 
God.3 
1A_H., II, x,4. 
?The word co- inherence has a critical function in this thesis; 
cf. Introduction, pp. 26f. 
3Cf. A.H., IV, xxxviii,3: By God's Power, Wisdom and Goodness 
men are created who "... by His exceeding goodness obtaining increase, and 
enduring longer, shall receive the glory of the Uncreated One, God un- 
grudgingly vouchsafing that which is good. While in respect of their 
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Creatio ex nihilo is for Irenaeus not primarily therefore a 
philosophical concept, or a doctrine which is employed to define the 
distance between God and man; creatio ex nihilo in his system is a 
doctrine that is intended to encourage dependence upon God and faith 
toward Him. He says: "Well therefore spake the Scripture which saith, 
First of all believe that there is One God, Who created ¡onstituit7 and 
perfected all things, and caused all to come out of non -existence /7x eo7 
into existence: comprehending all, and comprehended by none. "1 God who 
has created all things out of nothing is to be praised for His almighjy power. 
It is not for us to conjecture as to the means by which God created all 
things, for as Irenaeus reminds us, "... neither hath any Scripture set 
forth, ,,," His method of creation. 
2 
What is to be continually realized 
is the "tension" between the inherent inferiority of createdness in respect 
to the intended and established compatibility between God and His creation. 
Irenaeus readily affirms both poles of the tension. He can 
emphatically affirm first that: 
God alone is without beginning and without end, really and 
evermore the same, and alike disposed, He Who is Lord of all. 
But all things beneath Him, as many as have been and are made, 
admit of a beginning to their production, and are inferior 
/Inferiora7 to their Maker i2 this, that they are not uncreated 
/on ingenita7; ... .3 
production, they are not unoriginate, yet in respect of their enduring 
through long ages, they will receive the power of the Unoriginate, God 
freely bestowing upon them everlasting continuance. And so God for His 
part is first in all things, Who is alone Unoriginate, and first of all, 
and to all the cause of their being: while all other things remain in 
subjection to God. Now subjection to God is incorruption, and the con- 
tinuance of incorruption is the glory of the Unoriginate." 
1A_H,, IV, xx,2 (Quotation from Shepherd of Hermas, 2:1). 
2A_H,, II,xxviii,7, 
3A_H,, II, xxxiv,2, 
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Creation is "beneath" and "inferior" to God because of its "beginning ". 
This is the first pole of the tension. The other is equally affirmed: 
And the Father is called by the Spirit Most High, and Almighty, 
and Lord of Hosts, that we may learn that God is indeed such, 
that is, creator of heaven and earth and the whole world, and 
maker of angels and men, and Lord of all, who upholds all things, 
and by whom everything is sustained; merciful, compassionate and 
most tender, good, just, God of all, both of Jews and of Gentiles 
and of the faithful,1 
It would be premature to attempt to reconcile the tension at this point, 
but the possibility should be considered that a reconciliation of some 
sort was Irenaeus' intention. A study of that endeavour, in fact, 
impinges upon the interpretation of Irenaeus' doctrine of the imago Dei. 
However, while the majority of material will be illustrative of the 
tension's resolution, it should not be supposed that the difference between 
God and His creation is to be finally and absolutely obliterated. Neverthe- 
less, it is apparent that according to Irenaeus the difference was not absolute 
i.e., one that presupposed an intrinsic or inherent antipathy or contrariety 
between God and creation. 
a.2. His Nature and Person 
He did of Himself and by His own power freely make, ordain, 
and accomplish all, ...; He is found to be the only God, Who 
made all: ,,, Himself the Framer, Himself the Founder, Himself 
the Inventor, the Maker, the Lord of all: and there is not beside 
Him, nor above Him, ,,. He is Father, He God, He Founder, He 
Maker, He Framer, Who made them by Himself, i.e., by His Word and 
His Wisdom, ,,, ,2 
The attributes of the trinitarian God are for Irenaeus economic 
attributes. That is to say, his reference to God, Father, Son, and 
Spirit concentrate on the activities of God, and primarily those 
activities that are directed toward man. Irenaeus may be charged with 
1 
Proof, 8, 2A,H., II, xxx,9, 
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a certain lack of specificity in his doctrine of the Trinity; his 
writings are not notable for a clear and concise delineation of the 
various and separate natures and functions of each of the persons of 
the Godhead.l What is pertinent, however, is his affirmation of God's 
orientation toward man. Trinitarian structures are seemingly as 
applicable to each of the persons of the Trinity in terms of their work 
as they are to each of the persons within the Godhead, the intra- 
trinitarian relations. Jesus is referred to as "Salvation ", "Saviour ", 
and "Saving Might ", 
For He is, in the first place, the Saviour, in that He is the Son 
and Word of God, next He is Saving Might in that He is Spirit: 
'For the Spirit of our face,' it saith, 'is Christ the Lord.' 
(Lam. 4:20). Lastly, He is Salvation, in that He is Flesh: 
'For the Word was made Flesh, and dwelt among us.' (John 1:14). 
Another trinitarian structure is applied to God: 
And this is the Creator, Who in love is our Father, in power our 
Lord, in wisdom our Maker and Framer: ... .3 
1Ireaneus' doctrine of the Trinity, and its precision or lack 
of it, is of little concern or relevance to our consideration of the 
imago Dei. F.R.M. Hitchcock has an excellent chapter entitled "The 
Doctrine of the Trinity" wherein he evaluates St. Irenaeus' trinitarian 
formulation, and concludes that "... the Divine Persons have interest 
for him chiefly as they effect the regeneration and salvation of men, 
ells ." He also offers a thorough and helpful evaluation of Irenaeus' 
doctrine of the relation of the persons of the Trinity to one another. 
F.R. Montgomery Hitchcock, Ireaneus of Lugdunum, A Study of 
His Teaching, (Cambridge: University Press, 1914) pp. 124 -25, and 
lassim. Hereafter: Iren. Lugdunum. 
2A_H., III,x,3. All Scripture quotations have been italic- 
ized by the translators in the Irenaean text. In preference to under- 
lining, however, these internal quotes will be indicated by use of 
single inverted commas, the reference inserted within parenthesis. 
3A_H., V,xvii,l. 
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And still another illustration of the Trinity refers to the Spirit, but 
also incorporates the Father and the Son: 
For in the Name of Christ is understood, He who did anoint, and 
He who was anointed, and the Unction itself wherewith He was 
anointed. And as the Father did anoint, so the Son was anointed, 
with the Spirit, which is the anointing: as speaketh the Word by 
Esaias; 'The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because He hath 
anointed Me:' (Is. 61:1) signifying both the anointing Father and 
the anointed Son, and the anointing which is the S'pirit.1 
Not all of Irenaeus' discussion of the Trinity bears this 
apparent inexactness of terminology, and it should not be inferred that 
his doctrine was a naive or an undeveloped one. The following is 
illustrative of a very clear trinitarian formulation: 
For the Father underlying both the creation and the Word, and the 
Word upholden of the Father, impart the Spirit unto all, at the 
Father's good pleasure: ... . Above all, first, is the Father; 
and He is the Head of Christ: then, through all is the Word, and 
He is Head of the Church: in us all, again, is the Spirit, and He 
is the Living Water, which the Lord imparts to all that rightly be- 
lieve in Him, and love Him, and know that there is One Father Who 
is above all, and through all, and in you a11.2 
Irenaeus repeatedly affirms this quality or attribute of God - His being 
always for and toward man. The man toward whom God directs Himself, 
and the means of the accomplishment of His purpose for man, is the 
subject of a later section; for the moment we concentrate on Irenaeus' 
expressions which relate specifically to God. It will be discovered, 
however, that nearly without exception, those references that pertain to 
God, (theological, per se,) are simultaneously articulated within the 
God -man construct (The- anthropological).3 He states: "... as the 
III,xviii,3. 
2A_H., V,xviii,2. 
3The term "The -anthropology" was introduced by Karl Barth as a 
term descriptive of "... the commerce and communion between God and man." 
- The Humanity of God, trans. Thomas Wieser, (London: Collins, 1961), p. 11. 
For the context of our use of the term, cf. Introduction, -p . 2. 
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Glory of Man is God, so the aim of the works of God, and the recipient 
of all His Wisdom and Power, is Man. As the physician is proved in such 
as are sick, so is God made manifest in men, "1 Only slightly altered in 
a later reference he says, "... the glory of God is a living Man, and the 
life of man is to see God." 
2 
God's glory is manifest in creation. That 
is not, however, to assert that the beauty and majesty of creation itself 
is a sign which points away from itself to the glory of its Creator. 
That would imply a greater difference between Creator and creation than 
Irenaeus had intended. 
There may seem to be a subtle tendency toward pantheism in 
Irenaeus' assertion of the immanence of God. And, one recognizes that 
his tendency to articulate God's closeness, friendliness, and concern 
for the perfection of man may suggest a loss of the "otherness" of God. 
Of this Hitchcock says, 
It was the merit of Irenaeus to see that the secret of life and 
thought and spirit lay in the reconciliation of these two ideas, 
the transcendence and immanence of God as He is above and as He 
is within the human personality, and that this reconciliation was 
made by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity) 
God's "otherness" and difference from man is not forcefully articulated 
by Irenaeus; that was not his intention. It would be erroneous, however, 
to assume that he was either oblivious to-ate difference or that he 
consciously attempted to minimize it. That God makes and that man is 
made articulates a differentiation that cannot be minimized or destroyed. 
God therefore is Giver, man the recipient; God is always the Same, man 
is always in process of growth.4 Man is framed, chosen, formed, and 
1A_H., III,xxx,2. 2A_H., IV,xx,7. 
31ren, Lugdunum, p. 106. 4Cf. A.H., IV,xi.2. 
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taught.1 "In respect indeed of His greatness He is unknown to all them 
that were made by Him ... but in respect of His Love He is known ... . "2 
God is " .., longsuffering in the revolt of man, ... . "3 
God has no need of man, but man is formed "that He might have 
one on whom to bestow His favours. "4 It was the unconditional goodness 
and bounty of God that motivated Him to create. And not only did God 
stand in no need of man, neither did He need any assistance in His work 
of creation. His intention, motivated solely by His love, was to create 
one in His own image and likeness, and this was accomplished by "His 
Hands," 
Angels therefore did not make us, nor form us, neither -could 
Angels make an image of God: nor any other but the Word of the 
Lord, ... . For neither did God stand in need of these, to do the 
things which He had in Himself determined before to do, as though 
He had no Hands %manus7 of His own: since to Him is ever present 
His Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit, by whom and in whom 
He made all things freely and voluntarily: to whom also He speaks 
saying, 'Let us make man after our Image and Likeness': (Gen.1 ;265 
Himself receiving from Himself the being of His creatures fipse a 
semetipso substantium creaturam7, and the pattern of His works, and . 
the form /'i guram7 of the things wherewith the world is furnished.5 
A more complete consideration of the "image and likeness" in relation to 
the "Hands of God" will be offered in a subsequent section, but it should 
be noted here that it is "from Himself ", by means of the Son and the 
Spirit, that man is created. Such terminology makes it extremely 
difficult to speak of God's radical distinction from man. On the other 
hand, Irenaeus' terminology makes possible the articulation of God's 
1Cf. A.H., IV,xiv,2. 2A.H. IV,xx,4. 
3A_H., IV,xxxvii,7. 4A_H., IV,xiv,1, cf. V,ii,1. 
5A.H., IV,xx,1. 
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relationship to man in what may be called both dynamic and personal 
categories. 
The phrase noted in the last quotation, that man was made by God 
in His image and likeness, "...Himself receiving from Himself the being 
of His creatures, ... ," may suggest that creation itself, and specifically 
man, was produced by some process of emanation. However, it has been 
noted first, that Irenaeus will not enter the field of speculation and 
conjecture as to how God may have fashioned the world and man (supra p.38, 
and n.2), and secondly that he has indeed been careful to articulate the 
difference between God and man, and the consequent inferiority of all 
creation. Nevertheless, the above phrase should not be minimized by the 
suggestion that it is simply an i.judicious choice of words. That man 
does somehow participate in the being of God is one of the central 
affirmations of St. Irenaeus. In order to sustain that suggestion, 
however, both the being of God and the being of man require a certain 
redefinition. Without answering the question at this point, it would be 
well, at least, to pose it: what are the structures, inherent in God, 
created in man, that will make it possible to speak of God's co- inherence 
in man, and man's co- inherence in God? And at the same time, what 
structures appropriate respectively to God and man need to be articulated 
in order to preserve a necessary and essential difference between the two? 
The question was raised by Irenaeus in only a slightly altered form: 
how shall man pass into God, if God had not been caused to pass into man? "1 
a.3, His "Hands" 
It should already be apparent that to extract any "pure" theology 
1A.H., IV,xxxiii,4. 
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from Irenaeus is extremely difficult; Irenaeus' theology is integrally 
related to his anthropology. Nevertheless, for the sake of organization 
it seems advisable to continue the attempt in this final theological 
section regarding the "Hands" of God, i.e., Christ and the Spirit. 
While much more could be said about the Spirit, the relative paucity of 
references, as compared with those about Christ, is entirely a result of 
a closer affinity between man (created in the imago Dei) and Christ (who 
is, according to Irenaeus, the express image and likeness of God)1 than 
that which exists between man and the Spirit. The limited number of 
references, therefore, is not an indication that a consequent minimization 
of the work of the Spirit is intended by Irenaeus. 
The Father speaks to His "Hands ", (as noted in the reference p. 43, 
n. 5), and by them is man created after the image and likeness of God. 
Even more explicitly we note a similar reference: 
.., at no time did Adam escape from under the Hands of God, to 
which Hands the Father was speaking when He said, 'Let us make man 
after our image and likeness.' (Gen. 1:26), And therefore in the 
end, 'not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man' (Jn. 1:13) 
but of the good pleasure of the Father, did His Hands work out a 
Living Man, to be an Adam, after the Image and Likeness of God.2 
The subordination implied, in that the Father speaks to His Hands who 
then carry out His will, is that to which Hitchcock refers saying: 
... Irenaeus' doctrine of the Trinity may be summed up as a belief 
in One and the Same God, manifested to men in a three -fold Person- 
ality, Absolute, Eternal, coordinated essentially as touching the 
Divine Nature, but admtting of historical subordination as touch- 
ing the Divine Office. 
1The term "express image" is not from Irenaeus; it is the King 
James translation of Heb. 1:34á,oa.arr;).. Nevertheless, it is one which coincides with Irenaeus' understanding, i.e., that Christ is the image 
of God, cf. A.H., V,xvi,2. 
2A_H., V,i,3. 31ren. Lugdunum, p. 125. 
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What is obviously more intrinsic to this study than the intra- trinitarian 
relations is the bold assertion that from the beginning, at the will and 
according to the intention of God, His Hands have been at work effecting 
that which God intends. In that respect they are "subordinate" to the 
Father. Co- operation, specifying both co- eternity and co- equality of 
intention would seem a more appropriate attribute of God's Hands than that 
of subordination; and it may be that which is implied by Hitchcock's 
phrase, "historical subordination. "1 
Irenaeus asserts a belief in the progressive manifestation of 
the Spirit, implying that it was necessary for the Son's incarnation to 
r 
have occured before He (the Spirit) could fully and completely reside 
with man. It was, states Irenaeus, (basing his conclusions on Isaiah 
11:2; 61:1; Mat, 10:20, and 28:19), in Christ's incarnation that the 
Spirit dwelled, "... using Himself to dwell with Him in mankind and to 
rest among men, and to reside in the work of God's Hands, ... , "2 It 
can be concluded, therefore, that the Son and the Spirit share a 
mutuality of labor, both working together to effect that which God 
ordains. 
The Son only, without mention of the Spirit, is He who manifests 
God's love (His "greatness kept unknown ") and is He "... through whom 
He created all things. "3 And the Son, the Word "... which was in the 
beginning with God," is the same Son who "... also was ever present with 
1Cf, John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus, (London: 
Epworth Press, 1948) Hereafter: Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 127: "The doctrine 
of The Two Hands of God represents immediate action by the whole Godhead, 
and consequently equality between the Son and Spirit. However, when 
loosely stated this doctrine may look like subordination of function, where 
none is intended. These two opposite arrangements of Son and Spirit in 
Revelation indicate essentially nothing other than that S, Irenaeus thinks 
of the two as equal and interchangeable in function." 
2A`H., III,xvii,1. 3A_H., IV,xx,4. 
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mankind; ... . "1 The Son's co- existence with both God and man is a 
critical affirmation of St, Irenaeus. He wants it clearly understood that 
God's economy of salvation, involving both the Son and the Spirit, was 
inherent in creation itself ,2 The knowledge of the Father has always 
been revealed by the Son, and therefore, says Irenaeus: 
our Lord said, 'No man knoweth the Son but the Father; nor 
the Father, but the Son, and to whomsoever the Son will reveal 
Him:' (Mat. 11:27; Lk. 10:22) 'Will reveal' being not spoken of 
the future only, as though the Word then began to make known the 
Father, when He was born of Mary, but set down largely as through- 
out all time. Because from the beginning the Son abiding by the 
work of His own hands, reveals the Father unto all, whom the 
Father will, and when He will, and as He wills.3 
He who from the beginning is God's Son has consistently been 
making known the Father's love; there is no change or transformation in 
the Son's work from beginning to end. He ",.. reigneth continually 
forever, ... ",4 and according to Irenaeus, (citing Romans 14:15: 'for 
whom Christ died;' Eph. 2:13: '... made nigh by the blood of Christ; 
...' and other texts), Scripture asserts "... that there came not down 
on Jesus a Christ incapable of suffering, but that He Himself, being 
Jesus Christ, suffered for us: "5 The Christ nature, the Messianic 
function, was with the Word from the beginning; it was within the economy 
of God, inherent in creation itself. 
1A_H,, III,xviii,1, 
2Cf, A`H III,xxii,3: " 
. 
. by Paul the same Adam is called 'the 
figure of Him which is to come': (Rom. 5:14) as though the Word, Who 
framed all things, had formed before hand with a view to Himself that 
Economy of Mankind, which was to centre in the Son of God; God forming 
first of all the natural man, to the end that he might be saved by the 
spiritual. For whereas He who saves existed before, there must needs be 
something made that should be saved, lest He that saveth prove a super- 
fluous thing." 




On the other hand it should be noted that there is not a uni- 
formity or sameness in the Son's work of revelation; Irenaeus does not 
suggest that because the Word co- exists with both God and men try there 
are no variations in His manner or mode of manifestation. In a sense, it 
would appear, neither could man tolerate a "complete "manifestation of the 
Father, nor would the Father allow it lest man should suffer.1 
Whereas the Son is always the same in relation to His Father, and 
remains always at work revealing the Father to man, His incarnation 
introduced a new mode of being. "For now," says Irenaeus, "were at hand 
all things new, the Word after a new manner ordaining for Himself an 
Advent in the flesh, that He might enroll as God's own that man who had 
departed far out of God, "2 It has been noted that it was the pre- existent 
Christ who was Jesus, that it was no docetic Christ which men know in Him, 
and yet Irenaeus had to consider the problem of an incarnate Word who, 
in spite of His power, suffered. The solution suggested by Irenaeus 
is: 
For as He was Man, that He might be tempted, so was He also the 
Word, that He might be glorified: the Word remaining inactive 
in His temptation and dishonour and crucifixion and death, but 
going along with the Man in His victory and endurance, and works 
of goodness, and resurrection and ascension.3 
The Word willingly lays aside His power in order to fully and completely 
identify Himself with man, for only as Man could He truly and necessarily 
be tempted, Both natures of Jesus Christ were necessary according to 
1 
Cf, A.H,, IV,xx,7: "...as He guards the invisibility of the 
Father, lest at any time man should become a despiser of God, ,,, so on 
the other hand in many and manifold ways He reveals God unto men, lest 
men altogether falling away from God should cease to be at all." 
2A,H,, III,x,3, 
3A_H,, III,xix, 3. The division of the human and divine nature 
of Christ is recognized. 
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Irenaeus, and without the presence and activity of both, the work of 
this "Hand" of God could not have been accomplished.1 
It will not be necessary or advisable to further consider the 
relationship of the human and divine natures of Jesus;2 having discussed 
the subject of God, a consideration of those subjects more directly 
applicable to the creation of man in the imago Dei is in order. 
b. Man and his Creation 
The concern of this entire section (b.) is the initial situation 
(as described by Irenaeus), related to God's intention for man. Unless 
it can be clearly articulated what God intended, it will be difficult to 
assess both the effect of man's sin on God's intention, and equally as 
difficult to specify the work of God, through Christ and the Spirit, in 
the attainment of His purpose. The first sub- section, therefore, while 
presenting Irenaeus' doctrine and understanding of the initial situation, 
will not include interpretation of the actual and historical situation in 
which man subsequently finds himself. 
b.1. God's Initial Intention: Perfection and Growth 
And so fair and goodly was the Garden, the Word of God was con- 
stantly walking in it; He would walk round and talk with the 
man, prefiguring what was to come to pass in the future, how 
1Cf. A.H., V,xvii,3: "For if no man can forgive sins but God 
only, and if our Lord did forgive them, and heal man; plain it is, that 
He was the very Word of God, made Son of Man, receiving from the Father 
the power of remitting sins, in that He is Man, and in that He is God: 
so that even as being Man, He sympathized with us, so being God He may 
have mercy on us, and forgive us our debts, which we owe to God our 
Creator." And cf. A.H., III,xviii,1: "... He in the last times accor- 
ding to the time ordained by the Father, was united to His own creation 
and made a Man capable of suffering: . ." And cf. A.H., IV,xx,4: "And 
this is His Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, Who in the last times was made 
a man among men, ... ." 
2It may also be pointed out that Irenaeus himself devoted rela- 
tively little attention to the two nature question. 
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He would become man's fellow, and talk with him, and come among 
mankind, teaching them justice.» 
Even though the Word's prefigurative relationship to "original" 
man in the Garden does not emphatically specify a disparity between that 
which was and that which was yet to be, nevertheless that such a difference 
is there should not be overlooked. The Garden, according to Irenaeus, was 
"fair and goodly ", a suitable place for the Word of God to be present. 
Even so, His presence, suggests Irenaeus, was precursory; His being with 
man there was sometime in the future to be even more direct.2 
The human race as a whole, according to Irenaeus, proceeds 
through five separate stages of development; "... one is first an in- 
fant, then a boy, a youth, a young man, and lastly an elder. "3 God's 
intention therefore is that man should continually grow toward that 
final stage, and that he should attain various levels of maturity along 
the way of his development. As was indicated in the first section, man 
by the fact of his being created, is inferior to his Creator. But, says 
Irenaeus, God's intention is that they should not remain at the same 
1Proof, 12. 
2Having said that the Word was walking in the Garden with man, but 
in a prefigurative sense, we should note also another reference related to 
the time, or sequence question: "For in no other way could we learn the 
things of God, except our Master, being the Word, had been made Man. 
Because no other but His own Word could declare unto us the things of the 
Father." - A_H., V,i,1. This is a further illustration that Irenaeus' 
doctrine of Creation and understanding of God's intention for it, were 
futurist; the Word had first to become incarnate before God's purpose was 
complete. 
3A_H., II,xxiv,4. Though the text may imply growth of either in- 
dividual or race we would, with Hitchcock, be inclined to interpret it in 
reference to the latter, i.e., the race. Cf. Iren. Lugdunum, pp. 62 -63. 
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level of inferiority, but "...that they LEhoul 7 continue and ...2T27 
drawn out into length of ages, ... : I mean that they are so framed at 
the beginning, and that He afterwards gives them their being. "1 Their 
creation looked forward in anticipation of their completion, "their being ". 
The same thought is reiterated, and is stated even more explicitly in the 
following: 
this alone is truly God and Father, Who both created this 
world, and formed Man, and bestowed upon His Creation the gift of 
increase, and calleth it from its lower conditions to the greater 
things which are with Him; even as He both brings out the in- 
fant, conceived in the womb, into the sun's light, and lays up 
the wheat in the garner, when He hath strengthened it in the 
stalk,2 
It would be unwarranted to suggest that the "increase" that 
Irenaeus mentions refers to numerical growth (e.g., "Be fruitful and 
multiply ") in the light of the two analogies he offers, those having to 
do with the maturation of the foetus toward the time of its birth, and 
also the ripening of the wheat on the stalk. Therefore, the "increase" 
to which he refers relates to the intention of God for man's growth and 
development, i.e., to participate in the "...greater things which are 
with Him; ,.. ." The precise nature and content of those "greater 
things" is partially understood as referring to man, " .,, ripening as 
he is by so great means for the sight and comprehension of God. "3 The 
relationship between the "sight and comprehension of God" and the 
deification of man is beaming increasingly apparent. It is that 
1Cf. A_H,, II,xxxiv,2. 
2A_H., II,xxviii,1. 
3L.H., IV, xxxvii,7. 
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toward which and for which man is destined.1 Man who was made (Adam) 
is also man who is being made. 
Finally, Irenaeus suggests that even the experience of man in 
the Garden was the initiation of his training for perfection. If that 
is so, one would expect to discover a view of Paradise that is consider- 
ably different from doctrines ordinarily received in the Church. And, 
because Irenaeus relates sin and evil to man's "training program" one 
would also expect to find a somewhat unfamiliar doctrine of sin. By 
way of anticipation of Irenaeus' doctrine of sin and evil, and at the 
same time to see its function within God's intention for man, the fol- 
lowing is significant: 
... man knew both the good of obedience, and the evil of disobedi- 
ence: that the mind's eye receiving trial.of both, might with 
judgment make its choice of the better, and might never become 
slothful, nor negligent of God's command: and as to that which 
deprives it of life, i.e., disobedience to God, - learning by 
experiment how evil it is, one might never even so much as try 
it: while as to obeying God, which is the preservative of his 
life, knowing how good it is, he may diligently keep it with all 
earnestness. And to this end he had also double sense, having 
the cognizance of both kinds: that with discipline ... he might 
make choice of the best. But how could he have had a training 
for good, knowing not what is contrary thereto ?2 
1Cf. A.H. IV,xxxix,2 which is perhaps the most complete ref- 
erence related to the intention and growth of man: "How then shall he 
be God, who is not yet made man? how made perfect, who is but just 
made at all? how immortal, who in mortal nature was not obedient to 
his Maker? Nay, thou must first guard well thy, position as man, and 
then at length partake of the glory of God. For thou makest not God, 
but God maketh thee. If then thou art God's handywork, stay for the 
hand of thine artificer, which doeth all things in season; and when I 
say 'in season', I mean as to thee who are in making ... But by guarding 
the assigned structure, thou will mount up to perfection: for by the 
workmanship of God the clay which is in thee disappears. ... But if 
they, speedily hardened, reject His skill, and prove ungrateful to Him, 
because thou art made (but) a man, by thus becoming unthankful to God, 
thou hast lost both His skill, and thine on life together. For to make, 




Now, as to whether or not man "knew both the good of obedience, 
and the evil of disobedience" by actual experience or if on the other 
hand it was rather a constitutive factor of his creation, i.e., a mental 
capacity or gift, the above reference does not unambiguously state. "The 
mind's eye receiving trial of both," would suggest a mental capacity 
without actual experience, and hence one could conclude that the 
experience of sin was an alien factor, having no valid function within 
the initial creation and intention of God. On the other hand, however, 
there are Irenaeus' words, "learning by experiment how evil it is ", (i.e., 
disobedience), which suggests that the knowledge of sin, and man's 
participation in it, was somehow included within the initial intention of 
God. Further discussion will have to be postponed, and we conclude with 
Hitchcock's commentary: Irenaeus "... seems to regard man's experience 
in the garden of innocence as an awakening of his conscience, and the 
knowledge of evil as necessary to the education and training of man. "1 
1lren, Lugdunum, pp. 165 -66. Stated even more to the point 
Hitchcock also says, on p. 166: ".., the original destiny of man was in 
no wise hindered by the Fall. The fact was that the Fall became the 
means of leading men to attain the perfection for which they were 
destined." 
The ambiguity with which we are dealing is noted again at the 
conclusion of A_H,, IV,xxxviii,4 and the beginning of IV,xxxix,1: "Now 
it was necessary that first nature should be manifested, then afterwards 
that the mortal should be overcome and absorbed by immortality, C Cor. 
15:517 and the corruptible by incorruption, and that man should be made 
in the image and likeness of God, receiving the knowledge of good and 
evil. 
And man did receive the knowledge of good and evil, how it is 
good to obey God, and to believe Him and to keep His Commandment: and 
this is the life of man: even as not to obey God, is bad; and this 
is man's death." 
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b.2. The Initial State of Man 
The question regarding the created nature of Adam, his perfection 
or imperfection, and subsequently his relationship to sin, stands at the 
heart and center of St. Irenaeus' doctrine of the imago Dei. If it could 
be shown, for instance, that Irenaeus maintained a doctrine of man (Adam) 
that unequivocally asserted a created non -perfection, then it would 
appropriately follow that his involvement with and experience of sin was 
not of paramount significance, i.e., the ultimate issue. That is, sin 
would be relegated to the periphery of the nature of man, and would not 
fa.f ry e 
be the primary interpretive principle of man's relationship in respect to 
God. Material will be offered which will tend to support that position. 
On the other hand, some of Irenaeus' writing would seem to suggest that 
man (Adam) in the beginning, even though just a "Child ", was adequately 
equipped to recognize the nature of sin, and at the same time to abstain 
from it. If this latter is Irenaeus' main intention and teaching, then 
sin will assume a greater significance, and will be not only one of the 
factors, but the primary factor, constitutive of the God -man relation. 
b,2,a. Man's Moral Perfection 
The first indication to consider relative to man's initial 
perfection is that which Irenaeus calls "Primal Innocence ". Commenting 
on the life of Adam. and Eve in the Garden, he says: 
And Adam and Eve ,., were naked and were not ashamed, for their 
thoughts were innocent and childlike, and they had no conception 
or imagination of the sort that is engendered in the soul by 
evil, through concupiscence, and by lust.1 
Here is a clear indication of a before -and -after situation, wherein 
1Proof, 14. 
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Irenaeus asserts, on the basis of Gen. 3:7, that in the created state 
nakedness was not an occasion for embarrassment or shame. Whereas, after 
the introduction of evil, as something with which there was no prior 
experience, naked exposure was associated with concupiscence and lust. 
Therefore, as related to inter -personal relationships, a quality of 
"perfection" pertains from the beginning, and is transformed by the 
experience of sin. 
Secondly, in that "... 'God formed man, taking clay of the earth, 
and breathed into his face the breath of life'," (Gen. 2:7) it is first 
of all doubtful that any suggestion of the non- perfection of that which 
God created should be seriously entertained. Elaborating on -the text, 
Irenaeus goes further and says that by God's own Hands he created man, "... 
receiving from Himself the being of His creatures, and the pattern of His 
works, and the form of the things wherewith the world is furnished. "1 
Secondly, it would seem likely that that which is from God is certainly 
good, and perfect in some sense of the word "perfect ". This implication 
is further substantiated in Irenaeus' Proof of the Apostolic Preaching: 
But man He fashioned with His own hands, taking of the purest and 
finest of earth, in measured wise mingling with the earth His 
own power; for He gave his frame the outline of His own form, 
that the visible form too should be godlike - for it was an image 
of God that man was fashioned and set on earth - and that he might 
come to life, He breathed into his face the breath of life, so that 
the man became like God in inspiration as well as in frame.2 
Even though that "perfection" is not one that approaches the 
ultimate perfection which is an exclusive quality of God, nonetheless, as 
. 
relates to the perfection which may be attributable to man, these Irenaean 
texts seem quite unambiguous. 
1A_H. N,xx,1. 
That Adam "... did receive the knowledge 
ZProof, 11. 
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of good and evil, how it is good to obey God, and to believe Him and to 
keep His Commandment: ... "1 seems to contradict the implication of an 
initial non -perfection. Creation of man with moral perfection necessarily 
involves knowledge of the distinction between good and evil (granted the 
possibility of evil), and with this knowledge it would appear man was 
created. 
There is, however, another reference related to this knowledge 
of good and evil which seems to introduce a sort of"neutrality" into the 
discussion. Irenaeus states that in order that Adam might appreciate that 
he, even though granted dominion over all creation, "... had for lord the 
Lord of all ", certain conditions were given him, which were also to 
encourage his humility. The picture of Adam is that he was as though, 
in the beginning, one facing all possibilities for the first time, un- 
encumbered by any liability. Nothing had been "tried "; therefore, nothing 
had failed, and consequently it was "perfect ". And, says Irenaeus, if 
Adam had observed that commandment, he would have retained that life 
with which he had been created, and would have remained immortal.2 
The words which Irenaeus puts in the mouth of Adam after the 
first transgression, "... the robe of holiness /anctitatis stolam%, which 
1A_H,, IV,xxxix,1, It does not, however, seem possible to state 
unqualifiedly that Irenaeus is referring specifically to Adam; he may, 
indeed, be referring to man already acquainted with the experience of sin, 
in which case the implication is that a certain moral imperfection does 
not necessarily fracture man's relationship with God. 
2Cf, Proof, 15. The text reads thus: "But so that the man should 
have no thoughts of grandeur, and become lifted up, as if he had no lord, 
because of the dominion that had been given to him, , a law was given him 
by God, that he might know that he had for Lord the Lord Of all. And He 
laid down for him certain conditions: so that, if he kept the command of 
God, then he would always remain as he was, that is, immortal: but if he 
did not, he would become mortal, melting into earth, whence his frame had 
been taken ". Cf. A.H. III,xxiii,7. 
57. 
I had from the Spirit, I have lost by disobedience, ..." , appear to be 
another indication of the created perfection of Adam. The Spirit was 
definitely associated with the holiness of man, and man therefore, was 
holy, wearing the "robe" "from the Spirit ". Of this, however, Lawson 
says that the robe, stola, is ".., a most apt expression to denote the 
conception of a donum su eradditum. Here is a relative perfection in 
Adam, which is not of the nature of Adam. "2 It would appear, nevertheless, 
that until such time as the "robe" was removed, the holiness to which the 
"robe" referred was indeed a quality which inhered in Adam, though not 
belonging to him. 
Some of the material that speaks of the freedom of man, and of 
his will, also tends to support the assertion of man's initial perfection. 
In saying, for instance, that "... liberty and freewill ... always was 
in man, ... . " Irenaeus suggests the possibility of man's initial 
perfection. The effects of sin on the freedom and will of man will be 
discussed later, but at this point, and on the basis of this reference, 
it would seem that man as initially created was fashioned with freedom. 
And, freedom is a characteristic which we are accustomed to ascribe 
primarily to perfect men, at least, that is, of the quality of freedom 
of which Irenaeus here speaks. This subject is considered more explicitly 
in Irenaeus' interpretation of Mat. 23:37: 
1 
A .H., III,xxiii,5. 
2Bib. Theol. Iren., pp. 202 -03. The substance /accident distinc- 
tion utilized by Lawson will not be a special consideration of this thesis. 
However, the suggestion that the "robe" may have implied a holiness not 
possessed by Adam, yet contingent upon his relationship to God's Spirit, 
may be a valid point. 
3A.H., 
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And in that He saith, 'How often would I have gathered thy chil- 
dren and thou wouldst not:' He declared the ancient law of man's 
liberty: how that God made him free from the beginning, having 
power of himself, and he had a soul of his own, to act upon God's 
decree voluntarily, and not upon compulsion from God. ... While 
He gives good1counsel to all, He hath set in man the power of 
choice, ,,, . 
Man had, from the beginning, according to these references, 
ability to discern between right and wrong, good and evil, and was also 
given freedom and power to effect his decision without external compulsion. 
This ability and freedom is placed within another context which might 
suggest an even stronger element of man's initial perfection. Irenaeus 
says that man's freedom and power are those which have been given by God, 
and are therefore good. But, this is a sort of a "good" that requires 
to be exercised, or as Irenaeus puts it: "... and such as work it shall 
receive glory and honour, for working good, when they might have declined 
working it: ,,, , "2 
The Irenaean material which has been considered seems to sub- 
stantiate the position which asserts the original perfection of man. We 
have seen that Adam and Eve enjoyed a "primal innocence" in the Garden 
before the incursion of sin which caused them to become ashamed of their 
nakedness. Second, there was the tacit implication of man's perfection 
due to his having been created by God. Because Irenaeus was refuting 
the Gnostics among whom it was taught that the God who created and the 
God who redeemed were not the same, Irenaeus' refutation of them would 
1 
A H., IV,xxxvii,1, 
2A_H,, IV,xxxvii,l, and cf. A H,, IV,xxxvii,2: ",,, because they 
are all of the same nature, and able to retain and do what is good, and 
able on the contrary to reject it and do it not: justly even among men 
who are well governed, and much more with God, are the one praised, and 
meet witness borne unto them, of their general choice of what is good, 
and perseverance in it; ... ." And cf. A,H,, IV,iv,3 regarding 
rationality and created free will and power. 
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have been seriously weakened had he emphatically and explicitly propounded 
a doctrine of created imperfection. He stated, to the contrary, that 
the very being of the creatures was in fact from God Himself. 
Thirdly, Irenaeus has asserted that man, initially created, was 
afforded all things necessary for moral integrity, i.e., knowledge of 
good and evil (whether experiential or intuitive hab not yet been 
determined) and power to retain his immortality. The "robe of holiness" 
which Adam wore is another constituent of perfection closely related to 
moral integrity. But, we have noted that according to Lawson the stola 
may have indicated a donum supperadditum, and therefore not of the essence 
of Adam. - 
Fourth, and finally, the freedom in which Adam was created, a 
freedom which is of the very distinctiveness of Adam, setting him apart 
from and over the other forms of creation not so endowed, is a critical 
symbol of perfection. Only the response of obedience of a truly free 
man qualifies as obedience; an obedience of compulsion is not obedience, 
per se, but rather one of inflexible naturel Adam's freedom points 
to a superiority among creation, and also to an initial perfection, not 
however, without ambiguity.2 
1 
Por a clear discussion of the subject, cf. Antony Flew and 
Alasdair Macintyre, editors, New Essa s In Philosophical Theology, in 
The Library of Philosophy and Theology, SCM Press, 1955), 
Chapter VIII, pp. 144 ff. 
2Cf. A,H IV,xxxvii,6: "Because they were made reasonable 
/ationabiles7 with faculties to examine and to judge, and not - (like 
irrational or inanimate things, which can do nought of their own will, 
but are drawn towards good by necessity and force; who have one only 
thought, and one only way) - these are not, I say, made unchangeable, and 
without judgment, so as to be capable of being anything but what they 
were made. And so to them neither would that which is good be pleasant, 
nor the communion of God precious, nor good greatly desirable, seeing 
that it grew up to them without any movement, care, or study of their 
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A precise definition of Irenaeus' teaching and position relative 
to man's initial status requires the consideration of those references 
which appear to assert man's initial "imperfection '. This is the subject 
of the created childishness of Adam, and a consequent limitation which 
mitigates not only Adam's transgression, but also qualifies the sub- 
sequent history of God's relationship to and with man. 
b.2.b. His Imperfection 
Having stated in A_H., IV,xxxvii,7 that God was longsuffering 
in the revolt of man, perpetually leading man toward the perfection of 
the Image, i.e., the Son, Irenaeus continues the argument: 
But if a man say 'How is this ?' Could not God render man per- 
fect rperfectum7 from the beginning? let him know, that although 
unto God, who is always just the same, and Unoriginated, in respect 
of Himself all things are possible; yet the things which were 
made by Him, so far as that, coming afterwards, they have each 
its own beginning of generation, so far they must also fall short 
of Him who made them; for the things just brought into being 
could not be unoriginated; and so far as they are not unoriginated, 
so far also they fall short of Perfection.1 
It is readily apparent that whenever man is compared with God, 
the adjectives perfect and imperfect assume a particular connotation. 
And it is within that context that Irenaeus begins to answer the question, 
"Could not God render man perfect from the beginning ?" If it is 
suggested that the criterion is God, then quite obviously the answer is 
No; that which is originate is, in relation to what which is Unoriginate, 
own, yea, as a spontaneous and untended plant. Thus there would be no 
energy in their goodness; they being what they are rather by nature 
than by will, and having good of itself, not by choice, and consequently 
not realizing so much as this, That what is good, is fair, and not 
enjoying it. For what enjoyment is there of Good in those who know it 
not? And what glory to those who have not exerted themselves for it? And 
what crown to those who have not won the same as conquerors in a struggle ?" 
1A.H., IV, xxxviii,l, Ital. mine. 
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imperfect.1 But beyond this primary reference, i.e., God vis -a -vis man, 
the adjectives, perfect /imperfect are applicable as related to man's 
initial creation. Therefore, Irenaeus continues: 
And in respect that they are younger, they are also childish, and 
in the same respect also unpracticed, and unexercised for the 
perfect training. God also was indeed able Himself to be- 
stow on man perfection from the beginning, but man was incapable 
of receiving it: for he was a babe /nfans7.2 
There is a broader configuration to which perfection applies 
than was initially noted. For, also in respect to man's origin and his 
subsequent history and development the adjectives perfection/imperfection 
pertain. Irenaeus states that insofar as man was a "babe" he was 
incapable of receiving perfection. That is, he was incapable insofar as 
perfection would have been incommensurate with his having begun- to -be; 
perfection comes properly in time.3 There is, it should be noted, no 
specific reference to the "babe's" involvement in sin; the only tentative 
indication offered in regard to that possibility is Irenaeus' statement 
that he was initially "...unexercised for the perfect training ". Whether 
or not that training included the experience of sin remains to be seen. 
The distinction between man's initial imperfection in relation 
to his future perfection is more emphatically defined within the context 
of man's created nature. Irenaeus states: 
For while according to His own benignity He bestowed good in 
good measure, and made men, like Himself, endowed with free -will; 
yet in His foreknowledge He was aware of man's infirmity jinfirmatatem7, 
1Cf. A.H., II,xxxiv,2 regarding imperfection in respect to the 
perfection of the Unoriginate. 
2A_H. IV,xxxviii,1 (Ital. mine), and cf. IV,xxxviii,2. 
3Cf. Hitchcock, Iren. Lugdunum, p. 82: "There is ... scope for 
development of evolution. But it is a God -directed development; ... ." 
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and of what would come thereof; and in His love and might He 
will overcome that which we are by our created nature.1 
The "infirmity" to which Irenaeus refers, and of which he says God was 
aware, is apparently closely related to that infirmity or inequality 
above, i.e., the difference between the Unoriginate and the originate 
which has just begun- to -be. What can it mean that God, in His fore- 
knowledge, was aware of what man would become because of his infirmity? 
One would not attempt to maximize the significance of this initial 
infirmity toward the end that God should be accused of creating poorly; 
neither, however, should the factor of initial infirmity be minimized, 
excusing Irenaeus of an apparently careless conclusion. There is, 
according to Irenaeus, a significant difference between what man was in 
the "beginning" and what he is intended to become at a future time. And 
for the moment the word imperfection is used to distinguish between the 
former and latter states of man. 
The question relating to man's initial imperfection is closely 
dependent upon what St. Irenaeus says about man's created nature. He 
has stated that God, in His love and might, "... will overcome that 
which we are by our created nature, ... "2; clearly, this assertion 
strikes some very unfamiliar chords. Ordinarily (i.e., in the West) the 
created situation is considered to have been fuL and finalized, and only 
1A.H., IV,xxxviii,4. And cf. Proof, 12 wherein Irenaeus associates 
the Garden with the growing man: "... having made man lord of the earth 
and everything in it, He made him in secret lord also of the servants 
5ngels, cf. Proof, 117in it. They, however, were in their full develop- 
ment, while the lord, that is, the man, was a little one; for he was a 
child and had need to grow so as to come to his full perfection. And so 
that he might have nourishment and grow up in luxury, a place was prepared 
for him better than this world, well -favoured in climate, ... [tc_7; and 
its name is the Garden." (Ital., mine). 
2A_H., IV,xxxviii,4. 
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subsequently disturbed by the "fall "; this does not appear to be 
Irenaeus' orientation. He elaborates upon the "created nature" motif, 
relating it to a distinction between inbreathing and Spirit. He says 
that the old life (apparently referring to all of life prior to the 
Incarnation) is overcome because it had been given by " inbreathing" and 
not by the Spirit. There is a basic distinction between the natural 
and the spiritual man; both are fashioned or created by God, but the 
first is simply by inbreathing, the second, and more perfect, is by the 
Spirit Himself. The inbreathing is common to all men; the Spirit, on 
the other hand, according to Irenaeus' interpretation of Isaiah 43 :5, 
is given more restrictively. Inbreathing, which is a lower gift, is 
apparently a temporal arrangement, whereas the Spirit is an eternal one. 
What seems most critical is that Irenaeus should so unambiguously assert 
that the temporality of the inbreathing (life) was entirely within the 
intention of God. 
1 
1Cf, A.H., V,xii, 1 and 2. Both sections are instructive, but 
only a portion of the latter needs to be given; commenting on Isaiah 
57:16, Irenaeus says, "... wherein he set down the word 'spirit' with 
especial reference to God, Who poureth it out on mankind in the last 
times by the adoption of sons: but the word Breath in a general sense 
with reference to the creature, which also he termed a thing made. 
But that which is made is different from the maker. The breath there- 
fore is for a time, but the Spirit is eternal. And the breath indeed 
having for a short space been at its height, and having remained for 
a time, afterwards departeth, leaving that breathless, to which before 
it had appertained: but the other, encompassing the man from within and 
from without, as being apt always to abide, never forsaketh him. 'But 
not first cometh that which is spiritual,' saith the Apostle, (I Cor. 15:46) 
(uttering this as to us men,) 'but first that which is animal, then that 
which is spiritual:' according to reason. For it was meet that men 
should first be formed, and being formed should receive a soul, and so 
afterwards receive the Communion of the Spirit. Wherefore also 'the 
first Adam was made' by the Lord 'a living soul, the second Adam a 
quickening spirit.' (I Cor. 15:45). As therefore he who was made a 
living soul, lost his life, casting it away to the worse: so on the 
other hand that same person, on returning to the better part, and ac- 
quiring the quickening Spirit, will attain life." 
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The temporal life which comes by "inbreathing" is commensurate 
with what has been tentatively called created imperfection. And it in 
turn is positively related to that to which reference has been made 
(supra, p. 47), i.e., that the Incarnation is integral to creation. 
Therefore, it was according to the economy of God that there should first 
be formed the natural man, who in turn should be saved (completed) by 
the spiritúal,l It is not yet possible to state conclusively whether 
a doctrine of initial perfection or imperfection is Irenaeus' primary 
intention. But according to the material which has been studied, it 
would appear that the configuration of creation is quite compatible with 
a doctrine of on -going and future completion (perfection). 
Whatever the final conclusion as regards Irenaeus' intention in 
respect to man's initial perfection/imperfection, it will be difficult 
to underestimate the value of his theories of man's "childlikeness ", 
some of which have already been considered.2 One additional reference 
will illustrate how his "child" concept functions within the situation 
of temptation and sin. It seems evident that Irenaeus' primary intention 
is to protect Adam, as it were, from those who might be inclined to 
ascribe more blame than he rightfully deserves. 
For the Lord for His part sowed good seed in His own field. (Now 
the field is the world). 'But while men slept, the enemy came, 
and sowed tares among the wheat, and departed.' (Mat. 13:25). 
Because from that time forward this Angel is an Apostate and an 
1Cf. A_H., III,xxii,3. And, cf. supra p. 47, n. 2. 
2Supra, especially pp. 60f., and cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., 
p. 212: "It is clear that S. Irenaeus is powerfully prompted to speak 
of salvation as the restoration of something lost.in the Fall. ... 
However, it is no less clear that when he expressly turns his mind to 




Wherefore also God's way with him who secretly sowed 
the crop of tares, i.e., brought in the transgression, was to sep- 
arate him from partaking of Himself: but him who in thoughtless- 
ness, however, wrongly, admitted the disobedience, even the man, 
He pitied. And He converted against the said (Serpent) the enmity 
whereby he had made us enemies: in that He repelled from Himself 
our enmity against Him and retorted it, and aimed it back at the 
serpent. 
It may be objected, because the parable to which Irenaeus refers 
has to do, not with creation and fall, but with the Kingdom of God and 
tares growing among the wheat, that therefore his interpretation is to 
be rejected. Nevertheless, having transposed the content from the Kingdom 
to Creation, the important aspect of his interpretation remains, that is, 
that whether Kingdom or Creation, the sower of the tares is the primarily 
guilty one, and the sleeper is pitied. In either context the question 
may properly be asked, how "perfect" is a sleeping man? And consequently, 
what measure of responsibility might properly accrue to one who is not 
chastised for sleeping, but only for thoughtlessness? It is apparent 
that Irenaeus is not inclined to ascribe full and entire responsibility 
to man, but rather to direct it back upon the Serpent. Sleep and thought- 
lessness are, one might want to say, acceptable attributes of an imperfect 
being - imperfect in respect to God, to the immediate fulfillment of his 
destiny, and in respect to Him who is the express imago, Jesus Christ. 
Having presented, without extensive commentary, the Irenaean 
material related to the initial state of man (section b) it remains to 
further develop his concept of the imago Dei from the perspective of its 
historical configuration. 
C. Man and His Historical Creaturely Existence 




periphery or at the center of a theological system may be debatable. 
Undebatable however is the assertion that the subject of sin must be 
clearly defined, that its significance be fully appreciated, and that no 
attempt be made to deny its reality, or to minimize its effect within the 
God -man relationship, It is a precarious path to walk, and it may be 
true that in respect to its doctrine of sin, the church has vacillated 
more extensively than upon any other. We will have to be especially 
careful and conscientious in our examination of Irenaeus' doctrine of 
sin; especially so because his concepts of creation, intentionality, and 
perfection/imperfection are, as we have seen, amenable to a minimization 
of the dimensions of sin. 
1 
That this was neither his intention nor 
conclusion will hopefully be made manifest; at the same time, that his 
concept or doctrine of sin is admittedly different from that which is 
well -known to us in the West will be strikingly apparent. 
c,1, Man and Sin 
Even as, according to Irenaeus, the method of creatio ex nihilo 
is inexplicable, 
So again the reason also, why, all things being created of God, 
some transgressed and departed from obedience to God, ... the 
cause itself of the nature of the transgressors, neither hath any 
Scripture related, nor Apostle said, nor hath the Lord taught,2 
1According to Paul Beuzart, Essai sur la Théologie d'Irenée, 
(Paris: 1908) p. 116, and Johannes Werner, Der Paulinismus des Irenaeus, 
in Texte und Untersuchungen, Gebhardt & Harnack, Vol. VI, (Leipsig, 1889) 
p. 135, and A. von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. of Third Edition by 
Neil Buchanan, Vol, II, (1896) p. 291 -92, all cited by Lawson, Bib. Theol. 
Iren., pp. 214 -15, Irenaeus had an inadequate doctrine of sin. Their 
opinion is rejected by Lawson; see especially pp. 223-226. 
2A,H,, II,xxviii,7. 
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Neither here nor elsewhere does Irenaeus attempt to explicate the orig- 
in of sin; its reality, presence, and consequences are his interest 
and concern, and he does not become involved in speculative assumptions. 
n 
His perspective is primarily from the "givenéss" of sin together with 
its impact and influence on man's history - history being, contiguously 
(co- inherently ?) associated with God and the work of His "Hands ". 
The first area of consideration, and apparently of prime 
importance within the Irenaean doctrine, is sin's relationship to death. 
Death's antithesis is, for Irenaeus, life; but life is not simply to 
be understood as that which could be ascertained from a clinical point 
of view. It signifies not breathing and blood -flow but rather an 
association or relation with God - of a particular quality. It is 
explicitly stated thus: 
And whatever beings keep their love towards God, to them He 
affords communion with Himself. Now Communion with God is life 
and light, and enjoyment of the good things which are from Him. 
But whosoever in their purpose withdraw from God, upon them He 
bringeth separation from Himself. Now separation from God is 
Death; and separation from light' is darkness, and separation 
from God is casting away all the good things which come from 
Him. Those then, who by rebellion have cast away the things 
aforesaid, as being deprived of all good things, come to be 
in all manner of punishment. For though God punish them not 
by express dispensation, yet that punishment followeth after 
them, because they are deprived of all good things from God 
being eternal and endless, the privation of them also is of 
course eternal and endless.1 
Life is communion with God; withdrawal is death. This is not a 
spatial separation, but as Irenaeus states, a separation which is a 
"...casting away of all the good things which come from Him." The word 
"rebellion" is employed here, but it is apparently not the sort of 
A.H., V,xxvii,2. 
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rebellion which is violent and forceful, but moreso a rejection of the 
"good" which God offers. It is not, at least here, a conscious grappling 
with authority or a proud demand for equality;1 rather, one is impressed 
by man's incredible foolishness. 
It should also be seen and appreciated that "separation from 
God ", being not a spatial or metaphysical separation, is rather cast in 
terminology which is compatible with personal relation and being.Irenaeus 
specifically and significantly uses the word "love ", saying "... whatever 
beings keep their love towards God, to them He affords communion with 
Himself." (supra. And the communion of which he speaks is life. That 
they should "keep" their love suggests that man was cast initially into, 
what might be called, a love construct. It was the realization that God 
loves and that the proper response of man was to retain His love that, 
for Irenaeus, characterized the ideal God -man relationship. 
The element of mortality is firmly associated with man's recog- 
nition of the creature- Creator relatiOn, and the saying'that it was cast 
within a love construct is not to imply that man would be allowed to 
despise difference without experiencing the negative implications. 
However much one might be impressed with Irenaeus' emphasis on man's 
union with God, he is nevertheless careful not to eradicate their 
differentiation. 
Immortality is contingent upon the perpetuation of a proper 
stance toward God; it is not a natural endowment, if by that is meant 
an attribute which pertains to man apart from a God -relation. In his 
The element of pride in the content of sin which is quite dominant 
in later theology, is not a major theme of Irenaeus, but it is noted, e.g., 
in A_H., III,xxiii,1. 
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Proof St. Irenaeus clearly articulated the proper God -man relation and 
its various effects upon man's life; there was a tendency, Irenaeus 
recognized, that man might be inclined to think over -much of himself and 
transgress his proper bounds (discussed, supra p. 56). If the word 
"love" were chosen to adequately summarize the intent of the first 
reference (pp. 67f.) in respect to the prospect of man's immortality, 
we should have to select the word "obedience" in this second: 
... He laid down for him certain conditions: so that, if he kept 
the command of God, then he would always remain as he was, that 
is, immortal; but if he did not, he would become mortal, melting 
into earth, whence his frame had been taken.1 
The "conditions" were established for man as a reminder of his 
creatureliness, and more importantly, it seems as a way to keep him 
within the proper love construct. That which Irenaeus says about the 
effects of man's disobedience seem to indicate that we are perhaps being 
confronted by a very particular use of the word2 which will subsequently 
relate to his doctrine of the imago Dei. Indeed, Irenaeus does 
emphatically relate death to disobedience, as we note: 
But that God was true, and the serpent a liar, was shewn by the 
event, when death followed close upon those who had eaten. For 
together with the food they made death also their own, since they 
ate in disobedience, and disobedience to God bringeth death 
finobedientia autem Dei mortem infert.3 
Death, however, is not considered primarily in its association 
1Proof, 15. And cf. A.H., IV,xxxix,1. 
2The attitude to which Irenaeus is being compared and contrasted 
is that in which, regarding the word disobedience, the atmosphere is 
volatile; man is completely at fault; God's retribution is swift; and 
man is punished by death. 
3A`H., V,xxiii, 1. 
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with punishment, or as an evidence of God's rejection of man.1 It is 
rather included by Irenaeus within that which we have called the love 
construct. And while it remains true that mortality represents the 
failure of man to retain his stance within that construct, death inter- 
venes, according to Irenaeus, as God's device to protect man. This is 
unambiguously stated in his comment on Adam's departure from Paradise: 
He cast him out of Paradise, and moved him to a distance from 
the Tree of Life: not grudging him the Tree of Life, as some dare 
to say, but in pity to him, that he might not last for ever as a 
sinner; and that the sin which was in him might not be immortal, 
and an infinite and incurable evil. But He forbade him to trans- 
gress, bringing in death as a check, and causing sin to cease, in 
that He put an end to it by the dissolution of the flesh which 
should take place on earth: that man, ceasing some day to live 
unto sin, and dying thereunto, might begin to live unto God,2 
1Cf. Lawson, Bib, Theol, Iren,, p. 216: "It is worthy of note 
that when Irenaeus wishes to denote man's disabled condition he speaks 
of liability to death far more than of bondage to sin. The predominance 
of this Greek usage is perhaps largely due to the associations of the 
Fall story, with its doom, 'in the day that thou eatest thou shalt 
surely die'. 
S. Irenaeus did not therefore believe in Original Sin in the 
proper sense of the word. The inherited defect of the human race is 
represented as a grievous disability, but not as involving man in guilt 
or constituting him the object of God's wrath." 
2 
A H., III,xxiii,6. There is an implicit dualism in this text 
in relating the cessation of sin to the dissolution of the flesh, but as 
Lawson points out, Bib. Theol. Iren,, p. 223, the context is one in which 
Irenaeus is arguing for the salvation of Adam against Tatian, and he says, 
"The real intention , is no more than that the exclusion from Paradise 
was not a mark of God's anger." And cf. Proof, 16, where referring to 
the commandment not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, 
he says: "This commandment the man did not keep, but disobeyed God, 
being misled by the angel, who, becoming jealous of the man and looking 
on him with envy because of God's many favours which He had bestowed on 
the man, both ruined himself and made man a sinner, persuading him to 
disobey God's command. So the angel, having become by falsehood the 
head and fount of sin, both was himself stricken, having offended against 
God, and caused the man to be cast forth out of Paradise. And because, 
at the prompting of his nature, he had rebelled and fallen away from 
God, he was called in Hebrew Satan, that is, rebel; ... , So God 
rebuked the serpent, who had been the bearer of the slanderer, and this 
curse fell upon both the animal itself, and the angel ...; and the man 
He put away from His face, and sent away to dwell by the road into the 
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Mortality, the effect of man's disobedience, and which by his 
sin affects the entire race of man,1 is set within the control and pur- 
pose of God. Worse than the experience of death, according to Irenaeus, 
would have been the continuation of an existence which was opposed to 
God. And in "pity" therefore for the man who had been maliciously mis- 
led by the Devil,2 death was allowed until such time as man might begin 
again to "live unto God." Recalling the discussion of the life love 
relationship (supra, pp. 67 -68) it should also be realized that not only 
does death follow disobedience, but that disobedience, being a moral 
separation from God, is death. 
The major emphasis of Irenaeus regarding the subject of that 
which is ordinarily termed the "fall" is firmly established within the 
context of death - death being the result, more than the punishment, of 
man's departure or separation from God. We have also noted that Adam 
Garden, since the Garden does not admit a sinner." And cf. A.H., III, 
xxiii,3 regarding the reaction of God to Adam's sin: "For which cause 
also in the beginning of Adam's transgression, as Scripture related, He 
cursed not Adam himself, but the ground in his works: as one of the 
Ancients saith, 'God for His part transferred the curse unto the earth, 
that it might not continue in the man.' .. But the whole curse 
discharged itself on the Serpent who had beguiled them." And cf. A.H. 
III,xxiii,5. 
1Cf. A.H., III,xxi,10. 
2Even though Irenaeus' concept of the Devil, per se, will not 
ultimately be maintained as a necessary and integral factor in our 
subsequently- developed use of the imago Dei, as a symbol of co- inherence, 
it may be beneficial to note his on beliefs. The Devil is, he says, 
"... a strong man, not altogether, but as compared with us." - (III 
viii,2). And because of his superior strength, he was able to capture 
the weaker man, and hold him in his power (cf. V,xxi,3). He conquered 
us and "... thrust Lus out of proper relation] by disobedience" (III, 
xviii,2). He ruled over man from the beginning, and is the enemy of 
God (V,xxi,1). 
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received less harsh judgement than did the Devil; man He "pitied" - 
the Devil He cursed.1 
c,2, Imago, Similitude, and the Structure of Man 
In order for the task of this section to be properly and adequately 
accomplished it will be essential to recall two critical conclusions 
formerly developed. The first, which was the subject especially of 
section a.1, was the definition of the difference between God and His 
creation. Irenaeus' occasional reference to "man becoming God" may tend 
to minimize the difference, but if this tendency were actualized in toto, 
his categories of Image and Likeness would be meaningless. The words 
image and likeness require that there would be that to which something 
can be like,2 and that to which something may be an image or likeness 
must necessarily be different, "other ". Saying therefore, that man is 
created in the image and likeness is not at all to say that he is the 
image and likeness. 
The second factor to be related to this present consideration is 
the concept of man's perfection /imperfection which was discussed in 
Section b. The question was raised there as to whether man, as he was 
initially created, was created "perfect ". Now, it may be possible to 
1But, cf. A.H., V,xvii,1: 
we have become enemies to Him." 
... whose commandment disobeying 
2Cf. Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, .trans. Ross 
Mackenzie, (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959) p. 21: "The 
affinity between the Son and man and the distinction between them are 
part of the same reality, and both the distance between them and the 
bond which unites them are expressed by saying that man is created in 
the imago and similitudo of the Son; but it is a better definition 
simply to say that the Son is the imago and similitude of God, and that 
man is created in God's imago and similitude." 
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resolve the question by subsuming it beneath the concept of man's 
potential and destiny to grow.) 
The distinction which was noted in Section b. regarding the 
perfection or imperfection of Adam was necessarily irreconcilable apart 
from a core or centering motif. For instance, it seemed inappropriate 
to state on the one hand that that which had been created by God could 
be anything less than perfect. Adam was "innocent ", (Proof 14); he 
received from God his very being, (A.H., IV,xx,1); he wore the "robe 
of holiness," (A.H., III,xxiii,5); he was free and had power of 
discernment, (A.H., IV,xxxvii,1). But, as over against this "perfection" 
there was noted material which seemed to speak of something less: "Could 
not God render man perfect from the beginning ?" (A.H, IV,xxxviii.,1); God 
"was aware of man's infirmity," (A.H., IV,xxxviii,4); there was the 
distinction between the lesser gift of "inbreathing" and the greater 
gift of "spirit," (A.H., V,xii,1 and 2). The core motif by which the 
apparent contradiction between perfection/imperfection may be reconciled 
is Irenaeus' concept of the child, and the provision for the child's 
growth. That reconciliation will, in turn, provide the means by which 
to interpret his doctrine of the imago and the similitudo toward, in, 
or for which man is created. 
On the subject of the future toward which man was created, 
Irenaeus says: 
1Cf. Gustaf Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, pp. 26 -38, and 
Lawson, Bib. Theo). Iren., especially p. 213 where he states: "This 
vital distinction L,e., between the perfection of the infant and that 
of the sain is, ... not far from being implied by what is said of Adam 
as on the one hand perfect, and on the other hand possessed only of the 
destiny and equipment to perfection. This distinction, if brought to the 
study of Irenaeus, certainly lights up his work." 
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.., by Paul ... Adam is called 'the figure of Him which is to 
come:' (Rom. 5:14) as though the Word, Who framed all things, 
had formed before hand with a view to Himself that Economy of 
Mankind, which was to centre in the Son of God; God forming 
first of all the natural man /nimalem homineii to the end that 
he might by saved by the spiritual spiritaai 
The assertion that from the very beginning of the formation of man there 
was that toward which he was oriented is unmistakable. The Son of Man 
is the "spiritual" man toward which man is being created, and according 
to which he is related as the natural man. According to a later 
reference, the mortal's (natural man's) transformation into the immortal 
(perfect man) is by means of absorption, the conclusion of which is that 
".., man should be made in the image and likeness of God. "2 - Irenaeus's 
juxtaposition of God's intention and man's tribulation, i.e., the process 
toward that which God intends, is reflected in the following: 
And for this cause in all time, Man who was framed in the beginning 
by the hands of God, i.e., of the Son and Spirit, is being made jit7 
after the Image and Similitude of God, by the casting away of the 
chaff, that is the Apostasy rapostasia7, and by the gathering into 
the garner of the Wheat, that is of such as by faith bear fruit 
unto God. And therefore is tribulation necessary jecessaria7 for 
such as are saved, that being in a manner bruised, and beaten small, 
and by patience kneaded up with the Word of God, and put into the 
fire, they may be meet for the King's Banquet:.... .3 
The source or origin of that "chaff ", the Apostasy of man, is 
not the question here; but we have previously been informed that it 
relates to man's participation in the rebellion from God which was intro- 
duced by the Devil, and for which the Devil more than man was cursed. 
1A_H. III,xxii,3. 
2A_H., IV,xxxviii,5, (Ital. mine) and cf. A.H., IV,xxxix,2,quoted 
p. 52, n. 1. 
3A.H., V,xxviii,4,(Ital. mine). 
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That is, however, only a secondary question at this time; the primary 
concern is to note how firmly Irenaeus asserts that the Apostasy has 
not "fractured" or destroyed the process by which man is being made after 
God's Image and Likeness. Tribulation within the process of growth is, 
according to Irenaeus, "necessary ". However, its "necessity" is the 
result of rebellion, not creation.1 Subsequent to man's departure from 
God, and the introduction of mortality, one notes the fact that God does 
not so much punish by means of tribulation, but rather and moreso utilizes 
it to effect His purpose, i.e., making man in His image and likeness. 
As compared with that man who struggles amidst tribulation toward 
his intended completion, Irenaeus speaks of the perfect man: 
,,. from the beginning of our formation in Adam, the inspiration 
of life which was of God, being united to that which He had mould- 
ed animated man, and exhibited him a rational animal; so in the 
end the Word of the Father, and the Spirit of God, being united 
to the old substance of Adam's formation, wrought out a living 
and perfect Man, ... . 2 For at no time did Adam escape from under the Hands of God, ... 
The "inspiration of life" to which Irenaeus here refers is the "breath 
of life" which God "breathed into his face. "3 "For ", says Irenaeus, 
"the breath of life, the result of which is the natural man, is one 
thing, and the quickening Spirit, which makes him also spiritual, is 
another thing. "4 As men we all consist, says Irenaeus, of a ".., 
body received of the earth, and of a soul receiving breath from God, 
. "5 But, the union of the body and soul, the flesh and the 
1Cf. Proof, 15, and A_H., IV,xxxix,1, 
2A_R., V,i,3. 3Proof, 11. 
4A_H,, V,xii,1, and cf. supra, pp. 63f, 
5A`H., III,xii,1. 
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'tinbreathi' , do not make the perfect man,1 
.,, God will be glorified in His own creature, moulding it in 
conformity and correspondence with His own Son. For by the Hands 
of the Father, i,e., by the Son and the Spirit, Man is made after 
the Image of God: man, not a part of man. Now the Soul and Spirit 
may be part of man, but man they cannot be: the Perfect Man being 
a certain mingling and uniting of the soul, receiving the Spirit 
of the Father: which mixture is blended also with that flesh, 
which is moulded according to the Image of God.2 
If it could be shown that Irenaeus propounded a doctrine in 
which man was originally, initially, created as the image and likeness 
of God, it would be apparent that subsequent formulations, i.e., regarding 
sin ( "fall ") and salvation would have to proceed on that basis; anthropology 
would have to reconcile itself to that particular conformation or con- 
figuration. Irenaeus does in fact specifically state that Christ's 
incarnation was in order "... that what we had lost in Adam, i.e., our 
being in the image and likeness of God, that we might recover in Christ 
Jesus."3 And again the Lord's coming was to the "lost sheep" "... who 
had been made in His image and likeness, ... . "4 In reference to this 
pole in Irenaeus' thought, i.e., the original endowment of the image and 
likeness, Lawson says, "It is clear that S. Irenaeus is powerfully 
prompted to speak of salvation as the restoration of something lost in 
1Cf, A_H V,vi,1: "For neither is the formation of the flesh 
itself by itself a perfect man, but it is the body of man, and a part of 
man: - even as the soul for its part is not the man, itself by itself, 
but it is the soul of man, and a part of man: - nor is the spirit the 
man, for it is called spirit, and not man: - but the blending and union 
of all these makes out the perfect Man." 
2Ibid. 3A.H,, III,xviii,1,(Ital, mine). 
4A_H III,xxiii,1,(Ital. mine). 
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the Fall. "1 However, that this is the major or principal pole is 
doubtful; it appears that within the context of soteriology Irenaeus 
deviates from his own model of the Adamic child concept in order to 
emphasize the critical centrality of the Incarnation as the saving 
event. 
2 
These explicit references to lost -ness represent one facet of 
/ r.'e 
Irenaeus' system. Alternat however, Irenaeus' consistently asserted 
concept of man's creation toward the image and likeness, from childhood 
to manhood, serves admirably and adequately to reconcile whatever 
apparent tensions and contradictions there may seem to be between never - 
having -had on the one hand, and having -lost on the other.3 
It now seems apparent that Irenaeus' characterization of man's 
trichotomous nature is primarily for the purpose of articulating man's 
growth- toward -Image, and only secondarily is it employed within the 
creation /fall construct. Having concluded that the former (i.e., never- 
having -had) is his major orientation, it becomes less critical to attempt 
to establish precisely the relation of the Spirit to the flesh and soul, 
or the relation of the Spirit to inbreathing. That is to say, if having - 
had and subsequent having -lost is not the constitutive motif, then the 
specificity of body- soul -Spirit relation is proportionately diminished. 
1Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 212. Cited in longer form, supra, 
p.64, n. 2. 
Because soteriology is not the subject of this thesis it will not 
be necessary to comment on the question whether or not soteriology is 
dependent upon a doctrine of catastrophic fall, that is, whether or not 
something has to have been lost in order to articulate salvation. We 
simply note that this was a technique employed by Irenaeus, though it was 
neither the only nor the major one. 
3But cf. David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, (London: SCM Press 
Ltd, 1953), Hereafter: The Image, p. 75 wherein he asserts Irenaeus' 
compatibility to traditional Western theological interpretation of "lost" 
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That is not, however, to imply that the issue becomes totally irrelevant.1 
David Cairns concludes that of the main Irenaean texts dealing with the 
distinction between Image and Likeness and their respective history in 
terms of the Fall, it remains impossible to draw an unambiguous con- 
clusion. ".., five of the six passages ", says Cairns, "neither support 
nor contradict the view usually assigned to Irenaeus, that the likeness 
was lost at the Fall, while the image remains. "2 It might be suggested 
and "fall ", and also Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 209, who says that 
Irenaeus can "... on occasion give the appearance of denying his doc- 
trine of 'the childhood of Adam'," And Ibid., p. 203: "The ó,orolwri sj 
similitudo Dei, in original man was .., an accident, i.e., not an 
element necessary to human nature, but that which could be lost. It 
is this divine quality which the Logos restores." 
1It would appear that of the three terms, (i.e., body(flesh), soul, 
and spirit), only the first has not been subject to disparate interpre- 
tation by Irenaean scholars. Irenaeus has indeed invited disagreement 
as regards the precise meaning of the latter two, and their relationship 
both to each other, and also their association with the terms image and 
likeness. In A,H., V, xii,1 Irenaeus stated that the "old life" "... 
had been given, not by the Spirit but by the inbreathing," And in 
the following paragraph, (V,xii,2) he asserted that ",.,, it was meet 
that men should first be formed, Lthe flesh and being formed should 
receive a soul, and so afterwards receive the Communion of the Spirit. 
Wherefore also 'the first Adam was made' by the Lord 'a living soul, 
the second Adam a quickening spirit.'" (I Cor. 15:45). He had already 
stated, however, in V,vi,1 that "If on the other hand the spirit is 
wanting to the soul, such an one is truly an Animal Man, and as being 
left carnal, will be imperfect; having indeed the Image in his form, 
but not assuming the Likeness by the Spirit." Lawson, Bib. Theol. 
Iren., pp. 204 -05) enters the debate regarding the distinction of Image 
and Likeness and, while agreeing that the Hebrew construction implies 
a parallelism, he aligns himself with Brunner of whom he says in respect 
to the latter's application of the differentiated terms: "Here is a 
simple and brilliant solution of the central problem of anthropology." 
(p. 205) That may be true, but whether this was the intention of 
Irenaeus seems debatable. 
2D. Cairns, The Image,, p. 75, n. 1. The five passages which 
he cites in the note are: A_H,, III,xxiii,1; III,xxiii,2; IV,xxxviii,3; 
IV,xxxviii,4; and V,i,3. The sixth passage to which he refers is III, 
xviii,1, and the pertinent portion reads: "... He summed up in Himself 
the long explanations of men, in one brief work achieving salvation for 
us; that what we had lost in Adam, i.e., our being in the image and 
likeness of God, that we might recover in Christ Jesus." Another text 
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again, therefore, that even if Irenaeus' principle of childhood and 
growth is allowed to serve as the core concept, it will be difficult to 
assert either conclusion unambiguously. Nevertheless, because his use 
especially of the term, likeness, is more relational and dynamic than 
substantialist and static, one could reasonably incline toward the 
unification of the two terms. 
1 
which would seem to be critical to the discussion is A_H., V,xvi,2; 
Cairns does cite it, (pp. 76 -77) but in another context, i.e., in relation 
to the visible, tangible, human nature of Christ's incarnation. As 
it relates, however, also to our consideration of Image and Likeness 
it should be noted that Irenaeus there says: ",,, in the former times 
it was said indeed that Man was made in the Image of God, but it was 
not revealed. For the Word was yet invisible, after Whose Image Man 
had been made, And for this cause, you see, he easily cast off also 
the resemblance of Him. But when the Word of God became flesh, He 
made both good. For He both truly revealed the Image, Himself having 
become that very Thing, which the Image was: 
tablished the resemblance, by causing man to partake of His on com- 
plete likeness to the Invisible Father, through the Visible Word." 
What is so strongly implied here is that first, Christ is both the 
Image and Likeness and second, that man is after the Image and Like- 
ness, Neither Image nor Likeness, it may finally have to be stated, 
belonged to man as a possession. Likeness, especially,,is a relational 
term, not a substantialist one. And cf. A,H,, V,i,1 as a supportive 
reference, 
1Cf, G. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. 157: "As soon 
as we make the distinction between natural and supernatural the basis 
of our thinking, human and divine will be sharply divided, and the 
somewhat naive transitions from body to Spirit, which are characteristic 
of Irenaeus, will be lost. We can see a typical illustration of such 
a misrepresentation of Irenaeus in the dogmatic historians who refuse 
to see imago and similitudo as constituting a unity, and instead 
attempt to give the term imago, one meaning and similitudo another. 
Irenaeus speaks of 'imago et similitudo' in an overwhelming number of 
expressions as constituting a unity. Were there not a scholastic 
tradition of medieval origin which separated imago, and similitudo 
into two distinct concepts, no theologian today would have thought 
of separating these two terms in Irenaeus," Nevertheless, Brunner 
who otherwise speaks favorably of Irenaeus' system asserts that the 
imago similitude distinction first occurs in Irenaeus - Brunner, 
Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), 
PP. 504 ff. 
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c,3. Man's Growth Toward Perfection 
The concept of man's growth from childhood to perfection has 
been introduced (supra, section b.1., where the perspective was primarily 
that of growth as intentionality). But now, in a more precise way, it 
is possible to articulate growth in relation to the Image and Likeness in 
or after which man is created from the perspective of its actuality. It 
will become increasingly apparent because of Irenaeus' child concept, the 
question regarding the fate of the image and likeness at the Fall assumes 
a particular connotation which is unfamiliar and somewhat alien in the 
West. Because his concepts of man's growth are integrally related to 
the child construct of growth- toward -image, a study of Irenaeus' inter- 
pretation of man and his growth will cast additional light on his inter- 
pretation of the imago Dei.1 
Growth, for Irenaeus, is cast firmly within the context of grace; 
his was emphatically not a theory of the innate potential toward man's 
progress which characterized the Age of Enlightenment; nor, on the 
other hand, would Irenaeus' theology be compatible with, i.e., the 
Augustinian concept of grace as a donum superadditum. The dynamic and 
relational constitution of grace toward growth is clearly articulated 
thus: 
... since both the Hand of God is truly and plainly exhibited, 
whereby Adam first and afterwards we are framed; there being also 
but one and the same Father, Whose Voice from the beginning to the 
end is present with His Creature; and the substance of our frame 
being clearly indicated by the Gospel: we are not now to seek for 
any other Father than This; ...: nor any other Hand of God, but 
this, which from beginning to end fashions and frames us unto life, 
1Unless specifically stated otherwise, the subsequent use of 
the term imago Dei will include both image and likeness, and similarly 
so will the word image, and the phrase, image of God. 
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and is present with Its on creature, and completes it after the 
Image and Likeness of God.1 
The Hand, or Hands of God, are creatively active from the beginning, 
fashioning and framing man unto life; this is God's dynamic presence of 
grace, completing His creation after the Image and Likeness. It would 
seem apparent that a concept of growth is meaningful only on the pre - 
suppostion that there is something as yet incomplete. It would also 
seem apparent that of the various possibilities available to articulate 
the means by which completion is effected, Irenaeus associates himself 
strongly on the side of the operation of grace. "... the entire 
grace of the Spirit, ..." says Irenaeus, "... will render us like unto 
Him /imiles nos ei efficiet7, and perfect us, by the will of the Father: 
for it will make man to be after the image and likeness of God. "2 Like 
unto Him; this is the center. This is the intention and potential of 
the imago Dei - to be like God. 
But man is always, in a sense, "on the way ". And the conclu- 
sion of his becoming, the consummation of his goal is not so much to 
be discovered in terms of what man is to be, but rather the process of 
his becoming. It is in respect to that latter referent that one 
recognizes the centrality of Irenaeus' relational constructs, i.e., image 
and likeness. Although Irenaeus may occasionally use terminology of 
substance, e.g., "structure ", "clay ", and "being made ", his categories 
are primarily dynamic and relational.3 For, as Irenaeus states: "If 
therefore thou present unto Him what is thine, i.e., faith towards Him 
and allegiance; thou wilt receive His skill, and wilt be a perfect work 
1A .H., V,xvi,1. 2A.H., V,viii,1. 
3Cf. supra, pp. 51f., especially p. 52, n.1. 
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of God. "1 It would seem fair to conclude that to be a "perfect work 
of God" is primarily the specification of the process of man's becoming, 
and not the specification of his being. That is to say, Irenaeus' 
terminology and interpretations are amenable to relational and dynamic 
structures, and conversely, they do not readily conform to language 
which signifies man's substance. 
According to Irenaeus man's growth toward perfection requires 
man's participation by struggle; that which God has for man by way of 
His intention is not simply bestowed upon him. Man's sense of appre- 
ciation is enhanced by what he calls "anxious toil ". Even our love 
for God, he says, "... the Lord taught us to obtain ... with labour, and 
the Apostle handed on the lesson. "2 But what, it might be asked, is 
man's experience and struggle intended to teach and produce? Irenaeus' 
commentary on I Cor. 1:29 provides an answer, concentrating on the values 
of humility, gratitude and dependence: 
So may he always continue glorifying God, and incessantly giving 
thanks for the salvation which he hath obtained from Him: 'That 
no flesh may glory before' (I Cor. 1:29) the Lord, nor man ever 
entertain the thought concerning God, so as to account the incor- 
ruption which he has to be his own by nature, and to be tossed 
about by empty arrogance, not holding the truth, - as though he 
by nature resembled God. For this, rather making him ungrateful 
to his Maker, did both obscure the love which God had towards man 
and blind his understanding that he might not think worthily of 
God; comparing and judging himself equal to God. 
This therefore was God's long suffering, in order that Man 
passing through all things, and acquiring moral knowledge, and 
so coming to the resurrection from the dead, and learning by ac- 
tual assay what he was delivered from, might ever be grateful to 
the Lord: having won of Him the gift of incorruption, that he 
might love Him more; .., that he might know himself, his mortal- 
ity and weakness, and might understand concerning God, how that 
1A_H., IV,xxxix,2. 
IV,xxxvii,7. The reference to the Apostle's lesson 
is I Cor. 9:24 -27. 
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He is in such sort immortal and powerful, as to give both immor- 
tality to the mortal being, and to the temporal eternity:... . 
The immortality of which Irenaeus speaks pertains specifically 
to categories of relation, and apparently has no proper reference to 
"nature" i.e., that which belongs to man as a substance. It was, 
Irenaeus says, that specious assumption that engendered man's ingrat- 
itude, obscured God's love, and blinded his understanding. Our ques- 
tion's answer, therefore, is discovered within the proper understanding 
of immortality; it is that for which man struggles; it is the intended 
goal of God for His creation; it is the form of the imago Dei.2 The 
labor and struggle of man toward his goal, including apparently all 
dimensions of his toil, are inherently and integrally related to this 
proper consummation. ... there is one salvation and one God: ", says 
Irenaeus, "but the precepts which form man are many, and the steps not 
few, which lead man unto God. "3 
Toil, struggle, labor - these are themselves indications of two 
realities: one, that man's life is not unambiguous or uni -form, and 
indications to the contrary are at best only relative; two, they are 
symptomatic of man's historical dissatisfaction, his insatiable longing 
for the "absolute" - whatever form the absolute may assume for each. 
Although it was not Irenaeus' intention to imply that man's struggle, as 
man, would eventually merit the prize of immortality, nevertheless man's 
historical dissatisfaction represents a theological component. It is 
1A_H., III,xx,1 and 2. 
2In this construction, Jesus is understood as the personification 
of personal relation, which relation in turn is immortality, an eternal 
participation in Him who is Eternity. 
3A.H., IV,ix,3. 
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doubtful, in fact, that one could derive from Irenaeus a doctrine of man, 
as man, if that implies the possibility of presenting and interpreting an 
absolutely, totally self -centered man. According to Irenaeus, God relates 
Himself to man and it is this relation of God that is the sine qua non 
of man -hood. The following reference is illustrative: 
And herein God differs from man, that God indeed maketh, but man 
is made: and while He that maketh is always the Same, that which 
is made must be capable of a beginning and of a middle, of addi- 
tion and growth. And whereas God is perfect in all things, 
Himself equal and like unto Himself, man on the other hand 
receives improvement and growth towards God. For just as God is 
always the Same, so man also, being found in God, will continu- 
ally get on towards God: since neither doth God ever grow slack 
in benefitting and enriching man, nor doth man cease to receive 
the benefit and to be enriched by God, 
Of this reference Hitchcock says: "This essential difference 
between man and God lies at the root of the gradual method of the Divine 
education of man, and is the source of man's perpetual aspiration after 
perfection and God. "2 It is the "difference" that creates the 
possibility of "likeness ". Man is, obviously, different from God; 
therefore, able to be an image of God. But, being different from God 
is not being contrary to God. There is neither identification (pantheism) 
nor absolute distinction (Deism), and any doctrine that inclines toward 
either extreme represents a misunderstanding of the imago Dei as 
interpreted by Irenaeus. 
It is absolutely essential that the difference between God and 
man remain, at least within that which we call historical existence. 
The difference perpetuates man's impetus toward growth. An eradica- 
tion of the difference (which is impossible) would simultaneously result 
in the elimination of that toward which man is challenged to grow; 
1A_H., IV,xi,2. 2lren. Lugdunum, pp. 52-3. 
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corsegy, fitly, man would then cease to be man. And that would be an 
annihilation of the imago Dei.1 
c,4. The Imago and Recapitulatio 
One facet of Irenaean theology remains to be considered in order 
to complete our consideration of the image concept, i.e., Irenaeus' 
doctrine of recapitulation.2 Although certain references which will 
be introduced may impinge on the previously considered question of man's 
"original" nature, and what may or may not have been "lost ", that debate 
will not be continued. Rather, the resolution of the question will be 
presupposed on the basis of Irenaeus' child -in- growth- toward -Image concept. 
The concept of recapitulation for Irenaeus was established primarily 
within a Christological orientation; our endeavor however will be 
primarily directed toward a greater understanding of the imago Dei from 
an anthropological perspective. That is to say, Irenaeus might have 
approached the question thus: who is it that recapitulates? That 
question may be altered thus: who is it that is recapitulated? Noting 
that shift in perspective will hopefully justify the omission of other- 
wise essential comment and criticism, i.e., the relation of the human 
and divine natures of Christ. 
1Cf. A.H., IV,xx,7: the Word "... guards the invisibility of the 
Father, lest at any time man should become a despiser of God, and that 
he might always have somethi ng to grow towards , ... ." 
2Cf. Lawson's summary of Molwitz's De'1Z1tt:Ll?ALAISOME in Irenaei 
Theologia Potestate, (Dresden, 1874), which reads: ">aon,aLov is that 
in which the parts of a thing have unity, the whole containing the parts. 
£c<pa ut,ovv expresses the action by which anything comes to its xcyaat.ov. 
In the verb,'vaxsTaXat , ov "v the preposition ava has not the proper sense 
of sursum, 'upwards', but of the Latin re.''waxay0a6oúv means, 'to 
collect together again'. " - Bib. Theol. Iren., P. 140. However, we have 
suggested that Irenaeus' use means more than that - more than a re- collection. 
His interpretation of Christ's work of completion suggests the factor of 
sursum. 
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The creation of man is imbued with a future perspective, accord- 
ing to Irenaeus. It therefore seems entirely consistent that sin should 
be interpreted in the light of the greater reality of recapitulation. 
Redemption, it would appear, is a necessary implicate of creation,: and 
not merely that by which God manages to rectify and re -order that which 
has been destroyed by the "fall ". Irenaeus states it thus: 
the Lord, taking clay out of the earth, formed man: and for 
his sake was the whole arrangement about the Lord's coming. He 
therefore had Himself also Flesh and Blood: gathering up as He 
was in Himself not some other creation, but that original one of 
the Father; seeking out that which had perished.2 
Christ gathered up (recapitulated) in Himself flesh and blood 
by Himself becoming that which God had formed in the beginning. The 
manifest implication is that there is no absolute incompatibility 
inherent between that which man was (can we also say, is ?) and that which 
Christ gathered into Himself. It was for man's sake, and it was as man 
that Christ effected the recapitulation, although indeed it was as man 
who was the Image, and therefore somehow different from man who was 
recapitulated.3 That very "difference" however may too readily be 
interpreted as "distinction "; this is not Irenaeus' clear intention.4 
1Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. 84: "Irenaeus holds 
Creation and the Incarnation together." 
A`H,, V,xiv,2. 
3But cf. A_H,, III,xix,3, quoted supra p. 46. Cf.A.H. V,xvii,3. 
4Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation_, pp. 122 -32, and especially 
p. 126 where he offers significant support for the assertion above: "If 
we conceive of man as being static and unmoved, perfectly developed and 
good, complete in every respect at the beginning of Creation, but having 
suffered some sort of loss at the Fall, then man's recapitulation in the 
Incarnation means that the same perfect substance is again present in 
Creation. ,,, In actual fact Irenaeus is continually thinking in terms 
of action and function. Man in Creation is in the process of development 
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It would not seem unjustified to interpret his words, "seeking out that 
which had perished ", (supra) as meaning not that some substance initially 
inherent in creation had perished and was now being sought out, or re- 
created, but rather that Adam's initial growth- toward -image had been 
arrested in his childhood, and was now restored to him in Christ) 
that we consist of a body received of the earth, and of a 
soul receiving breath from God, every person whatever will confess. 
This therefore the Word of God was2made, gathering up the work of 
His own Hands unto Himself: ... . 
Recapitulation which was the work of God's Word is a universal 
work; man is the work of God's Hands and we have not noted that Irenaeus 
attempts to specify certain sorts or classifications of men for salvation 
to the exclusion of others.3 Adam assumes the proportions of a universal 
archetype.4 However, the universality of man's growth -toward -image has 
- he is a growing child with a destiny towards which he is moving. Man's 
recapitulation is renewed growth. The function of Creation reappears." 
And cf. Man and the Incarnation, p. 106: "Divine nature is the anti- 
thesis of human nature only when we have conceived of a deistic, trans - 
scendent, and static God to whom the Incarnation is something alien." 
1Cf. Wingren who in many sections develops the "child" con- 
cept in respect to the Image, and note especially: "Man, like every 
other thing, is created in the Son and the Spirit, i.e., he has been 
formed by God's own hands, but he is different from the rest of Creation 
in that in addition he was created in order to become like God - to be- 
come the very image of God. This is his destiny. Irenaeus does not 
say that he is this image, nor was this destiny wholly realised in 
Creation before sin entered into the world, because man was a child. 
This means, in part, that man has not arrived at his appointed destiny 
in Creation, but it also means that, if he grew up to maturity without 
being confused by his adversary, he would reach the end which has been 
ordained for him by God." Man and the Incarnation, p. 20. 
2A_H,, III,xxii,l, 
3But cf. A.H., IV,xxviii,3, and Lawson's commentary, Bib. Theol. 
Iren, p. 217. 
4Cf, A.H., III,xxiii,2: "Now upon the salvation of man it follows 
that the first -formed man should be saved. It being too absurd to say 
that he who was grievously hurt by the enemy, and first suffered captivity 
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suffered a fragmentation; image specifies one -ness and community or 
communion, and these in turn relate to Irenaeus' understanding of 
immortality. Death, however, has intervened and disrupted the intended 
progression toward Image (immortal communion). The purpose and function 
of recapitulation in respect to this universal convolution, the perverse 
distortion of the circle of communion, is to re -unite and re- establish the 
structures of growth- toward- image.1 The Spirit is spoken of as one 
... bringing back distant tribes into unity, and offering to the 
Father the first -fruits of all nations. Wherefore also the Lord 
promised to send the Paraclete, to unite us to God. For as out 
of dry wheat one mass or one loaf cannot be made without moisture; 
so neither could we many be made one in Christ Jesus, without 
the water which is from Heaven. And as dry earth, except it re- 
ceive moisture, bears no fruit; so we also, being in the first 
place a dry tree, could never have become fruitful of life, with- 
out the spontaneous rain from above. For our bodies by the Laver 
received that Unity which leads to incorruption, but our souls 
by the Spirit. And so both are necessary, since both are profit- 
able for the Life of God:... .2 
Man, the recipient of recapitulation, is the "distant tribe," 
the "dry wheat" who, in his sin, has attentuated his on movement toward 
becoming, and remains, it would appear, the raw material with and for 
which the Hands of God work. However, it is with such tribes and such 
wheat that the hands do work; it is not as though it were necessary for 
is not rescued by the Conqueror of that enemy, while his sons are rescued 
whom he begat in that captivity." And cf. James Beaven, An Account 
of the Life and Writings of S. Irenaeus, (London: J.G.F. & J. Rivington, 
1841) p. 168: "... the more we examine, the more clear does it become 
that he Trenaeus7 would have been opposed to Calvinistic predestination. 
1Words chosen to articulate the "problem ", i.e., what is normally 
meant by "fall ", will hopefully not imply that the "distortion" is absolute, 
i.e., that sin has destroyed the structures of communion. Irenaeus surely 
intended to preserve and maintain his child -toward -growth concept which 
the "injury" did not annihilate. 
2AH., III,xvii,2. 
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there to be some new and qualitatively different creation. Who would 
want to say, for instance, that the dry tree could "become fruitful of 
life "? But then, on the other hand, who would venture to suggest that 
the fruit of life could be produced without the tree? Irenaeus prof e r s 
images that imply lack, incompletion - not those that intend re- creation.1 
We recall the reference which states: "... at no time did Adam escape 
from under the Hands of God, ... . And therefore in the end, ... did 
His Hands work out a Living Man, to be an Adam, after the Image and 
Likeness of God." 
2 
Christ, the recapitulator, ",,. the Word which was 
in the beginning with God, ... , Who also was ever present with mankind; 
... "3, did not reject man whom He found, nor initiate some other creation. 
He incorporated humanity into Himself, and in so doing effected the 
completion of the imago Dei with and for man.4 
Christ's "... connexion with either side, to gather both into 
friendship and concord: ... "5 refers specifically to both sides, God 
and man, and their unification in Christ is, according to Irenaeus, an 
indication of the basic complementariness of both. 
6 
At least this may 
1By re- creation is implied that which might approach another creatio 
ex nihilo wherein God is considered to have in effect, if not in fact, 
abandoned that first creation because of its failure. 
2A_H., V,i,3. 3A_H,, III,xviii,1, 
4Cf. Hans Von Campenhausen, The Fathers of the Greek Church, trans. 
and revised, L.A. Garrard, (London: A. and C. Black, 1963 ) p. 21: "Re- 
demption does not cancel out, but leads transcendently beyond, Creation. 
Irenaeus is not urging a cheap belief in progress. Everything in his 
thought is concerned with the new relationship of sonship which Christ has 
established. But it is one and the same God who in his triune power fulfils 
all things and leads the world and mankind to eternal " g perfection, ,,, , 
5AH,, III,xviii,7. 
6Cf, Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. xiii: "... the connexion 
between man and Christ which Irenaeus makes excludes any conception of God 
and man being in opposition to one another." 
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be ascertained when one departs from a substantialist mode of thought. 
For on relational presuppositions there appears to be no basic in- 
compatibility between the two parties. The imago Dei is the foundational 
structure within which man has been created, and it is that structure 
which is the precondition of the eventual incarnation of the image. "For 
how could we ", Irenaeus asks, "be partakersof His 'adoption of sons', 
(Gal. 4:5) had we not received from Him by the Son, the Communion which 
is with Him: - had not His Word made Flesh, come into Communion with us ? "1 
Recapitulation from the anthropological perspective is becoming increasingly 
comprehensive. His coming into communion with us, mentioned above, is not 
to be minimized, but taken as an affirmation that man is potentially 
conformable to God by means of the image structure.2 
A full and complete consideration of Irenaeus' interpretation of 
the historical existence of the recapitulated man would carry us into 
the field of ecclesiology and soteriology, which is beyond the scope 
of our thesis. Still, a brief comment on that subject will suffice to 
illustrate the "shape" of that existence and life. That Irenaeus asserts 
about the life of the recapitulated man appears to grow logically and 
consistently from the presuppositions with which he has operated thus 
far. That is to say, one notes no radical disjunction between the basic 
structures of existence; the imago Dei, now complete in Jesus Christ, 
bears the same ontological structure as is reflected in man before the 
1A_H., III,xviii,7. 
2Cf. A_H., III,xi.x,1 where we note a further elaboration on the 
same subject of adoption and union, including both man and God: " 
the Word of God was made man, ..., that man blended with God's Word, 
and receiving the adoption, might become the Son of God." Or, "... how 
could we be united to incorruption and immortality, without Incorrup- 
tion and Immortality being first made that which we are ?" 
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incarnation. Because the devil, says Irenaeus, 
at first persuaded man to break the precept of his Maker, he had 
him accordingly in his own Power: which Power is transgression 
and Apostasy, and by these he bound the Man - it was also meet 
that he on the contrary should through Man be overcome and bound 
with the same chains, wherewith he bound the man: that Man, being 
loosed, might return unto the Lord, leaving to him the chains 
wherewith he had been himself bound, i.e., transgression ... And 
while he was justly led captive, who had led man captive unjustly; 
man, who had before been led captive, was withdrawn from his pos- 
sessor's power, by the Mercy of God the Father: who pitied His 
own handy work ¡ic7, and gave it salvation, renewing it by the 
Word, i.e., by Christ: that man might learn by actual trial, how 
1 
that not of himself but by free gift of God he receiveth incorruption. 
Transgression and apostasy, which are mentioned by Irenaeus, are 
apparently to be considered extrinsic to the essence of man; however, 
they are on that basis no less formidable, for "Power" effectively conquers 
and captivates man. And yet Irenaeus does not infer that such power 
inverts the center of man's ontological structure of relationship, i.e. 
imago Dei. We note, consequently, that Irenaeus consistently includes 
terminology which affirms Christ's Man -hood in reference to His saving 
work: it was proper that the devil "... should through Man be overcome 
and bound ... ." (supra).2 
2 
d. Summary, Appraisal, and Implications3 
Our methodological procedure, stated on the first page, i.e., 
to examine "... St. Irenaeus' treatment of the imago Dei ..." as it re- 
lates to the principle of co- inherence (explicated in the Introduction), 
was constructed and utilized toward the achievement of two purposes: 
1A_H., V,xxi,3. 2And cf. A.H., V,xxi,1; IV,xx,4; III,xix,1. 
3We wish to point out that inasmuch as Irenaean theology is, in 
our estimation, more compatible with tendencies indicated in the intro- 
duction, more emphasis will be placed on implications derived than may 
normally be allowable. That is, we will take the liberty of being more 
subjective in this final section than, e.g., in our summary of St. Augustine. 
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first, to establish workable limits of responsibility. Our second 
afive 
objective was, having discovered an interpretive principle, to develop 
a reasonably concise working definition of the imago Dei. Establishing 
limits (and assuming that those limits were not unfairly arbitrary) has 
made it possible to ascertain Irenaeus' interpretation of the image of 
God, without in the process professing a thorough, complete, interpretation 
of Irenaean theology. Preliminarily stated, it would appear that the 
relationship between the super -imposed principle of co- inherence and the 
internal Irenaean concept of the imago Dei are quite consonant. 
Our presuppositions have admittedly circumscribed the dimensions 
of this chapter, but no less is that true of the very nature of Irenaeus' 
own theological perspective. His primary category appears to be God and 
Creation -toward -recapitulation. That is somewhat more extensive than the 
narrower imago Dei as a symbol of the God -man co- inherence, but neverthe- 
less in all primary respects compatible. The conjunction of the two 
categories has suggested the consideration of the various related themes, 
i.e., creatio ex nihilo, the nature and person of God and His relation 
with man, man as understood in respect to God's intention, and attendantly, 
perfection/imperfection and the imago Dei in relation to sin, growth and 
recapitulation. Because these are the themes and concepts around which 
this thesis will develop, it seems in order to begin to draw out and 
amplify some of their implications. However, what is offered here will 
only be the beginning; reduction of some, expansion of other will be 
appropriate in subsequent sections of the thesis. 
Irenaeus, in his refutation of Gnostic dualism, emphatically 
affirmed the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, and in his utilization of the 
doctrine clearly enunciated two critical themes; one, the "difference" 
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between Creator and creation, and two, creation's dependence upon the 
Creator. Because, however, creatio ex nihilo was understood by St. 
Irenaeus as primarily that which specified the solitary sovereignty of 
God, and not a metaphysical- philosophical construction, he was able to 
utilize the doctrine toward his understanding of the closest possible 
relation of the two, God and man. This does not destroy difference; 
indeed, the difference between the two parties becomes a critical integer 
in the subsequent development of his doctrine of recapitulation. The 
difference between a God who creates ex nihilo and that which is created 
is maintained by Irenaeus, but not in such fashion that the difference 
becomes "distinction ". Creation out of nothing is a creation which is 
"beneath ", and "inferior ", (cf.,supra, pp. 38f.). These adjectives of 
subordination specify exclusively a creation -God construct, and not some 
other referent, i.e., the present created order as opposed to an original 
paradisial existence. 
Following the section on Creatio ex nihilo we introduced Irenaeus' 
interpretation of the Trinity. Our concern was not an inclusive one, 
that is, to fully develop his trinitarian theology which would have been 
superfluous to this thesis. Rather, our intention was primarily to 
discover the point of contact, that by which his doctrine of the Trinity 
might impinge on his development of the imago Dei theme. And we noted 
that even though his was not a systematic presentation of the intra- 
trinitarian structure and therefore lacked the precision that is mandatory 
for the accomplishment of that endeavour, he nevertheless offered some 
significant material related to the development of our theme. 
The subsection a.3., "His 'Hands' ", was a discussion of the 
Trinity from the perspective of its orientation toward creation. While 
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intra- trinitarian structures and relations are not within the scope of 
this thesis, the Trinity's activity and association with an is central. 
And Irenaeus' concept of the Spirit and the Son as the ever -working and 
present Hands of God becomes a convenient concept toward the accomplish- 
ment of two ends: one, to speak of the trinitarian nature of God as 
specifically and uniformly orientated toward creation, especially man, 
and two, to further explicate the imago Dei as the center of man upon 
and within which the Hands are eternally operative. Irenaeus' development 
of the "Hands" theme enabled Hitchcock to deduce that his was a doctrine 
that explicated on the one hand the co- equality of the three -fold 
Personality, but on the other as "... admitting of historical subordination 
as touching the Divine Office." 
1 
The divine office may be considered as 
the divine economy, for this is the context within which Irenaeus' con- 
tribution is most significant and most instructive toward the understanding 
of the inherency of God with man. 
The second factor noted above, i.e., the explication of the 
imago Dei as the locus of the Hand's operation, or sphere of influence, 
is integrally related to Irenaeus' concept of man's childhood. The 
suitability of the "Hands" metaphor should be discussed before we return 
to the theme of man's "childhood ". One could conclude that his term 
"Hand" connotes or implies inferences of manipulation, and that therefore 
the term will not serve satisfactorily in a further development of the 
image of God theme. Apparently, at one time (e.g. for Irenaeus) the 
term was quite readily understood metaphorically, and as a literary 
device, whereas the same term for us may convey crass anthropomorphic 
1Hitchcock, Iren. Lugdunum., p. 125, and cf. supra, pp. 45f. 
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connotations. Nevertheless, that which is implied by Irenaeus is well 
worth preserving, namely, that the being of man is circumscribed by the 
presence and operation of God Himself. It may subsequently be appropriate 
to propose an alternative term for "Hands ", one which will be unencumbered 
by substantialist and anthropomorphic overtones. But, at the same time, 
it would seem advisable to retain, and even enlarge upon the inter- 
relatedness denoted by the term. 
Any term which may be proposed will have to reflect not only the 
Irenaean conceptualization of the "difference" and otherness between God 
and man which is a necessary implicate of creatio ex nihilo, but also the 
Scriptural witness in respect of that relation, i.e., Job's lamentation 
within the context of his recognition of that difference.1 Moreover, 
an alternative term should ideally be compatible with categories of 
personal relation. That criterion simultaneously requires specification 
of both difference and similarity; difference detached from similarity 
tends toward asymmetry, whereas similarity irrespective of difference 
approaches identification - neither is acceptable, for both ultimately 
destroy relation. Irenaeus' term, "Hand ", specifies the intimacy of 
1Cf. Job, chapters 9 and 10, and especially the following 
verses: Ch. 9: (2) "how can man be in the right against God ?" (5) "He 
moves the mountains, though they do not know it; he throws them down 
when he is angry ". (14,15) "How dare I plead my cause, then, or choose 
aivuments against him? For he whom I must sue is judge as well ". (32, 
33) "Yes, I am man, and he is not; and so no argument, no suit between 
the two of us is possible. There is no arbiter between us, to lay 
his hand on both," Ch. 10: (3 -5) "Is it right for you to injure me, 
cheapening the work of your hands and abetting the schemes of the wicked? 
Have you got human eyes, do you see as mankind sees? Is your life mor- 
tal like man's, do your years pass as men's days pass ?" (9) "You 
modelled me, remember, as clay is modelled, and would you reduce me now 
to dust ?" (18) "'Why did you bring me out of the womb ?'" 
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God's direct involvement in the formation and preservation of man. 
1 
A 
different term, however, might serve more adequately. 
It would seem that the suggested term, co- inherence,2 might be an 
advance, an improvement; it conveys the indispensable quality of intimacy 
and even though it, in itself, is devoid of personal connotations, it is 
not basically incompatible with them. Insofar, however, as it may incline 
toward the dissolution of the essential difference between God and man, 
it will have to carefully be qualified. That task would not appear to 
be unreasonably difficult. 
Continuing the introduction of the term co- inherence, we acknowledge 
that it is not, per se, a biblical term. Perhaps the nearest approximation 
would be that in Acts 17:28 where we read: "... it is in him that we 
live, and move, and exist, ,,," (R,S,V. renders "exist" as "have our 
being ",) Paul's familiar conviction of life in Christ is another case 
in point: ",,, and I live now not with my own life but with the life of 
Christ who lives in me ", (Gal, 2:20). "I am the vine, you are the 
branches. Whoever remains in me, with me in him, bears fruit in plenty," 
(Jn. 15:5, Ital, mine) is another explicit instance of the quality of 
inter -relation which may be expressed by co- inherence. Without com- 
pounding references at this stage, it would seem that this implication 
of Scripture might not only warrant, but moreover might even encourage 
the utilization of the term co- inherence as an attempt to concisely 
articulate this particular aspect of God's relation with man. We will 
1It should be noted that the Scripture's use of the term, with 
specific reference to God, is diverse; the metaphor is employed for in- 
stance to suggest: power and fear (I Sam, 5:11); inspiration (II Chron. 
30:12); blessing (Ezra 8:22, also 7:9 and Neh. 2:8 - where the Jeru- 
salem Bible renders "hand of God" as "kindly favour "); and possession 
Ps, 95:4 et al, 
2Cf, supra, Introduction, p. 26. 
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return to this topic in the consideration of recapitulation. 
The words from Proof, 12 (quoted supra,p.49) which say: "He 
would walk round and talk with the man, prefiguring what was to come to 
pass in the future, ... ", (Ital. mine) epitomize an interpretation which 
will be operative throughout the remainder of this thesis. The 
implication is clearly that even in the "Garden" there was the antic- 
ipation of a future - a future of and for which Paradise was a parable. 
That is not to say that this was necessarily St. Irenaeus' intention. 
While his references to and utilization of an interpretation of Paradise 
are minimal, it has certainly appeared that he did not radically depart 
from a somewhat historical interpretation of the myth. Conisequently, 
it should not be suggested that his written material dictates a radical 
de- mythologization, or that a parabolic interpretation is entirely 
compatible with other related material, e.g., the subsequent -to -fall 
curse of the Serpent. 
Irenaeus offers sufficient incentive (cf. supra, b.1.) and 
support toward the utilization and later elaboration of his child- toward- 
perfection concept. We noted that the formation and utilization of 
that theme permitted him optimistically to articulate a dynamic process 
which was constitutive of the very being of man and which at the same 
time was a process in which God was integrally and inseparably related. 
It also became apparent that Irenaeus' utilization of that construct 
enabled him to develop a theology and an anthropology (The -anthropology) 
on a foundation firmly established on the principle of God's co- relation 
with man. Stated negatively, we have suggested that Irenaeus was not 
committed first to a particular and highly -developed doctrine of sin 
(fall) upon which, and in reference to, he would subsequently be compelled 
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to articulate the relation between God and man. 
Irenaeus' child -toward -perfection theme also impinges upon the 
somewhat enigmatic consideration of man's original nature, his primal 
relation to God, his initial stance in respect to sin/evil - these are 
questions and considerations that have historically perplexed theology. 
And they are, in and of themselves, important ones. That is not to say, 
however, that the currency and prestige which they have enjoyed has 
been appropriate. As over against an interpretation of man's paradisial 
perfection, Irenaeus' motif of the childhood of Adam relativizes the 
significance of the beginning, asserting that that -toward -which man was 
created to grow represents more fairly (we might say also more Scripturally 
and reasonably) the locus of man's true being, than for example that from 
which man has come. 
1 
We might simply pose, and leave temporarily un- 
answered, these two questions: one, is it essential for the theological 
enterprise that any theory or doctrine of the original status of man be 
maintained, i.e., that Adam (individual or generic) was or was not 
morally perfect? Two, if the first is answered in the affirmative, 
then does Scripture intend, first of all to provide such a doctrine, and 
secondly, does it accomplish that intention? 
The considerations of Adam's perfection/imperfection were ex- 
plored (supra, b,2,, a. & b.) specifically in order to explicate the 
proper conformation of the man -and -sin environment. Ultimately, what 
1Cf. Lawson, Bib, Theol. Iren., p. 213: "Irenaeus does not 
explicitly say that there is one perfection of the infant, innocent, 
and complete in every faculty appropriate to infancy, and another per- 
fection, which is the crown of the saint who has contended with sin and 
triumphed. This vital distinction is, however, not far from being 
implied by what is said of Adam as on the one hand perfect, and on the 
other hand, as possessed only of the destiny and equipment to perfec- 
tion." 
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we want to determine and establish is an adequate (i.e., Scriptural 
reasonable, and experientially consistent) conceptualization and ordering 
of the realities: God, man, and sin. Irenaean references have been pre- 
sented and discussed which explicitly indicated that he did, in fact, 
maintain a concept of time sequence in the original situation, i.e., 
an historic "primal innocence" (cf. supra, pp. 54 -55) and subsequent 
fall. However, we also recognized that he exercised reserve in his 
development and elaboration of that particular doctrine. Because, it 
would seem, the fall is not the central, the constitutive theme,1 there- 
fore that which "preceded" was proportionately de- emphasized. Neither 
the Irenaean nor biblical specification of the goodness of God's creation 
(in the beginning) should be ignored, but it may be that "good" has more 
validity in respect to that toward which man grows, i.e., the imago Dei, 
than as a description of an historic beginning. 
Similarly, fruitless theological speculation as regards the 
entire question of Adam's initial exposure to and experience of sin is 
to be avoided. Unless there had been or could be developed an unambiguous 
and compelling theological doctrine relative to the method and nature of 
the world's origin, and specifically the origin of man, it does not appear 
tither incumbent or appropriate that we should pre -suppose a conclusion 
based on an assumption that there was an historical and actual condition 
from which man departed, And therefore, if it is not possible for us to 
1Cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 219: "We may candidly agree 
that S. Irenaeus tended to stress those elements in the story he fall7 
which serve to extenuate Adam's sin, while the bulk of traditional theolog- 
ians have strongly emphasized those which condemn. They have blackened 
the Fall into a crime of such inconceivable heinousness as to merit and 
justify the conceivably severe punishment of the damnation of the race. 
However, in the doctrine of 'the childhood of Adam' Irenaeus was far 
closer to the spirit of the story than was an Augustine or a Calvin ". 
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define and describe the world's and man's origin, neither would it seem 
possible, nor proper, to speculate upon man's initial confrontation with 
sin. 
Consequently, the biblical myth of the fall may aptly remain a 
myth without concrete, actual, historical referents, and may therefore 
be released from its captivity to serve again its proper function.2 As 
a further consequence, St. Irenaeus' very seriously constructed scheme 
descriptive of man's first experience of sin, as well as the attendant 
consideration of the effects of sin on either the dichotomous or 
trichotomous nature of man, will be more or less neglected. 
The subject of immortality, per se, which according to Irenaeus 
was offered, lost, and still remains an aspect of man's future completion, 
will not constitute an explicit and well- defined motif of this thesis. 
However, a derivative aspect of the subject will be utilized within 
the development of the concept of man's inherent and intrinsic propensity 
1Professor John Macquarries' conclusion regarding the consideration 
of the world's beginning in time is one which seems reasonable and appli- 
cable to our question, i.e., that it is "an illustration of the kind of 
problem that nowadays must be turned over to scientific cosmology ". 
Principles of Christian Theology, Study edition, (London: SCM Press Ltd., 
1966), p. 199. Admittedly, Professor Macquarrie's statement applies 
specifically to the question of cosmological origins, while our question 
is that of man's initial confrontation with sin, but we are inclined to 
say that the two are related insofar as both concepts are beyond the 
proper sphere of dogmatic theology. 
2The "proper" function of the myth is admittedly a subject of 
widely disparate opinion. And, by "proper" we will not claim, nor hope- 
fully imply, that ours in the only interpretation worth consideration. 
However, we are suggesting that the propriety of the fall myth is to 
be determined by its dependent relation to a particular interpretation 
of the imago Dei. That is to say, the imago Dei will be interpreted 
primarily as a symbol of co- inherence, and subordinately related to that 
development the myth of the fall of man may become more intelligible. 
101. 
for continuation, completion, and satisfaction. These positive implicates 
of the imago Dei, as well as the negative ones (e.g., man's aversion to 
death, his sense of futility and frustration) seem to deserve further 
consideration. 
The utilization of the Irenaean concept of the childhood of Adam 
comes particularly to the fore in the consideration of the initial 
imperfection of Adam, and we noted that certain characteristics of im- 
perfection were entirely commensurate with created man. First, there 
is the inevitable difference between that which is originate (man) and 
the unoriginate (God). That difference requires no elaboration. Second, 
and considerably more to our point, is the assertion that perfection is 
incompatible with one who has just begun to be (supra, section b.1.). 
If "perfection" implies all things necessary in order that man might one 
day become that which God intended for him, then "perfection" would seem 
appropriately ascribed. If, however, the adjective necessarily refers to 
an initial state of moral pre -eminence, its suitability is questionable.1 
Should it be asserted, for instance, that man in the beginning had the 
possibility of complete abstainence from sin (moral perfection) which, as 
non -actualized, required the incarnation as a counter -measure, a remedy 
for man's failure? It may rather be suggested that the incarnation is 
more related to completion than to cure, inasmuch as an initial state of 
moral imperfection seems entirely commensurate with a future oriented 
1Cf. Lawson, Bib. Theol. Iren., p. 213: "The general impression 
one gets is that S. Irenaeus looked upon Adam and Eve as entirely clean 
and wholesome, filled with every spiritual promise, and worthy of the God 
who had created them. They were in a state of salvation, and we can 
hardly imagine Irenaeus denying that the Holy Spirit rested upon them. 
In this sense they were 'perfect'. ... At the same time, the first pair 
were emphatically not the Adam and Eve of much traditional theology. S. 
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goal. This would, among other things, provide a rationale for time as 
a construct of development. More importantly perhaps, it would serve as 
an alternative structure toward an explication of man's relation to 
Christ. He (Christ) may be more recognizable as one who is Himself the 
express completion of God's intention, as a representative in whom we are 
incorporated, than alternately as one who restores man to his lost 
beginning by becoming our substitute.1 To understand and to take 
seriously the purpose for which Adam was created, i.e., to grow into the 
image of God, is to apprehend the connection, not the disjunction between, 
Christ and Adam.2 
As one proceeds into a consideration of the reality of sin in 
relation to man in the imago Dei, it should be appreciated that an 
articulation of a doctrine of sin, though subordinate to the primary 
category of co- inherence, must not imply its relative insignificance. 
On the other hand, because the subject of sin is secondary to our develop- 
ment of the imago Dei, and not therefore the main subject of this thesis, 
we will not attempt to present either a thorough survey, nor a radical 
departure. However, subordinating sin will necessarily require some 
degree of re- structuring. Hitchcock's statement is instructive: 
Irenaeus did not regard them as possessed of all fullness of intellectual 
insight and moral experience. These things could only be attained by 
gradual and, as it actually turned out, by painful growth ". 
1Cf. Col. 3:10 - ".., you have put on a new self which will progress 
towards true knowledge the more it is renewed in the image of its creator; 
..." and John 14:20: ",., you will understand that I am in my Father and 
you in me and I in you ". But, cf. as illustrative of substitution, Is. 
53, and I Pet. 2:24 -25. Dorothee Mlle's development of the representative 
concept (Christ the Representative, trans, David Lewis, London: SCM Press 
Ltd., 1967) will be introduced in a subsequent section. 
2Cf. Wingren, Man and the Incarnation, p. 17. 
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It was St. Paul's intense sense of his own crime against Christ 
before his conversion, and his rabbinical training, that gave 
motive and form respectively to his doctrine of sin. Augustine, 
in his burning consciousness of his own guilt and of the purity 
of Christ, and in his speculative transcendentalism, is the fol- 
lower of St. Paul. But Irenaeus is of the school of S. John. He 
did not approach the subject from the same standpoint, or with 
the same depth of feeling and passionate intensity as Augustine, 
because he had not passed through the terrible experience.1 
The question arises: without the "same depth of feeling" and 
"passionate intensity" is Irenaeus' doctrine of sin adequate? That is, 
does it fairly, objectively, and suitably reflect the teaching and in- 
tention of Scripture and experience ?2 Irenaeus speaks of sin within the 
context of immortality (supra,pp.67f.) which, as contingent upon the con- 
tinuation of his "proper" relation with God, was not enjoyed because of 
man's participation in sin. He also sets sin in relation to obedience; 
the intention of the conditions placed upon man, and to which he was to 
remain obedient, was that he continue his life in a particular quality, 
i.e., love (supra, p.68). However, it became clear that sin was defined 
primarily in terminology of injury and disability, and not that of 
punishment, guilt, and destruction. The so- called adequacy of Irenaeus' 
doctrine of sin will be determined in respect to that conclusion, and will 
necessarily be expanded throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
The hostile and alien factor which perplexes man (sin) is 
discernible and interpretable, according to Irenaeus, as it is recognized 
1Hitchcock Iren. Lugdunum, p. 161, and similarly cf, Lawson, Bib. 
Theol. Iren., pp. 218 -19: "The poetical and intellectual magnificence of 
Paradise Lost is a lasting monument to the spaciousness of that system of 
thought which has so often been erected by Christian theologians upon the 
foundation of the Genesis Fall- story. However, it is clear that the sys- 
tem has actually been an erection upon, and by no means a growth out of, 
the Bible. It is a momentous example of something read into Scripture." 
2We intend no precise equation of Scripture with experience; 
Scripture is pre- eminent, However, in respect to this particular issue or 
doctrine we doubt that there is intended a sacrificium intellectus, or contradiction of experience. 
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in its opposition to God's intention for man, (supra, pp. 73 -75). It 
would appear that we might reasonably conclude from Irenaeus' system that 
one, Christ, is the image of God; two, man is created to participate in 
and conform to Him who is the image; three, sin is that which hinders 
the attainment of God's intention. Clearly, this suggests implications 
not only for a doctrine of sin, but also for a further understanding of 
the imago Dei which is our primary concern. 
We do not find Irenaeus' treatment of the good effect of sin, i.e., 
that which by means of tribulation man is prepared for the King's Banquet 
(supra, p. 74, A`H., V,xxviii,4), especially advantageous as a method of 
explicating the doctrine. However, that he does not emphatically assert 
that sin is that which destroys God's relation to man (and can we also 
say, Man's relation to God ?) we find encouraging. One realizes that 
his The -anthropology affords the latitude which will facilitate an 
attempt toward a clearer interpretation of man's relation to sin. 
It was indicated that Irenaean theology was relatively free of 
substance ontology, and that categories of relation were his predominant 
Aft've 
interpreter technique. This enabled him to explicate man's dependent 
relation upon God while simultaneously retaining what we consider to be 
essential characteristics of personal responsibility (supra, pp. 83f.; cf. 
A.H., III,xx,1 &2). Categories of relation, as opposed to substantialist 
ones, seems amenable to the inclusion of all facets of man's life. And 
. 
the imago Dei, as that which is constitutive of both the becoming, being, 
and goal of man, becomes an all -inclusive symbol. The imago Dei, rather 
than referring specifically to man's "religious" dimension, itself suggests 
God's co- inherence in all that is man. Because co- inherence includes the 
difference between God and man and because man is he who is toward God, 
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the imago Dei becomes a symbol of all of man's struggle and aspiration.1 
The subject of recapitulation, with which the study was concluded, 
is of concern to us primarily inasmuch as it illustrates an additional 
dimension of the imago Dei,, Because Christ, who is the image, became 
man, we are able to apprehend a dimension of the imago Dei which may be 
called compatibility. That is not a term to be used in addition to the 
term co- inherence, but merely as an expression of it. That which is 
man is not alien to that which is God, and therefore Christ could take 
unto Himself man; there is a fundamental compatibility. Indeed, man 
is he who included within himself and his experience that which is in- 
compatible; but that is not to say that those alien factors render his 
being or person hostile, something which must be overcome or eliminated 
before Christ deigns to dwell with us, as man. 
1 
War and other forms of violence may at first threaten to nullify 
that statement. But might it be possible to suggest that such "in- humanity" 
is evidence of man's agonizing frustration born of failure to recognize 
and utilize his divine dimension, that is, his being- toward -God? 
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CHAPTER IT 
ST. AUGUSTINE - A CRITIQUE BASED ON 
THE IMAGO DEI 
Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, was born A.D. 354 and died 
A.D. 430. 
The figure of Augustine, probably the greatest man, next to St. 
Paul, ... stands like a Colossus upon a mountain crest, marking 
the watershed between the ancient and the modern worlds, and 
casting its shadow far along the road by which the Fall -doctrine 
was destined to travel.1 
It was he who in the fourth century gave to Western civilization 
the formative ideas which have guided it for centuries. ... 
Theology in Western Christianity has been a series of footnotes 
to Augustine.2 
It is doubtful that anything truly significant could be added to the wealth 
of tributes already ascribed to Augustine; it is enough that they are known 
and acknowledged. Because of his remarkable academic and popular stature, one 
would be ill -advised to criticize him from any perspective without extremely 
judicious reserve. Moreover, criticism that entirely ignores St. Augustine's 
theological -philosophical Sitz im Leben is suspect from the beginning.3 There- 
fore, this somewhat critical approach to a specific area of St. Augustine's 
material will be tempered by the recognition of his times conditioning. For 
example, we will not criticize Augustine's cosmology, per se, but will on the 
Norman Powell Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin, 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1927), p. 170. Hereafter: Fall and Origi- 
nal Sin. 
2Roy W. Battenhouse, ed., A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 3 -4. Hereafter: Study of Augus- 
tine. 
30f the many introductions to Augustine and his thought these three 
are especially helpful: Battenhouse, Study of Augustine; Williams, Fall and 
Original Sin; and Eugene Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine, 
(London: Burns & Oates, 1960). Hereafter: Guide to Augustine. 
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other hand offer criticism of certain theological conclusions which are 
influenced by his cosmological theories. 
We acknowledge both our appreciation of and debt to Professor John 
Hick, especially his book, Evil and the God of Love.1 It should be noted 
at the outset, however, that while Hick's intention was to evaluate and 
criticize St. Augustine from the perspective of theodicy, the stated in- 
tention of this thesis is not that having to do with theodicy, but rather 
a study of the relation and the structures of relation between God and man 
2 
(The-anthropology), with imago Dei as the central perspective. 
It is the intention of this chapter to present material from the 
works of St. Augustine that directly impinges upon the imago Dei theme as 
characterized in the Introduction. The relation of the Creator God to 
creation /sin would succinctly mark the chapter's boundaries. The critical 
question will be: given certain attributes of God, and a particular under- 
standing of the nature of man in the imago Dei, what then is the situation 
which faces God and man in terms of the attainment of His goal for creation, 
and man's participation in it? Only material that relates to that concern 
will be introduced, and it will not therefore be necessary to comment ex- 
tensively on issues that properly relate to patristic studies, i.e., trans- 
lation, etymology, or philology. That is not to suggest however, that one 
is relieved from recognizing that certain words, even in translation, bear 
1John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (London: Macmillan, 1966), 
Hereafter: Evil and God. 
2We appreciate that the use of such hyph$nated constructions as 
"The- anthropology" should be regularly avoided. However, because of the 
frequent mention of the relation and structures of relation to which The - 
anthropology refers, and because of the cumbersomeness of the construction 
we feel justified in the employment of Barth's term. Cf. supra, p. 2. 
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a particular significance within the literature that may be different from 
that commonly understood today. We realize, for instance, that Augustine's 
use of the word "existence "Psse7 bears a very special and specific conno- 
tation, and that it properly belongs, or is ascribed, only to God. Creature - 
ly existence is always derivative, and "exists" insofar as it exists at all, 
only and entirely in relation to God. That which is totally and absolutely 
apart from God cannot even be said to be. Such usages of language will of 
course be noted whenever they bear importance relative to the image theme. 
a. God and Creation 
It would be difficult, if not altogether impossible, to surpass St. 
Augustine's unquestioning conviction regarding the absolute omnipotence and 
omniscience of God. Although Augustine's doctrine of God is of interest 
only insofar as it relates to the imago Dei, one realizes, however, that the 
tendencies noted and developed in the Introduction, i.e., personal constructs 
of co- inherence, appear quite incompatible with Augustinian theology. Accord- 
ing to Augustine, because of who God is, and how He may and must be described, 
there is minimal inclination to speak of man in complimentary terms.1 Man's 
primary dignity seems to be that he may be the object of God's saving election. 
The attributes, omnipotence and omniscience, are closely related to 
that of immutability. It may perhaps be fair to suggest that immutability 
takes precedence over the other two. It is in terms of God's immutability 
that "existence" /sse7 is most properly considered, and is stated concisely 
in the following: 
1This tendency, i.e., the language of pessimism, is more discernible 
in respect to the scope of this chapter, imago Dei and sin, than it is, for 
instance, in relation to Augustine's doctrine of salvation, or again in re- 
spect to his material on the beata vita. The latter was a considerable fac- 
tor in the whole of Augustine's theology and we note his saying, "Away with 
all else; let us abandon all these futilities and devote ourselves to the 
search for truth alone. ... Why do we hesitate to give up all worldly am- 
bition and devote ourselves wholly to the search for God and the happy life ?" 
Confessions, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, XIV, ed. Marcus Dods, trans., 
J.G. Pinkington, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1886), VI,xi,19. 
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For that exists in the highest sense of the word which continues 
always the same, which is throughout like itself, which cannot in 
any part be corrupted or changed, which is not subject to time, 
which admits of no variation in its present as compared with its 
former condition. This is existence in its true sense /1-d enim 
est quod esse verisime dicitur7. For in this signification of 
the word existence there is implied a nature which is self -contained, 
and which continues immutably. Such things can be said only of 
God, to whom there is nothing contrary in the strict sense of the 
word. For the contrary of existence is non -existence. There is 
therefore no nature contrary to God.1 
This distinction between existence and non -existence is one of the 
most often- reasserted affirmations found throughout Augustine's writings. 
Existence and immutability may indeed be called the foundational doctrines 
of his theology; upon those two convictions and truths the entire system 
would seem to depend. As pure existence (one could say pure Being) God is 
absolutely unlimited in any enterprise that may be desired or attempted. 
On the other hand, whatever is not God enjoys only derivative, created ex- 
istence which is always subordinate to that by which it was created. The 
use of "derivative" must be carefully understood so as not to imply emanation; 
it may be employed however to indicate that whatever exists which is not God 
exists in a subordinate and participative sense. Its being or existence 
depends for its continuation on its affinity to Existence. Augustine's state- 
ment (supra, Mor. Manich. I,1), that there is "... no nature contrary to God" 
is illustrative of that which we would be inclined to emphasize - that there 
is that in which both God and man participate and have their being. However, 
the context from which this conclusion derives is clearly that of substance 
ontology, and therefore a structure of relation that we will find inadequate. 
1Augustine, On the Morals of the Manichaeans, The Works of Aurelius 
Augustine, V, ed. Marcus Dods, trans., Richard Stothert, (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1872), I,1. Hereafter: Mor. Manich. 
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Closely related to the specification of the attributes of God which 
are ordinarily preceded by the prefix "omni" are the concrete expressions 
of His power in relation to the created order. Foreknowing everything, God 
might be confronted with situations which were not according to His will, in 
the sense of desire, but nothing could arise which was beyond His anticipation 
or control. Conjecture might suggest that Adam and Eve would have been, save 
for their tragic fall, the first of the human citizens of Augustine's "holy 
city ", (the first being angels) and it might further be conjectured that their 
recalcitrance would have somehow thwarted His intention. In spite of the 
earlier suggestion that Augustine was not much concerned about any sort of 
personal God -man relationship, it should not be concluded that he was disin- 
terested at every level. The level upon which he was very.much interested 
was that having to do with the study of God's accomplishment of His aim, how- 
impersonal of its sometimes 
1 
was God's underlying purpose at creation: to surround Himself in His heaven- 
ly domain with souls who would worship Him eternally.2 
1Cf. Augustine, The City of God, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, 
I, II, ed. and trans. Marcus Dods, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1871), II: 
XIV, 11, Hereafter: Cit. God: "... because God foresaw all things, and was 
therefore not ignorant that man also would fall, we ought to consider this 
holy city in connection with what God foresaw and ordained, and not accord- 
ing to our on ideas, which do not embrace God's ordination. For man, by 
his sin, could not disturb the divine counsel, nor compel God to change what 
He had decreed; for God's foreknowledge had anticipated both, - that is 
to say, both how evil the man whom He had created good should become, and 
what good Be Himself should even thus derive from him ... ." 
2Ibid., II:XIV, 26: "... Almighty God, ... was not destitute of 
a plan by which He might people His city with the fixed number of citizens 
which His wisdom had foreordained even out of the condemned human race, 
discriminating them not now by merits, since the whole mass was condemned 
as if in a vitiated root, but by grace, and showing not only in the case of 
the redeemed, but also in those who were not delivered, how much grace He 
has bestowed upon them." But cf. Cit. God, I:XI, 24: "... by the words, 
'God saw that it was good,' it is sufficiently intimated that God made what 
was made not from any necessity, not for the sake of supplying any want, but 
solely from His on goodness, i.e., because it was good." 
Yet another reference should be noted to further illustrate Augus- 
tine's conviction of the supreme sovereignty of God, and the relative in- 
significance of man's decision: 
... who will be so foolish and blasphemous as to say that God 
cannot change the evil wills of men, whichever, whenever, and 
wheresoever He chooses, and direct them to what is good? But 
when He does this, He does it of mercy; when He does it not, it 
is of justice that He does it not; ... . "1 
He considered the text of I Tim. 2:4, "who will have all men to be saved," 
on the already firmly established conviction that first, God's will was 
irrefutable, and second that certainly not all men are saved ( "... we know well 
that all men are not saved, ... "). That is meant by the text, according to 
Augustine, is that the "all" refers to all sorts and conditions of men.2 
That exegesis is illustrative of the depth and strength of Augustine's con- 
viction that everything was within the power of God, as compared with the re- 
lative impotence of man. 
Quite a long discussion will be offered on the material which relates 
to the will of man, its initial freedom and subsequent captivity. However, 
by way of anticipation, and to further illustrate the wide scope of God's 
supreme power, we note the following: 
... when the intelligent creation, both angelic and human, sinned, 
doing not His will but their own, He used the very will of the crea- 
ture which was working in opposition to the Creator's will as an 
instrument for carrying out His will, the supremely Good thus turn- 
ing to good account even what is evil, to the condemnation of those 
whom in His justice He has predestined to punishment, and to the 
salvation of those whom in His mercy He has predestined to grace.3 
1Augustine, The Enchiridion, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, 
IX, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Prof. J.F. Shaw, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 




Here is one of the clearest expressions of another of St. Augustine's 
central doctrines: predestination. It is a doctrine which attains special 
prominence in the discussion of theodicy but for our purpose, predestination 
is of interest only as it contributes to our understanding of God in relation 
to man who was created in His image. 
1 
Its relation to the imago concept may 
best be approached in the form of several related questions: What is the 
nature and "shape" of the relationship between the Creator who is existence, 
and the creature whose mutable existence is subject to diminution? What is 
the relationship between evil and good? What has "happened" between God and 
man as a result of the fall? What is the fall? How is sin communicated from 
one generation to another? What is the will's relationship to sin? What 
can it mean that man is created in the image of God? 
Augustine seldom becomes involved in the questions related to the dis- 
tinctive place or position of man; his point of orientation is always God, 
and from that point everything else that exists has whatever meaning or sig- 
nificance it has only within the eternal and immutable plan of God. It may 
on occasion, however, appear otherwise; it may seem that creation and speci- 
fically man is given an integral position of importance in the created order. 
But we suggest that while man and creation itself often seem to be the subject 
1The debate concerning the nature of predestination, whether single 
or double, has primarily been related to the area of grace and salvation. 
Because our interest in soteriology is specifically related to the nature 
of man who is the object of salvation, the predestination controversy is not 
our concern. The confusion and complexities which have surrounded the subject 
are well and thoroughly considered in Portalie, Guide to Augustine, p. 217. 
He states that Augustine's is a "predestination which forces one to say that 
neither God nor Jesus Christ had the absolute will to save all men. God could 
if He had willed, have chosen a world where all souls would be saved. 'He 
could have saved Judas', says Augustine, 'but He did not will to.' /5e nature 
boni contra Manichaeos, 7,87 'He certainly could have converted the wicked. 
Why did He not do it? Because He did not will to. Why did He not will to? 
That is His own mystery.' "[e Genesi ad litteram libri XII, XI, 10,12. 
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under consideration, the primary subject is God; the major consideration 
is the completion of His intention.1 
All this relates to God's power and foreknowledge. Being able to 
foreknow not only the entire course of events, but each individual occur- 
rence, God is able to incorporate each happening into an eternal plan. Even 
God's vindication is pre -ordained; it is not something that is occasioned 
exclusively by events outside God, for that would be to suggest that God 
could be acted upon, or affected by that which is external to Himself. Thus 
Augustine states in reference to creation and Paradise, "... the Commandment, 
which they were not to keep, He yet preferred to give them, in order that they 
might be without excuse when He should begin to vindicate Himself against 
them. "2 
1The implications and significance of that assertion will be developed. 
However, it should be stated here, for the purpose of clarification, that it 
is not my intention to establish man in God's place as the primary subject, 
nor to infer that the completion of God's intention is of lesser significance 
than as developed by Augustine. It is, rather, the nature of man as developed 
and explicated by Augustine, and the consequent shape of God's accomplishment 
of His intention that becomes the issue of contention.- 
2Augustine, Treatise on the Catechising of the Uninstructed, The Works 
of Aurelius Augustine, IX, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., S.D. Salmond, (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1873), XVIII,30. Hereafter: Catech. And cf. Cit. God. II: 
XXII,l: "It is He who gave to this intellectual nature 2ángels7 free -will of 
such a kind, that if he wished to forsake God his blessedness, misery should 
forthwith result. It is He who, when He foreknew that certain angels would 
in their pride desire to suffice for their own blessedness, and would forsake 
their great good, did not deprive them of their power, deeming it to be more 
befitting His power and goodness to bring good out of evil than to prevent the 
evil from coming into existence. It is He who, when He foreknew that man would 
in turn sin by abandoning God and breaking His law, did not deprive him of 
the power of free -will, because He at the same time foresaw what good He Him- 
self would bring out of the evil, and how from this mortal race, deservedly and 
justly condemned, He would by His grace collect, as now He does, a people so 
numerous, that He thus fills up and repairs the blank made by the fallen 
angels... ." 
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It becomes increasingly clear that an appraisal of Augustine's work 
will not offer conclusions which tend toward what may be termed a dignified 
or exalted opinion of man. From Augustine's theocentric orientation, however, 
it is possible to derive his anthropology in respect to the image of God, and 
it is that which is our primary concern. An evaluation of some of the ma- 
terial on creation itself will clarify his interpretation of man in the imago 
Dei. Augustine's choice of language and terminology is careful and precise 
on the subject of creation, and it is so because of the Manichaean influence 
that threatened the doctrine of God's absolute supremacy. Theirs was a 
theory that suggested that there was a pre- created "something" with which 
God worked, and because of its already being present before creation, it might 
be implied that God has to share existence. That implication attacked the 
very finch -pin of Augustinian theology. Augustine's doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo effectively refuted the Manichaean heresy. Perhaps the clearest ar- 
ticulation is found in Augustine's Confessions: 
Thou, therefore, 0 Lord, ... didst in the beginning, which is of 
Thee, in Thy Wisdom, which was born of Thy Substance, create some- 
thing, and that out of nothing. For Thou didst create heaven and 
earth, not out of Thyself, for then they would be equal to Thine 
Only -begotten, and thereby even to Thee; ... . And aught else 
except Thee there was not whence Thou mightest create these things, 
0 God ... and, therefore, out of nothing didst Thou create heaven 
and earth, - a great thing and a small, - because Thou art Almighty 
and Good, to make all things good, even the great heaven and the 
small earth; two such things, one near unto Thee, the other near 
to nothing, - one to which Thou shouldest be superior, the other 
to which nothing should be inferior.' 
1Conf., XII, vii, 7. Cf. Ibid., XI,v,7 and note that not even the 
existence of a place within which to create was available for God: "How, 
0 God, didst Thou make heaven and earth? Truly, neither in the air, nor 
in the waters, since these also belong to the heaven and the earth; ... 
because there was no place wherein it could be made before it was made ...; 
nor didst Thou hold anything in Thy hand wherewith to make heaven and 
earth. For whence couldest Thou have what Thou hadst not made, whereof 
to make anything? For what is, save because Thou art? Therefore Thou 
didst speak and they were made, and in Thy Word Thou madest these things." 
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St. Augustine obviously considered it imperative to safeguard God's 
absolute supremacy over all created things, and this he effectually accom- 
plished by means of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. It is not implied 
that Augustine originated the doctrine, but his use of it was certainly 
more explicit and precise than it had been previously.1 As employed by 
him, creatio ex nihilo served to insure the absolute distinction between 
Creator and creation; in fact, the distinction becomes so absolute that it 
seems impossible to speak of the God -creation relationship in any but the 
most impersonal terms. That which has been created out of nothing has no 
right to claim anything for or of itself; its mode of creation establishes 
for all time its absolute and complete dependence upon its Creator. Its 
relationship to anything other than the Creator is a relationship to nothing, 
while its relationship to Him is its exclusive source of blessedness. The 
nature of this blessedness will be discussed later, but at this point it is 
important to understand blessedness in reference to the absolute distinction 
between God and creation which is ex nihilo. 
... we say that there is no unchangeable good but the one, true, 
blessed God; that the things which He made are indeed good because 
from Him, yet mutable because made not out of Him, but out of 
nothing... . ... in this nature which has been created so excellent, 
1 "... creatio ex nihilo was emphasized as early as the middle of the 
2nd century, as in the confession of faith in Hermas (Nand., 1.1; Vis., 1:6), 
which is often cited. It was stated polemically against Gnostic dualism, 
and in apologetics to counter the philosophical view that matter was eternal." 
We also read: "The opposition to dualism and to the eternal matter of Greek 
philosophy soon made cosmology and protology the chief interests in the 
Church's doctrine of creation .... The view of Irenaeus, centred in the 
history of salvation, found little echo." Sacramentum Mundi, Vol. II, ed. 
Karl Rahner, (London: Burns & Oates, 1968), p. 26. Creatio ex nihilo 
is noted in II Mac. 7:28: "observe heaven and earth, consider all that 
is in them and acknowledge that God made them out of what did not exist, ... ". 
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that though it be mutable itself, it can yet secure its blessedness 
by adhering to the immutable good, the supreme God; and since it is 
not satisfied unless it be perfectly blessed, and cannot be thus 
blessed save in God, - in this nature, I say, not to adhere to 
God, is manifestly a fault.' 
The terms which most nearly summarize the distinction between God 
and creation, including the distinction relative to God and man are immutable/ 
mutable. Not even man's affinity with earth, having been formed from it, 
is one of substantial relationship. For, "... though God formed man of the dust 
of the earth, yet the earth itself, and every earthly material, is absolutely 
created out of nothing; and man's soul, too, God created out of nothing, and 
joined to the body, when He made man. "2 Therefore, we conclude, man has his 
"existence" only and entirely in God, and any tendency on his part to form 
significant relationships apart from God, forming them in the sense of expres- 
sing his being, or developing his potential, are ultimately destructive rather 
than constitutive of his person.3 Dependence upon the Author of being is so 
1Cit. God., I:XII,1. And cf. Ibid., "... though it is not every creature 
that can be blessed ... yet that creature which has the capacity cannot be 
blessed of itself, since it is created out of nothing, but only by Him by whom 
it has been created. For it is blessed by the possession of that whose loss 
makes it miserable." 
2Augustine, On The Trinity, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, VII, ed., 
Marcus Dods, trans., Arthur West Haddan, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1873) 
XIV,11. Hereafter: Trin. 
3Cf. Cit. God., II:XIV,13: "... nature [natura] could not have been 
deprived by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it 
is a nature, this is because it is made by God; that it falls away from Him, 
this is because it is made out of nothing; but being turned towards himself, 
his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely 
is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his on satisfaction 
after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to 
that." And cf. Ibid., I:XII,l: "... the true cause of the blessedness of 
the good angels is found to be this, that they cleave to Him who supremely is. 
And if we ask the cause of the misery of the bad, it occurs to us, and unrea,- 
sm -ably, that they are miserable because they have forsaken Him who supremely is, 
and have turned to themselves who have no such essence." In this context 
Augustine's statements regarding angels may equally have been asserted of man. 
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thoroughly primary that it is difficult to articulate the importance of any 
external relationship which implies inter -dependence. There is the Creator - 
creature relation of primacy beneath which Augustine subsumes the significance 
of man-man and man- creation constructs. 
b. Existence 
He who supremely is is God. That which is made by Him is therefore 
also related to Him, and because of the relationship of being created, it is 
good. That which is, is good. That which is not, is nothing. Nothing, 
however, does not exist, but may be spoken of as existing in order that its 
"presence" may be expressed; that which does not exist as it was intended to 
exist may be called evil. Its relationship to existence is as a shadow of the 
thing itself. Strictly speaking, in spite of its pernicious influence, it has 
no independent reality. 
The terms "order" and "harmony" serve an important function in the 
understanding of Augustine's concept of existence. He appreciated that the 
problems of confusion, chaos, evil, disharmony, and strife were "realities" 
which confronted people, and that the treatment of these' issues was required 
of theology. He was able to address himself to these concerns by means of 
his understanding of existence (God as the prime illustration) and its rela- 
tion to non -existence. 
Now all things by corruption fall away from what they were, and 
are brought to non -continuance; for existence implies continuance... 
Now things which tend towards existence tend towards order [rdinem7; 
and in attaining order they attain existence, as far as that is pos- 
sible to a creature. For order reduces to a certain uniformity that 
which it arranges; and existence is nothing else than being one. Thus, 
so far as anything acquires unity unitatem7, so far it exists. For 
uniformity and harmony /Concordia are the effects of unity, and by these 
compound things exist as far as they have existence. ... Whatever is 
corrupted tends to non -existence.' 
1Mor. Manich., VI,8. 
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Whatever remnants of existence are retained qualify the whole, and it is 
called good. Moreover, whatever He has created, so long as it remains at 
all, remains good, for there is not anything outside (nihilo) that could 
possibly destroy it.1 
There is a certain hierarchy of values, or gradation of being, which 
is another integral part of Augustine's concept of existence, i.e., Augus- 
tine's concept regarding the nature of existence and its relation to evil. 
Existence is established on a descending scale of value, but the value is 
relative only to the supreme value who is God. That which exists, and which 
is not God, may fluctuate between greater or lesser value according to its 
intended purpose. More precisely speaking, this is true only of man and 
angels, for only they have the created ability to become other than they were 
created to be. A rock or a horse, for instance, retains its value or quality 
as a rock or horse, and there is no possibility of its becoming either more or 
less, as long as it remains. Men and angels, however, exercising that which 
is peculiar to them, namely, a "will ", may ascend or descend from that which 
they were created to be.2 This is not to suggest that either angels or men 
may become other than either angels or men, but what is implied is that as 
they ascend the scale of value, they approach nearer to God, and finally at- 
tain (not of themselves) a permanent position in His presence. It is stated 
thus: 
1Cf. Conf., VII,xiii,19 where we read: "And to Thee is there nothing 
at all evil, and not only to Thee, but to Thy whole creation; because there 
is nothing without which can break in, and mar that order which Thou hast 
appointed it. But in the parts thereof, some things, because they harmonize 
not with others, are considered evil; whereas those very things harmonize 
with others, and are good, and in themselves are good." 
2Cf. Ench. XII. 
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All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them 
all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are 
not, like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their 
good may be diminished and increased. But for good to be diminished 
is an evil, although, however much it may be diminished, it is nec- 
essary, if the being is to continue, that some good should remain 
to constitute the being. For however small or of whatever kind the 
being may be, the good which makes it a being cannot be destroyed 
without destroying the being itself.1 
We are being drawn toward the conclusion that evil "exists" only in 
a reflective sense. That is to say, that there is good, and that good is 
in an exclusive sense, makes it impossible and non -sensical to say alternate 
ly that evil is. Augustine was himself aware of the necessity of recog- 
nizing evil's presence on the one hand and of denying its "existence" on the 
other. To deny evil as a factor within the experience of man would suggest 
either blindness, dishonesty, or imperceptivity. On the other hand to speak 
of evil as a something which "exists" would lend credence to the Manichaean 
theory of the reality of an evil matter. By refusing to ascribe evil an 
independent "existence ", Augustine avoided dualism, but at the cost of an in- 
adequate treatment of God's personal relationship to man in relation to evil 
and sin. He struggled with this problem and concluded that there was perhaps 
no satisfactory answer.2 
Augustine's principle of the hierarchy of value enabled him to include 
evil within his theological system. Realizing that evil could not honestly 
be ignored, that it demanded some rationale within the structure, Augustine 
1Ench., XII. 
2Cf. Conf., VII,v,7. "Where, then, is evil, and whence, and how crept 
it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath it no being at 
all? Why, then, do we fear and shun that which hath no being? Or if we 
fear it needlessly, then surely is that fear evil whereby the heart is unnec- 
essarily pricked and tormented, ... . ... Or was there some evil matter of 
which He made and formed and ordered it, but left something in it which He 
did not convert into good? ... Was He powerless to change the whole lump, 
so that no evil should remain in it, seeing that He is omnipotent? ... Such 
like things did I revolve in my miserable breast, overwhelmed with most gnaw- 
ing cares lest I should die ere I discovered the truth; ... ." 
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very adeptly subsumed it beneath the higher principle of plenitude. Not 
all things are equal; ... there are some things better than others; and 
for this purpose are they unequal, in order that they might all exist. "1 
Here is noted another facet of Augustine's key doctrine: God creates what- 
ever exists; He could not create (being good) anything other than good; that 
which is not Him is imperfect (but still good); absolute equality of existence 
would not be aesthetic; therefore, inequality is necessary as an attribute of 
existence other than God, enabling all things to exist. At the same time, 
however, evil is only describable in relation to good. 
... although no one can doubt that good and evil are contraries, 
not only can they exist at the same time, but evil cannot exist 
without good, or in anything that is not good. Good, however, 
can exist without evil... . ... nothing can be wicked except a man or 
an angel; and so far as he is a man or an angel, he is good; so 
far as he is wicked, he is an evil. And these two contraries are 
so far co- existent, that if good did not exist in what is evil, 
neither could evil exist; because corruption could not have either 
a place to dwell in, or a source to spring from, if there were 
nothing that could be corrupted; and nothing can be corrupted 
except what is good, for corruption is nothing else but the des- 
truction of good. From what is good, then, evils arose, and 
except in what is good they do not exist; nor was there any other 
source from which any evil nature could arise. For if there were, 
then, in so far as this was a being, it was certainly good ... . 
It may be agreed that, as Augustine says, evil is only recognizable 
in relation to good, and that the elimination of good would consequently also 
be the elimination of evil. But, that is not the answer to the question why 
evil should exist at all. Good, after all, can exist without evil, so they 
do not bear the same structure of relation. Good is not dependent upon evil, 
either for its recognition or articulation. The validity of evil is related 
to its function, as Augustine says: 
3-Cit. God., I:XI,22, Ital. mine. 
2Ench., XIV, and cf. Trin. XIV,11. 
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... those evils which the faithful endure piously, are of profit 
either for the correction of sins, or for the exercising and prov- 
ing of righteousness, or to manifest the misery of this life, that 
the life where will be that true and perpetual blessedness may be 
desired more ardently, and sought out more earnestly. But it is 
on their account that these evils are still kept in being, ... .1 
The first two, correction of sins, and exercising and proving of righteous- 
ness, may be combined for our purpose; evil is maintained (assuming that 
God could, if He wished, eliminate it) in order that the faithful may be 
challenged. Without evil's presence there may be a tendency on the part of 
the faithful either to assume the battle over, and consequently to "drop 
their guard ", or to presume that they had won the battle, which would very 
possibly make them proud and liable again to fall. 
The third factor, "to manifest the misery of this life ", is of special 
interest; it is a clear expression of a world -denying attitude. Evil's 
function, not necessarily its first and foremost one, is to serve as a 
constant reminder of the fact that blessedness is not "of the earth ", but 
the anticipated glory of heaven. It is that heavenly blessedness that is 
to be earnestly sought. Evil's relation to good (in the case of the faithful) 
is that of patterned contribution. We do not imply that evil willingly serves 
good, but that it does indeed serve is certain,2 else it would not continue. 
We have summarized St. Augustine's doctrines of God, creation, and 
existence, and noted that God is primarily defined in categories and concepts 
suggestive of "distance ". Creatio ex nihilo, more fully developed in St. 
Augustine than his predecessors, is a doctrine which on the one hand refutes 
Manichaean dualism, but on the other hand effectually maximizes the separation 
between God and what God creates. It is apparent that Augustine's interpre- 
tation and articulation of the God -man relationship was not dependent upon the 
1Trin., XIII,xvi,20. 
2Cf. Cit. God., II:XIV,27. 
is' 
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use of terms of nearness, intimacy, or co- relation. His intended task was 
to establish a doctrine of God's being over against the world, both in respect 
to God's being (esse) over -against, and that of His being over -against. This 
appears to have been his rationale in the employment of the philosophical cat- 
egories of existence /non- existence which were aptly suited for his purpose.1 
Created existence, including man, is by nature good, and its retention 
of goodness is not as much a consideration of responsibility as it is one of 
a more philosophical category of the signification of existence. Responsibil- 
ity of "angels and men" is not completely ignored, but in Augustine's theology 
responsibility assumes a different coloration from that of, e.g., Emil Brunner's 
use of the term.2 Unity and the right order of created existence are the 
Augustinian terms which specify the desired status of creation wherein each 
form assumes "... its appropriate place in the hierarchy of being. "3 It is 
IExplicitly illustrative of this assertion is the following from John 
H.S. Burleigh, The City of God, A Study of St. Augustine's Philosophy, (London: 
Nisbet & Co., 1949), Hereafter: Augustine's Philosophy, p. 130: "... by Amor 
(or Dilectio or Caritas) Dei St. Augustine regularly means man's love for God. 
Indeed he is perplexed to find that Scripture frequently refers to God's love 
for man. No sane man will says fi.7 that He needs anything from us. 
Perhaps He makes use of us. 'Otherwise I am at a loss to discover in what 
way He can love us.' /De Doct. Christ. I,342 Curiously enough in his verse - 
by -verse commentary on St. John's Gospel he simply skips chapter 3 verse 16; 
God so loved the world. On I John 4.8ff., God is Love, he has little to the 
point. The harshness of his doctrine of grace, so offensive to modern senti- 
ment is due to the fact that he grounds it in the arbitrary will rather than 
in the loving Nature of God." 
2Cf. Infra, CHAPTER V, Sec. a.2, 
3Hick, Evil and God, p. 50. But cf. John Burnaby, Amor Dei, A Study of 
The Religion of St. Augustine, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938, Reprinted 1960), 
Hereafter: Religion of Augustine, Chapt. VI, and especially this characteriza- 
tion of Augustinian theology, p. 141: "To be joined to God is the supreme 
good for man, because there is no human goodness that is not the fruit of the 
marriage between the human spirit and the divine." And cf. Cit. God, X,3: 
"Being attached to Him, or rather let me say, re- attached, - for we had de- 
tached ourselves and lost hold of Him, - being, I say, re- attached to Him, we 
tend towards Him by love, that we may rest in Him, and find our blessedness by 
attaining that end. For our good, about which philosophers have so keenly 
contended, is nothing else than to be united to God." 
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within such a creation and in relation to such a God that we describe 
Augustine's concept of the imagó Dei. Consideration of creation, God, and 
existence, determined what Augustine was prepared to say about man, and 
similarly will enable us to describe and evaluate his concept of the imago 
Dei from an anthropological perspective. Three other concepts must be con- 
sidered, however, before the precise signification of the "image" emerges. 
The first is: 
c. Evil 
The explicit distinction between evil and sin in St. Augustine's 
thought must be appreciated. Sin, as we will discuss shortly, is that 
which relates to the moral decisions of men (and angels); evil, on the 
other hand, is a metaphysical construct by which is articulated the dis- 
tinction between what created existence is intended to be, and that which 
it often actually is. We have already noted that whatever is is good. 
Therefore we will expect that evil will not be granted an independent existence. 
For, whatever exists is good, and it would be inappropriate to assert that 
evil is good. Nevertheless, we will see that Augustine approaches precar- 
iously near to saying just that. Because God is pure existence, and creates 
subordinate existence having a specific value, any "declension" from God is 
a movement toward that which is of lesser value. That "movement" may be 
called evil. But, states Augustine: 
Now this decline does not initiate some other nature in a corrupt 
state, but it vitiates that which has been already created good. 
When this vitiation, however, has been healed, no evil remains; 
for although there was no doubt a vitium naturae, (since nature 
has received an injury), yet it was not vitium natura, (for nature 
was not itself essentially wrong).1 
1Augustine, On the Grace of Christ, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, 
XII, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Peter Holmes, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1874), 
I,20. Hereafter: Grace of Christ. And cf. Cit. God., I:XI,9, specifically 
this statement: "... the loss of good has received the name 'evil'." 
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Nature is and remains nature, and cannot, even in its association with evil, 
become other than nature. This is not to say, however, that in respect to 
a nature's particular relationship to God it remains constant; it may dimin- 
ish or increase commensurate with its adherence to or declension from H m.1 
Creation, being not God who is immutable, but being mutable, is consequently 
liable to exercise its possibility of change. Evil is therefore the diminu- 
tion of created existence; still, it must be remembered that that which is 
so diminished does not become evil, for whatever remains, remains good. There- 
fore, evil is a word descriptive of negation or loss.2 
In response to those who might prematurely conclude that Augustine's 
theology entirely eliminated evil, not only as an existence, but also as a 
"reality" which confronted creation, specifically man, let it be clearly under- 
stood that this was not Augustine's intention or conclusion. There is indeed 
that which is hostile to nature and to substance, and even though it cannot 
properly be ascribed the "dignity" of the term existence, it nevertheless de- 
scribes the movement or impulse to non -existence. In a sense, then, evil can 
best be described from the direction of its conclusion; in so far as evil 
leads to non -existence it is recognizable, even though it never has its own 
independent reality or being.3 
What implications for the imago Dei this concept of evil may have re- 
mains to be articulated. What is already established however is the essen- 
tial and necessary declaration that it is impossible to conceive of man's 
1Dy "nature" is meant all that exists other than God; its use does 
not distinguish between animate- inanimate, or organic- inorganic creation. 
2Cf. . Mor. Manich. , IV, 6. 
3 
Cf. Ibid., VIII, ll, and Cf. Hick, Evil and God, pp. 52 -53. 
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creation into existence which was subject to contrary powers. There is 
only one power, and He is God. This may suggest the creation of evil ex 
nihilo which is of particular interest in the question of theodicy, but for 
our purpose it is sufficient simply to note the tendency. The elimination 
of the existence of evil in substantialist terms will help clarify and sharpen 
the subsequent discussion of man and his involvement with sin. One might 
also anticipate that the relationship between God and man will be expressed 
primarily in impersonal terminology.) 
From Professor Hick's point of view Augustine's doctrine of evil as 
privatio boni is a salutary one, preventing the conclusion of either evil's 
co- existence with God or God's creation of it, and that its "... status with- 
in His universe is secondary and parasitic rather than primary and essential. "2 
Indeed, from the metaphysical perspective it is mandatory that evil should be 
considered parasitic, not con -substantial; but, from the perspective of the 
imago Dei we will be confronted with sin (sin being related morally to meta- 
physical evil) which may be technically secondary but which is practically 
speaking primary in its effect on the God -man relationship. 
d. Man and His Will 
The first and essential requisite toward an understanding of St. 
Augustine's total anthropology is that one be aware of his doctrine of the 
initial creation of both men and angels. Augustine's entire system proceeds 
from a theocentric analysis of all things, with the metaphysical overtones 
which have been considered. For him the next logical step in his attempt 
to understand and articulate the significance of man's present was to articu- 
late his "beginning ". We will not be surprised that St. Augustine, like his 
1Having previously introduced the adjective "personal" and now "imper- 
sonal" into the context of the God -man relationship, it should be noted that 
by personal is meant at least what is minimally implied: that applicable to 
both God and man are such terms as care, love, joy, integrity, responsibility, 
and relative freedom. 
2Hick, Evil and God., p. 61. 
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predecessors and contemporaries, was literalistic in his interpretation of 
the creation /fall narratives. There was general agreement that man at crea- 
-fro;n urkat 
tion was somehow "different" t6ciift he was subsequent to the fall. We are not 
concerned in this thesis to illustrate comparisons and contradictions among 
the Fathers of the Church,1 but to explicate specifically St. Augustine's 
treatment of the material. Our intention is to note his particular contri- 
butions and conclusions which were developed in respect to his doctrines of 
creation, Paradise, and fall. 
What St. Augustine asserted about angels is closely related to that 
which he says about man at the time of his initial creation. That God ini- 
tially intended to surround Himself with a worshipping congregation is a stated 
premise of the City of God, and that a "blank" was left in-that congregation 
as a result of certain angel's disobedience has already been mentioned.2 We 
will be concerned as to the reason for their disobedience only as it impinges 
on a similar defection by Adam. And, granting for the present, their created 
perfection and their participation in what Augustine calls the "blessed life ", 
we may inquire as to the reason or motivation of their fall. According to 
Augustine, there are two components of an intelligent being's "blessedness ": 
"... that it uninterruptedly enjoy the unchangeable good, which is God; and 
that it be delivered from all dubiety, and know certainly that it shall eter- 
nally abide in the same enjoyment. "3 It is quite apparent, according to Augus- 
tine, that not all angels retained their initial bliss, and one might ask, 
was the cause related to enjoyment or dubiety? If it were the first it could 
1Information of this type is available in such books as Williams, Fall 
and Original Sin. 
2Cf. supra, pp. 112f, especially p. 113, n.2. Indeed, this motive 
or intention of God in creation is significantly qualified by references such 
as: "... by the words, 'God saw that it was good' it is sufficiently intimated 
that God made what was made not from any necessity, nor for the sake of supply- 
ing any want, but solely from His own goodness, i.e., because it was good." 
Cit. God, I:XI,24. 
3Cit. God., I:XI,13. 
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reasonably be concluded that there was in fact a built -in "failure factor ", 
i.e., that their disparate creation was, at least in part, responsible for 
their defection. This would appear to make God co- responsible. 
On the other hand, reasons Augustine, to conclude that there was in 
fact an initial disparity between them in respect to their certainty of e- 
ternal enjoyment does not lead to the same conclusion. God cannot be accused 
of complicity. Especially significant is the conclusion that God's created, 
intelligent beings, whether men or angels, bear full, complete and total re- 
sponsibility for their defection from an absolutely perfect created existence. 
St. Augustine's thought occasionally approaches the point where he 
might logically ascribe some degree of responsibility for sin to God; he 
may have been so inclined. But, preservation of the absolute supremacy of 
God's existence and its immutability necessarily would have prevented him 
from even the most guarded suggestion that God may be related to His creation 
at that level. He did assert that there was a difference in their (angel's 
and men's) "wills and desires" but definitely not in their natures. We have 
seen that nature is, because created by God, good, and that prior to any de- 
fection from its created goodness it was uniformly good, even though mutable. 
So, speaking of angels and their decisions, Augustine says: 
While some stedfastly continued in that which was the common good 
of all, namely, in God Himself...; others, being enamoured rather 
of their own power, as if they could be their own good, lapsed to 
this private good of their own ... and, bartering the lofty dignity 
of eternity for the inflation of pride, ... they became proud, de- 
ceived, envious.' 
The perilous position of suggesting God's co- responsibility is somewhat 
diminished when one understands that "to stedfastly continue" and to "enjoy the 
unchangeable good" implies that to and for which angels were created; that 
was their blessing. 
1Cit. God., I:XII,l. 
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This qualification, as it were, is more clearly stated in another 
place in which Augustine asks, "But who can determine to what extent they 
were partakers of that wisdom before they fell ? "1 The wisdom to which he 
refers is that of the realization of the blessedness into which they had been 
created. The most significant word in the reference is "partaker ", /parti- 
ci es ; soon thereafter he also used the word "participated" articipatione7. 
The wisdom was there, the blessedness surrounded them; they did not take 
advantage of their proper blessing, but reached for more. 
While this may remove the "peril" of God's complicity from one per- 
spective it does not offer protection from another. Augustine did not pur- 
sue his line of reasoning to its conclusion. If the angels did not equally 
"participate ", and granting they were created equal by God, the next logical 
question is: why did they not equally participate? To answer - that 
obviously they chose not to do so is simply to beg the question and drive it 
further ad infinitum.2 We will leave the matter at this point, and resume 
a similar line of thought within our discussion of the fall of man, and the 
evil will. But introducing the subject of evil's cause, by way of expansion 
of the discussion of evil in the present section, facilitates a more thorough 
evaluation. 
1Cit. God., I:XI,ll, and the reference continues: "For if they had 
equally participated in this true knowledge, then the evil angels would have 
remained eternally blessed equally with the good, because they were equally 
expectant of it." 
2Cf. Hick, Evil and God, p. 69, the following objection: "If the 
angels are finitely perfect, then even though they are in some important sense 
free to sin they will never in fact do so. If they do sin we can only infer 
that they were not flawless - ... ." 
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d.l. The Cause of the Evil Will 
It has been stated that Augustine's doctrine of evil involves a 
metaphysical construct of existence and non -existence. Created existence, 
because created by God, is in itself good, and remains good as long as it 
remains at all. Evil is essentially a defection from existence, a tendency 
toward non -existence, and is a particular inclination of men and angels who are 
by creation, by an exercise of the will, mutable. But, the cause of the evil 
will is a question with which Augustine struggled. Though Augustine does not 
specifically assert that the will is created, it might reasonably be inferred 
that it, like everything which is, was created by God, and bears the mark of 
God's creation. That the will is not self -created may be granted; but can 
the same be granted in respect to the evil will? Evil does not "exist "; 
the will does exist. Therefore, an evil will "exists" in respect to that by 
which one decides to "decline" from his initial level of existence.l But, 
what is its cause? Whence its origin? Augustine's theory proceeded thus: 
Let no one ... look for an efficient cause of the evil will /fficientem 
causam malae voluntatis7; for it is not efficient /fficiens7, but 
deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting, of something, but a 
defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has 
less of being, - that is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek 
to discover the causes of these defections, - causes, as I have said, 
not efficient, but deficient, - is as if some one sought to see darkness, 
or hear silence ... . For those things which are known not by their 
actuality, but by their want of it, are known, if our expression may be 
allowed and understood, by not knowing them, that by knowing them 
they may not be known... .2 
1This particular argument is not one which I have chosen to introduce; 
it is rather "internal" to the theology of Augustine, and is debated here 
only to illustrate that I consider to be the inherent inadequacies of his 
conclusions based on his theological presuppositions and doctrines of "exis- 
tence" and Paradise. 
2Cit. God., I:XII,7. And cf. Ibid., I:XII,9: "... the will is made 
evil by nothing else than defection from God, - a defection of which the 
cause, too, is certainly deficient." 
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First, we need to consider his statement that the "will itself is 
not an effecting of something, but a defect." This is an a- typical asser- 
tion regarding the will, at least in respect to its created potential. It is 
not likely that the will to which Augustine here refers is the will at its 
initial creation, but rather the will which has already become involved in 
evil. Because of the relationship of all created existence to non- existence, 
having been created ex nihilo, there exists the possibility of the will's vol- 
untary defection from its created existence.l Therefore, speaking practi- 
cally and from within the situation of man, post -fall, the will by its misuse 
has not affected anything (it has defected) and that which has resulted from 
its choice is not any new existence, per se, but only a diminished existence. 
It is likely that this is what Augustine was implying by that apparently 
imprecise statement. 
Secondly, we need to interpret the subtleties of efficient /deficient 
causes. Augustine would apparently rest his case regarding the question of 
the will's cause on this distinction. It may have to be granted that of 
itself a defection defies definition, and that it requires something over 
against which it may be compared. The "not knowing" is our only indication 
that it (deficiency) is present. 
But it appears that St. Augustine has altered the original quest from 
that of determining the cause of the evil will to an analysis of the nature 
of deficiency. To say, therefore, that "deficiency" is inexplicable (and 
we will have to agree) is not to consider the first question raised, namely, 
the cause of such deficiency. Augustine insists that the "cause ", whatever 
1Cf. Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, The Works of Aurelius 
Augustine, XII, ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Peter Holmes, (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1874), II,48. Hereafter: Mar. and Concup. Note especially: "... 
the evil will could not arise out of good, in the sense that good was made by 
the good God, but because it was created out of nothing - not out of God." 
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it is, is necessarily voluntary and that consequently it is impossible to 
ascribe the fault to either nature (good) or God.l The cause does not 
become an unidentifiable "nothing" on the basis that its result is a defici- 
ency; indeed, the "cause" which is able to produce an evil will would seem 
of necessity to have both its "existence" and its "cause ", which for the 
present we will leave undetermined. 
It would seem that St. Augustine's foundational doctrine regarding 
the nature of God, specifically His absolute existence and consequent dis- 
tinction from mutable existence, and of course his understanding of creatio 
ex nihilo, effectually prevented him from even entertaining the possibility 
that God's initial relationship with His creation (specifically man and 
angels) included any imperfection. That is to say, because of both the 
nature of God and creation, no possibility existed that all was not perfect. 
The incursion of imperfection (the evil will) could not be from God; it 
could not be from nature.2 Men are punished because of it; therefore, 
man is its source. But, man as created is "perfect ". The enigma seems 
apparent.3 
1Cf. Cit. God., I:XII,8: "... the will could not become evil were it 
unwilling to become so; and therefore its failings are justly punished being 
not necessary, but voluntary. For its defections are not to evil things 
/iala7 but are themselves evil [ale7; that is to say, are not towards things 
that are naturally and in themselves evil, but the defection of the will is 
evil, because it is contrary to the order of nature, and an abandonment of 
that which hap supreme being for that which has less." And cf. Augustine, 
The Problem of Free Choice, Ancient Christian Writers, XXII, eds., Johannes 
Quasten, Joseph C. Plumpe, trans., Dom Mark Pontifex, (London: Longmans, 
Green; Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1955), Hereafter: Free Choice. 
See especially: I,1; 1II,17,48,49. 
2Cf. Free Choice, II,53. 
3So it seems also to Hick. Cf. Evil and God, pp. 66 -67: "... what 
Augustine's doctrine really amounts to is, I think, clear enough: evil willing 
is a self -originating act, and is as such not explicable in terms of causes 
that are distinguishable from the agent himself. Thus the origin of evil lies 
for ever hidden within the mystery of finite freedom; ... ." 
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Our concern is not to debate the internal enigma of St. Augustine's 
formulations, but primarily to explicate those areas of his thought which 
impinge on his understanding of the imago Dei. It is apparent from the fore- 
going argument that for him, God's creation (men and angels) is the source of 
its own defection, but as to the motivation or cause of its becoming involved 
in evil, we are left with a riddle. However, the so- called riddle which we 
discover, and which Augustine thoroughly appreciated, was not "neutral "; it 
was not consigned to a filing place for paradoxes, but rather hung suspended 
like a Damoclean sword over all of St. Augustine's theology, especially that 
having to do with his doctrine of sin and anthropology. Inexplicable as was 
the cause of the evil will, Augustine did not hesitate to ascribe its origin 
to the free decision of angels first, and then to man. And it was that as- 
cription that exercised such profound influence in the development of the 
doctrine of original sin. It is to that development and the attendant issues 
that we now turn. 
d.2. Adam: Before the Fall 
Now it was expedient /portebat7 that man should be at first so created, 
as to have it in his power both to'will what was right and to will 
what was wrong; not without reward'if he willed the former, and not 
without punishment if he willed the latter.' 
Augustine's choice of the word "expedient" may well occasion a 
question: for whom was it expedient that man should be created with this 
double freedom, having both power to will right and wrong? If one should 
say, expedient for God, we immediately recall that this might imply that 
one 'thing was better for God than another, and that He might be affected by 
particular alternatives. But, the immutability of God renders the consid- 
erations "better" and "worse" quite irrelevant. Therefore the question of 
lEnch., CV. 
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expedience cannot apply to God, and we turn to the question of its applic- 
ability to man. 
The initial reaction might be emphatically to reject the suggestion 
that such "power" was at all expedient for man, considering what has become 
the nature of post- fallen Adam as a result of the tragic use of that power. 
But, we do need to press the possibility further, and place it within the 
context of Augustine's speculations in regard to pre -fallen man. That has 
been said regarding the condition of angels (supra, pp.l26ff) and their de- 
fection is appropriate here. It was noted that there was a created "dif- 
ference" between those who remained in their created relationship and those 
who defected; the difference was that of their created wills and desires. 
That much had to be asserted in order to interpret the assertion that there 
are blessed angels as well as condemned ones. 
The situation regarding man, pre- and post -fallen, is somewhat 
different in so far as that while there are now angels enjoying eternal 
blessedness, there are no men of like blessedness; those whom God ordains 
wait until the resurrection. But, that difference is not critical for our 
purpose. One may evaluate St. Augustine's speculation relative to man as 
he was in the beginning, keeping in mind the raised and unanswered question 
about the expedience of man's created powers of decision. 
There are strong hints that the continuation of man's blessedness 
was contingent upon the realization of his dependence on God. 
... by that precept He gave, God commended obedience, which is, 
in a sort, the mother and guardian of all the virtues in the 
reasonable creature, which was so created that submission is ad- 
vantageous to it, while the fulfilment of its own will in prefer- 
ence to the Creator's is destruction. 
1Cit. God., II:XIV,12. 
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Obedience, if it is to express any measure of significance, necessitates 
at least the opportunity for alternate decisions. One might agree that 
if the created situation were as it was described by Augustine, the "free 
choice situation "1 (i.e., bi -polar power, and the advantage of submission) 
would also seem appropriate and consistent. However, Augustine's character- 
ization of pre -fallen existence is questionable (we would say, fallacious). 
What Augustine asserts according to the above reference is that God presented 
man with a decision situation (the tree) and that obedience was a more blessed 
state than disobedience. But that man was in fact equipped with power to 
decide is certain, at least according to Augustine. 
Augustine continues the obedience theme a step further when he states 
that God, 
... in order to make a wholesome obedience easy to him, had given 
him a single very brief and very light precept by which He re- 
minded that creature whose service was to be free that He was 
Lord, ... .2 
It is stated that the purpose of the commandment was that man might be 
reminded that he (man) was not Lord, but rather that God was. There is 
an implication, however subtle, that man who had been so perfectly created, 
and who enjoyed the fullest possible communion with God, might possibly 
"forget" his position, and attempt to assert himself above his created status. 
Interestingly, St. Augustine makes statements which precipitate such conclu- 
sions but never, as far as we can determine, substantiates his presuppositions. 
He rests the case on the, for him, reasonable assumption that freedom implies 
possibility of decision; both Scripture and experience predicate a "fall "; 
1An excellent discussion of this topic is included in Antony Flew 
and Alasdair Macintyre, eds., New Essays in Philosophical Theology, in 




God is in no way responsible; man is; therefore, man asserted himself, 
and that is evil. So, at least, proceeds the argument according to 
Augustine. 
When we inquire further into the precise nature of that will by 
which the decision was made, the fall effected, we are reminded of the 
enigma which was encountered in respect to the consideration of the angel's 
created disparity (cf. supra, pp. 126ff.). There was, it was seen, a created 
distinction of their desire and will; in respect to man, the distinction is 
rather in relation to grace (aid). The distinction is not as obvious as it 
might be, perhaps because of the complexity of thought. What we will seek 
to discover and articulate is the exact difference between first, man at crea- 
tion (pre-fallen), second, man as Augustine subsequently defined him (post - 
fall ) and, third, man as Augustine thought he might be at the consummation 
(heaven). 
The first man had not that grace by which he should never will 
to be evil; but assuredly he had that in which if he willed to 
abide he would never be evil, and without which, moreover, he 
could not of free choice be good, but which, nevertheless, by 
free choice he would forsake. God, therefore, did not will even 
him to be without His grace, which He left in his free choice; be- 
cause free -will is sufficient for evil, but is of little avail 
for good, unless it is aided by Omnipotent Good.' 
According to Augustine, Adam in Paradise had as a "potential" 
that grace or aid of God which was necessary for the perpetuation of his 
blessedness. But, it is imperative that we recognize that such grace was 
potential; it was not an inherent quality of man, as, i.e., his foot or 
intellect. Its relation, therefore, to man's decision -making ability was 
1Augustine, A Treatise on Rebuke and Grace, The Works of Aurelius 
Augustine, XV, ed., Marcus Dods, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest 
Wallis, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1876), 31. Hereafter: Rebuke. The 
quotation continues: "And if that man had not forsaken that assistance of 
his free -will, he would always have been good; but he forsook it, and he was 
forsaken. Because such was the nature of the aid, that he could forsake it 
when he would, and that he could continue in it when he would; but not such 
that he could be made to will his continuance." 
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as a gift being offered, available for the taking, but not forced upon him. 
The first sentence of the above reference can be clearly understood as af- 
firming that man did not have the power to remain in blessedness; it was 
potentially there, but man had to exercise discretion in order to utilize it. 
As Augustine continues, God wanted man to utilize His aid, but allowed Adam 
to decide even that. 
Immortality, such as the good angels enjoy, was the unachieved po- 
tential of pre -fallen Adam, a potential that he relinquished by the asser- 
tion of his will in an evil manner. Augustine does not suggest that Adam was 
fully aware of the implications of his choice; perhaps the dubiety which was 
noted in reference to the discussion of the angels would apply here also 
(cf. supra, pp.126ff.). But, that immortality was within Adam's range of 
possibilities, there is no doubt. We are not, however, given to understand 
that Adam's promised immortality would have been his by way of achievement; 
it, like the immortality which is promised the elect, would similarly have 
been by grace. And, there was no deficiency of God's grace; rather, there 
was the refusal on Adam's part to utilize it.1 
If our question were that of theodicy, we might recognize that it is 
at this point that the foundations tremble. The question must arise, how 
is it possible to maintain belief in God's creation of a perfectly good man, 
who would so foolishly ignore that which was necessary for his survival? 
That it is inconceivable seems apparent, and the theodicy fails. As inter- 
esting as is the question of'theodicy, however, our interest is in the imago 
1Cf. Ench., CVI, where we read: "The former immortality man lost 
through the exercise of his free -will; the latter he shall obtain through 
grace, whereas, if he had not sinned, he should have obtained it by desert. 
Even in that case, however, there could have been no merit without grace; 
because, although the mere exercise of man's free -will was sufficient to bring 
in sih, his free -will would not have sufficed for his maintenance in right- 
eousness, unless God had assisted it by imparting a portion of His unchange- 
able goodness... ." 
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Dei. But the context is not unrelated; the emphasis is transferred from God 
to man and it proceeds thus: how is it conceivable that such a perfectly cre- 
ated being would despise or ignore so great a grace? That it is inconceiv- 
able would suggest that perhaps one should modify his interpretation regard- 
ing man's original condition. But Augustine asserts, "... that he willed 
not to continue is absolutely the fault of him whose merit it would have been 
if he had willed to continue; ... . "1 That Augustine's inclination was to 
"blame" man to sustain his concept of God seems quite evident, and that his 
inclination proceeds from the theological position which was described in 
section one, coupled with a literal interpretation of the creation -fall nar- 
ratives is becoming increasingly manifest. 
As far as we were able to determine, there is but one reference in 
Augustine that might be considered an "extenuating circumstance" for Adam's 
first tragic decision. The Devil who is a fallen angel, being superior to 
the serpent, was able to use him (the serpent) for his evil purpose, and 
assaulted the "weaker part of the alliance ", not believing that he would suc- 
ceed with man who was the stronger of the two. Augustine concludes that 
the prompting of Eve, the weaker one, indicates that Adam was not deceived 
by either the Devil or his wife, but that "... he by the drawings of kindred 
yielded to the woman ... [because h7 could not bear to be severed from his 
only companion. "2 
Even though this does appear to be an attempt to provide some measure 
of mitigation, we soon realize that St. Augustine's minimal acknowledgement 
of a possible "rationale" of Adam's fall is compensated by maximal attention 
and effort directed toward the condemnation of man. 
1Rebuke, 32. The quotation continues: "If, however, this help had been 
wanting ... they certainly would not have fallen by their own fault, because 
the help would have been wanting without which they could not continue." 
2Cit. God., II:XIV,11. 
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Our first parents fell into disobedience because already they 
were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done 
had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our 
evil will but pride? ... The wicked deed, then, - that is to say, 
the transgression of eating the forbidden fruit, - was committed 
by persons who were already wicked. ... The devil, ... would not 
have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God 
had forbidden had man not already begun to live for himself.1 
The locus of man's self -perversion is not external to man himself, 
Augustine would assert. But, he does not articulate the rationale of man's 
self- exaltation, nor does he attempt to define its origin. We are not told 
why man as he was created should have attempted the impossible (and incompre- 
hensible) feat of achieving parity with God; we are simply informed, a post- 
eriori, that Adam (and Eve) consciously and intentionally essayed such incred- 
ible lunacy. That man had "already begun to live for himself" before the 
"actual" sin of eating the forbidden fruit is a fundamental theory in Augus- 
tine's doctrine of creation and fall, - fundamental because it was imperative 
that blame should be ascribed to man, and to man alone. For if blame were 
not so precisely located, questions could conceivably remain regarding the 
perfection of the creation ex nihilo, which in turn would cast doubt on the 
doctrine of God's omnipotence, and His exclusive, unchallengeable sovereignty. 
The awareness of disharmony, disorder, enmity, suffering, and all such "symptoms" 
of sin required a locus; the locus was, at least for Augustine, none other 
than man's primal self -assertion. 
It will not be profitable for us to return to the question that occu- 
pied us in the preceding section regarding the cause of the evil will, but it 
is instructive to note again how Augustine utilized those conclusions. On 
the basis of an inexplicably perverse use of a free will, man, by succumbing 
to his equally inexplicable pride, asserted himself and elicited eternal con- 
sequences, which we will consider in the following. 
1Cit. God., II:XN,13. 
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d.3. Adam: After the Fall 
By what means is it brought about that man exists with sin? Is it 
through the necessity of his nature, or through the choice of his 
will [per naturae necessitatem, an per arbitrii libertatem7? If 
it is through the necessity of his nature, he is blameless; if 
through his own will, then the question arises, from whom has he 
received this freedom of will? No doubt from God. Well, but 
that which God bestows is certainly good. This cannot be gainsaid. 
On what principle, then, is a thing proved to be good, if it is 
more prone to evil than to good? For there is greater proneness 
to evil than to good in an arrangement which renders it impossible 
for a man to live without sin. The answer is this: It came to 
pass by the exercise of free will that man associated himself 
with sin; but a penal viciousness closely followed thereon, and out 
of the liberty produced necessity ... . Because the will turned to 
sinning, the hard necessity of possessing sin pursued the sinner.' 
We will not have to consider again the discussion regarding the 
origin of man's evil will, or the perfect goodness of man's primal condi- 
tion. Augustine's position has been clearly articulated. What concerns 
us at this time is man who "exists with sin ". Something new has been in- 
troduced into the life style of man, an alien factor has been established. 
We are not permitted, because of what St. Augustine has taught about the 
goodness of all things that "exist ", to assume that the sin with which man 
exists has a being, per se. It, like evil itself, will have to be regarded 
as a defection, a diminution. Perhaps more properly speaking, sin should be 
spoken of and understood as the effect of the diminution which is evil. 
Nevertheless, man now lives in and with sin, and the question inevi- 
tably arises as to its necessity [ecessitas7. If it could be shown that 
necessity is properly ascribed to man's initially created nature, then indeed 
God would either bear or share responsibility with man for the fall. If on 
the other hand, as has already been determined, the introduction of evil /sin 
is due, not to nature, but to a voluntary defection from nature, then man is 
1Augustine, Treatise on the Perfection of Man's Righteousness, The 
Works of Aurelius Augustine, IV ed., Marcus Dods, trans., Peter Holmes, 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1872) IV,9. Hereafter: Perf. Right. 
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completely and entirely self- responsible. Initially man was neither more 
prone to evil than to good; else God would share co- responsibility. There 
was apparently in man's original state, a co- equality of option, toward either 
good or evil, and man had to decide for one or the other. But whereas that 
co- equality was a primal possibility, Augustine contends that man's post - 
fallen inheritance is that of necessity. It is clearly understood, however, 
that for this necessity God bears no responsibility; it is the logical and 
necessary result of man's defection. He now finds it impossible to live 
without sin. 
It may be objected that this necessity is not of a logical sort or 
nature, and that it should not therefore be concluded that there is an in- 
herent causal relationship between fall and necessity. Augustine did indeed 
acknowledge that "God in His justice abandoned him San] to himself, ... ",1 
and this infers a God -response context. But God's direct and personal re- 
sponse is not a factor to which Augustine devoted considerable attention - 
on this particular and specific subject. His conceptualization of the phy- 
sical complexion of existence (Creator and creature) and terminology which 
might suggest a more social structure of the God -man relation are uncongenial. 
It is further to be noted that that to which God abandoned man was not 
precisely "to himself ", but to "... live dissatisfied with himself in a hard 
and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, ... 
'Cit. God., II:XIV,15. 
2But cf. Burnaby, Religion of Augustine, pp. 168 -72, and his comments 
on Augustinian interpretation of redemption, and specifically p. 169: "... 
what is always uppermost in his mind when he speaks of Christ's Incarnation 
and Death - ... - is the love of God shown forth therein." 
3Cit. God., II:XIV,15. 
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At the risk of repetition, it should be recalled that because of the good 
"nature" of all that exists, the bondage under which man falls is more char- 
acteristic of the imagination than reality. It has been concluded (Supra, 
section b.) that in so far as even the devil exists, he is "good ", and con- 
sequently, man is not under the lordship of a totally alien power. Whatever 
power inheres in the devil is a power given and allowed by God. It is not 
to be understood as if there were an actually and independently existing 
person (angel) under whose direct dominion man now lives and serves. 
That man, however, has descended from his primal state having the 
freedom to will either good or evil is made manifest by his impotence. And 
this is man's misery, according to Augustine. It is man's incapacity to 
effect those things he desires, and his apparent inability to rectify the 
situation that is the clearest illustration of the fall. .Granted, says Aug- 
ustine, he was not omnipotent in his original created status - he was not God - 
but his relative power was sufficient; he could do whatever he willed to do. 
Therefore, "... in consequence of his not being willing to do what he could 
do, he now wills to do what he cannot. "1 
We should not conclude, however, that man's post- fallen will is total- 
ly incapacitated; man has not become completely impotent, only relatively so. 
And it is this relative incapacity that is painful to man, reminding him of 
his once perfect original life. "For he who laments the peace his nature has 
lost is stirred to do so by some relics of peace which makes his nature friend- 
ly to itself. "2 This is one of the clearest expressions of the painful con- 
sequences of the fall; man's will, broken, embondaged, and impotent, is not 
2-Cit. God., II:XIV,15. 
2Ibid., II:XIX,13. 
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yet destroyed. And its weakness is a constant remainder of its primal 
blessedness and present curse.1 
Assistance, aid, or grace of a nature different from that available 
to pre -fallen Adam is now required. As he had the grace whereby he could 
choose the good if he would, he had not the aid to will, (supra, especially 
p.135) but only the potential. But now, after the fall 
. we have that help without which we cannot continue even if we will, 
jo it was with Adam but, moreover, we have so great and such a 
help as (to cause us) to will. Because by this grace of God there 
is caused in us, in the reception of good and in the persevering 
hold of it, not only to be able to do what we will, but even to 
will to do what we are able.2 
There is a possibility of misinterpreting Augustine at this point; he is not 
asserting that in the present there are any who are completely and entirely 
both aware of the good and at the same time entirely able to effect the good. 
Man in the present is, as we have seen, subject to the ambivalence of relative 
impotence. There is, however, a distinction between those who are elect and 
those eternally condemned; the former have been granted by grace the ability 
to do something of what they are willing to do, and also to will as much as 
they are able, whereas the latter suffer deficiency both in will and ability. 
Likewise, when Augustine states that the "... will itself had to be freed 
from bondage in which it was held by sin and death, ... , "3 he is implying 
not a complete freedom which would in effect be an anticipation of heavenly 
blessedness, but a relative one. It must always be remembered, however, that 
whatever measure of freedom is restored to man is entirely of grace; Augustine 
1Cf. Conf., VIII,ix,21: "The mind commands the mind to will, and yet, 
though it be itself, it obeyeth not. Whence this monstrous thing? and why 
is it? I repeat, it commands itself to will, and would not give the command 
unless it willed; yet is not that done which it commandeth. But it willeth 
not entirely; therefore it commandeth not entirely. For so far forth it 
commandeth, as it willeth; and so far forth is the thing commanded not done, 
as it willeth not." 
2Rebuke, 32. 3Ench., CVI. 
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entertains no notions of residual power in terms of man's freedom to will. 
"For it was by the evil use of his free -will that man destroyed both it and 
himself. For, as a man who kills himself ... cannot restore himself to life; 
so, when man by his own free -will sinned, then sin being victorious over him, 
the freedom of his will was lost. "1 
We are given no reason to minimize the finality and seriousness of 
the terms Augustine employs. Man's self -assertion was a suicide; his free- 
will is lost. But, by grace, says Augustine, man is made alive again, and 
free -will is restored. 
d.4. The New Adam: Heaven 
Augustine's interest in the freedom of man's will was indeed directed 
to its involvement in life situations, i.e., in the matter of ethics, or how 
a man makes up his mind as a Christian, but his bi -polar orientation was pre- 
dominantly directed to what we might call a pre - and post -history, Paradise 
and the Beata vita.2 And his vision of perfect freedom, more perfect cer- 
t airily than that of Paradise, was that of the heavenly life. Speaking of man, 
freedom, and heaven, he says: 
... in the future life it shall not be in his San'.7 power to 
will evil; and yet this will constitute no restriction on the free- 
dom of his will. On the contrary, his will shall be much freer when 
it shall be wholly impossible for him to be the slave of sin.3 
Ench., XXX. 
2This statement must be qualified by the acknowledgement of the strong 
ethical overtones that are in fact present in Augustine. We read in the chap- 
ter written by Thomas J. Bigham and Albert T. Mollegan in Battenhouse, Study, 
of Augustine, p. 371: "The Augustinian theological ethic is a real synthesis 
of Neoplatonism and the New Testament. Its influence in the history of the 
West and of Western. Christianity can hardly be overestimated; ... ." 
3Ench., CV. The continuation of the reference enlarges the same thought 
and also includes a comment on the first and second immortality: "... God's 
arrangement was not to be broken, according to which He willed to show how good 
is a rational being who is able even to refrain from sin, and yet how much 
better is one who cannot sin at all; just as that was an inferior sort of 
144. 
That there should be no misunderstanding of the reference, it should be noted 
that properly speaking the elect while still on earth are not slaves of sin, 
in that they do not serve sin both completely and willingly, for they are 
recipients of God's grace to will and do the good, albeit imperfectly. The 
consummate re- creation of man's freedom is to be effected not on earth, in 
life, but after death, in heaven. And, the completest freedom which Augus- 
tine envisages is that freedom for which it shall be impossible for man to 
will evil, "to be the slave of sin ". To be free only to will and do the good 
is an Augustinian ideal, although it may be questioned whether or not such a 
use of the word "free" is meaningful. 
It could be suggested with some justification that Augustine over- 
develops his "case" against mans in order, it would appear, to assert the 
magnificence of God and the future glory of heaven. The litigation is firmly 
established on the basis of certain well -defined (but debatable) attributes of 
immortality, and yet it was immortality, when it was possible for man to avoid 
death, although there is reserved for the future a more perfect immortality, 
when it shall be impossible for man to die." We note here, in the first part 
of the reference beginning with "God's arrangement ... He willed ... and how 
much better ..." an atypical imprecision of language. It is possible to 
conclude from the text that God in fact willed not only to illustrate the 
goodness of man who is able to refrain from sin (that would be pre -fallen Adam) 
but also, and still according to God's intention, how much better is a man who 
is incapable of sin (that would have to be the fallen -and- restored, heavenly 
man.) This could be interpreted to mean that Adam was a poor and expendable 
means to a better and permanent end, in which case one could conclude that God 
prepared man to fall. This certainly was not Augustine's intention. 
1Cf. Ench., XXVII which offers one of the clearest expressions of 
Augustine's denunciations of man: "... would it not have been quite just, 
that the being who rebelled against God, who in the abuse of his freedom 
spurned and transgressed the command of his Creator when he could so easily 
have kept it, who defaced in himself the image of his Creator by stubbornly 
turning away from His light, who by an evil use of his free -will broke away 
from his wholesome bondage to the Creator's laws, - would it not have been 
just that such a being should have been wholly and to all eternity deserted 
by God, and left to suffer everlasting punishment he had so richly earned ?" 
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God and an altogether perfect primal creation of man. Granting both of 
those elements, man does properly and justifiably deserve the severest sen- 
tence of condemnation and to be eternally abandoned by God. God cannot be 
held accountable.1 
Heaven is the exercise of a will that cannot sin by a man who cannot 
die; this is a fundamental principle which emerges from Augustine's theology. 
One perceives again the necessity of his initial premises: that perfect ex- 
istence (God) is perfectly good and immutable; that created existence is good, 
but mutable, and perfect until the only creation with free -will maliciously 
exercised that will self- assertively, and occasioned, by declension, swift 
retribution, the condemnation of God. Heaven will not be a restoration of 
creation, but a re- creation. Free -will will then be so "free" as not to be 
able to sin, and immortality will be more perfect than originally inasmuch as 
it will not be a potential immortality, and liable to loss, but an actual one, 
impossible to lose. 
e. Sin: Its Presence and Transmission 
It would be advantageous, if it were possible, to finally and absolute- 
ly distinguish between sin and evil as the terms are employed by Augustine. 
Even though he uses the word "evil" to denote metaphysical imperfection, i.e. 
the declension from existence, it is not thereby completely devoid of moral 
connotations customarily associated with sin. Sin, he says, is "... the des- 
1Cf. Cit. God., I:XII,2l: "... Man ... whose nature was to be a mean 
between the angelic and bestial, He created in such a sort, that if he re- 
mained in subjection to his Creator as his rightful Lord, and piously kept His 
commandments, he should pass into the company of angels, and obtain, without 
the intervention of death, a blessed and endless immortality; but if he of- 
fend the Lord his God by a proud and disobedient use of his free will, he 
would become subject to death, and live as the beasts do, - the slave of 
appetite, and doomed to eternal punishment after death." And, cf. Ibid., 
I:XIII,1. 
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pising of the will of God, ... "1 but similarly, "... evil had never been, 
had not the mutable nature - ... - brought evil upon itself by sin. "2 In 
a universe so thoroughly theocentric as Augustine conceived it, there is no 
possibility of establishing a precise distinction between the two terms, evil 
and sin.3 Only for the sake of organization, therefore, will a distinction 
be made; evil will denote the metaphysical construct, existence /non- existence, 
while sin will denote evil from the perspective of the will's evil intention 
and results. 
Sin, with which we are presently concerned, is to be distinguished 
from the use of the word in the plural, sins.4 It is the inherited condition 
of all men, from which condition the acts of sin inevitably proceed. The term, 
original sin, will be employed in the Augustinian sense of that which denotes 
the sin descriptive of man's (Adam's) first declension from God.5 Sin's 
presence is realized, according to Augustine, by the on -going presence and 
'Cit. God., II:XIV,15. 
2Ibid., II:XXII,l. 
3Cf. Marion Le Roy Burton, The Problem of Evil, (Chicago: Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1909), pp. 21 -26. And in Trin., XIII,xvi,20 we read: 
"... all the evils of this world, and the griefs and labours of men, although 
they come from the deserts of sins, and especially of original sin, whence life 
itself too became bound by the bond of death, yet have fitly remained, even 
when sin is forgiven; ... ." 
4Cf. Free Choice, III,54: Wrong actions done, right actions not done 
are "... called sins because they draw their origin from the first sin which 
was committed freely, and which brought about these effects as a due con- 
sequence." 
5Cf. Mar. and Concup., II,57,: "Whence it came to pass, that our 
nature Laturar having then and there been deteriorated by that vast sin of 
the first man, not only became actively sinful, but also generates sinners; 
and yet the very weakness, under which the virtue of a holy life has drooped 
and died, is not really nature, but a vitiated state thereof; ... ." 
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reality of death. Immortality, as we have noted (supra, p.136), was the 
gift (potential) which would have been granted to Adam had he remained will- 
ingly subject to his Creator, but which was lost as a consequence of his self - 
assertion. 
We should not expect lengthy consideration of what might be called 
the personal instrumentation of sin's punishment. That is to say, Augustine 
devotes little attention to the question regarding how, for instance, God (or 
the devil) punished man; the practice of evil conveys its misery in a most 
impersonal, cause and effect relationship. For mutable existence (man) to 
decline from Existence (God) is automatically to reap the reward of death. 
That the devil is mentioned as he who inflicted the sinful "wound" "... at 
that fatal moment of the fall ... "1 is more a homiletic device than a careful 
statement of the actual process. That the devil's power is allowed by God, 
and within His control, makes it evident that properly speaking it was not the 
devil, but God Himself, who inflicted the wound. Even more exactly speaking, 
however, the wound was the logical concommitant of man's own rebellion, and re- 
quires no direct, personal reaction. 
But, whereas no personal instrumentation is required to explicate 
the method of sin's effect, St. Augustine does specify the "form" of communi- 
cability: 
By the justice of God in some sense, the human race was delivered 
into the power of the devil; the sin of the first man passing over 
originally into all of both sexes in their birth through conjugal 
union, and the debt of our first parents binding their whole pos- 
terity.2 
God's justice is re- affirmed in this context to illustrate again that God 
shares no complicity in the fall which belongs entirely and exclusively to 
1Mar. and Concup. II,57. 
2Trin., XIII,xii,16. 
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man. He, God, is not at all accountable, nor properly speaking is the devil, 
who is, so to speak, a device by which the movement or drama of the fall may 
be articulated. To infer that the devil had sufficient and independent power 
(not controlled by God) would tend to minimize man's singular responsibility.) 
It could then have been argued that man was indeed a victim, and unprepared 
by either power or experience to withstand the temptation. 
The closest possible unity between Adam and all of mankind is articu- 
lated by Augustine. It is, however, not a unity of promise, purpose, or 
dignity, but one of depravity and condemnation due to original sin. Vitiated 
nature, through conjugal union and procreation was unable to pass on either 
more or less of nature than it had itself. In Adam 
... the seminal natureinatura seminalis7 was there from which we were 
to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and bound by the 
chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man 
in any other state.2 
We conclude from the foregoing that the entire race of man was, according 
to Augustine, seminally present in Adam. In respect to man's relation to 
God, therefore, we will not expect any appreciable variation in his status, 
apart from a direct intervention by God. In so far as Adam was guilty, so 
also are we; there is no distinction. 
It should not be concluded, however, that there is anything innately 
evil in conjugal union, per se; though nature is vitiated, it is not there- 
fore evil. To infer that flesh, nature, is intrinsically evil would be to 
1Cf. Cit. God., II:XIV,13: "The devil, ... , would not have ensnared 
man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had not 
man already begun to live for himself." Previously cited, p. 138. 
2Ibid., I:XIII,14. The reference continues: "And thus, from the 
bad use of free will, there originated the whole train of evil, which, with 
its concatenation of miseries, convoys the whole human race from its depraved 
origin, ... , to the destruction of the second death, which has no end, ... ." 
Cf. Ibid., I:XII,22; I:XIII,3; Ench., XXVI. 
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destroy Augustine's entire theory of the created goodness of all creation. 
The term flesh is not to be misunderstood as denoting the source of sin; this 
would be a major concession to the Manichaeans. Augustine is explicit: 
... the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not 
the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not cor- 
ruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that 
made the flesh corruptible ... .he apostle say7, ... 'hatred, 
variance, emulations, strife, envying' are the works of the flesh; 
and of all these evils pride is the origin and head, and it rules 
in the devil though he has no flesh ... . And since he exibits all 
these works, though he has no flesh, how are they works of the flesh, 
unless because they are the works of man, who is, as I said, spoken 
of under the name of flesh? For it is not by having flesh, which 
the devil has not, but by living according to himself, - that is, 
according to man, - that man became like the devil » 
Man's likeness to the devil is the likeness of pride, his living unto and 
for himself. This, says Augustine, is sin. The flesh of man is the in- 
strument of sin; therefore it may be said that the works of the devil are 
the works of the flesh. But, this in no way means that flesh is innately 
sinful or evil. 
The will of man falls under the same sentence of punishment as the 
nature of man. His nature, now associated with non -existence, participates 
in death; likewise, the will having exercised its freedom maliciously no 
longer lives free; it too is "dead" inasmuch as it is bound. 
It is not surprising that man, through his ignorance, does not 
have free choice of will to determine what he ought to do; or that, 
through the resistance of carnal habits, which have become second 
nature as a result of the element of unrestraint handed on in human 
heredity, he sees what he ought to do and wills it, but cannot accom- 
plish it. It is an absolutely just punishment for sin that a man 
should lose what he refuses to use rightly, when he could do so with- 
out any difficulty if he wishes. ... When we speak of a will free 
to act rightly, we speak of the will with which man was created.2 
1Cit. God., II:XIV,3, and cf. Trin., XIII,xii,l6. 
2Free Choice., III,52. 
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The "restraint" which Augustine suggests was given to and subsequently lost 
by Adam, has become an inherited "unrestraint ", affecting all of Adam's 
posterity. Man, in the present post- fallen world, faces even greater foes 
than those encountered by Adam. He is confronted by those things which 
Augustine called "carnal habits ". There is, in addition to pride (that 
untreated and inexplicable cause of evil), also an alien and evil environment 
which compounds the plight of man, making it impossible for man to accomplish 
even as much as he intends. And, added to that hostile environment is "ig- 
norance" of that which man should will, for having once lost the paradisial 
fellowship with God, man no longer is aware of his responsibility. St. Aug- 
ustine has eliminated any insinuation that the natural (post -fallen) man con- 
tributes anything at all to his salvation. 
Nom even regeneration1 restores the vitiated nature, for what has been 
once vitiated cannot be replaced. Regeneration, unlike sin, is not trans- 
mitted by conjugal union. Its effect on the relation between man and God 
is purely and entirely individual. The derangement is communicable; the 
re- arrangement is not. Each and every man depends upon his on "... second 
and spiritual birth. "2 
f. The Imago Dei 
That the term "imago Dei" has not been specifically considered until 
this point in the development of Augustinian theology should not be inter- 
preted to mean that the imago Dei is either irrelevant to the whole of Aug - 
ustine's thought, or that an attempt to articulate Augustine's interpretation 
1The subject of regeneration is beyond the scope of this thesis, and 
its reference above is included only to illustrate its non -communicability 
in contrast to the transmission of sin. 
2Mar. and Concup., II,58. 
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of the image is futile. In response to the latter possibility it should 
be stated that what hopefully has been developed is a theological environment 
within which to understand man, even though the word "image" has not frequent- 
ly appeared. In respect to the former possibility (that it may be irrelevant) 
it should be appreciated that a development of theology is itself one half 
of the phrase, image of God, and that a treatment of the nature of man is the 
other half: the image of God in man. That is claimed, therefore, is a 
larger "field" within which to evaluate a doctrine of imago Dei, a field which 
has included God, existence, evil, man, his will, fall, and future.1 
The inclusion of an enlarged field does not imply, however, that 
specific references to the imago Dei are entirely lacking in St. Augustine. 
His On the Trinity is devoted almost entirely to a consideration of the image 
of God. His intention in that volume is to establish a relationship between 
that which man is in order to articulate the trinitarian structure of God. 
Augustine's interest there, as elsewhere, is characteristically theological, 
not anthropological. Therefore, its contribution is of minimal value as 
relates to the intent of this thesis which is neither theocentric nor anthro- 
pocentric, but The -anthropological. Augustine says: 
We have reasoned ... from the creature which God made, and, as 
far as we could, have warned those who demand a reason on such 
subjects to behold and understand His invisible things, so far 
as they could, by the rational or intellectual creature which is 
made after the image of God; through which glass, so to say, they 
might discern as far as they could, if they could, the Trinity 
which is God, in our own memory, understanding, will femoria, intelli- 
gentia,voluntate7. ... But I have warned him, so far as seemed suf- 
ficient, that he must not so compare this image thus wrought by That 
Trinity, and by his own fault changed for the worse, to that same 
Trinity as to think it in all points like to it, but rather that he 
should discern in that likeness, of whatever sort it be, a great 
unlikeness also..2 
1There is admittedly an organizational, methodological problem, and it 
will occur in each of the subsequent chapters. We maintain, nevertheless, 
that an adequate articulation of a doctrine of the imago Dei requires the 
preliminary inclusion of the "field ". Specific discussion of the imago Dei 
unavoidably, therefore, appears late in each chapter. 
2 rin., XV,xx,39. 
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The "glass" through which Augustine attempts to peer in order to 
better understand the mystery of the Trinity is so darkened by his estima- 
tion of post -fallen man (supra, sections d.l -3, & e.) that one should not 
presume to discover much material of a commendatory nature as related to man. 
His development in Books IX through XV of On the Trinity is a somewhat complex 
assortment of various trinitarian models ranging from love (myself, that which 
I love, and love itself)1 to memory, understanding, and will, and variations 
thereof. 2 
The single most edifying para -image which Augustine has developed is 
that of the Mind, and of it he says: 
This trinity, then, of the mind /entis7 is not therefore the image 
of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves 
itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love 
Him by whom it was made. ... Let it then remember its God, after 
whose image it is made, and let it understand and love Him.3 
The value of such material is that it serves to "locate" the image, identify- 
ing it in reference to its function. One notes that Augustine's perspective 
is toward the reason, mind, intellect of man; it is there that we are to 
recognize a God -likeness. And, it is due to such a location that Augustine 
escapes the temptation to speak as though the fall of man effectively destroy- 
ed the image. Whatever and however much man is said to have lost at the fall, 
he has not lost his rational power, diminished though it may be. 
A further, and even more significant, value is conferred by Augustine 
in so locating the image within man's mind. His emphasis is not on the 
mind's ability to manage itself, planning its present and future, nor in its 
ability to create structures, either social or political, nor again in its 
1Trin., IX,ii,2. 
2Ibid., X,xi,l8; XII,vi,6; XII,xi,16; XII,xiii,22. 
31bid., XIV,xii,l5. 
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potential for science and technology. For him the mind, with its tripartite 
potential, remembering God, understanding, and loving Him, was the residual 
image of God which remained in man in spite of the catastrophic fall. For 
Augustine there was nothing with which man was endowed greater than the mind 
itself, and the mind was for him the clearest reflection (image) of the reflec- 
tion's source who is God. 
... although the human mind /wens humana7 is not of the same nature 
with God, yet the image of that nature than which none is better, is to 
be sought and found in us, in that than which our nature also has nothing 
better. ... For it is His image in this very 2oint, that it is 
capable /apax est7 of Him, and can be partaker /esse particeps potest7 
of Him; which so great good is only made possible by its being His 
image. Well, then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if 
we discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but now at 
last an image of God.l 
Inasmuch as this formulation is located in the penultimate section 
of the book, and that he does not subsequently reject its assertion, it would 
appear that this is the essence of Augustine's concept of the imago Dei. 
Man truly is, he asserts, capable of communion with God, he can partake of 
Him, because the mind of man, fashioned by God, is fashioned in such a way 
that it can perceive and love Him. Prior to the above reference Augustine 
had associated the mind with the soul, a concept that will not specifically 
interest us; yet the quality of immortality which relates to the soul is in- 
formative.2 The soul [animal is not the mind /ens7, but in a sense is the 
1Trin., XIV,viii,ll (Ital. mine). Cf. Ibid., XII,vii,12. 
2Cf. Ibid., XIV,iv,6: "... neither is that trinity an image of God, 
which is not now, nor is that other an image of God, which then will not be; 
but we must find in the soul of man, i.e. the rational or intellectual soul, 
that image of the Creator which is immortally implanted in its immortality. 
For as the immortality itself of the soul is spoken with a qualification; 
since the soul too has its proper death, when it lacks a blessed life, which 
is to be called the true life of the soul; but it is therefore called immortal, 
because it never ceases to live with some life or other, even when it is most 
miserable; so, although reason or intellect is at one time torpid in it, at 
another appears small, and at another great, yet the human soul is never any- 
thing save rational or intellectual; and hence, if it is made after the 
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"residence" of the mind. Immortality which belongs to the soul, is also 
applicable to man's mind; there is in man, therefore - indeed, the most 
significant and imperishable quality of man - his created potentiality to 
relate to his God. 
That may be called a secondary function of the mind, i.e., dominion, 
receives only minimal attention in Augustine's writing. Whenever it is 
mentioned, dominion is not depicted as an innate quality, a created and given 
superiority, but an attendOnt and derivative characteristic associated with 
man's intelligence (mind). Man has dominion over the lower forms of creation 
by virtue of his likeness (image) to God,1 and although Augustine does not 
himself elaborate on the effects of the fall on the intellect, we have al- 
ready learned that there is a quality of immortality, a permanence, which 
remains in the mind, apart from which man would cease to bé man at all. 
There is, it should be realized, a disequality between the image and 
that which the image reflects, i.e., man and God, or mind and Mind. The 
likeness is not equal to that to which it is like. St. Augustine uses the 
word "after" ad in order to illustrate that inherent dissimilarity, but 
"after" is a word which must be properly understood. lest one conclude that 
image of God in respect to this, that it is able to use reason and intellect 
in order to understand and behold God, then from the moment when that nature 
so marvellous and so great began to be, ... certainly it always is." 
A full commentary and criticism of Augustine's concept of the soul's 
immortality, considering its extra- biblical and especially its Platonic over- 
tones, is unnecessary and irrelevant within this thesis. The assertion that 
there is that within man which is so fashioned so as to commune with God is 
all that concerns us at this point. 
1Cf. Cit. God., I:XII,23: "God, then, made man in His own image. 
For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he 
might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea, which were not so 
gifted." Cf. Catech., XVIII,29: God "... - made also man after His own 
image, in order that, as He Himself, ... , presides over universal creation, 
so man, in virtue of that intelligence of his by which he comes to know even 
his Creator and worships Him, might preside over all the living creatures of 
earth ... ." 
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what is inferred is too great a dissimilarity; He does not want to suggest 
that man is not the image. Nor again, will he allow the suggestion that 
the Son is the image, and that man is the image of the Son alone. Man is 
the image of the triune God.1 
"... approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, 
and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness." (cf. infra, n.l). Adam's pre - 
fallen God -likeness was due, not to "place ", i.e., Paradise, but by "likeness ". 
Although St. Augustine does not in this context elaborate on the nature of 
that "likeness ", we can justifiably infer on the basis of our consideration 
of the centrality of Augustine's understanding of "existence and non -existence" 
that here the "likeness" implies an analogue of existence. Similarly, "with- 
drawal" from God (declension toward non -existence) is not a spatial category, 
nor yet a relational one. It is upon this realization that the following 
should be understood. 
... those who, by being reminded, are turned to the Lord from that 
deformedness whereby they were through worldly lusts conformed to 
this world, are formed anew from the world, when they hearken to the 
apostle saying, 'Be not conformed Jolite conformari7 to this world, but 
be ye formed again in the renewing of your mind %reformamini in nouitate 
mentis estrae7;' that the image may begin to be formed again by Him 
by whom it had been formed at first. He says again elsewhere: 'Be ye 
renewed in the spirit of your mind; and put ye on the new man, which 
after God is created in righteousness and true holiness.' That which 
1Cf: Trin., VII,vi,l2: "But because that image of God was not made 
altogether equal to Him, as being not born of Him, but created by Him; in 
order to signify this, he is in such way the image as that he is 'after the 
image,' that is, he is not made equal by parity, but approaches to Him by a 
sort of likeness [imilitudine7. For approach to God is not by intervals 
of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness. For 
there are some who draw this distinction, that they will have the Son to be 
the image, but man not to be the image, but 'after the image.' But the 
apostle refutes them, saying, 'For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, 
forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God.' He did not say after the 
lame, but the image. And this image, since it is elsewhere spoken of as 
after the image, is not as if it were said relatively to the Son, who is the 
image equal to the Father; otherwise he would not say after our image. For 
how our, when the Son is the image of the Father alone? But man is said 
to be 'after the image,' on account, as we have said, of the inequality of 
the likeness; ... ." 
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is meant by 'Created after God,' is expressed in another place by 
'After the image of God.' But it lost righteousness and true 
holiness by sinning, through which that image became defaced and 
tarnished; and this it recovers again when it is formed again 
and renewed.1 
Remembering that according to Augustine the world, having been created 
by God, was good, we are not inclined to read dualistic overtones into the 
above; it was not that man's turning toward the world was in itself a turn- 
ing to evil, but the turning itself was evil insofar as it was a movement 
toward that of lesser existence. Righteousness and holiness likewise are 
not primarily relational terms, implying personal integrity and devotion, 
though they seem to assume such significance here. 
Those aspects of "relational" connotation noted above in respect to the 
mind and its potential for partaking of God, communion with Him, and love for 
Him are not to be casually ignored. What seems apparent is a desire to 
speak "relationally" on the one hand, and an inability or reluctance to do 
so because of a particular metaphysical, non -relational frame -work upon which 
the entire system depends. It is not, however, essential that one eliminate 
one emphasis to the exclusion of the other; neither, however, would it be 
appropriate to consider both the relational signification and the philosophical 
structure of Augustine's theology as co- equal. But, it should be apparent 
that the latter takes precedence over the former, and qualifies it. 
Finally, and in respect to the renewal and re- formation of the tar- 
nished and defaced imago Dei, Augustine asserts that unlike the instantaneous 
renewal which occurs in baptism, the renewal of the image of God is a progres- 
sive movement. It proceeds on its growth, energized by the grace of God, and 
marks its progress by an increasing renunciation of things temporal (mutable, 
1Trin., XIV,xvi,22. 
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visible, carnal) toward those things which are nearer to God.1 The final 
and complete re- formation of God's image in man will be its restoration to 
the full and unimpeded "sight of God ".2 This, for Augustine, is the com- 
pletion of the circle: man's re- creation by grace to unhindered participa- 
tion in that which is God, more wonderful, however, than Paradise, for then 
(heaven) there will be no possibility of falling away. 
g. Summation and Appraisal 
A super- imposed category, i.e., imago Dei, has led us into the pre- 
ceding study of those portions of Augustine's theology which bear a fairly 
direct relationship to the image theme. His presuppositions are often dis- 
similar from those explicated in our Introduction and as we might therefore 
expect, so are his conclusions. To ignore that would be to suggest that our 
criticism of Augustine is entirely intrinsic; it obviously is not. 
However, to posit basic theological and anthropological questions, 
i.e., who is God, and what is His relationship to man? who is man, and what 
is signified by asserting that he was created in the image of God? - to posit 
such questions as these, because they are so basic, is certainly not unjusti- 
fiably to super- impose alien criteria. Whether one says "the image of God 
in man" or "man created in God's image" there is specific mention of both God 
and man. The integration of the phrase seems to necessitate a co- incidental 
consideration of both God and man, even though major emphasis may vary between 
the theological and anthropological perspectives. 
The imago Dei, as a symbol of relationship, has been applied to the 
theology of St. Augustine, and the purpose of the study has been to describe 
1Cf. Trin., XIV,xvii,23. 
2Cf. Ibid., XIV,xviii,24. 
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his analysis of the "field" between God and man.1 The question arises: 
is the "field" so attenuated as a result of creation and subsequent cata- 
strophic fall that there is no residual and inherent positive God -man rela- 
tion, or is the "field" one within which both God and man struggle toward a 
glorious consummation? It is that question that qualifies our discussion, 
the results of which will circumscribe the dimensions of our final chapter. 
The establishment and articulation of a "dependence factor" was 
noted in the Introduction as that which relates to "word" creation. And 
the creation of man was further set within a dependency context by the narra- 
tor's specific choice of the word bara.2 Neither "word "(dabar)nor bara, 
in and of themselves, exhaustively define the "shape" of relationship between 
man and God. However, they do indicate not only a "method" of creation, but 
more importantly a structure of relation between man and God which seems most 
properly characterized as personal and inseparable. 
Conversely, it has been suggested that the "shape" of relation articu- 
lated by Augustine is established on the philosophical theme of existence. 
God is uncreated and immutable existence, and He creates existence which, 
because not of Him, is temporal and mutable. Therefore, created existence 
owes its entire being and continuation exclusively to God. It is doubtful 
that any "shape" of relationship could be articulated that offered a greater 
degree of dependence. Continuation of existence is contingent upon the con- 
tinuance of creation's relationship to God. Declension from that relation- 
ship is tendency toward non -existence. 
1By "field" is meant the structures of relationship, i.e., mind, will, 
sin, creation, fall, etc., all those concepts which impinge on God's "co- 
inherence" with man. 
2Cf. supra, p. 22 and passim. 
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That quality of relationship, however, makes personal structures, i.e., 
freedom and responsibility, somewhat gratuitous. Indeed, the concepts of 
realized freedom and responsibility which St. Augustine introduces are most 
conveniently set within the context of a pre- historical Paradise. The 
structure of freedom and responsibility has been radically inverted, accord- 
ing to Augustine, subsequent to an historic fall. It is perhaps impossible 
to determine whether Augustine's philosophical structures of existence pre- 
ceded (and so supported) his historicizing of creation -fall interpretations, 
or if his understanding of creation -fall required a system which would be con- 
sistent with it. 
1 
It would appear, however, that his philosophical system 
takes precedence and is pre- eminent over the more theological doctrines. 
This is not to suggest that he was more philosopher than theologian, but it 
is to suggest that certain of his philosophical structures, i.e., creatio ex 
nihilo, (not per se, a philosophical concept, but becoming increasingly so as 
employed by Augustine), somewhat pre -determined his more specifically theolog- 
ical conclusions.2 
Whether philosophy or theology is pre- eminent is debatable; what is 
certain is that from either perspective, St. Augustine's understanding of 
that pre- historical Paradise, the blessed home of Adam and Eve, has far - 
reaching implications for his doctrine of man, and specifically, his specu- 
lative treatment of angelology, by which Augustine apparently hoped to eluci- 
date, by comparison, the parallel history of man. It is not so much that 
1It would be erroneous to imply that Augustine originated the concept 
of an historical creation -fall; but on the other hand it is apparent that 
his predecessors had not deduced nearly as emphatic conclusions based on an 
historic fall, nor consequently did they develop such elaborate philosophical 
and soteriological structures as did Augustine. For a very thorough history 
of the development, see Williams, Fall and Original Sin, especially chapters 
IV and V. 
2Immutability for example, as an attribute of God, appears more consis- 
tent within a philosophical system, and more critical to it, than it seems to 
relate to theology. 
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there is a reluctance to allow any similarity, but moreso that whatever 
likeness there is supposed to be concentrates on beatific visions of bliss 
which are inexplicably eliminated and destroyed by a perverted use of free 
will. 
Augustine's doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, his theories of existence 
and declension from existence, his historicizing of Paradise and fall - 
these are factors which make it extremely difficult for him to consistently 
articulate the relationship between God and man in any but the most imper- 
sorsI terms and categories.l Creatio ex nihilo, taken by itself, and as a 
theological doctrine which encourages a response of worship, is entirely 
compatible with an attendant doctrine that articulates the relation between 
the Creator and His creatures on the basis of compatibility (co- inherence). 
Nor does this "compatibility" necessarily negate the valid distinction between 
Creator and creature. But, creatio ex nihilo, as interpreted by Augustine, 
creates such a seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the two, that a "fall" 
of whatever magnitude fractures the already fragile bond of unity. And 
unity, as we should like to understand it, specifies more than a metaphysical 
similarity of existence; it points to a factor which has been created by God 
in man by which God and man can communicate. 
Furthermore, that Augustine considers evil within a metaphysical frame- 
work compounds the already developed sense of man's alienation and despair. 
Unless man could be taught to comprehend his experience of evil, his fear 
of and attraction to it, in terms which were quite unrelated to his "heart ", 
1That Augustine did in fact utilize the terminology appropriate to 
personal relation has already been indicated. However, that his philoso- 
phical structures of existence have tended to transform and depersonalize 
the "shape" of the imago Dei has hopefully also been established. 
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his feelings and emotions, it would seem either absurd or futile to attempt 
to speak in terms of declension from existence, or diminution of being. 
There is no need to quarrel with the philosophical correctness of Augustine's 
doctrine of evil and sin; even "correct" it would seem from a faith point of 
view to be unsatisfactory. 
Turning to Augustine's highly- developed theories of the origin of 
evil, and its association with the first conscious and intentional aversio 
a Deo, conversio ad creaturas, two factors emerge. First, that its "cause ", 
not efficient but deficient, is attributed entirely to the pride of man. 
The second factor is that the exercise of such pride is that for which man 
is totally responsible, and by which not only Adam suffers, but also each and 
every individual who descends from him, i.e., humanity. Reacting to the 
first, it should be said that we do not reject the validity of the terms, 
"efficient" and "deficient "; they are not especially helpful, but neither 
are they, per se, obtrusive. What seems objectionable, however, is Augus- 
tine's insistence that evil originates from the depths of man's pride. While 
this section of the thesis should not properly attempt to formulate possible 
alternatives to Augustine, it would be appropriate to quote the words of 
John Hick who has formulated an objection pertinent to the issue under con- 
sideration: 
To say that an unqualifiedly good (though finite) being gratui- 
tously sins is to, say that he was not unqualifiedly good in the 
first place; and to infer that he was created as a morally imper- 
fect being is to suggest that God, who gave him this imperfect 
nature, should not blame him too severely when further evidences 
of imperfection flow from it .l 
Unless one adopts a completely radical alternative to the doctrine 
of creation by God, choosing rather to believe that God was in no way involved 
'Hick, Evil and God, p. 180. 
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at all, it would seem that we will have to reject either Augustine's doc- 
trine of the absolute perfection of man (including his pride) at an histor- 
ic moment, or we will have to deny that man's pride is the origin of evil. 
Belief in absolute perfection of the world's primal status demands an answer 
to the question, whence evil /sin? And that demand will not be satisfactorily 
silenced by claiming "mystery ". 
The mystery to which Augustine flees when pressed regarding the seat 
of evil's origin in pride is made necessary not primarily because of any 
theological doctrines, but result from his philosophical categories. That 
is not to say, however, that man's responsibility for,sin is not a theological 
issue, or further, that sin /evil is irrelevant as relates to the God -man rela- 
tionship. It is to say, however, that ascribing the origin of evil to man's 
pride unnecessarily and non -theologically attempts to localize the "fault" 
where it does not obviously and inevitably belong. 
And secondly, Augustine's assertion of the communicability of sin 
(original) through conjugal union, the loins of Adam, introduces a further 
and unnecessary implication of the historic "fall ". What the narrative may 
have been attempting to articulate by the fall account of Genesis 3 remains 
to be considered later in the thesis; what should be clearly stated here is 
that the fall from a perfect state which occasions punishment communicable to 
all men introduces an interpretation that is more compatible within static 
categories of existence and non -existence, i.e., substance ontology, than 
within a relationship of dynamic inter -relation, i.e., co- inherence. The 
meaning of "original" as it applies to sin will have to be considered at a 
later point, and it will be developed somewhat along the conclusion of John 
Hick who says; "The story of the fall does not describe genetically how our 
situation came to be as it is, but analyses that situation as it has always 
been. "1 
1Hick, Evil and God., p. 181. 
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Augustinian theology, presupposing a Paradise and catastrophic fall, 
asserts that the function and significance of the will has been radically 
transformed. The "original" will, created with power to do the good, and 
with potential to remain stedfast, has now become impotent and bound. This 
transformation has thoroughly and completely restructured the drama, and con- 
sequently, the will of the natural man no longer performs any vital and re- 
lational function. Indeed, Augustine does make provision for man's salva- 
tion in spite of the fall, but the "provision" seems more to have been "cre- 
ated" in response to a problem than it appears to flow from the eternal love 
of God for His creation.l The catastrophic fall with its universal impli- 
cations makes it imperative that God should encounter His now -fallen crea- 
tion in a new way. This in itself does not contradict the idea of God's 
4. 
eternal love, but because of the degradation of man, the expression of that 
love, its "shape ", is almost totally unrelated to the structures of person- 
al relation. Apart from the Augustinian fall interpretation which denigrates 
man, it is doubtful that there would have been the necessity to create a scheme 
of salvation which is so theocentric that the place of man, his will, and the 
created structures of dynamic relationship are virtually non- existent.2 
1But cf. Trin., IV,i,2: "And first we have had to be persuaded how 
much God loved us, lest from despair we should not dare to be lifted up to 
Him." And Ibid., IV,xiii,l3: "Therein is our true peace and firm bond 
of union with our Creator, that we should be purified and reconciled through 
the Mediator of life, as we had been polluted and alienated, and so had de- 
parted from Him, through the mediator of death." 
2Augustinian soteriology is not a constituent part of this thesis; 
our concern is with man with and for whom God works, man in the imago Dei. 
Chapter XII of Portalie's A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine offers 
a fairly thorough treatment of soteriology. However, one might wonder if 
he has minimized the import of the bondage and impotence of the will which 
were discussed in Section d., supra,. 
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The image of God concept was employed by Augustine primarily as a 
speculative instrument to articulate the nature of God, from which it was 
possible to deduce some illustrative material in respect to man. The lo- 
cation of the image in the mind does serve first to express the indestruct- 
ability of the "shape" of relationship, and secondly to qualify that "shape ". 
In spite of his normal and customary denunciations of man, Augustine was in- 
clined to speak favorably and complimentarily about the image; he was im- 
pressed with man's mind by which he could remember, understand, and love God. 
And, apparently, the mind of man is that to which Augustine looks and appeals 
when he intends to speak of some sort of continuing God -man relationship. 
We will not need to be further involved in the discussion of the soul's im- 
mortality, but will take the concept of the mind's derived immortality as an 
indication that Augustine was inclined to consider that some remnant of man's 
dignity remained after the fall. And, most importantly, the "shape" of com- 
munication which follows from a mind orientation (remembrance, understanding, 
and love) will be noted as a very significant contribution of St. Augustine. 
The question, or problem, posed in the Introduction (p.3) stands at 
the center of our entire consideration: is man in God's image to be under- 
stood from the perspective of sin? Or conversely, is sin to be understood 
in relation to man in God's image? In respect to St. Augustine, how shall 
this question be answered? Because specific references to the imago Dei 
are not extensive in Augustine's work, 
1 
it has been necessary to enlarge the 
context to discern his "picture" of man; but the question remains essential- 
ly the same: does a concept of sin precondition the picture of man, or does 
a picture of man as he is related to God condition our understanding of sin? 
1That is to say, specific references are not numerous apart from their 
treatment in De Trinitate. Cf. supra, section f. 
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The general impression is that Augustine's methodology has been inclined 
toward the former; his concept of sin determines his understanding of the 
status of both pre - and post- fallen man, though it is with the latter only 
that we are concerned. It may be unfair to assert that Augustine's con- 
scious intention was in fact to "do his theology" from the perspective of a 
particular concept of sin; his intention will perhaps have to remain a 
supposition. But, that his theological product reflects this orientation 
is our conclusion, and toward the support of that conclusion the foregoing 
material has been included. 
In summary the following themes, relative to that orientation, could 
be deduced; 
One, a rigid and radical historicized interpretation or paradisial 
bliss; 
Two, an equally radical and historicized interpretation of the fall; 
Three, Augustine's metaphysical concepts of existence /non- existence, 
and the immutability of God; 
Four, absolute bondage of the will; 
Five, creatio ex nihilo, as a philosophical concept, illustrating 
the distinction between Creator and creature; 
Six, man's total responsibility for the perverse exercise of pride; 
Seven, communicability of sin via conjugal union; 
Eight, the anticipation of heaven where will be man's non posse 
peccare. 
On the other hand, there are some themes which we will find to be 
quite compatible with an alternate theological method, i.e., conducting theo- 
logy from the perspective of the God -man relationship, and seeing sin as no 
less serious, but nevertheless as a secondary issue. Those more congenial 
themes are as follows: 
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One, locating the imago Dei in the mind, and specifically its 
function of memory, understanding, and love; 
Two, the strong emphasis on the unity of man, noted from two 
perspectives: one, the metaphysical relationship of all 
existence, and two, the inseparability of all men in the 
commonality of sin. 
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CHAPTER III 
SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE. IMAGO DEI THEME 
A. Scholastic Interpretation of the Imago Dei 
a. Foundations for St. Thomas 
The scope of the foregoing chapters has intentionally been 
broader than one might first deem necessary for the explication of the 
doctrine of the imago Dei. We extended the field of inquiry to include 
and involve, in our study of both St. Irenaeus and Augustine, their 
respective doctrines of sin, evil, creation, anthropology, and some 
philosophical themes. Our somewhat panoramic presentation was con- 
sidered advisable in order to comprehend the intricacies of their 
doctrines of the image. For instance, we suggest that apart from a clear 
understanding and appreciation of St. Irenaeus' concept of growth and 
childhood vis -a -vis Adam conclusions related to his doctrine of the image 
of God would at best be partial, and perhaps erroneous. So also with 
the material of St. Augustine; his understanding of existence and being 
as over against non -existence and declension from being seemed to be 
inextricably related to his development of the image theme. Similar to 
our method in the preceding chapters, we will again extend the field of 
inquiry beyond specific reference to the imago Dei. 
Two things need to be articulated at this point in our development 
of the thesis. First, that even though our primary intention is not 
exhaustively to present the history of the doctrine, nevertheless it 
seems proper that we should be aware of the most significant portions 
of the historical development of the theme. Secondly, therefore, is 
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the determination of the most suitable procedure. An inclusive con- 
sideration of the great number of theologians who have contributed to our 
theme would either over -extend the scope of the thesis, or would result 
in superficiality as the cost of abbreviation. Therefore, in order to 
transport our question from the fourth to the twentieth century, we shall 
concentrate on what we consider to be the most significant and representa- 
tive theologians. 
There appear to be only minor variations of the well -established 
Augustinian trinitarian structure of the imago, Dei noted in the main 
corpus of theological thought until at least the time of St. Thomas. 
Even then there is as much simple variation as significant modification. 
John Sullivan expresses it thus: 
At the dawn of the Middle Ages the writers in the West either 
briefly repeat something of the teaching of St. Augustine about 
the trinitarian image, as St. Fulgentius and, to a less degree, 
Cassiodorus and St. Isodore, or at the least intend to take St. 
Augustine as their principal guide in theological matters, as 
St. Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Gregory the Great, Venerable Bede, 
and even Boethius. In conformity with this established pattern 
the Carolingian Renaissance of the ninth century will be domin- 
ated by the thought of St. Augustine.» 
St. Anselm in the last quarter of the eleventh century, stated 
in pure Augustinian terminology: 
I acknowledge, 0 Lord, with thanksgiving, that thou hast created 
this thy image in me, so that, remembering thee, I may think of 
thee, may love thee. But this image is so effaced and worn away 
by my faults, it is so obscured by the smoke of my sins, that 
it cannot do what it was made to do, unless thou renew and reform 
it.2 
1John Edward Sullivan, The Image of God, (Dubuque, Iowa: The 
Priory Press, 1963), p. 207. Hereafter: Image. 
2Anselm, Proslogion, Ch. I, cited in Library of Christian Classics, 
X., A Scholastic Miscellany: Anse]m to Ockham, ed. and trans., Eugene R. 
Fairweather, (London: SCM Press, 1956), p. 73. 
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Anselm of Canterbury, who has been called the "founder of scholastic 
theology ", is credited with preparing the way for what Sullivan calls 
"the golden age of theology ".1 However, until the culmination of that 
age, i.e., in the person and writing of St. Thomas, there are other con- 
tributions to our theme, notably that of Peter Abelard, whose interpretation 
of the imago Dei in trinitarian formulation varies only slightly from that 
of St. Augustine . 
Like St. Augustine, Abelard established the locus of the image in 
the mind of man, in his powers of reason, "since it is through his reason 
that he is like God ".2 According to Weingart's estimation of Abelard's 
doctrine, the reason of man enjoys a transcendent quality, most properly 
exercising itself beyond the level of simple sense perception to inquire 
into the nature of divinity.3 Abelard's trinitarian structure is 
clearly articulated in the following: 
If any one wishes to consider more carefully and perfectly this 
image and likeness of God in which man is said to have been 
created according to the distinction of the Persons of the Trin- 
ity, he will see that man obtained in his creation the greatest 
likeness to both the Father and the Son or Holy Spirit. Certainly 
it is evident that that pertains especially to divine power is 
to be ascribed to God the Father, who has his being from himself 
and not from another; just as what pertains to wisdom is ascribed 
to the Son, who is called the Father's Wisdom; and to the Holy 
Spirit, who is called the Love of the two and also Love in his 
own right, is ascribed what pertains to the goodness of divine 
grace. Therefore, as was said, man was made, according to the 
dignity of the soul, in the likeness of each Person, since he is 
1Sullivan, Image, p. 209. 
2Peter Abelard, Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos, III,vii. 896c, 
cited in Richard E. Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love, A Critical Anal sis 
of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 
p. 22. Hereafter: Logic of Love. Henceforth abbreviations used by 
Weingart will also be employed by himself when citing his work. 
3Cf. Ibid., p. 22. 
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made similar to God, excelling other animals in power, wisdom, 
and love.1 
It would not seem entirely justified to assert that Peter Abelard's 
understanding of the imago Dei was primarily or purely rationalistic. 
Indeed, that particular emphasis is present, but reason is infused with 
the quality of love and thus issues in commitment to God beyond the 
solitary sphere of rationality.2 
Summarizing Abelard, Weingart says, "The divine -human relation- 
ship is thus characterized by love: God lovingly created man in his on 
image and provides the optimum conditions for his existence, and man 
lives in the responsive love of free obedience ".3 Such a statement 
would seem most applicable to the status of man either before the "fall" 
or subsequent to the parousia. For, continues Weingart's appraisal of 
Abelard, "Mankind has lost his innocence and original status. The imago 
Dei is not obliterated, but pristine fellowship with the Creator is 
broken. ... Man's personal structure is vitiated; his human faculties 
are impaired ".4 The concept of pristine fellowship (centered in love) 
is at the very heart of Abelard's understanding of the imago Dei, and 
consequently there is less emphasis on the quality of rationality than 
there is regarding the quality of love. In his synopsis of Chapter II 
Weingart says: 
Because love constitutes the logic of creation, love is the 
chief mark of the imago Dei in which man is created; man is 
made for fellowship with God, that is, to respond to his Creator 
in love through perfect obedience. 
Second, in the structure of man's personhood the soul is the 
controlling agent. It especially bears the mark of the imago 
1Abelard, 
Exp. in Hexaem. 763d., cited in Weingart, Logic of Love,p. 36. 
2Cf. Abelard, Exp. in Hexaem., 765a., cited in Weingart, Logic of 
Love, p. 38. 
3Weingart, Logic of Love, p. 38. 4Ibid., p. 49. 
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Dei, the insignia of man's spiritual relationship with God. ... 
The third conclusion is that sin is a rupture in man's spir- 
itual fellowship with God for which man is culpable.1 
It should be noted, however, that Abelard's estimation of man's 
culpability for sin is inextricably related to man's on personal 
accountability, and therefore there is less emphasis on the inherited 
penalty or effect of Adam's sin than e.g., in the theology of Augustine.2 
The relative insignificance of the imago Dei as a theological theme during 
the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and the consequent paucity 
of references during this period of church history suggest that it may be 
appropriate to continue our survey with a study of the most eminent of 
the scholastic theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Important for an understanding of Thomas' concept of the imago, 
Dei is an awareness of a theological development in the ninth century, 
that of Gottshalk and the predestination controversy. His formulation 
was Augustinianism carried to its logical conclusion. Although Gottshalk's 
extreme formulations were not widely accepted, nevertheless the tension 
between grace and human responsibility had been established, and was to 
play a prominent role in all subsequent theology. According to Robinson, 
Aquinas' procedure in the attempt to reconcile grace and freedom/responsi- 
bility was to "... give emphatic expression to the doctrine of predestinating 
grace, and then, when the ground is cleared by this recognition, to deal 
with the secondary causation of the human will as a sufficient basis for 
freedom and the resultant merit ".3 This synthesis Robinson critically 
1Weingart, Logic of Love, p. 64. 
3H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, second 
edition, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913 p. 204.- 
2Cf. Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
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calls "... psychological freedom combined with metaphysical determination 
... . "1 More positively, Sullivan refers to Aquinas' work thus: 
the genius of St. Thomas will place the augustinian teaching on more sure, 
more secure scientific and aristotelian foundations ".2 But later Sullivan 
also states that "... the mature thomistic understanding of likeness is 
more dependent ultimately on aristotelian static principles than on any 
augustinian insight, related as the latter is to the more dynamic and 
plotinian view of an image ".3 
There are two discernible evidences of the existence of the image 
in man, according to Sullivan's understanding of Aquinas - the first being 
related to a quantitative distinction; those creatures who are more able 
than others to imitate and represent God are properly said to image God 
because of their nobility. The second indication, noted especially in 
Thomas' Summa Theologica, is that whereas all creatures bear an analogical 
likeness to God, derived from Him as "... efficient and exemplary cause ", 
man's relationship is via a "quasi -species ".4 An adequate understanding 
of this factor of Thomas' system, as the context within which to compre- 
hend the imago Dei, requires a consideration of his interpretation of 
the order of creation. 
b. St. Thomas on Creation and Existence 
Of the act of creation, and creation's relation to the Creator, 
Thomas says in the Summa: 
1Sullivan, Image, p. 217. 2Sullivan, Image, p. 217. 
31bid., p, 223. 
41bid., p. 224, where he also states: "With respect to God 
obviously there can be no question of a species, for he is above all 
genera and species; so it will be a matter of a quasi- species only ". 
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Creation is ascribed to God because of his existence rsse7, 
which is identical with his essence /essential and common to 
all three Persons, and is, therefore, an activity of the whole 
Trinity, not peculiar to one Person. Nevertheless, origins 
within the Godhead have a causal bearing on creation. God is an 
artist, and the universe is his work of art. An artist sets to 
work through an exemplar in his mind and love in his will. God 
the Father makes creatures through his Word, who is his Son, and 
through his Love, who is the Holy Ghost. In this sense then, as 
implying the essential attributes of intellegency and will, the 
precessions of the divine Persons account for the production of 
the creatures.1 
St, Thomas' conceptualization of God's relation to creation, viz., 
cause to effect, artist to work of art, essential existence to created 
existence out of non -existence - these are the foundations upon which 
we will attempt to discover his concept of the imago Dei and the nature 
of man in relation to God. 
Literally everything that exists, all things that have being, are 
intrinsically related to God, for He is Existence and the exemplar of all 
other existents. Therefore nothing exists independently of God.2 The 
pluriformity and variety within the trinitarian relation manifests itself 
in the created world with its rich variety and distinctions. And the 
reason for the existence of such abundance and variegation is "... that 
his goodness may be communicated and manifested. One solitary creature 
would not suffice. Therefore he makes creatures many and diverse, that 
what is wanting in one may be supplied by another ".3 
1Thomas Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas., Theological Texts, selected and 
trans., Thomas Gilby, (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1955), 141. Hereafter: Texts, followed by his division number, e.g., Texts, 
141. The text from which the selection is taken will be indicated in the 
footnote, according to Gilby's method except that references to the Summa 
will follow our method, see p.175, n. 3. This exception is for the sake 
of uniformity. 
2Cf.Summa, I Q. VI 4; III Contra Gentes, 7; III Contra Gentes, 47 
cited in Gilby, Texts, 143, 155, 185, respectively. 
3Summa, I Q.X.VII 1, cited in Gilby, Texts, 152. 
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We shall have more to say of the significance of evil in a latter 
section, but a brief comment at this place will further elucidate St. 
Thomas' understanding of creation. That God permits evil is to be assumed; 
its presence in no way detracts from His goodness, for it is because of 
His goodness that He does not transform the nature of things that exist. 
There is a higher principle operative than the less significant one of 
the problematic presence of evil in a good world - the principle of 
perfection. Aquinas states: 
The perfection of the universe requires that some should be 
indefectible, while others should suffer changes according to 
their natures. Were evil swept away entirely, divine Providence 
could not regenerate and restore the integrity of things, and this 
would be a greater evil than the particular ills they suffer.1 
He continues to explicate the presence of evil by saying first 
that it serves as that by growth is e.g., "... the 
patience of the just supposes the persecution from the unjust ". Further- 
more, evil serves to make apparent the good, as shade intensifies the 
brightness of color. 
2 
That which is a direct effect of good (God) is 
necessarily also good, and since "... evil cannot be the direct effect 
of good, no being as such can be evil: every creature of God is good ". 
(I Tim. 4:4).3 
Creation, including the creation of man, is defined from the 
beginning by God's intentionality. It has been noted that all created 
forms are created for a purpose and function; now we note more explicitly 
the purpose and function for which man was created. "Happiness ", says 
1Aquinas, Compendium Theologiae, 142, cited in Gilby Texts, 162. 
Note the similarity to Augustine's doctrine of evil, cf. supra, CHAPTER II, 
Section c. 
2Cf. Ibid. 3Aquinas, III Contra Gentes, cited in Gilby, Texts, 155. 
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Aquinas, "is the ultimate achievement of rational nature. A thing is 
finally complete when it attains its original purpose, and without being 
forced ".1 He continues to specify the means by which man attains to 
God, viz., by likeness and activity, the first indicating a particular 
creature's relationship of similarity, the second a rational creature's 
specific activity of knowing and loving God. "Man's soul comes directly 
from God, and therefore finds its happiness by returning direct to God. "2 
Two references from the Summa suffice to define Thomas' under- 
standing of man's original, primal status in Paradise in respect to God. 
He states: 
Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect happiness 
to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the 
Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with a life of happi- 
ness in a certain measure, as Augustine says ... /en. ad lit. 47 
so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.3 
We note especially the explicit inference that there was a created in- 
completeness, that even the primal state was characterized by unfulfilled 
intention. It would appear that the "happiness" for and toward which man 
was created was not to be realized within the physical or historical 
dimension of creation, but beyond it, 
1Aquinas, X Quodlibets, viii,l, cited in Gilby, Texts,, 209. But 
cf. Appendix A for a discussion of the limitations imposed. 
2lbid, 
3Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica,, I Q.XCIV 1, Rep. Ob. 1. 
Quotations from the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, unless 
otherwise noted, are from the series entitled: The Summa Theologica 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, 20 vols., trans., Fathers of the English Dom- 
inican Province, (London: R. & T. Washbourne, 1911 -1925). Hereafter: 
Summa. Subsequent citations will include Part Number, Question Num- 
ber, Article Number in that order, e.g., I Q.VI 1. In the case of 
Part II where there is a further division and re- numbering of questions 
the citation will be: II -I, or II -II, the first numeral indicating the 
major division, the second specifying the internal division. 
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The second text further specifies the incompleteness of man's 
primal state regarding the beatific vision. Thomas argues, a priori, 
from the fact of man's fall to the impossibility of his original en- 
joyment of perfect beatitude: 
...The first man did not see God through His Essence if we con- 
sider the ordinary state of that life; ... . The reason is because, 
since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect 
of man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God 
as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot will- 
ingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necess- 
arily he desires it, and shuns misery. Wherefore no one who 
sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which 
means to sin. So all who see God through His Essence are so 
firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they 
can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he 
did not see God through His Essence.1 
Were it not for the already -noted affirmation that all that exists is 
good, and that all activity is the effect of the divine and first 
mover, God, one might be inclined to ascribe positive (real) power 
to the forces of evil as an explanation for the "fall ". However, that 
is not at all the explication which Aquinas offers. At this point 
we simply note the notion of created incompleteness; implicit in 
man's turning away from beatitude - rather, his turning away from the 
opportunity - and will discover further elaboration of the means by 
which God achieves His ordained purpose.2 
c, The Imago Dei in the Thought of St. Thomas 
c.1. The Essence of the Image and Likeness in Man 
The following material will hopefully make unmistakably clear 
that precisely speaking the "essence" of the image, that is, the object 
1S'umma, I Q,XCIV 1. Ital, mine. 
2Cf, Appendix A, Article 4.1.1., and passim. 
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of the imago is God.1 However, a presentation of St. Thomas' doctrine 
of God would far exceed the limits and responsibility of this thesis. 
Our task and question remains that of seeking to determine what may be 
the implications of the association of the phrase with man. We simply 
grant, therefore, that the object and specific locus of God's image is 
God Himself in our consideration of Thomas' work. 
There is, according to Thomas, no absolute distinction between 
image and likeness; however, there is a relative difference inasmuch 
as an image implies that which is more proximate to the object than 
likeness. The difference between the terms exists insofar as "... 
any likeness rsimilitudo] falls short of image jimaginis7, or, again, as 
it perfects the idea of image. "2 This is a relatively unimportant 
distinction within Thomas' thought; what is critical for our purpose is 
that the distinction between the object and subject of both image and 
likeness be fully appreciated. "An image ", he says, "is so called 
because it is produced as an imitation of something else; ... "3 There 
is in man, or in some aspect of man, an imitative quality, gift, or 
1Even more precisely, the essence of God is incorrectly termed 
"image" except insofar as the Persons imitate one another. Cf. Summa 
I Q.XCIII 5, Rep. Ob. 4. 
2Summa, I Q.XCIII 9, Rep. Ob. 1. But cf. Sullivan, Image, pp. 
222 -23, especially: "Likeness now is seen to be not only a deficient 
representation in comparison to image, but also can be considered, from 
another point of view, as perfective of the image." Sullivan continues 
to suggest that this interpretation of Aquinas"... is in complete accord 
with the total understanding of the term of likeness from the writings of 
Augustine. In the view of the latter likeness is also necessarily included 
in the concept of image, and it can be considered as a deficient representation 
in comparison to an image or as the dynamic term of the gradual'perfecting 
of the divine image in man. Yet the mature thomistic understanding of 
likeness is more dependent ultimately on aristotelian static principles 
than on any augustinian insight, related as the latter is to the more 
dynamic and plotinian view of an image." 
3Summa, I Q.XCIII 1. 
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ability which is signified by the term, imago Dei. But imitation is not 
equality: 
...equality /equalitas7 does not belong to the essence of an 
image; for, as Augustine says, Where there is an image there is 
not necessarily equality, as we see in a person's image reflected 
in a glass. ... Now it is manifest that in man there is some 
likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this 
likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely 
excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; 
... . And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was 
made to rd7 God's likeness; for the preposition to signifies a 
certain approach, as of something at a distance.1 
It,should be noted that St. Thomas' first assertion, i.e., that 
equality does not apply to the essence of the image, is a proper qualifi- 
cation only in respect to man. In this context the word essence does 
not mean God. St. Thomas' concern here is to specify the dis- equality 
between the proper object of the image and man who bears or reflects the 
likeness of that image. What we are attempting to determine is the 
precise nature, quality, and content of that which he implies by "some 
likeness to God, copied ... as from an exemplar ". 
The likeness of absolute equality is, says Thomas, beyond both 
the capability and conceivability of man, and was not the equality that 
was inordinately desired even by our first parents. On the other hand, 
there is a secondary likeness, that of imitation, "... as is possible for 
a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates 
somewhat in God's likeness according to its measure ".2 At this point 
we simply note the two referents, imitation and participation, but as yet 
are not in position to further qualify their subjects. The following 
will contribute toward that understanding: 
1Summa, I Q.XCIII 1. Cf. infra. Section c.2., for a more thorough 
consideration of the preposition ad. 
2Summa, II -II Q.CLXIII 2. 
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The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways: in 
one way it is found in something of the same specific nature 
/aturae secundum speciem7; as the image of the King is found in 
his son; in another way it is found in something of a different 
nature, as the King's image on the coin. In the first sense the 
on is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called 
the image of God; and therefore in order to express the imperfect 
character of the Divine image in man, man is not simply called 
the image, but according to the image (ad imaginem), whereby is 
expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it 
cannot be said that the Son of God is according to the image, 
because He is the perfect Image of the Father. 
The dis- equality, already noted, is our present concern. Because 
of the disparity of constitution in respect to the relation between God 
and man there can be no simple relation of proportionality - that is 
reserved for essences which share the same nature, i.e., the Father and 
the Son. Man's participation in the divine Image is further restricted 
because of the disparity of constitution (being). Man therefore bears a 
likeness comparable to the relation between the object and the object's 
representation, e.g., a man and a picture which represents the man.2 
There is a resemblance, an approximate likeness, but there can be no 
absolute co- relation between the two; they have their being in separate 
and distinct species. This distinction, dis- equality, is absolutely 
appropriate between God and man, for here the agent, God, is beyond any 
genus and therefore whatever relation the primary Image (God) bears to 
the derived image (man) must be one of simple analogy.3 "In this way 
all created things ", states St. Thomas, "so far as they exist, are like 
1Summa, I Q.XXXV 2, Rep. Ob. 3, and cf. Section c.2., infra. 
2Cf. Aquinas, IV Contra Gentes, 26, cited in Gilby, Texts, 174. 
3Cf. Summa, I Q.IV 3, Rep. Ob. 4, cited in Gilby, Texts, 12: 
"Two things enclosed within the same order may reflect one another's 
likeness, but the likeness between cause and effect is not thus mutual: 
we can say that a copy is like the original, but not conversely. We 
can speak of the creature resembling God in som=way, but not of God 
resembling the creature." 
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God as the First and universal principle of all being. "1 This we will 
call the analogical likeness of existence. 
Broadly speaking all of creation participates in the above 
analogical likeness of existence, but more specifically understood, 
regarding man and considering the above analogy as a "spiritual good" of 
nature, this serves as the first of three implications which Thomas derives 
from the word, likeness. The second implicate is that of knowledge which 
according to Thomas was bestowed on the angel at creation, not yet 
actually on the man, but only in potentiality. The third implicate of 
likeness is the "power of operation" which neither angel nor man was 
given "... because to each there remained something to be done whereby 
to obtain happiness. "2 Again we note that which was indicated earlier, 
viz., that there was a created incompleteness and unfulfilled intention 
which we suggested might imply creation's (nature's) necessary conclusion 
beyond itself .3 
However, as has been briefly introduced (supra, p. 178, text n. 2.), 
likeness between man and God is an imitative likeness. St. Thomas, citing 
Dionysius in support of his first qualification pertaining to man's 
imitative ability states: 
'The same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according 
as they imitate Him as far as He can be imitated, Who is not per- 
fectly imitable; unlike according as they fall short of their 
cause,' not merely in intensity and degree, [not only qualita- 
tively and quantitatively? ...; but because they are not in 
agreement, specifically or generically /ec secundum speciem 
.112211,2 7-4 
1Summa, I Q.IV 3. 2lbid., II -II Q.CLXIII 2. 
3Cf. Supra, p.175 , text of note 3. 
4Summa, I Q.IV 3, Rep. Ob. 1. First bracketed words are the trans- 
lation of A.M. Fairweather, Trans. and ed., Nature and Grace, Library of 
Christian Classics, Vol. XI, (London: SCM, 1954), P. 75. 
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God is related, Thomas continues, as one who "...transcends every genus; 
and as the principle of all genera. "1 Further, likeness can be 
articulated by means of an analogy, viz., "...inasmuch as God exists of 
His on Essence, and others in dependence upon Him. "2 And finally, the 
likeness of which we speak if qualified by Thomas' statement that while 
we may assert that creatures may bear some similarity to God, the state- 
ment is not transposable or reciprocal, i.e.,: 
...it must in no wise be admitted that God is like creatures; 
because, as Dioriysius says: A mutual likeness may be found be- 
tween thi :s of the same order but not between a cause and 
that which is caused. We say that a statue is like a man, but 
not conversely; ... . 
In spite of what may appear to be an overwhelming delimitation 
in respect to man's likeness to God, the inimitable One, nevertheless 
there are ways in which it can be asserted that there does exist an image, 
a likeness. Allowing for each of the qualifications imposed on the 
analogy of existence concept, Thomas says that beyond the oneness of 
number, species, or genus - all of which are inapplicable in respect to 
God's relation to man - there does exist a significant oneness: 
according to a certain analogy of proportion. In this sense a creature 
is one with God, or like to Him:... . "4 We shall attempt to locate that 
likeness in terms of the imago Dei. John Sullivan's synthesis of the 
concepts exemplar and species is instructive; he states that Aquinas' 
most complete argument for the existence of the image of God in man 
1Summa, I Q.IV 3, Rep. Ob. 2. 2Ibid., Rep. Ob. 3. 31bid., Rep. Ob. 4. 
4Summa, I Q.XCIII, 1, Ital. mine. Here, St. Thomas is referring to 
humanity under the broader term creation. The complexities of Aquinas' 
concept of proportionality will not have to be considered in this thesis. 
However, for a thorough evaluation see: Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between 
God and the World, trans. Axel Poignant, (Uppsala: Lundequistka Bokhandeln, 
1953), passim and especially Chapter VI. 
182. 
presupposes that "God is the exemplary as well as the efficient cause of 
creatures; the likeness to God in any creature is analogical only. "1 
Granting that this is a fair and adequate statement of Aquinas' intention, 
there remains a problem regarding the specific intention of such a state- 
ment. There may indeed be an analogical likeness between cause and 
effect, exemplar and image. However, one wonders in what specific sense 
an argument may be proposed which affirms the "existence of the image of 
God in man ". Would it be appropriate to suggest that the existence of 
an analogy significantly characterizes the being of man? According to 
the above phrase, i.e., "the likeness to God in any creature is analogical 
only ", it would appear rather that the utilization of the phrase "existence 
of the image of God in man" is a misleadingly imprecise one, and one with 
which St. Thomas would disagree. 
In light of the above objection, Sullivan's insight is construc- 
tive, as we note in the following: 
In the view of Thomas an image must bear a likeness which some- 
how pertains to the species of the exemplar. With respect to God 
obviously there can be no question of a species, for he is above 
all genera and species; so it will be a matter of a quasi- species 
only. The image of God among creatures must have a likeness per- 
taining to that which can be considered the quasi- species of God.2 
1Sullivan, Image, p. 224. 
2ibid., a portion of which has previously been quoted, supra, p.172, 
n. 4. The reference continues, extending to p. 225: "Though existence, 
life, and intelligence are all really identified in God,- we 
can conceive of intellectuality as being something like the species of God 
in our way of understanding the divine nature. For intellectuality is the 
ultimate grade of being proceeding from God, and so the ultimate grade of 
perfection which can be known about the divine nature. Among creatures, 
who participate in being, intelligence, life, and existence are not identical, 
nor to be found in every creature. When intellectuality is found in a 
creature it is always found in conjunction with life and existence, and pre- 
supposes life and existence. Therefore, intellectuality is ultimate, the 
ultimate procession of perfection from God. As ultimate it can be con- 
sidered as being the specific difference of the processions of beings from 
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That which was first termed the analogical likeness of existence 
(supra, p. 180 ) has now been further refined into what may be identified 
broadly as an analogy of quasi- species of intellectuality (supra, pp. 
182 -183, text of n. 2). This, we are inclined to suggest, simultaneously 
and 
specifies the absolute distance between God and man whdae on the other 
hand seeks to specify that by which both are related. It is, of course, 
the quality and term of relation with which we are primarily interested, 
and we recognize that here, as in the following, the cognitive power of 
man is that by which, according to Aquinas, he is most similar to God. 
He states: "Man is called the image of God; not that he is essentially 
an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin 
in an image of the king, as having the image of the king. "1 
Obviously these are not substantival terms; a king's facsimile 
may be impressed on the metal coin, but certainly the image of God 
(properly a quasi-image) cannot similarly be impressed on mind. Never- 
theless St. Thomas apparently wants to employ image categories when 
attempting to articulate the factor of likeness between God and man, and 
consequently designates the factor of similitude. However, pursuing the 
analogy offered, the relation between the king and his coined image is 
in no significant sense reciprocal, and we would conclude that similarly 
there is no reciprocity between the cognitive qualities of God and man. 
Nor, of course, would St. Thomas have attempted to articulate any such 
God. Intellectuality then is to be considered the quasi- species of God 
in our way of understanding the divine nature, for it is from these 
creaturely perfections that we attain to some knowledge of the divine 
nature." 
1Summa, I Q.XCIII 6. Cf. Aquinas, IV Contra Gentes, 26, cited 
in Gilby, Texts, 174: "God's likeness in men can be compared to that of 
Hercules in marble - a semblance of form, a disparity of nature." Cf. 
1-22M, P.179. 
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reciprocity. If therefore, the analogical quasi- species of intellectuality 
is non -substantial and non -reciprocal our question remains: precisely what 
is implied by saying that man was /is in or to the image of God? 
c.2. The preposition Ad. 
We have passed over, without sufficient comment, the significance 
of Aquinas' specific use and understanding of the preposition ád, to. 
We have called attention to the disjunctive dimensions implied by the 
preposition, but a more careful consideration may be constructive. Of 
ad as it effects the elucidation of the imago Dei St. Thomas says: 
...when it is written that God made man to His image, this can be 
understood in two ways, as meaning, first, that this preposition 
to points to the term of the making, so that the sense is, Let 
Us make man in such a wa that Our image ma be in him: or, sec- 
ondly, this preposition to may point to the exemplar cause, as 
when we say, This book is made to (the likeness of) that other one. 
Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incor- 
rectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. 
Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called image because thereby 
one Person imitates another.1 
We do not conclude that the alternatives are mutually exclusive; rather 
it would appear that there is an unavoidable difficulty in stating 
precisely the essence of the image. The preposition serves to illustrate 
both that difficulty and at the same time to offer tentative implications. 
Understood in the first sense, i.e., that image specifies the 
term of the making, two points are introduced. First, we recognize the 
disjunction between the cause and the effect; the image to which man is 
created does not become an intrinsic attribute of man - it is not an 
ontological factor of his essence.2 Secondly, inasmuch as there is 
1Summa, I Q.XCIII 5, Rep. Ob. 4. 
2But cf. Summa, I Q.VI 4, cited in Gilby, Texts, 143: "By the 
first essential existent and good each and every other thing exists and 
is good, partaking of God, and made like him, though distantly and 
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nevertheless a relation between cause and effect, between intention and 
actualization or realization, the term imago Dei does certainly qualify 
the being of man; apart from the image man would indeed be other than man 
whose being "includes" the image. 
Regarding the first, i.e., that there is an absolute disparity 
between the Image and that which is imaged, which is at the same time 
to specify the non -ontological qualification, we may proceed to note 
and appreciate the significance of a phrase from a prior reference, p. 179, 
n. 1: "... man is not simply called the image, but according to the image 
(ad imaginem), whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to 
perfection. "1 Ad imaginem articulates not only the potentiality of 
similitude, but also the distance between God and man.2 The perfection 
deficiently. Everything is called good by the divine goodness, as by 
its first principle, which is the exemplar, efficient, and final cause 
of all goodness. Nevertheless, the likeness of divine goodness is in- 
trinsic to each, and this formally is its own denoting goodness. Hence - 
oné goodness throughout the world, yet also many goodnesses." The 
"likeness of divine goodness ... intrinsic to each ",is apparently the 
goodness attributable on the basis of existence itself, and does not 
infer the minimization or indeed the elimination of either the distance 
or deficiency which characterizes created existence. Therefore we have 
suggested that the image to and toward which man is created, according 
to St. Thomas, is not an ontological factor of his essence. 
1The Latin text is: "homo non solum dicitur imago sed ad imaginem, 
per quod motus quidam tendentis in Eerfectionem designatur." Remembering 
that this qualification, and this precise use of the preposition is employed 
"... in order to express the imperfect character of the Divine image in 
man, ... ", it would appear that the so- called "movement of tendency to 
perfection" is tantamount to saying that the imago Dei primarily specifies 
the negativities of imperfection. For surely the "perfection" toward 
which there is a "movement of tendency" is entirely and recognizably 
unattainable, granting the validity of Thomas' specification of the in- 
imitability of God, and the disjunctive characteristics of cause and effect. 
2Cf. Summa, I Q. XC:III 1: "... there is in man a likeness to God; 
... for the preposition to signifies a certain approach, as of something 
at a distance." Ital. mine. 
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of which St. Thomas speaks presupposes an imperfection, an un- likeness, 
and he apparently wishes to hold both perfection and imperfection 
simultaneously in tension in his utilization of the term image. He 
states this explicitly saying that "... man is said to be both image, 
by reason of the likeness; and to the image by reason of the imperfect 
likeness. "1 
As to the second point noted above, i.e., that the image of God 
does indeed qualify the being of man, we are introduced to the realm of 
St. Thomas' conceptualization of the intellect of which something has 
already been said (especially p. 182). This is indeed a critical 
emphasis in the thought of St. Thomas, and it would appear that beyond 
both the simple likeness of existence, and the narrower likeness of life 
which increases likeness to God, there is the more particular likeness 
which accrues to rational beings. "... and these last, as Augustine 
says (Qq. 83), approach so near to God in likeness, that among all 
creatures nothing comes nearer to Him. "2 It follows that the capacity 
for cognition is that which qualifies the being of man, and therefore is 
that which simultaneously specifies the likeness of man to the exemplar. 
This is not to suggest, however, that by means of man's cognitive 
ability and powers there subsists in him an intrinsic similitude to God. 
To be sure, deprived of intellectuality, man forfeits relation to the 
image; however, the possession of intellectual capacity does not exhaust 
the implications of the imago Dei. That is to say, man with full 
cognitive powers is not thereby ipso facto in "possession" of the full 
measure of the image.3 
1Summa, I Q.XCIII 1. 2Ibid., I Q.XCIII 2. 
3Cf. AppendixA,especially Articles 1.3, 2.4. 
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Reflecting the terminology of St. Thomas this intellectual 
capacity may be called man's cognitive aptitude; it is given in common 
to all sentient beings.1 But there are two additional qualifications 
to be recognized; there is the image whereby man 
actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; 
which kind of image is by the conformity of grace: thirdly, inasmuch 
as man knows and loves God perfectly; which is from the likeness 
and conformity of glory. Wherefore on the words, The light of Thy 
countenance, 0 Lord, is signed upon us (Ps, iv.7), the gloss dis- 
tinguishes a threefold image, of creation, of re- creation, and of 
likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the 
just, the third only in the blessed.2 
d. Summary and Conclusion 
Significant modifications in respect to the doctrine of the 
imago Dei seem to have been precluded by the retention Of the structures 
of relation between God and man as explicated most systematically by 
Augustine in the later fourth and early fifth centuries. Those 
structures enunciated the distinction between God and man, both in re- 
spect to the relation as it pertained in Paradise and even more emphatically 
apropos the fall. Peter Abelard, in the eleventh century, in his 
particular emphasis of the factor of love in relation to the imago, 
Dei, indicated a tendency toward the explication of the image in terms 
of personal relation. However, we noted again that the pristine fellow- 
ship was destroyed, and that therefore the imago Dei theme was not 
subsequently used by Abelard to characterize the dimensions of the God/man 
relation in respect to man's post -fallen condition. 
10f. Summa, I Q,III 1, Rep, Ob. 2: "Man is said to be after the 
image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he 
excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, Let us make man to our image 
and likeness, it is added, And let him have dominion over the fishes of the 
sea (Gen. 1,26), Man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence. 
Hence it is according to his intelligence and reason (which are incorporeal), 
that man is said to be according to the image of God." 
2Summa, I Q,XCIII 4. The redemptive and soteriological concerns 
exceed the scope of this thesis. 
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Seeking to survey the centuries for material in respect to our 
theme and simultaneously striving to avoid superficiality, we narrowed our 
field of consideration and devoted special attention to a consideration 
of the theology of St. Thomas. His thought exemplifies the highest 
development of those structures which were articulated by St. Augustine, 
but also incorporates the static categories of Aristotle .1 And in the 
theology of St. Thomas we are exposed to the clearest possible delineation 
of the two spheres of reality, i.e., God and creation. 
The principle of "existence" serves an important function in 
Thomas' theology, for God, as the exemplar of all existence, is the 
sine qua non of all reality. It is Thomas' conceptualization of 
existence that leads to a fuller understanding of the variegation of 
creation, of the principle of perfection, and even the rationale of evil. 
As the highest of all created forms man is fashioned with potentiality 
which transcends his natural created being, i.e., toward the beatific 
vision. And it is in relation to that wherein we began to articulate 
Thomas' doctrine of the imago Dei, per se. 
We want to avoid repetition in this conclusion and therefore do 
not consider it advisable to reconstruct at length the arguments which 
have heretofore been considered. However, certain elements of St, Thomas' 
system deserve special comment. We noted (supra,pp.175f) that in spite 
of a doctrine which included an historical Paradise that experience or 
existence was not commensurate with the life for which man was destined 
by God; there was a greater dimension toward which man was created, i.e., 
a vision of the Divine Essence. It is in respect to that dimension that 
1Cf. supra, p. 172. 
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the image of God serves as a functional constituent.1 
According to Thomas the Divine Essence is itself the Image - the 
very Being of God is that which is to be derivatively imaged in and by 
man. Then followed a series of qualifications in respect to man's, may 
we say, "image- ability ". That is to say, St. Thomas carefully guards 
and protects the primary Essentiality of God while at the same time 
attempting to enunciate man's potentiality to truly reflect the being 
of God Himself. It was noted (p.178) that the term equality is inappro- 
priate in respect to the God -man relation. However, imitation and 
participation are applicable (pp.178f), and hence there is an "analogical 
likeness of existence" (pp, 174. 
Second, there is no appropriate generic equation between God and 
man because God transcends all genus, nor is there a simple equation 
between cause and effect. Here the analogy of proportion was introduced, 
and also John Sullivan's term, "quasi- species ", by which he attempts to 
specify the foundation or dimension of the God - man relation. Thirdly, 
we considered the dimension of intellectuality as a factor of the imago 
Dei (supra, especially pp. 183ff). 
Fourth was our discussion of the significance of St. Thomas' 
use of the preposition ad by which he clearly enunciated the distance 
between God and creation, specifically man, while simultaneous]yartic- 
ulating the factor of man's movement toward perfection for which God 
created him. Ad imaginem suggest both poles of the tension of relation, 
(cf. p.186 ), where again the factor of intellectuality was interjected. 
And it was suggested that although man's primal cognitive potentiality was 
1We acknowledge that no specific mention has been made to the "fall ". 
However, although the term itself is not frequently used by Thomas, the 
event to which it refers is a significant element in his system. Cf. 
Appendix A, Articles 2.2; 2.3; 2.4; 3; 3.1. 
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not tantamount to his "possession" of the image, there was nevertheless 
implicit an "aptitude" apart from which man is indefinable. It appears 
to us that this last factor of the image theme is perhaps the clearest 
articulation and summarization of that which St. Thomas wished to express 
in regard to the imago Dei. The cognitive aptitude is that which remains 
the distinctive characteristic of man in relation to all other forms of 
creation, and it is in respect to that facet that re- creation occurs, 
and ultimately the consummate likeness which God intends (cf. supra pp. 
186 -87) . 
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B. Post- scholastic Doctrine of the Imago Dei 
Duns Scotus, in the thirteenth century, introduced an alternative 
to the Thomistic structure of nature and grace. 
And, along with a re- 
introduction and amplication of older semi- Pelagian elements, 
there was 
an attendOnt revival and re- evaluation of the concept of the will. 
However, in spite of the fact that the will was certainly 
one of the 
recognized constituent factors of the imago Dei, there was 
a conspicuous 
absence of any new or altered doctrine of the image of God. 
Explanations 
for this absence are not of great importance insofar as this 
thesis is 
e- 
concerned, but we may suggest that because the two - storÿ structure 
of 
nature /grace, so eloquently and elaborately articulated by St. 
Thomas, 
continued unchallenged, therefore his contribution to the imago Dei 
theme 
similarly enjoyed a period of peace. That is to say, by way of suggestion, 
that so long as alternatives to the basic structures operative between 
God and man (e.g., nature /super- nature) were not pursued, that which 
had been asserted relative to the image of God accordingly continued 
unquestioned. And in spite of certain semi -Pelagian assertions of Duns 
Scotus relative to the will of man, the basic, foundational structures 
remained more or less inviolate.1 
It is somewhat remarkable that two centuries later than Scotus, 
in the great free -will debate between Erasmus and Luther, tat the image 
of God theme played such an insignificant role in the dialogue. One might 
have expected 1-ßt in such a thorough -going re- appraisal and reformulation 
between God and man that similarly the image of God theme might have been 
1For a short presentation of Duns Scotus' anthropology, cf. H. 
Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, second edition, (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1913) , pp. 207-08. 
extensively utilized and reconstructed. 
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One needs, however, to examine 
other works of Luther to discover specific reference to the theme in 
which we are interested. It was almost inevitable, however, that in con- 
junction with so radical a reassessment of the structure of relation 
between God and man as was articulated during the period after St. Thomas 
and Duns Scotus, that there would eventually be an equally radical re- 
statement of the doctrine of the image of God.. What therefore appears 
rudimentary in Luther achieves a certain refinement in Calvin; the lack 
of systematization of the imago Dei theme in Luther is both systematized 
and enlarged by the latter. We turn, therefore, to those two great 
figures of the Reformation to discern their contribution to the theme 
at hand. 
a. Martin Luther on the Imago Dei 
a.1. The seat and focus of the image. 
It may be well to note at the outset that there is an inherent 
dualism (not appreciably. unlike that of St. Thomas' nature /supernature) 
in Luther's theology expressed by the terms animal spiritual (mortal/ 
immortal). The image of God specifies a life which Luther asserts is 
different from and far above a mere animal life. "1 The animal 
life with which Adam was endowed is conjoined with, but separable from, 
the immortal life which, says Luther, was not as unambiguously mani- 
fest; it was held in hope. The loss of this dimension of Adam's 
primal existence had serious repercussions, affecting every facet of his 
1Martin Luther, Commentary on Genesis, Standard Edition of 
Luther's Works, Vol, I, ed. John Nicholas Lenker, (Minneapolis: Luther- 
ans in All Lands Co., 1904), 1:26a, p. 209. Hereafter: Gen, 
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mundane experience - eat, drink, generation, purity, and happiness.1 
Luther was well acquainted with the Augustinian theory of the 
trinitarian structure of the image, but expressed reservations relative 
to its propriety. The inherent danger which Luther recognized centered 
primarily around the issue of the power of the will. Proponents of a 
modified theory (notably Erasmus) amplified the Augustinian formula of 
memory, understanding, and will, and reasoned that as God is free, 
similarly must man, created in His image, be endowed with freedom. As 
we shall note shortly, Luther employed a doctrine of the fall in order 
to denounce any theory of man's continuing utilization of free -will, but 
his express reservation in respect to the trinitarian formulation was 
related to his denial of man's participation ".., with the grace and work 
of God, as a preceding and efficient cause of salvation. "2 
Furthermore, Luther emphatically expressed his reluctance to 
locate the image in memory, understanding, and will as natural endowments 
of man. We do indeed possess them, but "wholly corrupted, most miserably 
weakened: nay, that I may speak with greater plainness, utterly leprous 
and unclean. If these natural endowments therefore constitute the image 
of God it will inevitably follow that Satan also was created in the image 
of God; ... . "3 
Luther, in spite of the above noted reservations, continued to 
associate the imago Dei with those very endowments in terms of which he 
1Gen. 1:26a, p. 209. 
2Gen. 1:26a, p. 114. We note also an implicit denial of the 
Thomistic structure of nature /grace. 
3 
Ibid., p. 115. We question the logic of his argument; Satan's 
"inevitable" similarity of endowment does not appear at all self -evident. 
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is apprehensive about locating the image. But there is a very subtle 
transition of locus implied in the following: 
.., that the image of God created in Adam was a workmanship 
the most beautiful, the most excellent and the most noble, 
while as yet no leprosy of sin adhered either to his reason 
or to his will. Then all his senses, both internal and ex- 
ternal, were the most perfect and pure. His intellect was 
most clear, his memory most complete and his will the most 
sincere, accompanied with the most charming security, without 
any fear of death and without any care or anxiety whatever.1 
To be sure, the endowments of memory, understanding, and will - 
their implicates of reason and intellect - retain their appropriate 
place vis -a -vis the imago Dei; they are not rejected. However, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that Luther ascribes those attributes entirely 
to the nature of man, and that they have a history correlative with man's. 
They are factors of the image, implications, but they are not its essence. 
It would appear that the surest evidence of the imago Dei that in which 
the image manifest itself, is to be noted in the words: "... most charming 
security, without any fear of death and without any care or anxiety what- 
ever." (supra). His stated conclusion ik concise: "... that the image 
of God, in which Adam was created, was excellent above all things, in 
which was included eternal life, eternal security and all good. "2 
Life, security, and good are, in the theology of Luther, terms of 
relation; as they relate therefore to the imago Dei, so also does the 
image of God become something other than that which implies structures of 
metaphysical relation, e.g., nature /supernature(Aquinas), or existence /non- 
existence (Augustine). Rather, the terms qualify personal relation. This 
is articulated by Luther thus: 
1 
Gen, 1:26a., p. 116. 2Ibid., p. 120. 
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,,. I for my part understand the image of God to be this: that 
Adam possessed it in its moral substance or nature; that he 
not only knew God and believedhim to be good, but that he 
lived also a life truly divine; that is, free from the fear of 
death and of all dangers and happy in the face of God.1 
The image of God pertains to the moral life of man; it has implications 
related to a personal structure of relation. Further, inasmuch as Adam 
originally possessed the image he lived a "divine" life, that is, secure 
in the certain knowledge of God's providential will. It is, Luther states 
in the same connection, as if God had said: "... 'Adam and Eve, ye now 
live in all security. Ye neither see nor fear death. This is my image 
in which ye now live. Ye live as God lives. "'2 
Luther, like St. Thomas before him, locates the image outside 
the nature and being of man, though that is not to say beyond the range 
of effect. Original security which was the experience of the couple in 
Paradise was the concomitant of their created and unchallenged structure 
of relation. We are speaking of the moment in time (according to Luther) 
to which he refers as ".,. Adam's primitive, creative innocence ...", and 
which he calls: 
the childhood of glorious innocency, because Adam, ..., was 
in a middle state, or state of neutrality or liability; in 
a state where he could be deceived by Satan; and could fall in- 
to that awful calamity into which he did fall. But such a per- 
il of falling will not exist in that state of perfect manhood 
1Gen. 1:26a., p. 116. 
2Gen., 1:26a, p. 117. In the same place the converse is also 
expressed:-"... we see and feel the mighty perils in which we now live; 
how many forms and threatenings of death this miserable nature of ours 
is doomed to experience and endure, in addition to that unclean con- 
cupiscence and those other ragings of sin and those inordinate emotions 
and affections, which are engendered in the minds of all men. We are 
never confident and happy in God, fear and dread in the highest are 
perpetually trying us. These and like evils are the image of the devil, 
who has impressed that image upon us, But Adam lived in the highest 
pleasure and in the most peaceful security." 
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of glorified innocency, which we shall enjoy in the future and 
spiritual life .1 
This primal period of "glorious innocency" was further char- 
acterized by the quality of original righteousness which Luther insists 
was an "... essential part of created nature, ... 502 only a certain 
superfluous and superadded gift or ornament. "2 Unlike the scholastics 
before him, Luther associated original righteousness (rectitude in 
Thomas) with the moral structures of personal relation. He speaks of 
Adam in Paradise as "... righteous, true and upright; ... because he 
acknowledged God; because he obeyed, him with the utmost pleasure; 
because he understood the works of God without any instruction concerning 
them. "3 So comprehended, original righteousness is the prime term of 
the 122E2 _12E144 original righteousness empitomizes and includes all 
other implicates. 
1Gen., 2:17b, p. 183. We note the Augustinian themes: posse, 
non peccare and non posse peccare. 
2Ibid., 3 :7, p. 259. In the forefront is the factor of sin, 
an element by which, in our opinion, Western theology has been circum- 
scribed. Illustrative of our point we continue with the next line 
of the reference: "If you lay it down as a fact, that original right- 
eousness was not an essential quality of the nature of man, it must 
inevitably follow that the sin, which followed original righteousness, 
was also not an essential quality of the nature of man. And if so, 
was it not an utterly vain thing that Christ should be sent into the 
world as the Redeemer of man, if it was man's original righteousness 
only, which was merely a foreign and separate addition to his nature, 
that was lost; and if that loss still left the faculties and quali- 
ties of his original nature sound and perfect ?" 
31bid., 2:17b, p. 186, Ital. mine. The reference continues: "This 
last faculty of Adam is wonderfully exemplified by the fact, that when 
he had been in a profound sleep and God had formed Eve out of one of his 
ribs, the moment he awoke he recognized Eve as the work of God, saying 
'This is now bone of my bones.' Was not this a marvelous proof of 
intellect, thus at the first sight to know and comprehend the work of God ?" 
4Cf. Ibid., 1:27b, pp. 124 -25, especially the statement that Eve 
was "... like unto Adam in reference to the image of God, that is, with 
respect to righteousness, wisdom and salvation, ... ." 
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a.2. The Image Impending 
Luther's comments relative to the imago Dei in his Commentary on 
Genesis, are somewhat ambiguous in respect to the alternative whether 
Adam possessed or anticipated participation in the image of God. Com- 
menting on Gen. 2:17b he asserts that Adam had "... a most upright will, 
yet not a perfect will; for perfection itself was deferred from the 
state of the animal life to that of the spiritual and eternal life." 
1 
It appears that the perfection of which Luther speaks is that of glory, 
when it shall be impossible for man to sin. This was not an endowment 
of pre -fallen man, (supra, p. 196, text n. 1 ). Therefore it would seem 
that full participation in the image of God was reserved - a future 
experience. 
On the other hand, however, addressing himself to the question 
of the restoration of our spiritual life, Luther says: 
well indeed may we wonder and render thanks unto God, .,. 
that we, ,,, should be enabled through the merits and benefits of 
Christ to look with assurance for that same glory of a spiritual 
life, which Adam might also have looked for with all assurance, 
without the dying merits of Christ if he had remained unfallen 
in that animal life which possessed the image of God.2 
The "spiritual life" is that to which both Adam (in Paradise) and we 
(as Christians) look forward. The difference, however, is that where- 
as even though not already " perfect" Adam did possess the image, i.e., 
in terms of original righteousness. On the other hand perfection after 
the fall requires the "dying merits of Christ ". The initial appearance 
of an inconsistency is resolved, but only at the expense of a radical 
1Gen, 2:17b, p. 188, Irenaeus also utilizes this theme, 
alluding to I Cor, 15:45. Cf, CHAPTER I, p. 60, and passim. 
2Gen, 1:26b., P. 123. Ital. mine. 
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disjunction between the structures of Adam's and post- fallen man's 
anticipation of perfection. That is to say, the future toward which 
Adam may have grown (without the death of Christ), possessing the image 
of God, post- fallen man who has "lost" the image does not grow toward; 
a new structure of relation is required. For both pre - and post -fallen 
man, the perfection of spiritual life is prospective, although the means 
of attainment are dissimilar. Luther asserts that inasmuch as pre- fallen 
man possessed the image his attainment of perfection may have come 
through a gradual process; for post -fallen man, however, who has lost 
the image, perfection is "... through the merits and benefits of Christ." 
(supra). 
Was the image which Adam possessed the same image to which we now 
look forward, or may it be said that the implications of the imago Dei 
in respect to Adam did not exhaust the image? That is to say, what, if 
any, is the difference between the image possessed and lost and the image 
hoped -for? According to Luther the image which Adam initially possessed 
was somehow incomplete, less perfect than the image to which man in 
faith now looks forward. In that primal state of "glorious innocence" 
there was an incompleted intention for man. It is this of which Luther 
says: 
The divine object of the gospel is that we might be restored 
to that original and indeed better and higher image; an image, 
in which we are born again unto eternal life, or rather unto 
the hope of eternal life by faith, in order that we might live 
in God and with God and might be 'one' with him as Christ so 
beautifully and largely sets it forth in the seventeenth chapter 
of St. John.1 
1Gen, 1:26a, pp. 118 -19. Ital. mine. 
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The image which is now anticipated is a greater image than that 
image possessed by Adam. 
1 
The restoration of the image, consequently, 
is not simply a return to Paradise but an experience of greater dimension, 
achieved on our behalf by Christ's merit, and marked by a certain fixed 
and established security. 
a.3. The Image and Sin 
We have previously concluded that the imago Dei signifies a term 
of moral relation, the prime implicates of which are structures of 
dependence which issue in security. One expects sin, therefore, to be 
understood and articulated within a similar structure; and indeed, it 
would be difficult to formulate any clearer or more concise statement 
than this: 
... the serpent attacked the good will of God itself, and 
endeavored to prove by this very prohibition from the tree 
of life that the will of God towards man was not good. The 
serpent therefore attacks the image of God itself. He as- 
sails those highest and most perfect powers, which in the 
newly -created nature of Adam and Eve were as yet uncorrupted. 
He aims at overturning that highest worship of God, which 
God himself had just ordained. 
The "highest and most perfect powers" are most properly directed toward 
"worship of God" and therefore are the primary target of the serpent. 
A structure of relation established on the foundation of worship (which 
here implies trust, dependence, and love) is liable to destruction only 
on the same terms. 
Luther states: "The sum of the whole temptation and her LEve'i 
fall by it was that she listened to another word and departed from that 
WORD which God had spoken to her, "3 The "word" is the address 
1 
Cf. Gen. 1:26a, p. 119, where Luther says that when the image is 
"... perfected in the kingdom of the Father, then our will will be truly 
free and good, our mind truly illuminated and our memory constant and perfect. 
Then will it come to pass also that all creatures shall be more subject 
unto us than ever they were unto Adam in paradise." 
?Gen. 3:1b, p. 231. 31bid., p. 233. 
of personal communi cation;1 
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departure from the "word" is therefore 
departure from personal relation. Shortly after Luther puts it thus: 
"... Adam by his sin dashed against the very person of Christ, who is 
the very image of God. "2 
when we now 
a thing unknown, an 
but the contrary to 
experience still, 
are the mere terms, 
all we now hear and 
attempt to speak of that image we speak of 
image which we not only have never experienced, 
which we have experienced all our lives and 
Of this image therefore all we now possess 
'the image of God;' These naked words are 
all we know.3 
Thus does Luther introduce into the imago Dei doctrine a dimension 
around which the debate still continues. We have noted the implications 
of stating that Adam possessed the image, and we have considered the 
impact of sin upon it. But, is it possible to assert without qualification 
that the image is "lost "? If so, what are the human implications? 
Luther vacillates between bold statements of its having been totally lost, 
and more guarded assertions of its corruption. Both positions are 
expressed in his commentary on the one verse, Gen. 1:26. 
In the context of original sin he states: 
Is it not most mighty, both in concupiscence and in disgust? 
And what shall we further say of hatred toward God and blas- 
phemies of all kinds? These are sad evidences of the fall, 
which do indeed prove that the _image of God in us is lost.4 
Luther's estimation of sin is unequivocal; it is a radical disease 
which totally effects the total nature of man. And commensurate with 
his doctrine of sin, it would appear that the image is "lost ". If 
we recall that the image is a term of righteous relation, we would not 
1It is not implied that Luther himself employed the word "personal" 
to express this structure of relation. Nevertheless, there is a simmi lori y 
between his expression and our use of the term, 
2Gen. 3:22, p. 341. 31bid. , 1:26 p. 117. 
4Gen. 1:26a, p. 122, Ital. mine. 
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expect Luther to equivocate by suggesting that the effect of sin was 
less than total. 
But on the other hand, Luther is inclined to "protect" the 
dignity of man in respect to lower animals, and because the imago Dei 
bears implicates of reason and a specific quality of relation to God, he 
tends to qualify the term "lost ". He says: 
Although therefore this image of God be almost wholly lost, 
there is nevertheless still remaining a mighty difference 
between man and all other animals of God's creation. But 
originally, before the sin of the fall, the difference was 
far greater and far more illustrious; ... .1 
The latter difference to which he refers is that between man's pre - 
and post -fallen knowledge and understanding of God; it is that dif- 
ference which specifies man's superiority. Quite apparently, were 
Luther to have interjected an interpretation of the unqualified lostness 
of the imago Dei, so also would the difference between man and other 
animals have been destroyed. On the contrary, he says: 
As to us in our present state we still possess indeed some 
certain dull and as it were dead remnants of this knowledge. 
But all animals besides are altogether void of such understand- 
ing. They know not their Creator nor their origin nor their 
end; nor whence nor why they were created. No other animals 
therefore possess anything whatever of this similitude of God.2 
Luther is careful to protect the dignity of man and his 
superiority in respect to lower animals, and within that context speaks 
of a less -than -total destruction of the imago Dei. But on the other 
1Gen. 1:26a, p. 122, Ital. mine. 
2Gen. 1:26b, p. 122. We would suggest that this apparently 
irreconcilable tension, i.e., either total or partial loss of the 
image, is inevitable granting, first the historic perfection of Paradise 
and'subsequent catastrophic fall, and second the shape and structure of 
the imago Dei as porträyed by Luther. Neither tenet, we would suggest, 
is self- evident, nor necessarily required by Scripture. 
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hand, in respect to the factor of the image of God which signifies man's 
primal righteous relation with God, he employs terminology of totality, 
i.e., lost and corrupt.1 
a.4. Conclusion 
In spite of significant variations in post -Thomistic theology, 
notably in that of Duns Scotus, the relative constancy of the "shape" 
of relation between God and man produced no truly significant re- 
formation of the doctrine of the imago Dei. Therefore, we chose to 
pursue our consideration in the theology of Martin Luther, in which 
appears to be the first serious and creative alternative in respect to 
our theme. 
Even though structures of dualism, i.e., categories which 
specify the distinction between God and man, remained operative in 
Luther's theology, the means by which the so- called distinction was 
transcended was via categories of personal relation as opposed to 
metaphysical structures operative generally from Augustine through St. 
Thomas. Consequently, both the paradisial structure of relation and the 
subsequent dissolution of relation (fall) assume a different dimension. 
While Luther retained some of the terminology apropos the imago Dei, 
i.e., knowledge, understanding, and will, the constructs of personal 
relation required a modification in respect to their primal and post - 
fallen function. 
That the image of God is presented as a term which articulates 
a created quality of personal and righteous relation maximizes the 
1Cf. Gen. 2:17b, p. 187: "Thus it is evident that original sin 
is the essential and entire loss and deprivation and absence of original 
righteousness; just as blindness is the privation or absence of sight." 
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radical dissimilarity in respect to pre - and post- fallen man. The imago. 
Dei, in the theology of Luther, was possessed by Adam in his primal state, 
and as we noted (supra, p. 195) he possessed it in its "moral substance 
or nature." Implications thereof are those qualities or dimensions of 
his life which are compatible with participation in divinity, e.g., 
absolute security. That Adam "possessed" the image of God does not, 
however, imply that his possession exhausted its dimensions. We con- 
cluded that essentially the imago Dei specified righteous relation. 
That relation, of course, was liable to destruction. But destruction of 
the relation insofar as Adam was concerned, did not concomitantly destroy 
the reality which transcended it, namely, the indestructible intention of 
God, first that the imago Dei should be the critical characterization of 
man, and second that subsequent to its "destruction" it should be re- 
created. However, the structure and shape of relation, and man's 
association with the image of God, assumed a different dimension sub- 
sequent to the fall, for then the dying merits of Christ were necessary, 
whereas in Paradise, according to Luther, they were not. 
We have consistently, from the beginning of this work, either 
implicitly or explicitly expressed our reluctance to articulate the 
relation between God and man on the presupposition of an entirely and 
completely perfect paradisial existence and a subsequent and cat® 
astrophic fall. Consequently, we will not consider it either necessary 
or advisable to criticize the validity of those of Luther's conclusions 
which both presuppose that structure and also emanate from those pre- 
suppositions. However, Luther's conceptualization of the relation 
between God and man based primarily on personal categories we feel to be 
scripturally consistent and constructive. 
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Similarly, Luther's characterization of sin in his Commentary 
on Genesis conforms consistently with the categories of personal rela- 
tion; the serpent attacks "... the image of God itself," (supra, p.199, 
text n. 2 ), which may, in this instance, be called man's "worship 
center." Satan challenges the goodness of God's intention toward man, 
and man allows himself to be deluded and deceived. One wonders what the 
shape of the God /man relation would have been had Luther not begun with 
so firmly an established doctrine of the perfection of Paradise, and 
emphasized personal relational structures, and the imago Dei as righteous 
relation. Obviously, the last phrase, "righteous relation ", would have 
had to have been modified; "righteous" would not appear to be a term which 
would appropriately be ascribed to a less- than -perfect relation between 
God and man. Nevertheless, an approximation of that which is implied by 
the term might have been feasible apart from a concept of perfect Paradise. 
For instance, we recall Irenaeus' concept of Adam's childhood in the 
Garden with its implication of an affinity between himself and God apart 
from perfect and mature righteousness. Is there an unexpressed re- 
luctance on the part of Luther to see not only the possibility of the 
Incarnation implicit in creation, but also its conformability? That is 
to say, is not he (and Western theology in general) averse to considering 
the possibility that inherent and implicit in the Incarnation itself 
there may be elements of the perfection of an initial imperfection, e.g., 
the perfect righteousness of man whose very createdness implies only an 
approximation of righteousness? These and related questionshave guided 
our work, and will also shape our final conclusion. 
As Luther's doctrine of sin conforms to a configuration of personal 
relation, and as the imago Dei similarly conforms, Luther is inclined to 
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suggest that the totality of sin's dimensions similarly adversely affected 
the imago Dei, i.e., destroyed it. On the other hand there is implicit 
in the imago Dei, according to Luther, the specification of the differentia- 
tion between man and other animals which he seeks to maintain, and there- 
fore he seems reluctant to assert unqualifiedly that the image is lost. 
This dilemma introduced the terminology of "image remnants, ", though 
from a slightly different perspective from that of St. Augustine's 
a: 
"vestighi image ". 
1 
Apart from proceeding from a presupposition of an historic 
Paradise, the term "remnant" and all associated terminology would appear 
to be quite irrelevant. Because we do not subscribe to those particular 
presuppositions, we will attempt to reconcile the problem implied, i.e., 
having -had, having -lost, and gradations thereof in a different way using 
different presuppositions. It would, of course, be naive and mis- 
leading to suggest that simply rejecting a set of presuppositions would 
lead toward a completely satisfactory alternative, that is, in terms of 
that which have been outlined in the Introduction. There is latitude 
for many variations which purport to proceed from other presuppositions, 
e.g., the treatment offered by Karl Barth. But, in addition to one's 
interpretation of the original structure of creation, there is the 
equally important interpretation of the structure of the relation between 
God and man in respect to sin, which is, in a sense, another variable 
which is determinative. It is that which we see exemplified in the 
theology of John Calvin. 
1As "remnant" presupposes a proportion of "lostness" one would con- 
clude that utilization of such terminology would also presuppose an historic 
"possession ". Interestingly, this structure is operative in both David 
Cairns' The Image of God in Man, and even more explicitly in G.C. Berkouwer's 
Man: The Image of God, trans. Dirk W. Jellema, (Grand Rapids: Erdmans, 1962) . 
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b. Calvin's concept of the Imago Dei 
It was suggested in our consideration of Luther's analysis of the 
imago Dei that whereas Luther's doctrine of the image was rudimentary and 
somewhat unsystematic, John Calvin's was well - defined. Indeed, one 
discovers that the imago Dei is a foundational theme employed by Calvin 
to articulate both the actual and the intended relation between God and 
man. As noted in our consideration of Luther, so also is John Calvin's 
utilization of the image of God theme directed primarily toward a fuller 
understanding of the God/man relation; it is a relational term. 
The following quotation from Calvin's Institutes of the Christian 
Religion enunciates several aspects of the image of God which are 
particularly significant, namely nature /supernature, the pre - and post - 
fallen characteristics of man, and grace. Our discussion of these and 
other topics that impinps on the imago Dei, e.g., the soul, gratitude, and 
the subjective and objective aspects of the image, illustrate the dualistic 
structures upon which John Calvin operated. Of man and his natural and 
supernatural gifts, Calvin says: 
I feel pleased with the well -known saying which has been bor- 
rowed from the writings of Augustine, that man's natural gifts 
were corrupted by sin, and his supernatural gifts withdrawn; 
meaning by supernatural gifts the light of faith and righteous- 
ness, which would have been sufficient for the attainment of life 
and everlasting felicity. Man, when he withdrew his allegiance 
to God, was deprived of the spiritual gifts by which he had been 
raised to the hope of eternal salvation. Hence it follows, that 
he is now an exile from the kingdom of God, so that all things 
which pertain to the blessed life of the soul are extinguished 
in him until he recover them by the grace of regeneration. 
Among them are faith, love to God, charity towards our neigh- 
bour, the study of righteousness and holiness. All these, when 
restored to us by Christ, are to be regarded as adventitious and 
above nature. If so, we infer that they were previously abol- 
ished. On the other hand, soundness of mind and integrity of 
heart were, at the same time, withdrawn, and it is this which 
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constitutes the corruption of natural gifts.1 
Presupposed, as in other Western theology which has been studied, 
is the historicity of both the paradisial life and the fall. In.Calvin's 
theology, no less than in respect to others examined, this presupposition 
shapes and in a sense determines the entire system. It incorporates not 
only the characteristics of fallen man and his relation to God, but also 
the nature and effect of sin and the redemption by Christ. Moreover, 
it becomes somewhat mandatory to engage in conjecture regarding the 
characteristics of pre- fallen man, his attributes, powers, potential, 
and the God /man relationship as it prevailed in Eden.2 
b.1. The Original Imago Dei: 
Its Essence and Dimensions 
Stated generally,_ according to Calvin the image of God is the 
reflected glory of God, and the consequent or derivative superiority of 
man. It is recognized immediately that the image is not primarily that 
which inheres in Adam. It is rather that originally he adequately 
1John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Reli ion, 3 vols., 
trans., Henry Beveridge, Edinburgh: Edinburgh Printing Co., 1845- 1846), 
2.1.12,t r45.;;.4 Following common custom, the numbers indicate Book, Chapter, and 
Section, respectively. 
2But, cf. Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine of Man, (London: 
Lutterworth Press, 1949), pp. 84 -85: "... when Calvin approaches the 
facts of man's fallen and depraved nature, he refuses to enunciate a 
doctrine in abstraction from the new creation in Christ where man is 
placed in the light of his original truth which is still the truth about 
man, no matter how much he has perverted it and himself. That is the 
Word of grace by which he was made, and to which he is called to conform, 
toward which his life is destinated.And so the imago Dei in which and 
unto which man is created we see at last in Christ, who is identical with 
God's gracious action toward man." And cf. On Eph. 4:24; Inst. 1.15.4. 
We do not wish to imply either that Calvin's constitutive motif in respect 
to his doctrine of the imago Dei was other than Christ, or that our own 
orientation would challenge that order. However, this reservation seems 
valid, viz., that there is some degree of reciprocity between "situation" 
and "solution ". That is to say, the predetermination of the shape of 
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reflected the glory of God inasmuch as there was a primal similitude 
between himself and Christ.1 Being united to God, which is one of the 
dimensions of the image, is what Calvin calls "... the true and highest 
perfection of dignity ... . "2 We will attempt to determine Calvin's 
meaning of the term "united ", for as a term of relation it partially 
characterizes Calvin's doctrine of the imago Dei. 
Professor Torrance's conclusion in respect to the essence of 
the image in Calvin's theology states concisely: 
There is no doubt that Calvin always thinks of the imago, in 
terms of a mirror. Only while the mirror actually reflects 
an object does it have the image of that object. There is 
no such thing in Calvin's thought as an imago dissociated from 
the act of reflecting.3 
Granting the above, which of course does not exhaust Calvin's contribution 
to the image theme, we will need to further explore the precise meaning 
and significance of the assertion that the imagé relates to this ability 
or potential of man, i.e., to reflect the "object ", God himself. This 
potentiality of primal man is what Torrance refers to as the subjective 
aspect of the image. But first and foremost one should appreciate that 
the subjective dimension of the image is entirely dependent on its 
objective foundation. There is no image in man, per se,; the image is 
rather reflected ]a man. "God looks upon Himself, so to speak, and 
post -fallen man's relation to God to some extent shapes one's Christology, 
and conversely, one's Christology prescribes one's anthropology. 
1Calvin emphatically asserts that it is the pre -existent Christ 
to whom Adam is related; it is not a relation to the future incarnate 
Christ, which idea he calls "silly and distorted ". Cf. Inst. 2.12.6. 
2Ínst. 2.12.6. 
3Calvin's Doctrine of Man, p. 36, and cf. Ibid.., P. 39: 
"Primarily, it is God Himself who beholds His on glory in the works of 
His hand, or rather who images Himself in these works." 
beholds Himself in man as in a mirror. "1 
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This primary factor qualifies 
Calvin's entire contribution to the image doctrine. 
Beyond the purely objective characteristics of the imago Dei, 
our study especially involves the subjective aspects; i.e., those 
factors which impinge more directly on the nature of man. In this sense, 
states Calvin, the image 
extends to everything in which the nature of man surpasses 
that of all other species of animals. Accordingly, by this term 
is denoted the integrity with which Adam was endued when his 
intellect was clear, his affections subordinated to reason, 
all his senses duly regulated, and when he truly ascribed all 
his excellence to the admirable gifts of his Maker.2 
The potentiality and primal actuality of Adam's reflection of the glory 
of God carries with it those characteristics of man which have variously 
been termed "original rectitude" (Aquinas) and "original righteousness" 
(Luther) which Calvin designates as "integrity ".3 A primary con- 
stituent of such integrity is man's intial cognitive and intellectual 
capacity, however not in a purely rationalistic dimension, as we note: 
as God at first formed us in his own image, that he might 
elevate our minds to the pursuit of virtue, and the contemplation 
of eternal life, so to prevent us from heartlessly burying those 
qualities which distinguish us from the lower animals, it is of 
importance to know that we were endued with reason and intelligence, 
in order that we might cultivate a holy and honourable life, and 
regard a blessed immortality as our destined aim.4 
Recalling the conclusion that the image refers to man's reflec- 
tive potential, and that Adam's cognitive capacity was oriented primarily 
toward the pursuit of virtue, that is, the cultivation of a "holy and 
honourable life ", it may be assumed that initially there was an intrinsic 
1Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 74. And cf. Serm, on Job 10:7f. 
2Inst. 1.15.3., and cf, Brief Confession of Faith, p. 131, cited 
by Torrance, Ibid., p. 39. 
3Cf, Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 39, n. 4. 4Inst. 2.1.1. 
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relation between the objective constituent of the image, i.e., God, and 
man's apprehension of a particular mode of relation between himself and 
God.1 Professor Torrance, citing Inst. 1.6.2. and 1.15.6., asserts that 
according to Calvin "... man had a primeval revelation which enabled 
him to live in communion with the Creator of the world, ... . "2 To 
live "in communion with the Creator" is at one and the same time the 
end (intention) of the image, and constitutive of true, essential man - 
hood,3 Such communion, according to Calvin, was a blessing operative 
in Paradise, the continuation of which was contingent upon Adam's proper 
response of obedience and gratitude.4 He states: 
For a man to be ungrateful in refusal to acknowledge the grace 
of God is to deface the image of God in him, to un -man himself, 
and to become a beast or a creature without light in his under- 
standing .5 
God's intention to reflect Himself in His creation, pre -eminently 
in man, joined with a particular function of rationality, i.e., perception, 
gratitude, and obedience, would seem to be the heart of Calvin's doctrine 
1Cf. Comm. on I Pet. 1:25: "There is no true life but in God, 
and this is communicated to us by His Word." - cited by Torrance, Calvin's 
Doctrine, p. 59. And cf. Torrance, Ibid., p. 31: "... man's true life 
consists in the light of his understanding is so far as that is reflexive 
of the glory of God revealed through His Word. It is thus that men 
resemble God." 
Torrance, Ibid., p. 33. 
3Cf. Comm. on Gen. 3:22: "Direct communication with God is the 
source of life to man." - cited by Torrance, Ibid., p. 59. 
4Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 70: "On the subjective 
side, the imago Dei may be defined as man's humble and adoring gratitude 
to God for His wonderful grace, in!which motion of thankfulness man 
most truly reflects or images the glory of the Father so as to be himself 
a true child of the Father. It is grateful sonship." 
51bid., p. 34. 
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of the imago Dei. It ought, perhaps, to be re- emphasized that the 
primary orientation of man's intellectual capacity exceeded the manage- 
ment of mundane affairs; it was primarily directed toward the exercise 
of communion with the Divine. According to Calvin: 
Men excelled in these noble endowments r .e., intellect and will 
in his primitive condition, when reason, intelligence, prudence, 
and judgment, not only sufficed for the government of his earthly 
life, but also enabled him to rise up to God and eternal happi- 
ness.1 
It may be suggested that the imago Dei, as portrayed by Calvin, 
is liable to dissolution from either one of two directions. Because 
the image is pre -eminently the reflection of God in terms of His will 
and Word2, God could withdraw Himself entirely, thereby depriving the 
reflective potential of man of its object. The actualization of that 
possibility, i.e., the total retraction of God's grace, has not been 
realized.3 On the other hand, the dissolution of the imago Dei has 
been effected by means of man's misuse of his powers of intellect and 
will as Calvin makes clear: 
At first every part of the soul was formed to rectitude. There 
was soundness of mind and freedom of will to choose the good. 
If any one objects that it was placed, as it were, in a slip- 
pery position, because its power was weak, I answer, that the 
degree conferred was sufficient to take away every excuse . 
Man had received the power, if he had the will, but he had not . 
the will which would have given the power; for this will would 
have been followed by perserverance. Still, after he had re- 
ceived so much, there is no excuse for his having spontaneously 
brought death upon himself. No necessity was laid upon God to 
1Inst. 1.15.8. And cf. Ibid., 1.15.7. wherein Calvin says: "... 
the office of the intellect ... 1i] to distinguish between objects, 
according as they seem deserving of being approved or disapproved; and 
the office of the will, to choose and follow what the intellect declares 
to be good, to reject and shun what it declares to be bad, ... ." 
2Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 64. 
3Cf. Inst., 2.2.16. 
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give him more than that intermediate and even transient will, 
that out of man's fall he might extract materials for his own 
glory.1 
Apart from the issue of theodicy, the consideration of which is out- 
side our field of responsibility, the above reference raises a question 
in respect to Calvin's doctrine of the imago Dei, i.e., were "soundness 
of mind and freedom of will ", (which are constitutive of the imago Dei), 
in fact sufficient to take "away every excuse "? According to Calvin they 
failed to perpetuate the image. Adam's primal power was "sufficient ", 
but for reasons which are inexplicable, the will was defective. This 
is essentially the rationale employed by St. Augustine,2 and if one grants 
the historicity of a completed and perfect Paradise, the explication 
offered may in fact be the only one possible. 
However, there is another contention which presents itself, i.e., 
the assertion that Christ was pre- eminently the image of God, and that 
whatever excellence was engraven on Adam had its origin in this, 
that by means of the only begotten Son he approximated to the 
glory of his Maker. Man, therefore, was created in the image of 
God, (Gen. i.27), and in him the Creator was pleased to behold, 
as in a mirror, his own glory. To this degree of honour he 
was exalted by the kindness of the only begotten Sbn.3 
It is clearly stated that the excellence of man was "engraven" which, 
except for the "mirror" theme, might imply (erroneously) that such 
excellence was of man's nature, his being, that is, something which was 
a "given" property of man.4 But the "mirror" theme and the added quali- 
fication that the image was a Christ- property make that conclusion doubtful. 
Therefore, it seems inappropriate and illegitimate to expect from Adam 
1lnst 1.15.8. 
31nst. 2.12.6. 
2Cf. Chapter II, pp. 132 -33. 
4But cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 77 regarding the objective 
and subjective dimensions wherein Prof. Torrance implies a degree of "given - 
ness" in man's understanding. But, cf. Ibid., p. 47. 
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the "perfection" which is only properly accomplished by the Son. Adam 
is nonetheless held culpable, in spite of his "slippery position" and 
his "intermediate and even transient will" (supra, p.211 .). This seems 
unjustified, even from within Calvin's on system. He seems to have 
ignored the essential difference between the Son and Adam and their respective 
relation to the imago Dei. 
b.2. The Image: of Nature or Supernature? 
Calvin's anthropology is primarily of the dichotomist order; 
he states: ... there can be no question that man consists of a body and 
a soul; meaning by soul, an immortal though created essence, which is 
his nobler part. "1 Because man is "... called the image of God in 
respect of the soul; ... ",2 and also, as we have seen, because the soul 
is "... the proper seat of the image ",3 we will concentrate on that 
dimension of man's being. In reference both to the last quotation, and 
to Calvin's Commentary on Ezekiel 18:32, Professor Torrance introduces 
the following clarification: 
It seems quite clear ... that when Calvin says that the proper 
seat of the image is in the soul, he does not mean that the 
imago Dei is the soul, or any natural property of the soul, but 
that the soul is the mirror which reflects in it or ought to 
reflect in it the image of God. In this way Calvin can say, on 
the one hand, that the imago Dei is a bonum adventitium. 
On the other hand, however, Professor Torrance cites Calvin's Institutes 
1.15.4. to assert that the imago Dei is also a bonum internum inasmuch 
as the soul possesses it "... by way of spiritual ornaments such as 
wisdom, virtue, justice, truth, and holiness. "5 This so- called bonum 
1Inst. 1.15.2. 2lbid., 1.15.3. 
31bid., and supra, especially pp. 206f. 
41orrance, 
Calvin's Doctrine, p. 53. 
51bid. 
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internum pertains to the soul, affects the soul, but is not possessed by 
the soul in terms of a soul -property, as we have noted.1 A more careful 
examination of nature / supernature may clarify this apparent ambiguity, 
i.e., the bonum adventitium/internum, in respect to the imago Dei. Calvin 
says that ".. the image of God constitutes the entire excellence of human 
nature, as it shone in Adam before his fall, ,., , "2 But that which is 
thus constitutive does not as much constitute human nature as a certain 
quality of nature's ornaments, e.g., integrity. 
"... man's natural gifts were corrupted by sin, and his super- 
natural gifts ... Cer7 withdrawn; meaning by supernatural gifts the 
light of faith and righteousness, ,,,, "3 The imago Dei is a factor of 
supernature, and its relation to the nature of man would seem to be that 
of association, somewhat extrinsic and separable. It is to be ".., regarded 
as above the common order of nature and as consisting in supernatural 
gifts ",4 "... a spiritual possession, and therefore above nature and 
the world. "5 It is clear that Calvin's doctrine of the imago Dei is 
contingent upon his understanding of these two spheres of reality, nature 
and supernature, and that the image pre- eminently pertains to the latter. 
1Cf. Inst. 2.2.1.: "At the time when he was raised to the 
highest pinnacle of honour, all which Scripture attributes to him is, 
that he was created in the image of God, thereby intimating that the 
blessings in which his happiness consisted were not his own, but derived 
by divine communication." Ital. mine. 
2lnst. 1.15.4. 31bid ., 2.2.12. 
4Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 69. 
51bid., P. 54, Ital, mine. And cf. Calvin, The Catechism of 
the Church of Geneva, p. 43, cited by Torrance, Ibid., p. 43: That 
we are sons of God we have not from nature, but from adoption and 
grace only." 
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b.3. The Imago Dei - Post Fall 
Having enunciated in the first sections af Calvin's doctrine of 
the imago Dei as related to Adam prior to the fall, this section will 
consider the image as it is, that is, relative to man post -fall. However, 
it may not be possible to say the image "is" in the sense of an existing 
reality. "Is" is used therefore to signify only the post -fallen 
characteristics of the image, and to ascertain whether or not, according 
to Calvin, the image of God is still applicable as a present constitutive 
factor of man. We shall also attempt to discern the implications of 
the fall relative to man's natural and supernatural endowments. 
The realization or actualization of the imago Dei in respect to 
paradisial man requires the proper configuration of grace and gratitude. 
Therefore, we would expect the dissolution of the original actualization 
to occur within that structure. We have already noted (supra, pp. 211 -12) 
that grace, the intention of God, is constant; therefore, the tragic 
variable would seem to be centered in the latter, i.e., man's response 
of gratitude, and its implicates. This is precisely asserted by Calvin: 
"... his ingratitude has thrust him down from the highest glory to extreme 
ignominy. "1 Certainly, a prime implicate of Adam's gratitude was his 
1Inst., 2.2.1., and cf. supra, p. 210, n. 4. But, cf. A. Mitchell 
Hunter, The Teaching of Calvin, (London: James Clark & Co., second ed., 
1950) wherein we read, pp. 118 -19: "Calvin consistently assigns repro- 
bation to two causes, the will of God and the sin of man. The sin of 
man, however, was not the ultimate reason of his rejection, but its just- 
ification. Rejection preceded actual sin; it was an eternal decree of 
God." Here the culpability of Adam is subordinated to divine predestin- 
ation. Undoubtedly, an explication of Calvin's doctrine of predestin- 
ation would contribute to our understanding of his doctrine of man - 
though it is doubtful that anything significant would be added apropos 
the imago Dei, per se. Furthermore, apart from a very thorough study, 
the dimensions of which would exceed the limits of our chapter, half - 
truths and misconceptions would seem inevitable. There is no apparent 
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primeval recognition first of the reality of the two spheres, i.e., 
nature and supernature, and secondly that he was, as a creature of nature, 
entirely dependent upon the supernatural (spiritual) not only for his 
existence, but primarily for the shape and quality of his existence in 
relation to God. The rationale and shape of the "fall" therefore is 
this, that: 
.., though he was formed after the image of God to have understand- 
ing of all things that pertained to him in such wise that he 
could wish for nothing more .., he was not content to be so far 
enlightened in the knowledge of things by God's Spirit as was 
expedient for his welfare, but would needs become like unto God. 
That Adam despised his dependence and desired equality is Calvin's 
analysis of ingratitude, from which he proceeds to explore its implications. 
Calvin says: 
After the heavenly image in man was effaced, he not only was himself 
punished by a withdrawal of the ornaments in which he had been 
arrayed, viz., wisdom, virtue, justice, truth, and holiness, and by 
the substitution in their place of those dire pests, blindness, 
impotence, vanity, impurity, and unrighteousness, but he involved 
his posterity also, and plunged them in the same wretchedness.2 
unanimity regarding the proper interpretation of Calvin's enunciation 
of this doctrine. Cf. Ibid., pp. 93 -96, and the entire Chapter VI for 
Hunter's valuable contribution to this subject. 
1Serm. on Job 28:10f, cited by Torrance, 
pp. 55 -56. 
2Inst. 2.1.5. The reference continues: "This is the heredi- 
tary corruption to which early Christian writers gave the name of Original 
Sin, meaning by the term the depravation of nature formerly good and pure." 
We do not consider it necessary to thoroughly explicate Calvin's doctrine 
of original sin; nevertheless, we will include a cursory summary. Again, 
Calvin maintains the duality of nature / supernature, and asserts "... that 
man is corrupted by a natural viciousness, but not by one which proceeded 
from nature. In saying that it proceeded not from nature, we mean that 
it was rather an adventitious event which befell man, than a substantial 
property assigned to him from the beginning." Here follows a note which 
says: " -we deny that it is of nature, in order to show that it is rather 
a quality super -added to man than a property of his substance, which has 
been from the beginning rooted in him." The text then continues: "We, 
however, call it natural to prevent any one from supposing that each 
Çalyin' s Doctrine, 
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The significance of the "withdrawal of the ornaments in which he 5daJ 
had been arrayed" poses a question: is the punishment incurred ex- 
haustively explained in terms of withdrawal, i.e., deprivation? If so, 
do the antithetical "pests ", i.e., blindness, impotence, etc., follow 
logically as e.g., emptiness logically follows the draining of a cup? 
Or are we to infer that the "pests" that plague fallen man subsist in the 
same order of reality as do the "ornaments" and that therefore they follow 
not logically, but punitively? Inasmuch as Calvin asserts that both 
the "ornaments" and the "pests" are similarly adventitious, and that 
both are "superadded to man" (supra, p. 216, n. 2), it would appear that: 
(1) Adam's punishment is not simply via privation; (2) punishment is 
not merely of a "logical" order; (3) Adam's bane and blessing are alike 
adventitious, and therefore subsist as spiritual realities.1 
individual contracts it by depraved habit, whereas all receive it by a 
hereditary law." Eph. 2:3 is cited as his support. Inst, 2.1.11. 
Therefore, says Calvin, "Man, since he was corrupted by the fall, sins 
not forced or unwilling, but voluntarily, by a most forward bias of the 
mind; not by violent compulsion, or external force, but by the movement 
of his on passion; and yet such is the depravity of his nature, that 
he cannot move and act except in the direction of evil. If this is true, 
the thing not obscurely expressed is, that he is under a necessity of 
sinning." Inst, 2.3.5. 
Inasmuch as the image relationship is adventitious, so also, 
says Calvin, is that "viciousness" which destroys it. It is called 
natural to emphasize its hereditary communication, but it is not of his 
nature which, because from God, can only be good. The viciousness of 
nature engenders no ontological break with God, for that would imply 
man's total annihilation. Cf, Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 92. 
Nature is corruptible, but not destructable. Cf. Inst. 2.2.12. 
1Whereas these conclusions are admittedly relevant primarily 
within the context of soteriology inasmuch as they determine the shape 
of salvation, nevertheless they also contribute to our understanding of 
the imago Dei insofar as they contribute to our understanding of the man 
who was made in God's image. Note the significantly different explication 
proposed by Augustine (supra, especially pp. 123f.) which was essentially 
privative. Irenaeus' interpretation is even more dissimilar; his concept 
of man's growth makes sin and evil relative to the goal toward which man 
is expected to struggle, cf. supra pp. 60 -62, 101f. 
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On the basis of the foregoing we conclude that corruption, of 
which Calvin speaks so much, is to be considered more as a positive con- 
stituent of fallen man than simply as a negation of his paradisial 
ornaments. That is to say, man's corruption is not essentially 
privative.1 Therefore, Calvin speaks in what Professor Torrance calls 
"total" terms.2 An illustration, relevant to post -fallen man, is the 
"total" antithesis between flesh and Spirit of which Calvin states: 
In the contrast between the Spirit and the flesh, there is nothing 
left of an intermediate nature. In this way, everything in man, 
which is not spiritual, falls under the denomination of carnal. 
But we have nothing of the Spirit except through regeneration.3 
1Cf. Inst. 2.1.9.: "... the part in which the dignity and ex- 
cellence of the soul are most conspicuous, 5.e., the mind, has not 
only been wounded, but so corrupted, that mere cure is not sufficient." 
2Cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, p. 85: "It is because faith 
must speak of salvation and forgiveness in total terms that it must also 
speak of sin and depravity in total terms. It is only within this con- 
text of grace, and only on the ground of this grace, that we have any 
right to make such a total judgment upon man as he is, ... ".(Ital. mine.) 
And cf. Ibid., p. 88: "Because grace implies a total judgment on man, 
it also implies a total judgment on his possession of the imago dei. 
It is an inescapable inference from the revelation of grace that Christ 
is our righteousness, and wisdom, and imago dei, that fallen man is 
quite bereft of the image of God." (Ital. mine.) And cf. Ibid., p. 19: 
"... from a dogmatic point of view, Calvin's doctrine of the fall of man 
and of sin is a corollary of the doctrine of grace in forgiveness and 
salvation. Justification by grace alone carries with it the doctrine 
that the justitia originalis has been wholly and irrevocably lost." 
Christology and soteriology exceed the scope of this chapter, 
but we suggest that apart from the configuration of Paradise operative in 
Calvin's system (and also Torrance's, e.g., justitia originalis) both 
Christology and soteriology may have developed along somewhat different 
lines. Cf. supra, p. 207, n. 2. 
31nst. 2.3.1., and infra where, citing John 3:6 and Rom. 8:8 
Calvin asks: "Is it true that the flesh is so perverse, that it is per- 
petually striving with all its might against God: that it cannot accord 
with the righteousness of the divine law? that, in short, it can beget 
nothing but the materials of death? Grant that there is nothing in human 
nature but flesh, and then extract something good out of it if you can." 
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Thus Calvin portrays post -fallen and pre- regenerate man. And 
recalling that the image is a spiritual factor of man, there appears to 
be little doubt that the image is incompatible with "flesh ". Although 
man's natural gifts which come from God are not, per se, subject to 
pollution, nevertheless in regard to fallen man they have ceased to be 
pure.1 Therefore the mind which is a natural gift and hence in- 
destructable (though corruptible) becomes no more than a shapeless ruin. 
2 
The material presented above (section b.3.) leads to an unambiguous con- 
clusion regarding Calvin's doctrine of man in the image of God (or shall 
we say, post -imago Dei ?). It asserts a doctrine which is thoroughly 
negative and totally pessimistic. 
There is, however, another doctrinal strain woven into his 
system to which we now turn our attention. 
Should anyone object that this divine image has been obliterated, 
the solution is easy. First there still exists some remnant of it, 
so that man is possessed of no small dignity; and secondly, the 
Celestial Creator Himself, however corrupted man may be, still keeps 
in view the end of his original creation; and according to His 
example, we ought to consider for what end He created men, and what 
excellence He was bestowed upon them above the rest of living 
beings.3 
That God retains the memory of His original purpose and intention for His 
creation, specifically man, implies to Calvin the terminology of "remnant ".4 
1Cf, Inst,, 2.2.17. 
2Cf, Ibid., 2.2.12; 1.15.4., and cf. Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine., 
pp. 34 and 78 wherein Professor Torrance cites Calvin's references to the 
"bestiality" of fallen man in his Sermon(s) on Dt. 28:46f; and Job 15 :17f 
and 32:4f; and 33:29f. 
3Torrance, Ibid., pp. 97 -98, Ital. mine., and cf. Ibid., p. 88. 
4Cf, supra, pp. 200ff., for Luther's interpretation. His under- 
standing of the "remnant" relates to man's mind. Calvin's emphasis on the 
factor of God's "intention" as the image remnant is more constructive. 
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Professor Torrance suggests that this second dimension of Calvin's 
system is actually intrinsic and consistent inasmuch as he is speaking 
not of a static, substantival relation, but of a dynamic and spiritual 
one.1 In that dynamic, spiritual sense, God "... still keeps us in 
existence, even when we are sinners, with natural gifts from His hand. "2 
Torrance also adds that 
,., the mirror remains, though grievously impaired, and we may 
see God's workmanship in it, especially in his ian'] creation 
as a rational and conscious creature, and in that sense it re- 
flects God's image.3 
We will not ignore the conspicuous presence of either of these 
two apparently contradictory assertions, i.e., total depravity and 
remnant, nor will we assume the position of arbiter, attempting to deter- 
mine which is the pre- eminent thrust. Rather, both will be maintained, 
as Calvin himself apparently intended, in spite of the consequent (and 
we would suggest, unnecessary) confusion. In a sense, Calvin's system 
or doctrine is contextually determined; regarding grace, on the one 
hand, there must indeed be the recognition of corruption, but the strength 
of God's gracious intention, i.e., that man's destiny is still circumscribed 
by conformation to the divine image, qualifies and palliates the fall's 
dimensions so as to accomodate the concept of "remnant" and its implicates. 
Within the context of post- fallen corruption, on the other hand, Calvin 
emphatically enunciates the terminology of totality and despair.4 
1Torrance, Calvin's Doctrine, pp. 56, 107. 
2Ibid., p. 92, and cf. Inst. 2.2.17. 
3Torrance, Ibid., p. 97. 
'We might also say that in respect to man's relation to God, total 
corruption applies; but, in respect to lower forms of creation, a "remnant" 
remains to signify man's superiority. 
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b.4. Conclusion 
It seems apparent on the basis of our consideration of John 
Calvin's doctrine of the imago Dei that the dualistic structure of nature/ 
supernature circumscribes the dimensions and "shape" of the image. Indeed, 
as we indicated at the outset, Calvin's doctrine, like that of Luther 
before him, was relationally oriented. However, in Calvin's system, 
the primacy of the sphere of supernature effectually delimits that which 
may conceivably be ascribed to man. Consequently, the imago Dei is pre- 
eminently God's own image - He is its object. 
That which subsequently relates to man, therefore, is his potent- 
iality to "mirror" the object of the image. One factor of man's "mir- 
roring" potential, and perhaps the most important one, is that man was 
initially (in Paradise) endowed with communion with the Creator. We 
are careful to point out, however, that the initial communion, charac- 
terized by Calvin, is essentially of a responsory nature; consistent 
with the "mirror" theme, man most faithfully communes with God by means 
of a response of gratitude. This, in turn, is refracted into the sphere 
of the mundane which, though not at all insignificant, is of secondary 
value. The precision, clarity, and indeed, the "religious" value of 
Calvin's doctrine, thus far considered, is admirable. But, as we have 
pointed out (nearly to the point of redundancy) the sine qua non of the 
system is the truth and credibility of perfect Paradise and catastrophic 
fall. Furthermore the structures of nature / supernature, as supportive 
of the system, are indispensable. 
In respect to a possible explication of the relation between 
God and man via the imago Dei, we note the utilization of categories 
which in fact tend toward disjunction. It seems that Calvin is over- 
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solicitous to preserve and protect the "otherness" and sovereignty of 
God, which may be the concomitant of his particular characterization of 
the grace of God (though his specific motive is not our concern). A 
consequence, however, of his solicitude is the attempt to distinguish 
between bonum adventitium and bonum internum in respect to the ornaments 
with which man is initially endowed. On the one hand, the endowments 
constitutive of man's primal dignity pertain to man inasmuch as they 
are constitutive of his original relation to God. On the other hand, 
however, they are not of his nature, for they can (and Calvin says, have 
been) be withdrawn. The implications are first, the man no longer 
reflects God's glory, and second, that he is no longer truly human. We 
'must conclude therefore that to be truly human is a quality or dimension 
of supernature, attendOht but subordinate consequences of which are the 
dimensions of intra- personal being and inter -personal relation. 
The radical and total disparity between the spheres of nature/ 
supernature which was temporarily overcome in Paradise, has again asser- 
ted itself via the "fall ". The ramifications of that contra -distinction 
are in no sense neutral or passive; rather, the disjunction issues in 
open and active hostility. Man, bereft of his former supernatural en- 
dowments, is not merely natural man; his privation is accompanied by 
"dire pests ", namely, blindness, impotence, vanity, impurity, and un- 
righteousness which subsist in a sphere of reality similar to the adven- 
titious gifts which formerly contributed to proper relation. For man, 
therefore, to be "natural" is not to be neutral; the deprivation of 
man's supernatural endowments issues in a certain bestiality to which 
Calvin ascribes the terms carnal and total depravity. 
We noted, however, another and somewhat contradictory strain 
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or element in Calvin's doctrine of the imago Dei, i.e., the ascription 
of "remnant ". This, and its implicates of residual rationality and 
relative superiority of man over lower forms of nature, is a theme ap- 
parently required to explicate another factor of the image, i.e., the 
intentionality of God to restore some by means of the redemptive work 
of Christ. 
Our conclusion and summary of Calvin's doctrine of the imago 
Dei make it apparent that if the image of God is as explicated by Calvin, 
i.e., a spiritual relation reflective of God's supernatural glory, we 
shall not expect to make significant utilization of his categories in 
respect to a doctrine which includes implicates of co- inherence. We 
can, indeed, appreciate the characterization from the perspective of a 
God -man relationship, and moreover, that God does endow man with 
potentiality. We can further affirm the association of the imago Dei 
with Christ. However, even these possible points of agreement become 
negligible inasmuch as Calvin surrounds them with the presuppositions 
of a perfect Paradise, and more significantly, a post -fallen antipathy 
between nature and grace, the implications of which are that God must 
unilaterally overcome the opposition which pertains between God and man. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SIGNIFICANT CONTEMPORARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE IMAGO DEI THEME 
-PART ONE- 
The Imago Dei in the Theology 
of Karl Barth 
A resurgence of theological interest in the imago Dei theme has 
occurred in this century. This re- awakening of interest has produced 
some of the most creative, realistic, progressive, and biblically sound 
material which the church has offered. Perhaps most notably in the 
theology of Karl Barth one recognizes the emergence of a theology which 
transcends both the theological liberalism of the nineteenth century 
(anthropocentrism) and the tendency toward rigid conservatism of the early 
twentieth (theocentrism).1 Indicative of the century's mood is this assess- 
ment of Barth: "... he forces God and man, heaven and earth, creator and 
creature asunder, by exalting the superiority of God and deepening the in- 
feriority of man to their ultimate degree. "2 The same man, however, ad- 
dressing the Swiss Reformed Minister's Association in Arau in 1956 said this: 
1We will not include an explication of the so- called stages of de- 
velopment in Karl Barth's theology. An adequate summary of that may be 
found in David Cairns' The Image of God in Man, (London: SCM Press, 1953), 
pp. 164 -167. Hereafter: Image. Cf. also H. Hirschwald, "The Teaching of 
Karl Barth on the Doctrine of the 'Imago Dei'", The Presbyter, Vol. 5., 
No.4., (1947). 
2Heinz Zahrnt, l'hejlidestionofGodPro.htinthe 
Twentieth Century, trans. R.A. Wilson, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World), 
p. 24. Hereafter: Question of God. 
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But did it not appear to escape us by quite a distance that the 
deity of the living God - and we certainly wanted to deal with 
Him - found its meaning and its power only in the context of His 
history and His dialogue with man, and thus in His togetherness 
with man? ... Who God is and what He is in His deity He proves 
and reveals not in a vacuum as a divine being- for -Himself, but 
precisely and authentically in the fact that He exists, speaks, 
and acts as the partner of man, though of course as the absolutely 
superior partner.1 
Barth's unquestioned leadership and influence in the calling of 
theology back to its center, and on the other hand, his insistence that 
theology has necessarily to do with God's "togetherness" with man, are 
qualifications that suggest our consideration. Furthermore, and of 
greatest importance as regards our consideration of Barth, is the fact that 
he offers us an especially creative interpretation of the imago Dei theme. 
Our question has to do with man created by God, in His image. And 
because Barth so explicitly developVs a doctrine of the Creator -God with 
implications in respect to man, it is appropriate to begin our discussion 
with that subject. 
a. God: The Creator 
From Barth's point of view, the attempt to explicate the meaning 
and significance of creation requires that one look first to Him who is 
worshipped as Creator. He is the inner logic, the rationale of creation 
itself. Even more explicitly stated, to comprehend creation necessitates 
an understanding of the trinitarian structure of God, and the relation be- 
tween the Persons of the Trinity.2 Barth expresses it thus: 
1Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. Thomas Wieser, (London: 
Collins, 1961), p. 45. 
2A comprehensive discussion of this aspect of Barth's theological 
system is not essential to our thesis. A brief summary of the trinitarian 
relation is noted in Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vols. I -IV, eds. G.W. 
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936 -1962), II1 /2, 
p. 218. Hereafter: C.D. 
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... what God does as the Creator can in the Christian sense only 
be seen and understood as a reflection, as a shadowing forth of 
this inner divine relationship between the Father and the Son.1 
An understanding of this factor of divine inter- relation is essential for 
an understanding of Barth's interpretation of the imago Dei. In other 
words, it is obviously inappropriate to attempt to abstract creation or 
any portion thereof from the doctrine of God in order thereby to comprehend 
it. Furthermore, one is well -advised to constantly retain this founda- 
tional doctrine in further consideration of related subjects. 
The word "creation" may signify the divine act by which God brings 
into being that which did not exist before. Or, on the other hand, "cre- 
ation" may refer to that which exists, i.e., man, nature, and history. It 
is important to note that both senses are, according to Barth, included in 
the covenant intention of God - the intention by which, in its actualization, 
creation itself occurs. There is an internal basis of the covenant, namely, 
that which may be called the intra- trinitarian experience of joyous commun- 
ion. The extension of that relation, and the ultimate re- creation or re- 
enactment of that experience, become the rationale for the creative act of 
God.2 The love of God, according to Barth, could not remain satisfied with 
the intra- trinitarian expression of the covenant. Therefore, it "... made 
itself this external ground of the covenant, i.e., it made necessary the 
existence and being of the creature and therefore of creation. "3 
1Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G.T. Thomson, (London: 
SCM Press, 1949), p. 52. Henceforth: Dog. Outline. 
2Cf. C.D., III /1, p. 98: "The goal of creation, and at the same 
time the beginning of all that follows, is the event of God's Sabbath 
freedom, Sabbath rest and Sabbath joy, in which man, too, has been 
summoned to participate." 
31bid., p. 97. 
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But, that which is thus created remains inseparably related to the 
covenant intention of God, and derives its reality and purpose from that 
perspective. Barth says, 
Creation is one long preparation, and therefore the being and 
existence of the creature one long readiness, for what God will 
intend and do with it in the history of the covenant. Its nature 
is simply its equipment for grace. Its creatureliness is pure 
promise, expectation and prophecy of that which in His grace, 
in the execution of His eternal love, and finally and supremely 
in the consummation of the giving of His Son, God plans for man 
and will not delay to accomplish for his benefit. In this way 
creation is the road to the covenant ... . 
"The existence of the creature" and the nature of that creature 
in the imago Dei, specifically man, is the concern of this thesis. And, 
at this point the following questions arise. That really is the signifi- 
cance of creaturely, historical existence if, as we have been informed, it 
is essentially a reproduction of a pre -existent relation between the Father 
and the Son? A related question is this: how will the relation between 
God's "intention" and its actualization finally be expressed? Will the 
pre- eminence of the eternal covenant minimize the significance of man's 
creaturely existence? 
It is evident that Barth intends to make certain that creation is 
not to be considered as an independent sphere óf reality. Rather, to com- 
prehend creation one must recognize the Creator, and creation's relation 
to His covenant. Barth suggests that the word from Genesis in reference 
to creation being "good" means "... that it was adapted to the purpose which 
God had in view; adapted to be the external basis of His covenant of grace. "2 
Further elucidating the priority of the covenant and its relation to Christ, 
Barth says: 
1C.D. III/1, p. 231. 
2Ibid., p. 213. 
228. 
... by covenant we mean Jesus Christ. But it is not the case that 
the covenant between God and man is so to speak a second fact, 
something additional, but the covenant is as old as creation 
itself. When the existence of creation begins, God's dealing 
with man also begins. For all that exists points towards man, in 
so far as it makes God's purpose visible, moving towards His 
revealed and effective action in the covenant with Jesus Christ. 
The covenant is not only quite as old as creation; it is older 
than it. Before the world was, before heaven and earth were, 
the resolve or decree of God exists in view of this event in which 
God willed to hold communion with man, as it became inconceivably 
true and real in Jesus Christ. And when we ask about the meaning 
of existence and creation, about their ground and goal, we have 
to think of this covenant between God and man. "1 
The effect of the above is clearly to locate the origin of the 
entire purpose and plan of God within the sphere of pre- creation. The 
covenant is not, as Barth says, simply as old as creation; in no way does 
it have its origin, for instance, with the call to Abraham, nor even with 
earlier men. We may conclude, therefore, that the manifestation of 
the covenant - primarily in Jesus Christ - is simply the manifestation 
of that which existed before creation itself. What therefore, may we 
say of man in relation to the covenant? Barth says that he is 
... a being determined by God for life with God and existing for 
the history of the covenant which God has established with him. 
... It is as he is not divine but cosmic, and therefore from 
God's standpoint below, ... that he is determined by God and 
for life with God.2 
Man, as a creaturely being, is determined by God as God's covenant 
partner - at least in respect to Barth's estimation of man as a theological 
being. The qualifications imposed on man's theological "being" are yet 
to be considered. That has been realized in this section is that both 
the act of God which is called creation, and also the creaturely existence 
'Dog. Outline, pp. 63 -64. 
2C_D., III/2, p. 204. 
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itself, are comprehensible only as they reflect and potentially re -enact 
the relation between the Father and the Son.1 Further, we have noted 
that the covenant which pre -existed between the Father and the Son becomes 
the rationale of creation itself, and creation becomes the manifestation of 
that covenant. We turn now to a consideration of the created order, real- 
izing that in reference to Barth's system such an attempt is theological, 
not cosmological. 
b. God and Creation 
Having determined that God's creation is the expression of His in- 
ternal covenant we now seek to comprehend the nature of that which Barth 
terms a "reality distinct from God ".2 That phrase is a significant one, 
implying more than simply - what is not -God is distinct from God. Rather, 
Barth maintains, what God has created to be distinct from Him is in fact 
that which is required by Him in order to effect the being of a creaturely 
covenant partner. That which is created "distinct" is properly termed 
reality; nothingness is not thus characterized. As Barth states: 
Creaturely reality means reality on the basis of a creatio ex 
nihilo, a creation out of nothing. Where nothing exists - and 
not a kind of primal matter - there through God there has come 
into existence that which is distinct from Him.3 
There is also to be noted in Barth's system the factor of on -going 
creation, with the implication that the continuation of the created sphere 
is also properly termed creation. Both the preservation and government of 
1Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 113, and his severe criticism of this 
element in Barth's system: "Reduced to a formula, we might say that the di- 
vine Trinity devised a drama in eternity, and gave its first performance with- 
in itself, played by the three persons. Now this drama is to be re- enacted 
on earth, as it has been in heaven. To this end the world is created as 
the stage, and man as the spectator." 
2Dog. Outline, p. 55, and cf. C.D., III /2, p. 204. 
31bid., p. 55. The German text is: "Geschópfliche Wirklichkeit, das 
bedeutet Wirklichkeit auf Grund einer creatio ex nihilo, einer Schöpfung aus 
dem Nichts. Da wo nichts ist - auch nicht etwa eine Art Urstoff: - da wurde 
durch Gott das, was nun verschieden von ihm ist." Nothingness is further 
discussed below, Sec. b.l., and Appendix B. 
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man, sometimes called providence, are included in what Barth calls creatio 
continua.' However, this is not to suggest that there are no terminal 
points, or that the existence of the created order is a timeless one. 
History, states Barth, "... begins with creation; ... creation itself has 
as such a historical character and is an event fulfilling time. "2 
The complexity and profundity of Barth's concepts of history and 
time - though we do not intend to thoroughly discuss them - are illustrated 
in the following: 
The termination of creation is not its completion /Der AbschliAler 
Schopfung ist noch nicht ihre Vollendunng7. That is to say, it is 
not completed because it is concluded, but because of the pre- 
supposition of this conclusion God rested on the seventh day. The 
completion of creation is the joyful readiness in which the Creator 
and creature, the Master and the work which He has set before Him, are 
now conjoined, and together anticipate the common history which now 
commences.3 
This is only one perspective relative to creation and history, 
i.e., that creation's conclusion is not yet accomplished. Yet, in 
anticipation, and with assurance of its proper consummation, God has 
already celebrated the Sabbath rest. There is, however, one very signifi- 
cant point that demands clarification; something has occurred to alter the 
shape of the "common history which now commences." Surely the "joyful 
readiness" in which God and man are conjoined has become other than purely 
joyful. In response to that query Barth says, 
It is only under the very different order of the being of the 
creature which follows creation and is under passive or active 
threat, only in the sphere of history which will become that of 
the intervening incident of the fall [Sundenfalls7, that things 
will turn out differently, and an order of creaturely relationship 
will be set up which will be commensurate with the breach of peac9 
between God and man, which will have regard to this breach, ... 
'Cf. C.D., III/1, p. 60. 2Ibid. 
31bid., pp. 176-177. 41bid., p. 209. 
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History has been, according to Barth, radically affected by the 
"incident of the fall ". That "event" as it relates to man himself will 
be discussed below (Secs. d.l -3.). At this point however, we note that 
in spite of the fact that Barth rejects the notion of an historic Paradise 
and subsequent fall, he nevertheless continues to employ those concepts. 
One wonders how both statements can be asserted - on the one hand that 
God and man "together anticipate the common history which now commences" 
and on the other hand that "... history for its "1 part begins with creation;... . 
For Barth asserts that history involves the "different order of being" - 
post -fall - whereas his suggestion that God and man "together anticipate 
the common history" would seem to imply either that the "fall" in fact had 
no significant (i.e. actual and historical) detrimental effect, or that 
creation's "completion" so overwhelmed the time of anticipation (history) 
that its "fall" paled in that glory. The following consideration of the 
positive and negative poles of creation will contribute toward a resolution 
of this problem. And, at the same time, it will provide a broader definition 
of the environment of man's creation in the imago Dei. 
b.l. Creation: Its Positive and Negative Poles 
God created man to lift him in His own Son into fellowship with Him. 
This is the positive meaning of human existence /Dasein7 and all 
existence. But this elevation presupposes a wretchedness hied - 
righeit7 of human and all existence which His own Son will share 
and bear. This is the negative meaning of creation. Since 
everything is created for Jesus Christ and His death and resurrec- 
tion, from the very outset everything must stand under this twofold 
and contradictory determination. It is not nothing but something; 
yet it is something on the edge of nothing, bordering it and menaced 
by it, and having no power of itself to overcome the danger.2 
10_D., II171, p. 60. 
2Ibid., p. 376. The German text of the last line is: "... es ist 
nicht Nichts sondern Etwas, aber Etwas am Rande des Nichts, ein dem Nichts 
benachbartes und von ihm bedrohtes und aus und durch sich selbst dieser 
Bedrohung nicht gewachsenes Etwas ". 
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The portrait of creation presented above has the effect of driving 
the problem of man's rebellion (fall) into the realm of pre -history. 
Creation's positive meaning inheres therefore not in that which is created, 
but in the Son who is ordained to lift it, elevate it from the wretchedness 
of its condition. Thus, the negative pole of creation is the wretchedness 
Which was somehow introduced into God's creation which was good. 
a/ 
What is of principle concern to us is the negative pole's relation 
to "nothing" - a "nothing" which is still something. It should not be 
assumed that the negative aspect of creation is totally alien, nor indeed, 
totally detrimental to the entire being of man. Furthermore, it must be 
clearly understood that although the negativity of creation is closely 
related to "nothingness ", it is not synonymous. Barth suggests that the 
reference in the creation narrative to the distinction and opposition of 
day and night, land and water, unmistakably indicates the two -fold character 
of creaturely existence, i.e., the positive and negative aspects. Then 
he states: 
Viewed from its negative aspect, creation is as it were on the 
frontier of nothingness and orientated towards it. Creation 
is continually confronted by this menace. It is continually 
reminded that as God's creation it has not only a positive but 
also a negative side. Yet this negative side /chattenseite7 
is not to be identified with nothingness /ichtigen7, nor must it 
be postulated that the latter Lñothingnes 7 belongs to the essence 
of creaturely nature and may somehow be understood and interpreted 
as a mark of its character and perfection.' 
Nothingness is not of the essence of creation, not even of 
creation's negativity. However, it must be asserted, says Barth, that 
nothingness is the border of creation, and therefore related to it. 
Nothingness threatens to overwhelm creation; it is destructive. But 
1C.D., III/3, pp. 295-96. 
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on the other hand, the negative pole of creation contributes to creation's 
wholeness and is, says Barth, "... a mark of its perfection, ... . ,1 
Stated another way, according to Barth, this negative aspect is that which 
is creation's dependence factor, as opposed to the positive pole which 
specifies creation's worthiness,1 or in another place its "individual 
distinctiveness ".2 
The negative pole is the "not" which points to the distinction 
between Creator and creature, a distinction which must be maintained, 
(discussed supra, pp. 227 -28). There it was asserted that God's love 
required the being of another distinct from Himself with whom He could 
enter covenant relation. The "not" is therefore, in Barth's system, a 
positive value; it limits the creature, but does not demean it.3 Em- 
ploying the terminology of non- being, at one point Barth suggests that 
even before the existence of the race of man, there was "... somewhere a 
non -being Iichtsein7 from which the individual and the race ... " have 
sprung, and to which they also proc eed. 4 If it is true to say that this 
so- called "non- being" is of the same form as the "non- real ", one will also 
be inclined to say that it is not good.5 But, one wonders how both asser- 
tions may be related, i.e., that the non -real is in fact recognizable by 
the fact that it is not created, and therefore not "good ", and second, that 
this "kingdom of the non -real" is that from which our race has sprung? There 
1C.D., III/3, p. 296. 2Ibid., p. 350. 
3Cf. Ibid., p. 350. "What we have called the 'shadow side' of crea- 
tion is constituted by the 'not' which in this twofold respect, as its dis- 
tinction from God and its individual distinctiveness, pertains to creaturely 
nature. On this shadow side the creature is contiguous to nothingness, for 
this 'not' is at once the expression and frontier of the positive will, 
election and activity of God." 
4Cf. Ibid., III/2, p. 574. 
5 
Cf. Ibid., III/1, p. 331. 
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appears to be a reification of the nihilo out of which God created. This, 
at least, is the impression that Barth gives, and it is intensified by 
Barth's treatment of "nothingness ".1 
Material is cited in Appendix B which substantiates the suggestion 
above, i.e., that there does exist a sphere of reality, the non -real, noth- 
ingness, which is in active opposition to the creaturely realm. Further, 
there are references which assert that the primary antagonists are God and 
nothingness (cf. especially Appendix B, Article 3.4.). Although the re- 
sponsibility of the creature is not specifically excluded, neither is it 
included as an active constituent in the struggle against non -existence. 
Does that imply, it may be asked, that the creature's (i.e. man's) position 
is thereby located at the periphery of the struggle for existence? 
To conclude this section, a word should be said in specific ref- 
erence to the subject of evil (cf. Appendix B. Article 3.1.) and its rela- 
tion to nothingness. 
That relation is specifically stated by Barth: 
... if there is a reality of evil, it can only be the reality of 
this excluded and repudiated thing, the reality behind God's 
back, which He passed over, when He made the world and made it 
good. ... That is not good God did not make; it has no creaturely 
existence. But if being is to be ascribed to it at all, and we 
would rather not say that it is non -existent, then it is only the 
power of the being which arises out of the weight of the divine 
'No'.2 
1Cf. Appendix B, infra. 
2Dog. Outline, p. 57. And cf. this on the same page: "... the 
whole realm that we term evil - death, sin, the Devil and hell - is not 
God's creation, but rather what was excluded by God's creation, that to 
which God has said 'No' ." Cf. also infra, Appendix B, Article 3.3. 
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Barth is clearly struggling with a critical dilemma of theology, i.e., 
either to ascribe reality to evil and thereby accord it a degree of creature - 
ly status, or to deny its reality and existence and thereby reject it as an 
authentic factor of man's historical existence and religious experience. 
The first option leads inevitably toward a position which on the one hand 
assigns the responsibility for the existence of evil to God, and which on 
the other hand tends to minimize man's complicity. The alternate option 
tends to minimize evil itself, making it appear as simply a vain and un- 
real figment of the imagination, with which man, of course, cannot actually 
be associated. Barth, with reservations, seems inclined toward the first 
option, i.e., to grant evil its existence. And thereby he accepts the 
attendant problems inherent in that decision - problems which will affect 
other significant doctrines, not least the Christian understanding of man 
in the imago Dei. 
It is interesting to note in a preliminary sense that because of the 
structure of reality which primarily includes God and nothingness, it becomes 
difficult to define the role and function of man. In response to the ques- 
tion - what does man offer? - Barth states: "All that we were and achieved 
will be subject to the judgement that it was sin. And sin means transgress- 
ion, deviation. "1 It would appear that historical creaturely existence, 
i.e., man's historical being and life, is primarily related to the sphere 
of nothingness, for sin is an expression, an outflow, of nothingness. And 
Barth states that all we were and all we achieved was sin. However, the 
final estimation of this critical point will have to be deferred; we need 
first to direct attention to another key subject. A brief consideration of 
Barth's Christology will further characterize the "theological environment" 
within which to interpret man in the imago Dei. 
1Dog. Outline, p. 150. 
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c. Christ and Anthropology 
It is indisputable that Barth's theological system is thoroughly 
Christocentric. Christology permeates and dominates all of his work. 
Although it is not necessary within the scope of the thesis to conduct a 
thorough study of Barth's Christology, it is important to indicate the sa- 
lient features of that doctrine as they relate to and affect our work. 
Essentially, our objective is to explicate the structure of the relation 
between Christ and man in specific reference to the imago Dei. That is 
to say, inasmuch as the imago Dei theme circumscribes and dictates the 
dimensions of our study, Christ's relation to the imago Dei, and attend :nt - 
ly man's relation to Christ are our concerns. 
Barth's contribution is succinctly set forth in his treatise, "Christ 
and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5 ". And we cite the following from 
that work: 
The meaning of the famous parallel (so called ) between 'Adam and 
Christ', ..., is not that the relationship between Adam and us 
is the expression of our true eigentlichen7 and original nature 
furspriunglichen Wesens7, so that we would have to recognize in 
Adam the fundamental truth of anthropology to which the subsequent 
relationship between Christ and us would have to fit and adapt 
itself .1 
The effect of Barth's assertion is to establish the locus of man's 
"original nature" beyond the time of creation. One discovers the truth 
of anthropology neither in man as he is today, nor in the mythological 
figure of Adam. Rather, the truth of anthropology inheres in the structure 
of relation between Christ and ourselves; it is not via Adam.2 Adam, 
1Karl Barth, "Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5 ", trans. 
T.A. Small, Scottish Journal of Theology, Occasional Papers, No. 5, 
(Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1956), p. 6. Hereafter: "Christ and Adam ". 
2The traditional theological utilization of the Adam myth has been 
primarily to specify the reality and universality of sin. Consequently, 
as we have frequently indicated throughout, the fundamental truth of man 
has been his sinful nature. The reference from Barth however, seems to 
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therefore, does not pre -determine the shape of soteriology; nor does it 
(i.e., the Adamic myth) reveal to us what is fundamentally "man ". 
However, Barth continues, our relation to Adam is not altogether 
devoid of anthropological implications. He says: 
The relationship between Adam and us reveals not the primary 
but only the secondary anthropological truth and ordering 
principle. The primary anthropological truth and ordering 
principle, which only mirrors itself in that relationship, is 
made clear only through the relationship between Christ and us. 
Adam is, as is said in v. 14 Leh. 711?os Tavaeros 
the type of Him who was to come. Man's essential and original 
nature is to be found, therefore, not in Adam but in Christ. 
In Adam we can only find it prefigured. Adam can therefore be 
interpreted only in the light of Christ and not the other 
way round.l 
The Adamic myth reflects a secondary truth and ordering principle; the 
primary principle is reflected in the "original" relationship between 
Christ and us. Our relation to Adam, therefore, our association in the 
truth that he reveals about man, is typological, and so points to a dimen- 
sion of the truth of man that surpasses that which can be asserted apart 
from Christ. That man's nature is only prefigured in Adam points to or 
implies that there is a dimension of humanity which cannot be articulated 
apart from the recognition of an intrinsic relation to Christ. 
overturn that structure; if Adam is not the truth of anthropology then, 
we ask, will sin remain the dominant motif? If it does remain so, from 
whence will arise its reality? If another motif is introduced, what will 
it be, and what will be the implications, not only in relation to anthro- 
pology, but in relation to other doctrines, e.g., Christology,, soteriology, 
etc.? We will return to those questions, but at this point we suggest 
that Barth has offered a suggestion that promises to be of special signifi- 
cance in respect to our theme, the imago Dei. 
1 "Christ and Adam ", p. 6. 
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We take special note of Barth's statement that our "... essential 
and original nature ... is to be found, ..., in Christ." And we are 
not led subsequently to believe that it has ever been otherwise. That 
is to say, Barth does not suggest that once (e.g., in Paradise) man's 
essential nature was to be found in Adam, then subsequently lost. This 
appears to be a fairly radical departure from traditional formulations 
regarding man's nature. It is, in fact, an assertion which we have not 
noted in any of the theologians thus far considered.) The implication 
of Barth's statement is that man has never realized his essential nature 
apart from Christ; Christ is man's essential nature. 
Our relationship with Adam, which qualifies human existence, is 
that to which Barth refers as "our unhappy past" when we were "weak, 
sinners, godless, enemies ". He then continues to say that it 
... has no independent reality, status, or importance of its own. 
It is only an indirect witness to the reality of Jesus Christ and 
to the original and essential human existence [ursprúnglichen ... 
eigentlichen Menschheitsgeschichte7 that He inaugurates and 
reveals. The righteous decision of God has fallen upon men not 
in Adam but in Christ.2 
Quite obviously Barth differentiates between man's essential nature 
(who is Christ) and human existence which is qualified by our relationship 
with Adam. It would be erroneous to infer that the phrase "our unhappy 
past" refers to a point in time which followed upon another historical 
moment when man did in fact enjoy his "essential nature ", (e.g. Paradise); 
Barth will not allow that implication. Rather, he clearly asserts that 
We concluded, in Chapter I, that Irenaeus' conception of man's 
original nature was different from, e.g., that of St. Augustine, and 
similarly those Western theologians we considered. However, different 
though it is, it is not the difference which Barth suggests. 
2 "Christ and Adam ", p. 7. 
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the essential nature of humanity has always, been that of Christ .1 The 
"unhappy past" would seem therefore, to refer to the time following 
creation, (i.e., all of historical existence), and before Christ's incar- 
nation; therein was the inauguration and revelation of full and essential 
humanity . 2 
That conviction leads reasonably to another assertion in respect 
to the relation between Christ and man. Barth comments on the particu- 
larist tendency in Romans 5:1 -11, where faith is a limiting factor in the 
extension of relation. But then follows his comment on vss. 12 -21 where 
he notes a more inclusive dimension of that relation. He states: 
The nature of Christ objectively conditions human nature and the 
work of Christ makes an objective difference [b:jectiver Voraus- 
setzungen7 to the life and destiny of all men. ... In short, 
'grace rules', as it is put in v.21.3 
1This assertion bears an interesting affinity to St. Irenaeus' 
concept of the childhood and growth of Adam. Therein we noted his 
(Irenaeus') suggestion that the fullness of humanity, the culmination of 
its development, coincided with the Incarnation of the Son. Cf. C.D., 
III /2, p. 459; there Barth, in his comment on Ga1.4:1f says: "With 
the mission of the Son, with His entry into the time process, a new era 
of time has dawned, so far -reaching in its consequences that it may justly 
be called the fullness of time. Man has now reached maturity. He has 
become God's son and heir, the 'Lord of all'. He has become a free man." 
It should be noted, however, that whereas Irenaeus'system includes a 
factor of historical continuity between Adam and Christ, Barth emphasizes 
the discontinuity between them. Cf. infra, especially Sec. d.3. 
2This, it would appear, implies a certain disregard for the 
importance of the being and existence of humanity as it appears in Adam, 
and in us. It raises the question, for instance, as to what may in fact 
be the significance of human existence at all. Cf. Dorothee 8ölle's 
critical remarks: " Barth's tendency is to objectify representation, to 
regard it as a fact which is independent of the assent or will of those 
represented, ... . The terms employed by Barth in formulating this 
radical view accordingly fail to indicate any distinction between rep- 
resentation and substitution. Christ the Representative, An Essay in 
Theology after the 'Death of God', trans. David Lewis, (Alva, Scotland: 
SCM Press, 1967), p. 89. 
3 "Christ and Adam ", p. 42. And cf. Karl Barth, The Epistle to 
the Romans, trans. from Sixth Edition by Edwyn C. Hoskyns, (London: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1933), pp. 176 -78. Hereafter: Romans. It is realized that 
Barth's over -all interpretation of the imago Dei reflected in Romans was 
subsequently rejected. However, the reference above appears consistent 
with his later position. Cf. Hirschwald, "The Teaching of Karl Barth on 
the Doctrine of the 'Imago Dei' ", pp. 4 -5. 
240. 
It might be inferred from the above that the work of the incarnated 
Christ indicates a dividing point between a time when grace did not rule 
(before the incarnation) and the time following. However, on the basis 
of material already considered (supra,pp.237f.) that inference must at 
least be qualified. Christ has always been essential manhood, true human- 
ity. Therefore, says Barth, in respect to the time before the incarnation, 
"... we may recognize the ordering principle of the Kingdom of Christ even 
in the ordering principle of the world of Adam. ... Though we were 
travelling in a very different direction, the rule of the road strikingly 
resembled - was indeed the same as - the one we know now. "1 
What, then is the "difference" - the concrete alteration in the 
structure of relation between God and man which Christ effects? The 
question leads into the material which speaks of Christ in terms of the 
imago Dei. Barth says, 
He who is already glorified by the Father in His relationship to 
Him is again glorified in them, in His relationship to man. 
Thus the divine original [g ttliche Urbild7 creates for itself a 
copy [Gegenbild7 in the creaturely world. The Father and the 
Son are reflected in the man Jesus. There could be no plainer 
reference to the analogia relationis and therefore the imago Dei 
in the most central, i.e., the christological sense of the term.2 
The pre- existent Christ, glorified in that relation to the Father, 
becomes glorified again, Barth says, in his relationship to man. But, 
the weight, the stress, seems to remain at the divine level with a 
resultant minimization of humanity. However, our question regarding the 
"concrete difference" at the level of humanity has not been answered. 
While the priority of God's action on behalf of man is an indispensable 
1 "Christ and Adam ", p. 5. 
2C.D., III /2, p. 221, and cf. p. 220. 
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doctrine, it does not seem self -evident that such priority entirely 
precludes man's active participation. The latter, however, is difficult 
to locate in Barth's system.1 
When Barth speaks of the function of humanity in relation to Christ, 
and when it would seem that a positive value might be ascribed to humanity, 
there occurs an additional qualification. Barth asserts: 
The humanity of Jesus is not merely the repetition and reflec- 
tion of His divinity, or of God's controlling will; it is the 
repetition and reflection of God Himself, no more and no less. 
It is the image of God, the imago Dei.2 
1But cf. Humanity of God, p. 11: "'Theology,' in the literal 
sense, means the science and doctrine of God. A very precise defini- 
tion of the Christian endeavour in this respect would really require the 
more complex term 'The -anthropology.' For an abstract doctrine of God 
has no place in the Christian realm, only a 'doctrine of God and of man,' 
a doctrine of the commerce and communion between God and man." And cf. 
Ibid. pp. 69 -70: "I, too, have heard the news that we can speak about 
God only by speaking about man. I do not contest this claim. Rightly 
interpreted, it may be an expression of the true insight that God is not 
without man. This means in our particular context that God's own freedom 
must be recognised as freedom to be a partisan for man." 
2C.D., III /2, p. 219. And cf. p. 222: "Jesus is man for His 
fellows, and therefore the image of God, in a way which others cannot 
even approach, just as they cannot be for God in the sense that He is. 
He alone is the Son of God, and therefore His humanity alone can be 
described as the being of an I which is wholly from and to the fellow - 
human Thou, and therefore a genuine I. In this respect we do not even have 
to take into account the fact that all other men are sinners and have 
turned aside from God. This means, of course, that their humanity (in 
more or less complete antithesis to this description) actually develops 
from their contradiction of the Thou to fresh opposition, and cannot 
therefore be a genuine I. But let us assume that there is in every man at 
least a serious even if hopeless striving in the other direction. The 
difference between Jesus and ourselves is still indissoluble. It is quite 
fundamental. ... We are the victims of idealistic illusions if we deck 
out the humanity of man generally with features exclusive to that of the man 
Jesus." Then follows (pp. 223ff.) Barth's attempt to articulate that 
quality in or of man which indicates a compatability of humanity, Christ's 
and ours, which makes possible a relation. And he states on p. 224: 
"We do not ask, ..., concerning a capacity to enter into covenant which man 
himself has to actualise, but concerning that which makes him as the work 
of His Creator possible, serviceable, adapted and well -pleasing as His 
covenant- partner before all other creatures, and to that extent capable of 
entering into covenant." 
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This statement, i.e., that the humanity of Jesus is in fact the repetition 
and reflection of God Himself, suggests that we have to deal with the 
humanity of God. Barth, in his essay bearing that title, speaks of that 
subject, and says, 
The humanity of God: Rightly understood that is bound to mean 
God's relation to and turning towards man. ... It represents 
God's existence, intercession, and activity for man, the 
intercourse God holds with him, and the free grace in which He 
wills to be and is nothing other than the God of man.l 
Christ's humanity, consequently, because it is essentially a 
repetition of God's own humanity, must be considered something entirely 
other than what we normally mean by humanity, i.e., the race of man. 
Surely, humanity as "God's existence, intercession, and activity for man" 
is an unfamiliar use of the term. Yet, it is consistent with Barth's own 
system in which all things are a repetition of the primary intra- trinitarian 
activity (cf. supra, Sec. b). It does not seem unjustified therefore, to 
'Humanity of God, p. 37. The correspondence /distinction problem 
inherent in the above may illustrate one of the "stages" of Barth's devel- 
opment. Stewart C. Zabriskie suggests that Barth's essay, The HumaniLy 
of God represents a "third stage" and that therefore that which has preceded 
is qualified. Although Zabriskie's discussion pertains to "Christ and 
Adam" (not C.D.) his comments are apt: "There is a definite ambiguity here 
about the correspondence to and the distinction from Christ as regards man 
in his humanity. The problem ... becomes one of Christ's relationship to 
man in his humanity - man who is the image of him who is the image of the 
invisible God. The imago Dei has become involved in the confusion surround- 
ing a'Christological problem; and this confusion seems to win the day in 
the 'third stage' - ... ." "A Critical View of Karl Barth's Approach to 
the Christian Doctrine of The Imago Dei ", Anglican Theological Review, 
XLVII (Oct., 1965), pp. 365 -366. Hereafter: "Critical View of Barth's 
Doctrine ". 
There may be, as Zabriskie says, a third "stage" represented in 
Barth's "Humanity of God ". We are reluctant, however, to assume that 
Barth's intention therein was to disavow all preceeding contribution to 
the theme. It would seem entirely unjustifiable to conclude that there 
is no continuity between "stages "; therefore, a modification seems more 
accurately to describe the variation than does transformation. 
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suggest that as the humanity of Jesus is itself the reflection of God, so 
also is God's relation and turning toward man essentially God's turning to- 
ward Himself. That is, unless by "man" is meant something other than human- 
ity. On the other hand, Barth says that "If the humanity of Jesus is the 
image of God, this means that it is only indirectly and not directly identi- 
cal with God. It belongs intrinsically to the creaturely world, to the 
cosmos. "1 
The question with which we began regarding the "difference" that 
Christ makes, (supra, p.240 ) may better be re- phrased thus: not what, 
but is there a difference notable on the concrete and historical level of 
humanity which Christ effects? The following suggests a negative response: 
God Himself has in Jesus Christ stepped into man's place. We 
think once more of our assertion that the reconciliation is an 
exchange. God now takes over the responsibility for us.2 
The is clearly one in which an exchange has occurred above the 
level of historical humanity; it is a divine transaction. Though signifi- 
cantly qualified, a similar concept of "exchange" is implied in the following: 
This is not to say, however, that man is confined to the role of 
an approving spectator. The gift of freedom becomes operative 
at this critical point. Man's freedom always remains human free- 
dom and is not to be confused with the divine freedom whereby 
God in Jesus Christ took man's part.3 
The subject of freedom will be more thoroughly considered in a later section; 
at this point we call attention to the indication that although Barth refuses 
1C.D., III/2, p. 219. 
2 22g. Outline, p. 151. The German text is: "Gott selber ist 
in Jesus Christus an des Menschen Stelle getreten. Wir denken noch einmal an 
unsere Erklárung der Versöhnung als Vertauschung. Gott übernimmt nun die 
Verantwortung für uns . " 
3Humanity of God, pp. 81 -82. 
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to consign man to the role of spectator, nevertheless, "God in Jesus took 
man's part ". The role of Christ is a dual role; He represents both God 
and man.l This is explicitly stated by Barth.2 However, in the same 
book in which was noted the duality of Christ's function, we note this 
affirmation: man "... is the being whom God has loved, loves, and will love, 
because He has substituted Himself in Jesus Christ and has made Himself the 
guarantee. "3 Again, therefore, the structure of relation has become prim- 
arily established within the divine sphere. 
We conclude this section, "Christ and Anthropology" with an espec- 
ially representative quotation from Barth, and a critical comment in res- 
ponse. Barth states: 
The dialogue and encounter which are our theological theme involve 
God's grace and man's gratitude. To open up again the abyss 
closed in Jesus Christ cannot be our task. Man is not good: 
that is indeed true and must once more be asserted. God does 
not turn towards him without uttering in inexorable sharpness 
a 'No' to his transgression. Thus theology has no choice but to 
put this 'No' into words within this framework of its theme. 
However, it must be the 'No' which Jesus Christ has taken upon 
Himself for us men, in order that it may no longer affect us 
and that we may no longer place ourselves under it. That takes 
place'in God's humanity is, since it includes that 'No' in itself, 
the affirmation of man . 4 
-We appreciate that we have entered the discussion relative to the 
two natures of Christ and their relation in Jesus. We will not presume 
either to explicate our own view or will the dimensions of our thesis allow 
or demand a full consideration of Barth's position. Our own sensitivity to 
the critical difference between Christ as "substitute" and Christ as "repre- 
sentative" is due to an appreciative reading of Dorothee SÖlle's Christ the 
Representative. 
2Cf. Humanity of God, p. 47: Christ "... comes forward to man on 
behalf of God calling for and awakening faith, love, and hope, and to God 
on behalf of man, representing man, making satisfaction and interceding." 
31bid., p. 60, and cf. p. 51: "His free affirmation of man, His 
free concern for him, His free substitution for him - this is God's humanity." 
As compared with the motivation for God's love in the above, cf. that of 
John 3 :16. 
41bid., pp. 59-60. 
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The 'No' addressed to man in his transgression is the 'No' to man's re- 
lation to Adam (cf. supra, p. 236 ). For, Adam represents man's secondary 
and hostile constitution. The primary ordering principle is that which 
originally exists between Christ and us. Therefore, to close the abyss 
between God and man necessitated the incarnation of the true and essential 
man, Jesus Christ; He assumes full responsibility for the victory over 
the 'No', over evil. It is the victory of grace. However, one wonders 
what may be the implications of this structure of grace in respect to man's 
historical existence and bei 1 ng. Even more specifically, what are the 
conditions imposed on the development of a doctrine of the imago Dei as it 
relates to creaturely historical existence, i.e., post -fallen man? 
d. Implications of the "Fall" 
d.l. Anthropological Implications 
Man in respect to the "fall" is the first subject of consideration, 
and one is immediately aware that in the theology of Barth the "fall" as-:- 
states an interpretation which has not been previously noted in the main- 
stream of Western theology. While Barth does not explicate the paradisial 
existence of Adam in any historic sense, yet the concept of the "fall" is 
included in his system as an event of pre -history. His utilization of the 
concept (i.e., the fall) enables him to characterize the fallen state of man 
1Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 115: "The priority of grace takes 
away from evil rand may we suggest also, manj its real historical signifi- 
cance. But in proportion as evil loses its historical reality, the redeem- 
ing act of Christ also diminishes in historical reality. If Jesus Christ 
precedes everything, then he also precedes sin. But if this is so, then 
his cross is 'not really brought about by sin, but only by his self - 
sacrifice, decreed from eternity', and the fall is therefore merely an act 
necessarily created as a framework for this. Even the cross becomes 
ultimately only a monologue of God the Father with himself as God the Son, 
and therefore 'a ghostly apparition without reality'." (internal quotations 
from Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Barth, Darstellung and Deutung seiner 
Theologie, (Cologne, 1961) pp. 225f, and 380). The essence of Zahrnt's 
criticism is apt; however, the argument he proposes in the following 
sentences is specious. 
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in considerably more radical terms than discussed heretofore; Barth's 
reinterpretation of the fall story does not minimize its implications. 
Having referred to Michelangelo's "Creation of Adam" which depicts 
unobstructed communion between God and man, Barth says, 
Out of this relationship, which never has been, and never will be 
an event in history, we issue, and towards it we move. Nor can sin 
destroy this primal union Beziehune, for it is the act and work 
of God alone.' 
If the relationship (normally attributed to Paradise) never has been, nor 
ever will be an historical phenomena, what may be said of its significance? 
It is obvious that even though non -historical, it loses none of its value, 
its essential import. Indeed, it may be that because of its non -historicity 
it assumes even greater implications as interpreted by Barth. There is, 
says Barth, an indestructible primal union which is the act of God. The 
concept of this "primal union" therefore replaces, in a sense, that which 
the older formulations tried to assert, viz., Paradise. 
Barth relates the history of Israel to the theme of Paradise, and 
in that relation discovers a new dimension of the former. He says, the 
Old Testament "... represents Israel as a people that is completely perver- 
ted and lost, ... . "2 Similarly, Paradise illustrates the same conclusion. 
For, says Barth, even though God's grace was manifest in Israel's history 
in a unique manner, that relation serves only to confirm 
... what was already clear in Paradise, that man is neither capable 
nor worthy [icht fáhig ... wúrdig7 of the fellowship with God for 
which he was created, that he is radically separated from God's grace. 
Because of his guilt, there can be no positive relationship 
positive Beziehung7 between him and God.3 
1Romans, p. 249. 
2 "Christ and Adam ", p. 26. Our concern at this point is primarily 
to discover Barth's interpretation of Paradise. Therefore we will not 
become involved in a discussion regarding the validity of the above state- 
ment, though we may indicate our reservation. Cf. C.D., III /1, p. 275: 
"What the history of Paradise indicates acquires its form in the history 
of Israel, but only in its provisional form." 
31bid., p. 29. 
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Two themes are present in the above; first, that both Paradise and Israel 
exemplify man's incapacity and unworthiness for fellowship with God. Second 
is the futurist dimension implied in the words, "... for which he was crea- 
ted," although it would be presumptuous to draw any firm conclusion based 
on this single reference. Nevertheless inasmuch as true and essential human- 
ity has eternally been represented by the Son (supra, Sec. c.) there may be 
a parallel interpretation here. The question occurs - has man ever, in 
historical existence, experienced such fellowship with God? If not, what 
are the implications? Are we to deduce from Barth's system the conclusion 
that man, as created, initially lacked the capacity for that fellowship? Or, 
will it be discovered that, similar to traditional interpretations, man re- 
jected that capacity - that is, he renounced his pre- fallen communion with 
the Father? 
reference i.e., has ever experienced, 
in historical existence, true fellowship with God? Barth states: 
The sin which entered the world through Adam is, like the right- 
eousness manifested to the world in Christ, timeless and trans - 
cendental.1 
Barth is not suggesting that sin and righteousness have no historical 
implications; rather, he is suggesting that they are realities which are 
not exhaustively contained within historical perspective. There is also 
the implication in the above that Adam becomes an instrument of sin, as 
though sin were an existing reality apart from the activity of man. This 
implication becomes quite explicit in the following statement from Barth: 
1Romans, p. 171. 
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Sin is the characteristic mark of human nature as such; ... it 
is the Fall which occurred with the emergence of human life. 
Sin occurs before it has taken concrete form consciously or un- 
consciously in this or that man, and it is powerful before it 
takes control of his will or disposition.' 
Not only, says Barth, does sin precede its concrete form or expression, 
i.e., by means of a human decision, but it is the characteristic of 
human nature. What, then, is implied in respect to man's initial 
capacity? 
Considering the same subject in the Dogmatics Barth states that 
history itself begins "... with the great episode in which the peace 
between God and itself 2:The creaturg is broken by man. "2 A peace which 
is broken by man would seem to imply the historical existence of such 
peace. As a consequence or corollary, therefore, one might be inclined 
to infer that man did in fact experience the capacity to maintain it. 
An earlier statement from the Dogmatics affirms that implication: 
... the revelation of God does not show us man as we wish to see 
him, in the wholeness of his created being, but in its perversion 
and corruption. The truth of man's being as revealed in the Word 
of God and attested generally by Holy Scripture shows us man 
as a betrayer of himself and a sinner against his creaturely 
existence Ceschöpfliches Wesen7. It accuses him of standing in 
contradiction to God his Creator, but also to himself and the 
end for which he was created. It presents him as the corrupter of 
his own nature. ... What is sinful and strives against God and 
himself is not just something in him, qualities or achievements or 
defects, but his very being.3 
It is apparent that Barth assigns the culpability for man's perversion 
and corruption entirely to man. The "creaturely existence" which man 
betrays and against which he sins would seem to indicate the actuality of 
1Romans, p. 173. And cf. our discussion of "nothingness ", supra, 
Sec. b.l., and Appendix B, infra. 
2C_D., 111/4, P. 353. 
31bid., III /2, p. 26. 
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a form of existence unbroken, and unbetrayed. Barth refers to that 
fracture of relationship as "... the very moment when God acts with the 
greatest faithfulness towards man ... and in which "... man in supreme 
unfaithfulness takes sides against God his Creator. "1 
It is in reference to the above that the centrality of Barth's 
Christocentrism becomes critical. One simply cannot, he would assert, 
explicate the significance of man's unbroken, unbetrayed existence by 
means of an examination of historical creaturely existence. "Sin is 
... meaningless and incomprehensible except as the negation of the right- 
eousness which is in Christ, and apart from its being surmounted by 
the 'Yes' of that righteousness. "2 The righteousness of Christ becomes 
the essential and indispensable interpretile principle in reference to 
the question of the nature of man's unbroken creaturely existence. The 
significance and implication of that principle are manifest in the 
following: 
That Adam was oefore he became mortal and what Christ is after 
He ceased to be mortal - in other words, the operation of the 
emergence of death from Life and Life from death - is ... 
by definition non -historical Cnhistorische7. It follows then of 
necessity that the entrance of sin into the world through Adam 
is in no strict sense an historical or psychological happening. 
The doctrine of Original Sin, as it has been generally understood 
in the West, would not have been to Paul an 'attractive hypothesis' 
(Lietzmann) ... .3 
The situation, therefore, is that of attempting to speak of the 
creature's initial status and involvement in sin within the categories of 
history. The attempt is fruitless; we have to do here with primal 
1C.D., III /2, p. 26. 
2Romans, p. 171. 
31bid., Ital. mine. 
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pre -history and creaturely existence which only becomes historical existence 
simultaneous with the "fall ". The only creaturely existence is fallen 
existence. 
1 
Barth is thus able to avoid many of the problems entertained 
by his predecessors in respect to an "historical fall" doctrine. Other 
problems and questions arise, however, regarding the structure of relation 
between God and man. 
d.2. God and Fallen Man 
It is important to realize that in Barth's thought creaturely 
existence is fallen existence, and that fallen existence does not reveal 
the truth about man. Barth states that "... what we recognize to be human 
nature is nothing other than the disgrace which covers his nature; his 
inhumanity, perversion and corruption. "2 It is equally important to 
note that the being of man, which may be distorted and corrupted, is 
nevertheless indestructible.3 However, the indestructibility is not due 
1Cf. the following from Romans: (pp.248 -49) - Commenting on Romans 
7:9, Barth says, "The words I was alive can no more refer to the historical 
past than can the words we shall live (6:2, etc.) to some historical future; 
the reference is-to that life which is primal and non -historical, ... . 
There is no question here of contrasting a particular epoch in the life of a 
single individual, or of a group, or indeed of all mankind, with some other 
epoch, past or future. The passage refers to that timeless age to which 
all men belong." And p. 181 - The "... fallen state is the consequence of 
no single historical act : it is the unavoidable pre- supposition of all 
human history, and, in the last analysis, proceeds from the secret of the 
divine displeasure and divine rejection." Of that displeasure and rejection 
Barth states on p. 172: "The Fall is not occasioned by the transgression of 
Adam; but the transgression was presumably its first manifest operation. In 
this context the venerable Reformation doctrine of 'Supralapsarianism' becomes 
intelligible. According to it, predestination into rejection precedes the 
'historical' fall. Only in so far as Adam did what we all do, is it legiti- 
mate for us to call and define by his name the shadow in which we all stand." 
2C.D., III/2, p. 27 
3Cf. Ibid.: Even granting the perversion of man's nature, it 
"... is not effaced, and he cannot succeed in destroying it and making 
himself unreal. The distortion or corruption of his being is not the 
same thing as its annihilation fVerkenhrung und Verderbnis hejat doch 
nicht Vernichtung seines Wesens " 
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to an intrinsic, inherent quality of creaturely existence - it is not 
something possessed; rather, it is a characteristic of creaturehood which 
has its origin and source from outside itself, i.e., in the eternal covenant 
intention and claim of God. The truth about man is discernable, not on 
the plane of historical existence, but only in the sphere of the divine.1 
An intrinsic characteristic of creaturely existence is sin. And 
because sin is totally inexplicable apart from a theological orientation, 
creaturely existence is explicable only in relation to God.2 Therefore, 
in answer to the question, what is the structure of the God -man relation 
reflected in Adam ?, Barth states: 
Clearly - and this lies already in the word 'Fall' - God is here 
deserted and denied by men; He suffers and is robbed. Sin is, 
essentially, robbing God of what is His and because it is robbing 
of God, sin is essentially the appearance in the world of a ower - 
like God (5:12). Sin is an invisible negative occurrence [uunanschaulich 
negatives Geschehen7 encountered by God and in Him.3 
In spite of creaturely existence's relation to sin, it would seem that 
the essential relation is between sin and God; it is, says Barth, "... 
encountered by God and in Him." This characterization of the principle 
opponents is discussed at length in Appendix B, especially Articles 3.1. - 
3.4. 
In conjunction with the God -man-sin relation the question of freedom 
occurs. Freedom to decide for or against the covenant relation is one of 
the constituent characteristics of humanity, and one which Barth emphasizes 
in this particular consideration. Man can break his covenant relation - in 
1Cf. supra, Sec. c. 
2Cf. Humanity of God, p. 80: "God wants man free together with his 
fellow men in the greatness and anxiety, in the richness and the poverty of 
his humanity. True enough, man no longer knows what it means to be truly 
human. Alienated from God, he is alienated from himself and from his true 
nature. But God does not cease to call and to claim this estranged creature 
for His own." 
3Romans, p. 177. 
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fact, the brokenbss of that relation, as we have seen, is an integral 
factor of historical existence. "This ability 5.e. to deny his reality by 
si.7 for which there is no reason," says Barth, "the mad and incomprehensible 
possibility of sin, is a sorry fact. "1 But, according to Barth, the freedom 
to decide which was given to man, is not, as one might expect, freedom to 
decide between two possibilities. He says, 
Freedom to decide, rEntscheidungsfreiheit7 means freedom to decide 
towards the Only One for whom God's creature can decide, for the 
affirmation of Him who has created it... . But we have to do with 
freedom to decide. ... Should it happen that the creature makes 
a different use of his freedom than the only possible one, (ital. 
mine) should he want to sin - that is, to 'sunder' himself from God 
and from himself - what else can happen than that, entered into 
contradiction to God's will, he is bound to fall by his disobedience, 
into the possibility not foreseen in creation? ... There must now 
take place the fall into nihil.2 
The above is intelligible only on the prior understanding of the 
dimension or categories of God and nothingness (cf. infra, Appendix B). 
Barth does not imply that contrary decisions are not in fact made; rather, 
he asserts that the contradictory decision (sin), though a fact, is so 
contrary to our humanity that it falls into the category of ontological 
impossibility.3 This does not mean that sin, as an ontological impossibil- 
ity, is non -existent; it would seem to "exist" in the same way as nothing- 
ness is said to exist. Sin therefore, is an impossibility inasmuch as it 
is entirely inimical to our humanity - though apparently not to our historical 
1C.D., II172, p. 205. 
2Dog. Outline, pp. 56 -57. 
3Cf. C.D., I11 /2, p. 136 "Godlessness is not ... a possibility 
but an ontological impossibility for man /ottlosigheit ist - n-folgedessen 
keine Möglichkeit, sondern die ontologische Unmöglichkeit des Menschseins7. 
Man is not without, but with God. This is not to say, of course that godless 
men do not exist. Sin is undoubtedly committed and exists. Yet sin is not 
a possibility but an ontological impossibility for man. ... To be in sin, 
in godlessness, is a mode of being contrary to our humanity." 
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creaturely existence. If that is true, it would follow that humanity is 
not synonymous with historical existence. Indeed, that seems to be 
Barth's thesis. 
Man, he says, 
... has not to choose between two possibilities, but between 
his one and only possibility, and thus between his being and his 
non -being, between the reality and unreality of his freedom. 
To choose freely is to choose oneself in one's possibility, 
being and freedom / rei Ahlen heft: sich selbst in seiner Möglichkeit, 
sich selbst in seinem Sein, sich selbst in seiner Freiheit wáhlen.7] 
The above might suggest that man, in his historical existence, retains his 
faculty for "free choice" - that there remains for him the possibility of 
choosing between his being (his possibility) and non -being (his impossibility). 
That suggestion, however, could only be maintained at the expense of a re- 
jection of a fundamental doctrine in Barth's system, i.e., the universal 
brokenness of creaturely existence (cf. supra, Sec. d.l.) Therefore, 
because "freedom" is an intrinsic constituent of humanity, and because 
creaturely existence is not "free ", humanity and creaturely existence are 
essentially dissimilar.2 
1C.D., III/2, p. 197, and cf. Ibid., p. 26. 
2The same subject, i.e., the dissimilarity between God and man, 
has been previously discussed, but from a somewhat different perspective, 
cf. supra, Chapter III, Part A, especially Sec. c.l. It was noted that 
St. Thomas proposed various possibilities to express both the relatedness 
and unrelatedness of God and man, involving the terms quasi -species and the 
analogical likeness of existence. Whereas Barth does not utilize any of 
St. Thomas' terminology, at this point he is nevertheless confronted with 
a similar problem. And one notes the utilization of similar structures 
of relation employed by both Barth and St. Thomas, i.e., being and non- 
being. But cf. Humanity of God, p. 80: "The gift of freedom makes man 
free to be not more and not less than human. Whatever God's other intent- 
ions for man may be, they will always be a confirmation of his nature as a 
creature of God. And whatever man may choose to do with his God -given 
freedom, it always will have to be carried out within the framework of 
human possibilities. If he cannot boast of his human condition and achieve- 
ment because they are a gift of God, he need not be ashamed of them either." 
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Barth says, 
... man does not live up to this freedom. Even worse, he fails 
in every respect. It is true enough that he does not know any 
longer the natural freedom which was bestowed upon him in creation; 
he does not know as yet the ultimate freedom in store for him at 
the completion of his journey, in the ultimate fulfilment of his 
existence.' 
Man stands in his historical creaturely existence between the boundaries 
of natural freedom (lost) and ultimate freedom (not yet realized).2 If 
freedom, which is constitutive of humanity, is renounced and not yet renewed 
or restored, what will be appropriate to assert about the nature of man's 
humanity in the interim? Western theology has perenially debated this 
same question and has developed variant interpretations which have been 
discussed in the preceding chapters. And even though Barth's system proceeds 
from a dissimilar structure, i.e., other than Paradise and subsequent cata- 
strophic fall, nevertheless the question has neither become irrelevant, nor 
answered, at least to this point in our discussion. It is to that question_ 
that we now address ourselves, employing Barth's categories of the Adam- 
Christ typology and the imago Dei. 
d.3. Christ and Fallen Man 
Barth's contribution to the Christ -Adam structure of relation dis- 
cussed above, is the foundation on which to deter ine his understanding of 
the same structure from the perspective of post- fallen man. Barth, in 
reference to I Corinthians 15:47, maintains that there is a significant area 
of confusion regarding the "really first" and the "really second", i.e., 
between Adam and Christ.3 The confusion becomes apparent, he suggests, in 
reference to Colossians 3:9f, where we are told to 
'Humanity of God, p. 78. 
2Cf. C.D., III /4, p. 353. "Creation and consummation are the 
boundaries of history, and therefore of this interim period." 
3Cf. Ibid., III /2, p. 205. 
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put off the old and put on the new, [for the] we have to remember 
that what is here called the old is really the new which has 
illegitimately obtruded itself and which we ought never to have 
put on, whereas the new is really true and proper man, and to 
that extent the old and original man which could be put off 
only in the reckless folly of sin.' 
Considering the seeming inevitability of man's encounter with sin 
(cf. supra, Sec. b.l.), Barth's dictum that it should never have been 
put on seems rather extraneous.2 Apart from that, however, his attempt 
to re- establish the priorities is constructive. His system requires 
that Christ, and not Adam, should be regarded as the eternally true and 
proper man. Adam, therefore, in the creaturely existence which he typifies, 
is not to be regaìded as the perfection of human existence subsequently lost. 
Christ's priority is more, therefore, than the priority of time; His is 
the priority, the pre -eminence, of value - He is true and essential man. 
However, Barth's statement that "... the old is really the new 
which has illegitimately obtruded itself ..." seems to require some actual 
structure of relationship between God and man which man did in fact destroy. 
But, the "new" is, as we have seen, the historical concretion of an original 
- a pre- historical - relation, which in its becoming historical assumed 
characteristics which are dissimilar from the prototype (cf. Sec. d.l.). 
Therefore, Barth is able to assert the following: 
... Christ who seems to come second, really comes first, and Adam 
who seems to come first really comes second. In Christ the relation- 
ship between the one and many is original, in Adam it is only a copy 
bl en Zeugnischaracter7 of that original. Our relationship to Adam 
depends for its reality on our relationship to Christ. And that 
means, in practice, that to find the true and essential rigentlich ... 
ursprúnglich7 nature of man we have to look not to Adam the fallen man, 
but to Christ in whom what is fallen has been cancelled and what 
was original has been restored.3 
1C.D., I1I /2, p. 205. 
2Cf. supra, Sec. b.l., and infra, Appendix B. 
3 "Christ and Adam ", p. 24. (Ital. mine) And cf. Ibid., p. 10: "We 
are real men Sabrer Mensch7 in our relationship to Adam, only because 
Adam is not our head and we are not his members, because above Adam and 
before Adam is Christ." And cf. Ibid., p. 7. 
256. 
In calling attention to the questionable "appearances ", i.e., the 
"seeming" nature of priority, Barth has undoubtedly asserted a significant 
theological qualification. On the basis of his re- ordering, Barth sustains 
the centrality of the Christ -man relation, where other systems have failed. 
That is to say, other soteriological structures require the model of a 
once -perfect and fallen man to which Christ relates as the one who re- 
stores him to that pristine condition. The concept of the eternal priority 
of Christ, in Barth's system, alters that structure.) 
There are basically two characteristics which Barth includes in 
his analysis of the Christ -man relation. One suggests the element of 
dissimilarity, difference; the other specifies the correspondence between 
Christ and Adam. It ma y first at appear 
s 
that thex°e are contradictory, 
but, as we shall see, they are closely inter -related by Barth. Both 
characteristics are discernible in the following: 
... our relationship to Adam is only the type, the likeness, 
the preliminary shadow /eRenbild ... Gleichnis ... voranlaufende 
Schatten7 of our relationship to Christ. The same human nature 
appears in both but the humanity of Adam is only real and genuine 
in so far as it reflects and corresponds to the humanity of 
Christ . 2 
The dissimilarity evident in the above is indicated by the terms 
type, likeness, preliminary shadow. The correspondence issues from the 
assertion that both Christ and Adam participate in the same human nature. 
It is apparent, however, that the former, i.e., the real and genuine 
IIndeed, Barth does use the words, "... what is fallen has been 
cancelled and what was original has been restored." Supra, p. 255. 
The cancellation and restoration, however, do not refer to a repristina- 
tion of some historical existence; they relate to the consummation of 
God's covenant intention. Our reservations in respect to Barth's 
particular re-structuring have been stated, supra, Sec. c., et passim. 
2 "Christ and Adam ", p. 9. 
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humanity of Christ, qualifies the latter. This is clearly and concisely 
stated by Barth: 
Man's nature in Adam irf not, as is usually assumed, his true and 
original nature; it is only truly human at all in so far 
as it reflects and corresponds to the essential human nature as 
it is found in Christ.l 
It seems evident that Barth is attempting to establish the foundation 
for correspondence while at the same time maintaining the difference. 
Essential humanity inheres in Christ; Adam (man) is therefore human 
insofar as his humanity reflects Christ's. Will it be possible, we ask, 
for Barth to meaningfully relate the two? Are there, in fact, two human 
natures to be related ?2 It would seem, on the one hand, that when speaking 
of human nature, Barth is specifying essential or real human nature which 
is a Christ property. On the other hand, as was noted in the text of note 2, 
p.256,, he also attempts to speak of human nature in both Adam and Christ. 
It may be a fair conclusion to suggest that the human nature of Adam 
(i.e., creaturely historical existence) indicates only and entirely man's 
reflective potential.3 
Commenting on Romans 5:13 -14, and 20, Barth asserts that the 
. formal correspondence [formalen Korrespondenz7 and identity 
jleichheit between Adam and Christ is based upon their material 
disparity /achliche Ungleichheit7. In the encounter between 
s 
1 "Christ and Adam ", p. 43. 
2Cf. Zabriskie's criticism: "Within Barth's re- definition of 
'humanity', he still maintains a definite distinction between man and 
God, for the humanity of God is a perfect humanity. But this concept 
confuses the doctrine of the imago Dei." "Critical View of Barth's 
Doctrine ", p. 368. 
3This theme in Barth bears a marked similarity to the theology of 
Calvin, specifically Calvin's utilization of the term "mirror" - cf. supra, 
Chapter III, Sec. b.l. beginning p. 207. Our reservations are similar, 
and will not need to be repeated. 
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them Christ has more right and power, and Adam less. It is 
only in this disparity of status and in this disproportion that 
they can be compared. 
This is the clearest expression thus far regarding the locus of the God - 
man relation in Barth's system. It is apparent that in the attempt to 
explicate the correspondence between Christ and man, only an understanding 
of the humanity of Christ will reveal the essence of that relation. On 
the other hand, an analysis of creaturely human existence only portrays the 
disparity, the dissimilarity. If this is correct - that is, a fair apprais- 
al of Barth's system - then it would appear that the resultant structure of 
relation between God and man is not essentially unlike classical Augustin- 
ianism which has dominated in the West.2 
The imago Dei theme has served throughout as the principle by which 
we have attempted to elucidate the structure of the God -man relation. Our 
premise has been that the imago Dei is a biblical motif which signifies the 
nature of man in relation to God, and conversely, God in relation to man. 
The method by which we have examined and criticized Barth's system has both 
a positive and a negative character. The positive value is that it creates 
a broad environment for a specific discussion of the imago Dei, per se. On 
1 "Christ and Adam ", p. 44. And cf. Ibid., p. 16: The "how much more" 
of Romans 5:15 -17 joins, or relates in another way Adam and Christ 
.. 
and 
points to an ordering principle that can connect even such opposites (ital. 
mine) as these." And cf. also Ibid., p. 45: "In the unity of the one and 
the many Adam is the type and likeness [ orbild ... Gleichnis7 of Christ, 
although formally he differs from Christ because he is not lord and head in 
this unity, and materially he differs from Him because his nature is perverted 
by sin. But this unity, as such, belongs not to the perversion of his 
nature but to its original constitution." 
2Indeed, it could be countered that the Augustinian structure proceeded 
from the presupposition of an historic Paradise in which man was endowed with 
factors of union, and that man subsequently lost what he once possessed. 
Barth's system does not proceed along these lines. The affinity of his 
system results from a "theory" of a pre -historical humanity (in Christ) 
which man, in historical existence has never possessed, but apart from which 
he is not fully human. Therefore, we suggest a basic similarity, and 
essential Augustinianism, in spite of certain differences. 
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the other hand, our method is liable to the criticism of unnecessary delay. 
It will hopefully be realized. that the material considered thus far is 
inextricably related to Barth's interpretation of the imago Dei. What 
has been more or less implicit may now become explicit. 
e. Man and the Imago Dei 
The man with whom we have to deal in this section is the being 
created by God to fulfil His covenant intention (cf. supra, Sec. a.). 
He is also the form of creaturely existence whose essential, true, and 
original nature inheres not in himself, but in Christ who is man's arche- 
type (cf. supra, Sec. c.). Furthermore, his historical existence, indeed 
history itself, coincides with the intrusion of and man's relation to the 
existence of nothingness, e.g. sin (slam, Secs. b.l., and all of Sec. d.)1 
Of the "man" with whom we are concerned in this section Barth says: 
God wills and creates man when He wills and creates the being 
between which and Himself there exists this tertium comparationis, 
this analogy; the analogy of free differentiation and relation 
freien Unterscheidung and Beziehung7.2 
Barth's contribution to the imago Dei theme is summarized in these 
few words. The tertium comparationis is an analogy of relation which has 
its origin in the being of God, and its reflection in man. And in neither, 
it should be clearly understood, could it be destroyed without thus destroy- 
ing the very being of both.3 It is in relation to this conviction and 
doctrine that Barth explicitly employs the biblical phrase, the imago Dei, for 
here he locates the essence of the relation between God and man. The source 
and the indestructibility of the relation is expressed by Barth in the following: 
1Cf. C.D., III /2, p. 319: "Man is oriented toward that for which he 
is determined. ... Even as a sinner he remains the creature of God and 
therefore the being whose orientation is to be the covenant partner of God. 
He can give himself up for lost. But he cannot escape God, or lose his 
being as a creature of God, or the nature of his being." 
2Ibid., III /1, p. 185. 
3 Cf. Ibid. 
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'In our image' means to be created as a being which has its 
ground and possibility in the fact that in 'us', i.e., in God's 
own sphere of being, there exists a divine and therefore self - 
grounded prototype /In sich selbst begrúndetes Urbild7 to which 
this being can correspond; which can therefore legitimate it for all 
that it is a heterogeneous imitation; which can justify its existence; 
and by which, when existence is given to it, it will in fact be legiti- 
mated and justified.' 
The creature's legitimization and justification derive from these 
two inter- related poles: first, that its very existence is a "given" 
i.e., it is from beyond man, proceeding from the intention of God; second, 
the creature is endowed with a correspondence factor. However, Barth will 
not permit the inference that man, so endowed, possesses either his justifica- 
tion or ability of correspondence in himself .2 It derives from his very 
createdness in the image of God. "He would not be man", Barth says, "if 
he were not the image of God. He is the image of God in the fact that he 
is man."3 That is to say, man's being as man in the image, i.e., in 
correspondence to God, is constitutive of his being; man is the form of 
1C_D., III/1, p. 183. 
2Cf. Ibid., p. 197: "Man is not created to be the image of God 
but - ... - he is created in correspondence (ital. mine) with the image 
of God. His divine likeness is never his possession, but consists wholly 
in the intention and deed of his Creator, whose will concerning him is 
this correspondence [Entsprechung7." 
31bid., p. 184, where we also note: God- likeness is "... not 
a quality of man. ... It does not consist in anything that man is or does. 
It consists as man himself consists as the creature of God." From this 
it would seem apparent that the "likeness" and similarly the "image" are 
factors of man's being which derive entirely from the actualized intention 
of God. Therefore, Barth will not need to consider the possibility of its 
loss (a departure from traditional Augustinian formulation) nor, we would 
assume, will his system reflect a highly developed ethical structure. 
It may be appropriate to include a word regarding the relation 
between "image" and "likeness ". Barth does not consider the terms as 
distinct from one another; neither, however, are they exactly synonymous, 
as we note in the following: "The phrase 'in our image' is obviously the 
decisive insight of the saga, for it is repeated twice. The other phrase: 
'In our likeness', means to be created as a being whose nature is decisively 
characterised by the fact that although it is created by God it is not a 
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creaturely existence irrefragably God- oriented. Consequently, an attempt 
to speak of man apart from a theological orientation is both inadequate and 
ultimately absurd according to Barth's theology.1 
The confrontation, the communion between the Father and the Son is, 
according to Barth, the primary locus of the imago Dei. The "... inner 
divine relationship between the Father and the Son, "2 is therefore, that to 
which man is created to correspond. It would appear that the creaturely 
correspondence of which Barth speaks includes two dimensions; one, the 
relation between man and God, and two, the relation between man and fellow 
man. The first dimension has been surveyed in the context of essential 
and original humanity, cf. supra, section c, et passim. It was concluded 
there that essential humanity is not that which pertains especially to 
historical creaturely existence, but primarily to the humanity which is in 
Christ. Both poles of the correspondence are included in the following: 
As man generally is modelled on the man Jesus and His being for 
others, and as the man Jesus is modelled on God, it has to be 
said of man generally that he is created in the image of God. 
He is in his humanity, and therefore in his fellow -humanity 
%Mitmenschlichkeit7. God created him in His own image in the 
fact that He did not create him alone but in this connexion 
and fellowship.3 
new nature to the extent that it has a pattern in the nature of God himself; 
to the extent that it is created as a likeness of this divine image, i.e., 
in the likeness of this image. The being created in the likeness of this 
image is man." - C.D., III /1, pp. 183 -84. And for a similar statement, 
cf. "Christ and Adam ", p. 11: "Even under the lordship of sin and death 
his 2 an'] nature is still human nature and so is the image and likeness of 
what it will be under the lordship of grace and life." For a more complete 
discussion of demuth and tselem cf., C.D. III /1 pp. 197 ff. Our impression 
is that Barth, while recognizing the delicate difference between the terms, 
consistently interprets them as Hebrew parallelism. 
1Cf. text of note 1, supra, p. 259. 
2Dog. Outline, p. 52. 
3C.D., III /2, p. 324. 
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It would seem that the phrase "as the man Jesus is modelled on God" 
refers essentially to the same relation as that "inner divine relationship 
between the Father and the Son" to which reference was made above. There- 
fore, one could conclude that the dimension of "being for others" is a 
quality of Christ's being exercised both in His relation to God and to man. 
Consequently, it may be appropriate to suggest that the being of man inheres 
in the same dipolar relation, i.e., in reference both to God and fellow -man. 
However, the question arises whether man's fellow -humanity, i.e., the exercise 
of his being- for -others, is tantamount to man's relation to God. That is to 
say, what is the correlation between man's relation to his fellow -man and his 
relation to God? The quotation above (p.261, n.3.) seems to indicate a 
degree of proportionality.1 
That correspondence is further illustrated in the following citation: 
... by the Word and word of God man really became the being which, 
as male and female, exists in correspondence with the divine original 
Prbild7 and prototype /orbild7, ... to which there has finally been 
granted the possibility of life corresponding to its creaturely 
necessity rkreatúrlichen Bedúrftigkeit7.2 
1If Barth's system leads to, or even allows, that conclusion, we may 
have discovered a theme compatible with our own theme of "co- inherence" 
Cf. Introduction, pp. 26 -27. But cf. C.D., II1 /2, p. 219: "Between God 
and God, the Father and the Son and the Son and the Father, there is unity 
of essence, the perfect satisfaction of self -grounded reality, and a blessed- 
ness eternally self -originated and self -renewed. But there can be no 
question of this between God and man, and it cannot therefore find expression 
in the humanity of Jesus, in His fellow -humanity as the image of God. In 
this case we have a complete disparity between the two aspects." In the 
light of this statement we may have to suggest that the fellow -humanity of 
Jesus' life is a factor which has no counterpart in His pre -Incarnational 
relation with the Father. And consequently, the theme of co- inherence and 
the structure of dipolarity are invalidated. Cf. also supra, pp. 244ff. 
for further qualification. 
2C.D., III /1, p. 212, and cf. Ibid., p. 186: "... as God is One, 
and He alone is God, so man is one and alone, and two only in the duality 
of his kind, i.e., in the duality of man and woman. In this way he is 
a copy /bbild7 and imitation Cachbild7 of God. In this way he repeats 
in his confrontation of God and himself the confrontation in God." 
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It is, Barth asserts, as man exists "as male and female" that he is the 
reproduction, the correspondence, of the essential prototypal relation, 
i.e., between Father and Son. It would, however, be erroneous to 
suggest that man's inter -human relationships exhaust, without remainder, 
the dimensions of his being. There is a more significant and fundamental 
focus of man's being which Barth says is oriented toward the "... hope of 
the being and action of the One who is his original in this relationship. "1 
The context of this statement makes it clear that both foci of the relation 
are included; Barth does not imply that man's relationships may be either 
with God or with fellow -man. The inter -human dimensions of man's relation- 
ships impinge inevitably on his relation to God. 
Barth asserts that the phrase from the first creation account, 
"male and female ", signifies more than the simple duality of sexes. The 
implicates extend even beyond the expression of the capacity for inter - 
human relations. There is a related implicate inherent in the phrase, 
"male and female ", which Barth indicates in the following: 
... man is the first and only one to be created in genuine 
confrontation with God and as a genuine counterpart of his 
fellows, it is he first and alone who is created 'in the image' 
and 'after the likeness' of God.2 
Asserted again is the inseparability of these dimensions implicit in 
the "male- female" designation. And whereas the male- female structure 
bears no independent value of its own, it nevertheless is for Barth central 
in his elucidation of the imago Dei motif. To say that the male- female 
structure bears no independent value of its own does not, according to 
Barth minimize the value of man; rather, by specifying the inseparability 
1C.D., III/2, p. 324. 
2Ibid., III/l, p. 184. 
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of the two dimensions of relation (God -man, and man -man) the value of being 
man is asserted. Man is irrefragably, indestructibly man- in- relation.1 
It is this factor of his creation, Barth says, which provides the "... 
internal basis of the covenant 
The futility of the attempt to speak of man apart from his theological 
orientation has been noted (pp. 260-62 ). The question which occurs in 
that context is the significance of man's participation in that orientation. 
If, as we have said, man's being in relation (as male and female) is 
simultaneously the expression of his relation to God, can it then be suggest- 
ed that man's inter -human relations constitute his relation to God? If, 
on the other hand, his inter -human relationships merely reflect the primary 
relation (i.e., that which God constitutes as a reflection of His trinitarian 
relation) then, we ask, of what value are man's inter -personal relations? 
Does "... the hope of the being and action of the One who is his original 
in this relationship" (supra, p. 263, n.l)require an active and responsible 
participation on the part of man? 
Toward a response to these questions we cite Barth's statement from 
his discussion of Christ's virgin birth: 
1Cf., C.D., III /1, p. 186. Apart from the specific reference to 
the creation of man as male and female, according to Barth we could not 
say that creation was "good ", because "... solitary man would not be 
created in the image of God, who Himself is not solitary." - Ibid., p. 290. 
And cf. Ibid., III /4, p. 117. We do not find it necessary to discuss ex- 
tensively the differentiation and relation implicit in the male -female 
structure. The fundamental importance of the creation of the two sexes is 
readily granted, but an explication of Barth's entire utilization of that 
concept, we believe, would not add anything significant to our study. As 
far as we are able to discern, Barth himself does not discuss the human 
male -female relationship apart from its theological dimension, e.g., as 
the created capacity for man to reproduce the fellowship between the 
Father and the Son. 
2Ibid., III /1, p. 290, and cf. supra, Sec. b. 
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God did not choose man in his pride /stolz7 and in his defiance, rotz7 
but man in his weakness and humility / Schwachheit ... Demut7, not man 
in his historical role, but man in the weakness of his nature as 
represented by the woman, the human creature who can confront God 
only with the words, 'Behold, the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto 
me according as Thou hast said'. Such is human co- operation 
Citwirkung7 in this matter, that and only that We must not think 
of making a merit of this handmaid existence, nor attempt once more 
to ascribe a potency to the creature.' 
It would be inappropriate to suggest on the basis of the above 
that Barth is totally depreciating the value of creaturely existence. At 
the very least it must be recognized that the value of "this handmaid exist- 
ence" is that apart from which there would be no "external basis of the 
covenant ". Creaturely existence is required for the completion of God's 
intention. One wonders however, if Barth's characterization of "handmaid 
existence" does full justice to man whom God has created in terms of man's 
responsibility, and indeed, his historical activity. 
Barth delimits the value of man's historical role in the following: 
Christ, says Barth, 
... steps into Adam's place and into our place with the claim, 
the right, and the power, to make our sin and our death His 
responsibility %Sache7... .2 
In addition to Christ's being the essential and prototypal humanity 
(the positive pole) He is also the One who assumes our place in terms of 
sin and death (the negative pole). We are reminded of a statement which 
has been cited (p2.58) and which bears repeating: 
Human existence, as constituted by our relationship with Adam 
in our unhappy past as weak, sinners, godless, enemies, has no 
independent reality, status, or laaportance of its own. It is 
only an indirect witness ßndirerztes Zeugnis7 to the reality of 
Jesus Christ and to the original and essential human existence 
that He inaugurates and reveals. The righteous decision of 
God has fallen upon men not in Adam but in Christ.3 
1Dog. Outline, p. 99. 
2 "Christ and Adam ", p. 18. 
31bid., p. 7. 
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We would like to be able to say something of more positive significance 
in respect to the value of human existence than that it "... is only an 
indirect witness to the reality of Jesus Christ ". Indeed, that human 
existence is the internal basis of the covenant, and that the male- female 
structure re- enacts the relation between the Father and the Son - these 
are significant. However, the qualifications with which Barth surrounds 
them, render, them of limited historical value.' We may have to conclude 
that Barth did not entertain the question of man's active, responsible 
participation in the manner we might have wished. On the other hand his 
system does not entirely preclude the possibility of asserting more positive 
values - not in spite of - but on the basis of certain aspects of his system. 
Some illustration of that will be indicated in the conclusion which follows, 
and also in the final chapter. 
f. Summary and Conclusion 
We noted at the outset of the chapter the centrality of God through- 
out Barth's system. It may be suggested that all theology would claim the 
same. However, it seems doubtful that there exists another system in which 
that method is so clearly defined, and so assiduously maintained. 
1But, cf. Humanity of God, p. 54, where this statement is notable 
especially because of its unique and uncharacteristic content: "What is 
culture in itself except the attempt of man to be man and thus to hold the 
good gift of his humanity in honour and to put it to work? That in this 
attempt he ever and again runs aground and even accomplishes the opposite 
is a problem in itself, but one which in no way alters the fact that 
this attempt is inevitable. Above all, the fact remains that the man who, 
either as the creator or as the beneficiary, somehow participates -7Ttal. 
mine) in this attempt is the being who interests God." This is not typical 
of the anthropology noted thus far. It is not, however, a contradiction 
in the light of the qualifications with which Barth has surrounded the ad- 
jective "somehow" before "participates ". It should also be said that in 
Barth's ever -developing interpretation, the element of "partnership" - less 
qualified - may one day have emerged. 
267. 
Following the brief introduction related to the externalization 
of the intra- trinitarian relation, the significance of the covenant intention 
of God was considered. It was noted in Sec. a. that the covenant is the re- 
creation of an intra- trinitarian communion on the plane of creaturely exist- 
ence; covenant and creation are inseparably interrelated. But God is 
known as Creator primarily through His work of reconciliation. Barth 
states: "... when the Creator has Himself become a creature, God become 
man, ... , then the mystery of the Creator and His work and the mystery of 
His creation are open to us in Jesus Christ, ... . "1 Creation, from that 
perspective, is the actualization of the covenant intention, and simultaneous- 
ly the "stage" for the accomplishment of His purpose (cf. supra, pp.226 -229. 
Barth's creative interpretation and utilization of the covenant 
theme is constructive from several points of view. Stated negatively, it 
avoids the necessity of seeking to explicate the God -man relation primarily 
from the perspective of sin. To be sure, that factor is not thereby ignored, 
but neither does it remain the constitutive motif, which we suggested had 
been true since Augustine. Positively expressed, the configuration of the 
covenant relation and intention established the God -man relation essentially 
on the foundation of Christology - but, with a difference. Christ, as 
essential man, from before the creation of the world, assumes a fundamental 
priority in terms of the fulfillment of God's original intention. Christ's 
function remains that of Redeemer, but more significantly, His redemptive 
1Dog. Outline, p. 53. And cf. C.D., III /2, p. 319: "God acknowledges 
and confesses Himself the Creator by reconciling the world to Himself in 
Christ, in the One for whom and with a view to whom He created it." For a 
critical note cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 105: "Barth's error, ... , 
lies in over -stressing his christological lever. The consequence is that 
he does not leave sufficient breathing space between the creation and the 
redemption, so that the reality of the redemption overwhelms the reality of 
creation - nature, history, the world and man - like a tidal wave, sweeping 
away any independent foothold it possesses." 
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work coincides with His role as the historical completion of God's eternal 
intention. This emphasis makes possible the explication of the Christ -man 
relation upon an essentially positive plane - though, in our estimation 
Barth failed to do so. 
The idea of creatio continua was discussed in Sec. b. The consumma- 
tion which the sovereign God had already anticipated is that toward which 
the completed creation will be transformed in and by Christ. Creation, 
according to Barth, does not possess its interpretation within itself; its 
reality is not disclosed from within but properly derives from beyond itself, 
i.e., from the reality of God. The problems which arise from that theme 
were noted, e.g., the relation between the "joyful readiness" and the 
"incident of the fall" (supra,pp.230 -31). Although Barth radically re- interprets. 
the "fall" event, it retains a central place in his theological system (cf. 
Sec. d.). The "fall" remains that which has effected a radical reorientation 
in the relation between God and man. The re- interpretation which Barth 
proposes, based on a "timeless and transcendental" dimension, seems to require 
a commensurate re- interpretation of the God -man relation on the plane of 
creaturely historical existence. 
Our rather extended discussion of creation's negative and positive 
poles, and the association they have with nothingness, defined the framework 
upon which Barth articulated man's relation to evil and sin (supra, Sec. b.l. 
and infra, Appendix B). Barth's interpretation has both a positive and 
negative effect. On the one hand, his development of the theme is one 
which articulates man's relation to sin /evil as a secondary constituent of 
his being. On the other hand, Barth's structure makes it difficult to ex- 
plicate man's relation to sin /evil in terms which are adequate. That is to 
say, in Barth's system man is culpable, but not responsible (cf. supra, p.235; 
infra, Appendix B, Articles 3.3 & 3.4.). 
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The re- orientation in respect to our "true and original nature" 
was indicated at the beginning of Sec. c. Barth unambiguously asserted 
that Christ, not Adam, is the true, original, and essential man. Consequent- 
ly, the relation between Christ and humanity is the prior and fundamental one, 
while the man/Adam relation is secondary. Adam, and derivatively man, is 
the pre -figuration, the type of "man" who was yet to come (cf. supra, pp. 236ff). 
The centrality of Christ which Barth maintains, and the implications which 
that centrality implies in respect to the understanding of man are con- 
structive. Adam is accorded a critical function in terms of interpreting 
the reality of man; but his (Adam's) is not the pre- eminent principle. 
That appropriately accrues to Christ. 
However, on the basis of Barth's system certain questions occur: 
if Christ is original and essential man, what is our relation to Him? Are 
there any, and if so what, points of similarity between Christ and man, viz., 
in his creaturely historical existence? What is the significance of that 
creaturely existence in respect to Christ's pre -historical and incarnate 
humanity? It was stated that Christ's work effects an objective difference 
in the realm of creaturely existence (supra, p. 239). Our question is this: 
is it possible to suggest that man from "below" also makes a "difference" to 
Christ? Or, is the weight of the fore -ordained conclusion sufficient to 
render that "difference" either impossible or irrelevant (cf. supra, pp.239- 
41)? Barth clearly asserts that there is intended no disregard for man; 
the "humanity of God" is precisely His relation to and turning toward man. 
God is the God of man. Nevertheless, our conclusion is that although Barth's 
re- structuring of the priorities is creative, his utilization of the structure 
severely (and inappropriately) depreciates the significance of creaturely 
existence (cf. supra, pp .241 -44) 
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Barth's utilization of the concept of the "primal union" makes it 
unmistakably clear that he is not speaking of it in any "historical" sense, 
i.e. as that which pertains primarily to creaturely historical existence 
(cf. supra, Sec. d.1.). The "primal union" refers to a positive relation 
between God and man; creaturely historical existence is (and has always been) 
"radically separated from God" (supra, pp. 246ff.). In response to the 
question whether or not Adam (man) did, in time, experience the joy of 
"primal union ", Barth prof ers a negative conclusion. 
As Barth transfers the locus of the truth about man's being to the 
sphere of the non -historical, so also does man's involvement in creaturely 
existence impinge upon the non -historical, (supra, Sec. d.2.). Creaturely 
existence is existence in sin, but sin is a dimension of "nothingness" which 
primarily God, not man, meets in combat. And, as seen in the following, 
creaturely existence is confronted by an already defeated foe: 
Until the hour strikes when its destruction in the victory of 
Jesus Christ will be finally revealed, He thus permits nothingness 
to retain its semblance of significance /cheingeltung7 and still 
to manifest its already fragmentary existence. ... He thinks it 
good that we should exist 'as if' He had not yet mastered it for 
The above presents a fair summary of the "un- reality" of creaturely histori- 
cal existence. For, it would seem to us that if Christ is the truth, the 
reality, of humanity on the one hand, and if the characteristic mark of 
creaturely existence is sin for which sole responsibility is assumed by God 
on the other hand, creaturely existence is rendered somewhat "un- real ". 
That is to say, creaturely existence is ontologically irrelevant - cf. 
su ra, p. 252, n.2.2 
1C.D., III /3, p. 367. Ital. mine. 
2We are not ignoring that which Barth suggests as the alternative 
structure of reality - that is, the essential significance of creaturely 
existence which derives from its relation to Christ. We are merely 
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Our earlier discussion (Sec. c.) of the central significance of 
Christology was enlarged in Sec. d.3. The qualitative difference between 
essential humanity (Christ) and creaturely existence (Adam) was further 
examined. We noted that the difference was not absolute; an absolute 
difference would render relation impossible. However, because of the 
nature of creaturely existence, the relation between it and Christ is establish- 
ed on the basis of its "material disparity" - supra, pp. 257 -58. The 
barrier between a Christocentric relation and Christomonism has been 
breached with a resultant depreciation of creaturely existence.1 
Specific consideration of Barth's utilization of the imago Dei theme 
revealed that the imago was essentially a factor of correspondence (Sec. e.). 
The phrase, imago Dei, does not in itself specify that which inheres in man's 
being; it rather points to a tertium comparationis, (supra, p. 259). The 
analogy of "free differentiation and relation" is that quality of God to 
which man is created to correspond. And, to express that intention of 
creation Barth uses the phrase, imago Dei. 
attempting to illustrate some of the implications of Barth's structure. 
Cf., "Christ and Adam ", p. 10: "Our human nature is preserved by sharing 
Adam's nature, because Adam's humanity is a provisional copy [Vorláufigkeit7 
of the real humanity that is in Christ." 
1Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God, p. 106: "No theologian ... will dis- 
agree with Barth when he asserts that the history of salvation is the 
'centre' and that the history of the world is the 'circumference' around it. 
But every theologian who has studied the Bible will disagree with Barth when 
he considers the history of the world as devoid of any meaning or value of 
its own, serving only as the analogy, image, sign, correspondence and 
adumbration of the history of salvation, and that this is so from all eternity. 
The same Barth who in his struggle with natural theology, with its general 
concept of the divine, emphasises too strongly the concrete and historical 
figure of Jesus Christ, makes use of Jesus Christ in his analogical thought 
as a universal and supra -temporal principle which can reveal to him the 
reality of the whole universe - with the result that the reality of the 
universe evaporates." 
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Barth carefully qualifies his statements regarding the image and 
its relation to man. The imago Dei is constitutive of man's being, but 
the essence of the image inheres in God, not in man, cf. supra, p. 260. 
The legitimization and justification of man occurs not from within himself, 
but from beyond, i.e., from God. The imago Dei, in Barth's system, is a 
term which points to relation. That man is the image of God specifies 
his created orientation toward God. It is the imago Dei which depicts 
the dimension of communion apart from which man would not be man. 
In Barth's system there are two dimensions of the imago Dei. The 
first, and pre -eminent one, is the dimension of Christ's relation to the 
Father. The second dimension is that of creaturely inter -personal relations 
wherein Barth speaks of the indispensability of the male- female order. A 
question was raised at this point as to the significance of the relation 
between the two dimensions. Does man's creation in the image of God 
suggest that as the Son is in relation to the Father, so also is man in 
relation to man? Barth's answer is affirmative - with qualifications. 
Because of Christ's relation to man, therefore, might we suggest that inter - 
human relations imply dimensions which transcend the human? Again, an 
affirmative response seemed justified, but with the qualification that 
inter -personal relations do not exhaust the dimensions of the imago Dei. 
The implicates of the male- female order signify the essentiality of 
relation - whether between the Father and the Son, or on the level of 
humanity. However, while there is an analogy between the two orders of 
relation, the relation is not ontological. That is to say - because of 
the "complete disparity" of essences (i.e., between God and man) the analogy 
of relation does not signify even an approximation of co- relation between 
God and man. The disparity, the distinction, between the two appears to 
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be absolute.l 
The end toward which the male- female order is oriented is not totally 
realized on the plane of inter- personal relations; its true focus is what 
Barth describes as the "internal basis of the covenant ", cf. supra,pp. 263 -64. 
It was at that point, and on the basis of that assertion, that the question 
was repeated regarding the probability of man's historical participation. 
Barth emphatically denies the possibility (cf. supra, pp. 264 -65). Barth's 
Christology makes gratuitous, if not impossible, the attempt to authentically 
involve man (creaturely existence) in the God -man relation; Christ as essent- 
ial man fulfills all the requirements for man.2 
This section of the thesis is not an appropriate place to suggest 
alternatives to Barth, nor even to formulate minor variations based on his 
system. It may be permissible, however, to conclude this portion of the 
chapter with one preliminary idea. If Barth's concept of the centrality 
of Christ as "essential" man were freed from its delimiting implications 
(e.g. the un- reality of man) it could be utilized as a theme of the concrete, 
historical completion of God's eternal intention.3 This would necessitate 
1Cf. supra, p. 262 and especially the text of n. ,l This factor 
of Barth's theology is reminiscent of St. Thomas' differentiation between 
the Image and that which is imaged - see pp. 176 -187 of Chapter III. 
2Cf. Zahrnt, Question of God: p. 113: No one will object to the way 
Barth draws together the beginning and the end of the whole historical 
process in Jesus Christ. But the question is whether in Barth it is still 
a matter of an historical process: does he present anything in history as 
still happening? ... The basing of the event of salvation upon a timeless 
event in the perfect tense results for Barth in an irreparable loss of 
concrete historical reality." 
3For example, see Gordon D. Kaufman, Systematic Theology: An Histori- 
cist Perspective, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), Kaufman maintains 
that the imago Dei should be interpreted as man's "historicalness, his 
historicity." - p. 330. Shortly thereafter he states "What, now, does it 
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a more historically related and dynamic Christology than his system generally 
implies. However, his essay, The Humanity of God, illustrates a certain 
tendency toward that direction. There are some interesting and constructive 
affinities between Barth's concept (modified) and Irenaeus' interpretation 
of man's growth- toward -image. The articulation of the imago Dei as a symbol 
of God's historical co- inherence with man characterizes our task and hope. 
mean to say that man's defining characteristic is his historicity? Man is 
preeminently a historical being because he is both made by his history and 
he himself makes history: thus man makes and remakes himself. All of nature 
is created in the historical process; man alone takes an active part in his 
own creation in history." - p. 333. 
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CHAPTER V 
SIGNIFICANT CONTEMPORARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE IMAGO DEI THEME 
-PART TWO- 
The Imago Dei in the Theology 
of 'Emil Brunner 
David Cairns has suggested that Brunner's contribution to the 
doctrine of the imago Dei ".., has perhaps made the most impact on the 
thought of our time." 
1 
Brunner's recognized theological contribution 
and stature, Cairns' estimation, and our appreciation of Brunner's 
creative work - these are the factors which recommend an examination 
of his system, especially in respect to the imago Dei. 
Brunner's elucidation of the imago Dei theme is more conspicuously 
anthropological than those heretofore considered. That is to say, his 
characterization of man, in his historical creaturely existence is 
plainly and explicitly about man. At the very heart of his system is 
his interpretation of the imago Dei, from which he draws implicates which 
impinge on the totality of man's being. On the other hand, Brunner 
occasionally uses terminology and forms of expression which imply that 
man within historical existence is other than man in his origin. The 
outline in this chapter may inadvertently imply that Brunner's anthropology 
1David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, (London: SCM, 1953), 
p. 146. Hereafter: Image. It is further suggested that the Brunner's 
".., doctrine of man- developed most fully in Man in Revolt is the most 
important contribution of Emil Brunner to theology." - The Library of 
Living Theology, Vol. III, The Theolo of Emil Brunner, ed. Charles W. 
Kegley, (New York: Macmillan, 19626. Hereafter: Kegley, Theol. 
of Brunner. 
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is essentially of the "before- and -after" variety. Nevertheless, his 
characterization of the origin of man, because of its importance within 
the system, requires a section of its own. 
a. The Shape of Original Man 
His Origin 
Even though Brunner does not repeatedly press the point, one is 
aware that his anthropology is dependent upon his Christology,l Christ's 
relation to man, according to Brunner, is the Word's relation to the 
creature called into being by the Word. And, says Brunner: 
The revelation of Christ points back to the revelation in 
Creation, to the Word 'in whom all things cohere', jol. 1:127 
in whom also, in a very special way, man has the ground of his 
being, as man. His responsible being rerantwortliches Sein7 
is based upon the Word of the Origin:... ,2 
Especially significant is the note of continuity indicated, the link which 
joins all times, i.e., Christ, the Word. That man's being is established 
on the foundation of the Word is a basic and fundamental constituent of 
his being.3 Man is, foremost and fundamentally, the being created by 
God for relation. The phrase, imago Dei, bears implicates of that re- 
lation, which are evident in the following: 
Man, in contrast from all the rest of creation, has not merely 
been created by God and through God, but in and for God. ... 
Just as it is said of no other creatures, 'let us make', so 
1Cf. infra, Sec, b.3,a, for a discussion of Brunner's Christological 
presuppositions and their utilization. 
2Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutter- 
worth Press, 1939), P. 67. Hereafter: M.I.R. The relation between creation 
and redemption, and the subject of "responsible being" will be considered 
in later sections. 
3Cf. M,I_R., p. 71: "Man is man by the fact that he is a creature 
who stands in a special relation to the Word of God, a relation of being 
grounded in and upheld by the Word." And cf. Ibid.: "Just as the new 
man is generated by the Word of God, so also the original man in the divine 
original act of Creation was generated by the Word of God." 
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also it is said of no other that it has been created 'after 
His likeness' or 'in His image'. The whole Christian doctrine 
of man hangs upon the interpretation of this expression - but 
on the interpretation which is drawn from the New Testament, 
from the point of view of Jesus Christ » 
In addition to the Christocentric element indicated, Brunner emphasizes 
the importance of the phrases "after His likeness" and "in His image ". 
These phrases specify the uniqueness of man, as compared with other forms 
of creation. The imago Dei indicates the particularity of man who alone 
is created "in and for God ". This is the heart of Brunner's inter- 
pretation of the imago theme. 
It may be well to indicate at this point in the development of 
the chapter Brunner's conceptualization of the essential difference 
between God and man. It will become increasingly clear that Brunner's 
interpretation is oriented toward the articulation of the nearest possible 
relation between God and man; it is not to magnify the distinction 
between the two. There is no confusion of the natures of God and man; 
man is a ",,, product of His will, he is a creature. "2 Difference is 
required in order to permit true relation. What appears almost as an 
overstatement, Brunner says: 
The original Biblical word 'Creation' means first of all, that 
there is an impassable gulf between the Creator and the creature, 
1M,I.R,, p. 92. And cf. Ibid., pp. 70 -71: The doctrine of 
Creation is the fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith, asserting 
"... that all being is either of God or has been created and established 
by Him. But the Biblical ontology is not content with this. It states 
that God has created all that is outside Himself through His Word. The 
Word of God therefore, ... is the ground of being of all created existence, 
not merely in the sense that all created being has its origin in the Word 
of God, but in the sense that in the Word 'all things cohere', that all 
that God has created He upholds 'by the Word of His power.'" 
2Cf. Ibid., p. 77. 
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There is no greater sense of distance than that which 
lies in the words Creator - Creation. "1 
It becomes apparent in the light of the following paragraphs of Brunner's 
text that the above quotation is applicable only within the context of 
God's "... inescapable, operative presence ... . "2 The "impassable 
gulf" ,he unüberbrtickbare Distant specifies the basic, fundamental, 
and eternal distance in the face of man's attempt to either deny or 
bridge it for himself. But from God's perspective the distance is not 
insuperable. Brunner does, however, make it unmistakably clear that 
creation can assert no valid claim upon the Creator on the basis of its 
created compatibility or relative superiority. 
Even the very phrase which signifies the relation between God and 
man, i.e., the imago Dei, expresses their essential difference. Brunner's 
very carefully worded explication both of that fact, and also of God's 
nature is stated: 
Man is in the Image of God, his personality derives from God's, 
yet just because it is from God his person is different from 
God's. God - the God known to us in His Word - is the un- 
conditioned, the underived, and, save from Himself, by naught 
determined, absolute and, to Himself, absolutely transcendent 
Spirit. Yet this designation 'absolute Spirit' would forthwith 
land us in the bottomless and impersonal could we not at once 
add a second: He is to Himself self -related, one knowing and 
willing Himself in love, the Triune God. Wherefore, only the 
Triune God is genuinely personal, for He is within Himself 
self- related, willing, knowing, loving Himself.3 
The "gulf ", the disparity perceived between God and man derives primarily 
from the fact of the difference of their being. That is to say, God is 
the absolutely self -sufficient and independent One; man is the absolutely 
1M,I,R,, p. 90. And on the same page we read: "Man, although he 
has been created out of love, in love and for love, is not of divine nature, 
as though he had a share in the being of God; but he is a product of His 
will, he is a creature." 
2Ibid., p. 91. 31bid., pp. 218-219. 
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derived and dependent one. However, Brunner's purpose is not primarily 
to specify and clarify their relative distinction, but to assert that by 
which they are related. Of the above characterization of God he asserts: 
"This Triune personal being of God is the original image according to which 
and for which man has been created. "1 It is precisely the interpretation 
of the structure of that relation which is our concern. Whatever may be 
said of the gulf which exists between God and man is asserted in the 
light of God's endeavor to overcome it.2 And the means by which God 
operates toward that end is itself constitutive of the being of man. 
The being of man, Brunner says, is created in such a way "... that 
man knows that he is determined and conditioned by God, and in this fact 
is truly human. "3 This being "determined and conditioned by God" is not 
to suggest Brunner's attempt to assert a doctrine of determinism; rather, 
it is his attempt to specify a positive constituent of man. God has, 
according to Brunner, created man - determined and conditioned him - for 
relation. However, the dimensions of that relation are established by 
God, and therefore any subsequent and positive relation must conform to 
the structures which God has established. The nature and capacities of 
man do not enable him to create the structures; his nature "... -is 
nothing in itself, and ... it is not intelligible from itself, ... its 
ground of existence and of knowledge is in God. "4 Brunner maintains that 
1M.I.R., p. 219. 
2Cf. Ibid., p. 9, where Brunner asserts that the message of the 
Bible is "... not concerned with 'God in Himself,' but with 'God for us,' 
the God who manifests His nature and His will in the Son of Man, in order 
that in man this centre may once more become the true centre." 
311.I.11., p. 97. 
41bid., p. 96. 
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the term, imago Dei, includes within itself the dimensions of that order 
and structure of relation,: 
It is at this point, however, that Brunner's articulation of the 
difference between the Old and New Testament interpretation becomes 
critical. Although the subject of the fall and sin and their effect 
on man created in the imago Dei have not been introduced, it seems 
advisable to anticipate that subject very briefly at this point in order 
to present Brunner's interpretation. Basically, the Old Testament 
interpretation of the imago Dei is what Brunner calls the formal aspect; 
it is that which signifies man's being as subject, including his freedom.2 
The New Testament image (material image) on the other hand derives from 
the fact that, as Brunner says, 
God created man good and that man is now evil: these two 
are of the of New 
Testament, a presupposition which can never be removed from 
New Testament thought, and one which is always operative.3 
In respect, therefore, to the New Testament interpretation of the 
imago Dei, the concept of a created and lost quality of life must be 
maintained. The New Testament builds upon the restoration of that lost 
quality. Brunner states that "... the whole work of Jesus Christ in 
reconciliation and redemption may be summed up in this central conception 
of the renewal and consummation of the Divine Image in man. "4 The 
1Cf. M.I,R,, p. 83: "The phrase with which the Christian doctrine 
describes the origin of man, and in so doing the ground, the character, and 
the limits of that higher element, is the parabolic expression of the 
Creation narrative: Namely that man has been created 'In the image of God. "' 
2Cf. Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, 
Dogmatics, Vol, II, trans., Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), 
P. 57. Hereafter: Dog,, It should be pointed out that Brunner has 
abandoned the use of the terms "formal" and "material" in favor of "Old 
Testament" and "New Testament" image - cf. M.I,R., p. 513. 
3M.I,R,, p. 499 41bid., p. 501. 
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relation between the Old and New Testament interpretations is a com- 
plementary one, i.e., the latter completing the former. The Old 
Testament contribution which asserts the responsible subjectivity of 
man's being is not, in Brunner's interpretation, replaced; it remains as 
an essential description of man's being. The New Testament contribution 
to the theme, however, completes the picture -a completion apart from 
o n e. 1 
which/Icannot present a theological anthropology. 
to 
Man's destiny, the intent of the Old Testament perspective, is 
'repeat' the original Divine Word - he must not make a word 
of his own, but of his own accord he must give it back saying: 
'Yes, I am Thine.' ... We are concerned not with an 'image' 
and a 'reflection' but with a 'word' and an 'answer'; this is 
the exposition which the New Testament gives of the Old Testa- 
ment story of Creation, the idea of the Imago Dei.2 
1For Cairns' comments on the subject of the "formal" and "material" 
image, and their relation, cf. Kegley, Theo'. of Brunner, pp. 82 -84, and 
cf. also Cairns, Image, pp. 156 -59, especially this from p. 157: In 
respect to the relation between the two pictures, according to Brunner, 
"It is impossible to make a simple appeal to the Bible, and ask what 
it teaches, for it is clear that both doctrines lie together in it, even 
in the teaching of St. Paul, and that no attempt is made either to re- 
concile or relate them. Such a relation of the concepts to each other 
is, Brunner believes, a necessary and important task of systematic 
theology." 
The importance which Brunner attaches to the relation is clear in 
the following Do , II, p. 59): "It is evident that our thought will 
become terribly muddled if the two ideas of the Imago Dei - the 'formal' 
and'structural' one of the Old Testament, and the 'material' one of the 
New Testament - are either confused with one another, or treated as 
identical, The result will be: either that we must deny that the sinner 
possesses the quality of humanity at all; or, that which makes him a 
human being must be severed from the Imago Dei; or, the loss of the Imago 
in the material sense must be regarded merely as an obscuring, a partial 
corruption of the Imago, which lessens the heinousness of sin. All 
these three false solutions disappear once the distinction is rightly made." 
pp. 98-99. Cf. Emil Brunner, The Word of God and Modern 
Man, trans. David Cairns, (London: Epworth Press, 1965). Hereafter: Word 
of God, p, 38: "In being created in the image of God, man is created to 
make this decision." I.e., to say either 'Yes' or 'No' to the fulfilling 
of the destiny of his creation. Brunner's statement, ",., not with an 
'image' and a 'reflection' ... is a significant departure from the systems 
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The affinity between the Old and New Testament pictures in Brunner's 
exposition is notable. The affinity factor is man's call to respond - 
a call which is of the very essence of man's being.1 It is to that 
factor of "The Shape of Original Man" that we now direct our attention. 
We have attempted to outline the basis upon which Brunner builds 
his doctrine of the imago Dei. Certainly, the most critical element 
of his system is the centrality of the Word, Christ, as God's Word, 
is on the one hand the link of continuity between Creation and Redemption; 
on the other hand, He is the one through whom and in whom man is created. 
Man's being, therefore, in the imago Dei, is a being -in- relation to the 
Word. Indeed, we noted the difference between God and man (pp. 277 -79) 
but, we suggested that Brunner's intention in articulating that difference 
was to establish the proper foundation for relation. It appears that 
Brunner's emphasis is to articulate the difference in order to maintain 
the necessary priority or pre -eminence; God determines the structures 
within which man is created to relate. Finally, we briefly noted the 
importance which Brunner attaches to the differentiation between the 
Old and New Testament interpretations of the Imago Dei. There we 
concluded that both interpretations are essential; each interpretation, 
from a slightly different perspective, offers its own contribution to 
the development of a theological anthropology. 
There is another related aspect of Brunner's system that requires 
comment, i.e., the historicity or non -historicity of the origin of man. 
That is to say, when Brunner says, e.g. that "... God created man good 
of both Calvin and Barth for whom "reflection" was a key word. But, cf. 
infra, p. 289 where both the word and the concept are utilized. 
1Cf, M,I.R. pp. 103 -04: "Being according to the Imago Dei is a 
divine gift, it is communicated life, not merely an aim." 
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and that man is now evil: ... "(supra, p. 280 ) is he referring to two 
estates of man in an actual, historical sense, or is only one historical? 
This important subject may conveniently be studied in an Appendix to 
avoid unnecessarily complicating the main text. Cf. Appendix C, infra. 
a.2. Responsible Relation. 
We presented, in the first section, a brief picture of the origin 
of man. Primarily noted were the structures to which man is created to 
conform. Attention is now directed to the discovery of man's fundamental 
or essential being. Admittedly, what will here be considered may be a 
somewhat idealized picture; until the implications of the fall and sin 
are included we will not be speaking of man in the totality of his actual 
and historical existence. The present subject is man as he is intended 
to be, which is not necessarily, says Brunner, what man is. 
There are two themes which are integrally related in Brunner's 
interpretation of man in responsible existence. The first is that man's 
very being is determined for relation to God; the second is the factor 
of inter -human relations. The two themes will be examined separately - 
though they are intrinsically inseparable - and subsequently their 
relationship to each other will be defined. 
Part of the uniqueness of man, and at the same time Brunner's 
interpretative key, is that man is the being who is called into existence. 
From God's point of view, according to Brunner, the essence of man is that 
of "call" /Inruf7; from man's perspective it is "answer" %Antwort7. "Thus ", 
says Brunner, "the heart of man's being is seen to be: responsible existence 
5-erantwortliches 8ein7. "1 Brunner locates the essence of man in terms of 
1M.I.R., p. 97. Brunner's use of verantworten and its cognates is 
derived from the noun, Antwort. Therefore the element of an answer, or 
reply is pre -eminent. It does not especially signify, as our use of the 
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his responsibility; stated thus: 
In all that man is, does, says, and thinks, he gives an answer to 
the word of creation, the word of destiny; indeed, he not only 
gives an answer, he himself is an answer (Ital. mine). Human 
existence, in contrast to every other form of existence, is 
responsive existence /antwortendes Sein7, that is, existence 
which must and can answer, and in so doing is free and yet 
bound. 
However, the "answer" which man is - his essence - necessarily points 
away from itself. Indeed, it properly points also beyond his intra -human 
relationships. That man is responsible existence is not to imply that 
he carries his being independently. Brunner asserts that man's answer, 
his being 
is not intelligible in the light of his own nature, but only 
in that which precedes it - a primal truth. ... it is only in the 
light of this primal origin that we can comprehend the end for 
which he has been created; it is only in this light that we can 
understand the aim of man's existence and the meaning of his 
failure to attain this aim.2 
Were it possible, therefore, to ascertain the total dimensions 
of man's responsibility, one would know both his relation to the "primal 
truth" and also the "end ", the goal of his existence. However, we are 
dealing with an "ideal ", and not yet an actual form of human existence. 
Nevertheless, the importance which Brunner attaches to locating man's 
being outside, or beyond man, is conspicuous. 
word responsibility often does, the element of morally justifiable 
behaviour. Brunner focuses attention on man's ability to respond, i.e., 
response -ability. 
M.I.R., p. 65. And cf. Ibid., p. 50: "Responsibility 
/Verantwortlichkeit7 is not an attribute, it is the 'substance' /ubstanz7 
of human existence. It contains everything: freedom and bondage, the 
independence of the individual and our relation to one another and the 
fact of community, our relation to God, to our fellow- creatures and to 
the world, that which distinguishes man from all other creatures, and that 
which binds him to all other creatures." 
2Ibid., P. 65. 
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Viewed from a slightly different perspective, Brunner interprets 
the responsibility of man in terms of knowledge and determination. He 
says that whereas other forms of creation are finished, complete, man is 
to be understood in a dynamic, moving sense. In the primary sense, man 
is known and determined; Brunner's reference is to the action of God 
toward man. Derivatively, and in a secondary sense, man "... is a being- 
in-self -knowledge /ein- in- Selbsterkenntnis7 and a being -in- self -determin- 
ation ein -in- Selbstbestimmung], ... . "1 This asserts the critical 
importance of man's decision - making ability. Brunner insists, however, 
that man does not make decisions independently, but only within the 
limits of "Divine determination" ¡ ttlichen Bestimmung]. This does not 
minimize the importance of the exercise of that ability; Brunner states: 
"The necessity for decision /ntscheidungsnotwendigheit7, an obligation 
which he can never evade, is the distinguishing feature /esensmerkmal7 
of man. "2 
The third facet of the same quality, i.e, responsibility, is that 
of the I-Self and its relation to love. The following quotation aptly 
states Brunner's salient point: 
Since God has created man in His image He has created him, 
as a person. It is not the mind, nor the soul but the psycho - 
physical whole, the person 'man' whom God has created in His 
own image. The unity of man is the unity of his personal being 
/ersonseins7. But we can only perceive his personal being 
through faith, in the light of the Word of God, namely as a 
creature which has been called to communion with God, and thus 
to responsibility -in -love /Verantwortung- in- Liebe7. That is 
the Scriptural basis of the understanding of the 'I- Self.'3 
1M.I.R., p. 97. 2lbid, p. 98. 
31bid., p. 218. 
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In addition to the significant insight which Brunner reveals as his 
"theology of the person ", a point to which we wish to call attention is 
the factor of faith.1 It is faith alone, Brunner asserts, that reveals 
the irrefragable bond of communion between God and man.2 Inasmuch as 
man is the being called to communion, so also does that signify his 
"responsibility -in- love." And it is the total being of man that is 
thus characterized 
The essence of man, i.e., being- for- love,4 implies at the same 
time man's being -in -God, According to Brunner, man is created by God 
as the creature who finds the source and goal of his love outside himself, 
1Cf. M,I,R,, pp. 83, 481 -82, quoted infra, p.309, n. 2, 
2It should be realized that in Brunner's system it is only from 
God's point of view that the relation is irrefragable; man's breaking 
of the relation will be considered in a subsequent section. Cf. Brunner, 
Dog. II, pp. 60 -61: "We must note, however, that necessary as it is for 
us to think of the Imago Dei with this distinction between the formal and 
material sense, from the point of view of the divine Creation it does not 
exist. God calls man into existence in order that he may respond to Him 
aright - not in order that he may respond wrongly or rightly. Man is not 
destined to choose between faith and unbelief, obedience and disobedience; 
God has made man in such a way that he can respond as God wills him to do. 
A certain freedom of choice, which makes this response possible, only 
becomes visible when the wrong response has been made." We cite Cairns' 
objection to Brunner's analysis: "... if the distinction between formal 
and material freedom from the standpoint of God does not exist, how can 
God, as Dr. Brunner suggests, have so seriously taken into account the 
possibility of man's sin that He actually created His world 'With such 
a character as would correspond to a sinful humanity' ?" - Kegley, Theol. 
of Brunner, p. 91, citing Brunner, Dog. II, p. 131. 
3Cf, . M.I.R., p. 99: "The intrinsic worth of man's being lies 
in the Word of God, hence his nature is: responsibility from love, in 
love, for love faus Liebe, in Liebe, zu Liebe7." 
4Cf, M.I.R,, p. 74: "Being- for -love / ein- zur- Liebe? is not 
one attribute of human existence among others, but it is human existence 
itself. Man is man to the exact extent in which he lives in love." 
unlike God who is self -existent, self -sufficing love.1 
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It would be 
incorrect to suggest that the expression of man's responsibility -in -love 
rverantwortung -in- Liebe] represents an option; it is not as though man 
can or can not, according to his choice, live from and for love. 
Responsibility -in -love is an expression of created reality - the way 
things are. Brunner states it thus: 
.., this responsibility ,,, is not first of all a task but a gift; 
it is not first of all a demand but life; not law but grace. 
The Primal Word is not an imperative, but it is the indicative 
of the Divine love: 'Thou art Mine,'2 
Finally, the dimensions of man's constitution in and from the 
being of God is manifest in the terms 'I' and 'Self'. Inasmuch as man 
is able to use the personal pronoun 'I' in reference to himself, he 
resembles God. However, Brunner makes it unmistakably clear that the 
dimensions of the 'I' aware of itself, is not the philosophical,cogito, 
ergo sum. That, he says, was an attempt to understand man severed from 
God. Rather, the 'I' of which Brunner speaks, is the 'I' who is aware 
of himself as a "theological being ". Therefore, "... as soon as he 
1Cf. M,I,R,, p. 219: "God, the Primal Word, is creative, self - 
existent, and self -sufficing love; man has been created by God as a 
responsive, reflexive love, that is, a love whose content is outside 
itself. With God, the 'I' of man has its 'Self' in the Word of God. 
In Himself God is love, but man can only be love from God and unto God." 
We raise the question here whether Brunner's own affirmations in respect 
to the essence of man -in -love do not require some modification of the 
doctrine of God's self -existence, and self -sufficience. There are two 
factors that suggest such a revision; one, if God is the "content" of 
love, outside of man, then one might suggest that this effects the being 
of God - He is not entirely self -existent. Second, if "man can only be 
love from God and unto God ", then both prepositions imply that the being 
of God is intimately (and could we say, inextricably) associated with 
man, i.e., that God co- inheres with man. One may want to insist that 
God would continue to be, to exist, without the existence of creation. 
However, it would seem reasonable to suggest that such an eventuality 
would certainly imply an alteration in the nature of God. 
p. 98, May it be, therefore, that the alteration incurred 
by the fall and sin, which we will consider shortly, is only the "appearance" 
of an alteration? 
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truly desires to say 'I myself,' he must immediately refer himself to God 
1 as the ground of his selfhood, to whom he must be responsible; 
This understanding of the 'I' is the only adequate expression of man's 
responsibility -in -love; it relates itself to love which "... is the 
unity of willing, knowing and feeling, the sole total act of the person. "2 
Other attempts to define the 'I' are inevitably partial, and therefore 
erroneous. 
Having explored the implications of responsibility especially from 
the God -man perspective, we now examine the inter -human implications. It 
should be remembered that the perspective remains primarily that of the 
"ideal" situation; 
Brunner's concept of the person -in- relation is not a peripheral 
facet of his characterization of the person; it is fundamental. There 
is one curious reference from Brunner that seems to imply that as God 
is in relation to Himself, so also can man be understood as one in relation 
to himself "... based on his relation to God. "3 That which we find 
curious is the suggestion that man is able to realize his being as an 'I' - 
'Self', based on his relation to God apart from inter -human relationships. 
Apparently what Brunner wants to assert is not that possibility (which he, 
in fact, denies)4 but the centrality of the God -man dimension. However, 
it is a centrality and not an alternative which he has in mind. The 
centrality of that structure of relation requires, as it were, a parallel 
structure, i.e., the inter -human structure of relation. 
1M.I.R., p. 220. 2lbid. 
3M.I.R., p. 221: "To be a person is to be in relation to someone: 
the Divine Being is in relation to Himself; man's being is a relation to 
himself based on his relation to God." 
4But, cf. Ibid., p. 290: "Existence in God, ..., as existence in the 
love of God, is also necessarily existence in love to the whole creation." 
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The essence of man as responsibility -in -love (supra, pp. 286 -87) 
requires inter -human dimensions for the expression of its reality.1 That 
is to say, in the words of Brunner: 
Human life is characterized as human ... by the union of human 
beings in love. That is the content of human existence, which 
is in accordance with man's original divine destiny /öttlichen 
Urbestimmung7, and is an earthly reflection of the divine 
nature itself. 2 
Man's destiny has been determined to be a reflection of intra- Trinitarian 
love; it is the formal, Old Testament interpretation of the imago Dei.3 
That reflection necessitates the presence of the "other ". Man, Brunner 
asserts, "... does not occur as an individual, ... . "4 God has created 
man as a reflection; as there is an I -Thou relation within the Trinity, 
therefore, in order to create the possibility for reflection, God has 
created man in confrontation with a human Thou.5 The human Thou who 
confronts an other does not merely add, as an accident, a qualitative 
dimension to the 'I'; it is that apart from which the 'I' cannot exist.6 
1Cf. M.I.R., p. 105: "Responsibility -in -love first becomes real 
in man's relation with his fellow -man." 
2lbid., p. 106. The similarity to Barth's concept of the male - 
female relation is apparent. However, Brunner places more emphasis on the 
quality of relation, i.e., being- for -love, and also asserts a more direct 
God -man relation than noted in Barth's analogia relationis. 
3Cf. Dog. II, p. 56: "... it is of the essence of this responsible 
freedom that its purpose may or may not be fulfilled. This open question 
is the consequence of freedom. Thus it is part of the divinely created 
nature of man that it should have both a formal and a material aspect. The 
fact that man must respond, that he is responsible, is fixed; ... ." For 
Brunner's qualification of the term "reflection" cf. supra, pp. 280 -81. 
41bid., p. 23. 
5Cf. Ibid., p. 106: "... the fact of the Divine 'Thou' means that 
the human 'Thou' is also given to man as the possibility of his selfhood. 
Man cannot be man 'by himself'; he can only be man in community." 
6Cf. Ibid.: "The human 'Thou' is not an accident of human existence, 
something which gives to his present human existence a new content and rich- 
ness; but it is that which conditions his human existence." 
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The necessity of inter -human relations is further emphasized in 
respect to an understanding of the human 'I' and its relation to God. 
The importance of realizing the centrality of the God -man relation as 
a parallel to inter -human relations was indicated (p.288). Now in 
reference to the essence of the 'I', Brunner asserts that God relates 
himself not to single and solitary individuals, but to the individual 
in community. Brunner says that the community is 
the concrete limitation [Begrenzunp7 of the 'I'. The Divine 
'Thou' is not confronted by a single human 'I' - for if this were 
so, such a self would not be responsible, a being with genuine ties 
- but by a number of selves who recognize that the bond which 
unites them with God also unites them with one another. As the 
Creator gives to man the humanity of his life in community in love, 
so also He assigns to him his limitations /renze7 in his connexion 
with others. From the outset the human 'I' is limited by a con- 
crete 'Thou', and only so does it become a concretely responsible 
Self.1 
The 'I' is neither self -creative, nor self -sustaining; it is created by 
God for relation. The relation for which it is created is characterized 
in terms of responsibility, and it is that factor that implies the 
limitations necessary for its being. In other words, the "I" as inter- 
preted by Brunner can only be a responsible "I "; there can be no 
structure of responsibility apart from the limitation /renze7 provided 
by the presence of another "I ". 
The limitation, however, is not to be thought of exclusively in 
boundary terms, i.e., as structures which confine or restrict the 
expression of one's individuality. There is that factor present, but 
equally as important is what may be called the necessity of openness. 
'ILI R., p. 107. 
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Brunner speaks of that necessity in the following: 
God has created the self for self -existence in community, as a 
non -self- sufficient self /icht- autarkes Selbst7, which ought 
not to exist for itself, and cannot exist for itself. This is 
why God gives us such individuality which forces us to depend 
upon one another that we may complement each other. The most 
1 
important instance of this is sex -individuality, man and woman. 
The individuality, the uniqueness of the "Self ", is intended to prevent 
the "Self" from existing in and for itself, and to force the "Self" out 
of itself to find its completion in the "other". 
In an assessment of Brunner's system regarding the self in 
community, e e would be difficult to overstate the factor of co- relation. 
Indeed, one discovers that the solitary "Self" does not exist. A 
solitary "Self" could not be responsible, and according to Brunner 
responsible existence is the very essence of man. Each human being has 
his origin, his creation in the imago Dei. And, says Brunner, "... 
upon this origin is based both our human unity as well as our solidarity. 
,,. Essentially we are one, in spite of the fact that as individuals we 
possess and express this essential element in different ways. "2 
It was stated at the outset of this Section (a.2.) that apart 
from the factors of the fall and sin a characterization of man would be 
1M.I,R., p. 323. Brunner's utilization of the male -female theme 
is more historically creature- oriented than Barth's (the popularizer of 
the theme). The non -self- sufficience and interdependence factors in 
Brunner's system signify authentic human and divine implicates which 
transcend Barth's analogia relations. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, Sec. e. 
2Cf. The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon, (London: Lutterworth Press, 
1934), pp. 144 -145. The quotation is from p. 145. We acknowledge the 
fact that a comprehensive treatment of Brunner's doctrine of the imago 
Dei would require a fuller treatment of the concept of the "Self" than 
we have offered. Nevertheless, we have limited ourselves for the sake of 
brevity, hoping that our brief explication of the "Self" is sufficient to 
indicate the main outline of his thought. Chapter XII of Brunner's Man 
in Revolt offers an extensive treatment of the subject. 
somewhat idealized. 
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It may be necessary to revise, or at least qualify, 
that suggestion. 
1 
The mood (in the grammatical sense) of Brunner's verb 
forms have been indicative without exception. In respect of God's call 
/Anruf7, man is an answer /ntwort7. Brunner never implies that man 
ought to be an answer; the heart of his being is responsible existence 
/verantwortliches SeinZ 2 
The inter -human dimensions of Brunner's structure of responsible 
existence are similarly indicative. Man is responsibility -in -love 
/ Verantwortung-in- Lieber. This truth, and its implicates of the "self" 
in community, are factors of creation; the primal truth precedes 
empirical observation. We suggest, in a preliminary sense, that Brunner's 
picture of man, i.e., a primal one, involves anthropological implications 
not appreciably unlike those derived from a theory of an historic Paradise 
and subsequent fall. This is, of course, only a tentative conclusion. 
One question which emerges is the relation between the formal essence of 
man in respect to the material essence. Do they co -exist - equal but 
separate? Brunner articulates the problem and simultaneously intro- 
duces the next section thus: 
The individual becomes what he is in community and through others, 
and what he is also has its effect upon others. This - if I may 
put it so - formal structure of creation of man's being has re- 
mained as well as formal responsibility. Indeed, at bottom both 
are one, since community is simply responsibility in its concrete 
form. But: the quality of community, the love content of this 
community -existence has been destroyed.3 
1We do not wish to imply that this inclination to qualify has only 
emerged at this point in our development. Brunner's interpretation of 
the formal imago Dei and our consideration thereof (supra, pp. 280 -81) 
and also the material presented in Appendix C, infra, are factors which 
are related to the ideal actual structure of man's existence. 
Man's being, thus characterized, is discernible on the basis of 
his knowledge of his primal origin - through faith. Cf, supra, p. 285, n. 3, 
and p. 287, n. 1. 
3Nl,I,R,, p. 138. Ital. mine. 
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b. The Shape of Fallen Man 
Fallen man is man in his historical existence. Our division is 
not meant to imply that Brunner proposes, in any sense, that there did 
exist an original pre -fallen man on the plane of historical reality (cf. 
Appendix C). The elucidation of the shape of fallen man, in contrast 
to his origin, is only for the sake of clarity. A consideration of the 
dimensions of sin and the fall, together with section a., will complete 
our interpretation of Brunner's doctrine of the imago Dei. 
b,1. Preconditions of the Fall. 
Brunner's clear and creative utilization of the "formal" elements 
of the imago Dei, especially that which specifies the indestructibility 
of man's call and responsibility, prepares the way for his interpretation 
of the fall, It has been ascertained that the origin of man and his life 
in harmony with the primal truth are supra- temporal realities. Similarly, 
Brunner asserts, the fall is supra- temporal; that is to say, it is an 
"event" that transcends creaturely historical existence, though it 
impinges upon it. The fall, says Brunner, 
.., is not an event in the story of the growth of humanity; it is 
no more an empirical event than the Creation; it lies behind or 
above the empirical plane. The antithesis between 'created good 
- fallen' has nothing to do with the difference between 'earlier 
(in the empirical time -series) or later.'1 
One would, however, be seriously mistaken were he to conclude that Brunner's 
system disregards or minimizes the importance of history, or more 
specifically, the significance of creaturely historical existence. Neither 
of the supra -temporal states, i.e. the creation and the contradiction 
/Widerspruch7, are properties of historical existence. Nevertheless, 
says Brunner, ".., through the genuinely historical they impinge upon it, 
and manifest themselves within it."2 
1M.I.R., P. 399. 2Ibid., p. 401. 
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One looks to man, created in the imago Dei, to discern both 
states of man's existence. One does not, according to Brunner, look 
exclusively beyond man to perceive the magnificence of his origin; nor 
does an evaluation of man reveal only the depravity of his fallen 
existence,l His magnificence, and also his depravity, coincide in the 
parabolic expression: imago Dei. Brunner most clearly expresses it 
thus: 
Single out any part of human life that you may choose, whatever 
you examine will always be a product of the original perversion, 
of the primal sin; But when you see sin you also see the image 
of God. Only where there is the Imago Dei is there also peccatum; 
sin itself is a testimony to the divine origin of man.2 
The primal sin, in Brunner's terminology, is the sin of self - 
deification /elbstvergottung7, This arises, however, precisely from 
the fact that man's created position is superior in respect to all other 
forms of creation. Man's misunderstanding and misuse of his position is 
the primal sin. 3 Brunner also refers to this as ",,, sinful confusion, 
by which the copy makes itself the original, jhich7 is only possible 
because it is a copy ",4 The inseparable inter- relation of man's power 
and pathos is fundamental in Brunner's system, That man not only is 
able to commit the sin of self -deification, but moreover "that he feels 
1The element of Brunner's interpretation that both man's digni y 
and depravity inhere in the imago Dei differs notably from Barth's 
thorough -going Christocentric interpretation. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, Sec. 
e,3, et. passim. 
p. 187. 
3Cf. M.I.R., p. 173. And cf. p. 181: "There is no stronger prof 
of the actuality and depth of that contradiction, which we called 'prim -1 
sin', than the self -deification of man," 
4lbid,, p. 173. The German reads: "Diese sündige Verwechslung, durch 
die sich das Abbild zum Urbild macht, ist nur darum möglich, weil es Abbild 
ist." 
295 . 
impelled to do so, he derives from God. "1 Brunner's system does not 
require (nor will it allow for) the presence and operation of diabolical 
forces, e.g., Satan in the older systems, "nothingness" in Barth's. The 
implicates of creation in the imago Dei provide a basis for understanding, 
though not for complete explication,2 of the sin of self -deification. 
The fall of man, one might conclude, is the supra -historical self - 
deification of man that generates, on the plane of history, man in conflict 
with himself and with God. "Man must be understood ", says Brunner, "in 
terms of the contradiction between the divine image and sin, in terms of 
the contradiction between origin and fall. Precisely this, this contra- 
diction between truth and falsehood in him, is the hallmark of the real 
man."3 
It would appear that Brunner (like Barth) implies the existence 
of a supra- natural stage whereon creation and fall occur to be re- produced 
on the plane of historical existence.4 Brunner's system, apart from that 
inference, (which we challenge), evolves from a serious study of man in his 
historical existence. There are theological as well as anthropological 
implications; it is to these that we now direct our attention. 
1M.I.R., p. 187. 
2Cf. The Mediator, p. 144: "The more anyone knows what evil is the 
more inexplicable does it become. The doctrine of the Fall is not a theory 
which is intended to explain the existence of evil; on the contrary, it is 
the idea in which the inexplicable character of evil finds its clearest ex- 
pression." We suggest, however, that though evil there finds its clearest 
expression, the interpretation of that expression remains, nevertheless, a 
subject of debate. 
3Word of God, p. 45. 
4Cf. supra, Chapter IV, Secs. a. & b. To be sure, Brunner rejects 
a theory of a two -stage level of existence such as we have characterized 
above. Nevertheless, his utilization of the terms of the myth, e.g., origin, 
primal truth, and fall, seem to imply the actual existence of those realities. 
Cf. infra, Appendix C, where this issue is more thoroughly considered. Cf. 
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b.2. Theological Dimensions 
In relation to man's original relation to God, which was existence 
in responsibility /Verantwortlichkeit7 and love %Liebe (cf. supra, Sec. 
a.2.), Brunner characterizes fallen man's relation in terms of perversion. 
An integral facet of Brunner's system is that relation determines being; 
therefore, man's relation to God, whether proper or perverted, determines 
the nature of his being. Although the fall does not destroy man's being, 
Brunner asserts that 
it has been perverted. Man does not cease to be the being who 
is responsible to God, but his responsibility has been altered from 
a state of being -in -love /ffein -in- der -Liebe7 to a state of being - 
under- the -law /Sein- unter- dem- Gesetz7, a life under the wrath jorn7 
of God .1 
The original being of man, according to Brunner, is that form of 
existence circumscribed by existence in love. Sin does not remove man 
from the sphere of responsibility, i.e., man does not become free and 
independent from God. Rather, ... "the reversal of the relation must be 
... the perversion 5esensverkehrung7 of the being, "2 This so called 
perversion has obvious anthropological implications, e.g., in respect to 
love, to be examined in the next section. But the theological implications 
do not appear to be quite so obvious. That is to say, granting the perver- 
sion of the being of man, does it then follow that a change (we will not 
want to say perversion) also occurs in God, and in His relation to man? 
Does man's self -perversion create a real, that is objectively different 
structure of relation from God's point of view? 
also, M,I,R,, p. 300: "Both the Divine image which has been imprinted upon 
man by the Creator, and its destruction by sin, together constitute - with- 
out ceasing to be 'act' - the primal act which determines all that follows 
and the primal imprint of man's nature." 
1M,I,R,, p. 105. 
2 
Cf. Ibid,, p. 133. 
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Brunner proposes an affirmative answer; he says, 
the most appalling thing about sin is this: that through 
it the original personal relation between the Creator and the 
creature has been distorted. Guilt now lies between man and 
God. God can no longer admit man to His Presence. ., Guilt 
is something objective, not something subjective, just as truly 
as the relation to God is objective and not merely subjective. 
But guilt expressed in positive terms means the wrath of God. 
This is the new attitude of God towards man, that He is angry 
with him on account of his sin,1 
Guilt, the objectified result of sin, is that which constitutes the 
barrier of separation between God and man. It is clearly stated in the 
above that this objective reality does indeed transform God's love into 
His wrath; He is an angry God. And it should not be assumed, according 
to Brunner, that this is only the "appearance" of transformation.2 Even 
though Brunner speaks of God's wrath as His "altered Face" / erstelltem 
Angesicht7 and a "misunderstanding" verständnis7, yet, "... just as 
this misunderstanding is an objective reality, the perversion of human 
nature, so also its correlate, the wrath of God, is an objective reality. 
This is the God of the man who is in sin; he cannot and must not have any 
other. "3 
1The Mediator, pp. 147 -48. And cf. M.I.R,, pp. 133 -35. 
2But cf. Brunner, M.I.R., p. 187, wherein Brunner seems to imply a 
more subjective reality: "The wrath of God under which the idolatrous, 
sinfully perverted man stands is simply the divine love, which has become a 
force opposed to him who has turned against God. The wrath of God is the 
love of God, in the form in which the man who has turned away from God, 
experiences it, as indeed, thanks to the holiness of God, he must and ought 
to experience it." As we understand it, Brunner's statement - that love has 
become a force opposed - suggests an objective change; on the other hand, his 
saying that the wrath of God is God's love erroneously experienced suggests a 
more subjective one. The same ambiguity is also present in the following 
from Ibid., p. 169: Man does "... not cease to be in the Word of God, called 
by God and summoned to responsibility. But through the contradiction of 
his attitude (Ital. mine /tellung7 to the God who calls him is perverted; 
hence also the call itself has been transformed (Ital. mine) from a call of 
generous love into that of a demanding and accusing law." 
p. 163. 
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The existence of man is constituted in terms of relation. And 
it would be entirely fallacious to suppose that God's wrath is a term of 
relation that implies man's independence; he does not escape God. Where- 
as God's original relation to man was constituted in love, now the relation 
is maintained by law. Drawing on the theme of "protective custody" in 
Gal, 3:23, Brunner states that the law has replaced love, and that in the 
fallen state the law "... preserves for man's existence a vestige of 
1 
humanity /Test von Me'schlichkeitl ". 
Whether or not the fall of man creates a consequent transformation 
in God according to Brunner's interpretation may have to remain undetermined. 
Our primary concern is not, after all, to explicate Brunner's doctrine of 
God; rather it is to discover his doctrine of the imago Dei. What has 
been determined, in spite of the problem above, is that fallen man lives 
in relation to the wrath of God. The implications in respect to the 
imago Dei are stated by Brunner thus: man 
... precisely in his legalism ,,, is one who lives in conflict 
with God and with himself. But in this very conflict he is to 
be understood only in the light of his origin and his original 
nature, that is, of the Imago Dei. That he can be a sinner is 
due to his origin; that he must be a sinner is due to his falling 
away from his origin.2 
Brunner's reference to the imago Dei in respect to man's origin 
has been discussed above (section a.1.). Basically, he is referring to 
the fact that man not only gives an answer, but he is an answer.3 That 
factor of his constitution, together with the created potential for self - 
deification (cf. supra, b.1.) are constituents of man's being apart from 
which man's essence is inexplicable. His origin is a factor of the 
1M,I.R., p. 157. 2lbid., pp. 525-26. 
3 Cf. Ibid., p. 65, and supra)p. 28¢, 
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imago Dei; therefore, man in conflict with his origin, i.e., fallen man 
under the law and in the face of God's wrath, necessitates the "presence" 
of that origin. Fallen man is responsible /Verantwortlichkeit7 before 
God. 
The fall occasions more specifically anthropological implications 
than have thus far been considered. They emerge, in a sense, from the 
disorientation created by the fall, We say "in a sense" because there 
is no strictly chronological order implied. That is to say, it is not 
first that man breaks relation with God, and second that there are inter - 
human manifestations thereof. We remember that both man's origin and fall 
are supra- historical. Furthermore, man's existence -in- relation is 
simultaneously his relation with God and with fellow man. 
b.3. Anthropological Dimensions 
(And Christological Implications)1 
b.3.a. Methodology and Presuppositions. 
In this and subsequent sections we will be considering Brunner's 
material which is specifically oriented toward man; however, Brunner's 
anthropology is explicitly Christocentric, and that factor circumscribes 
his anthropology. He expresses his aim and method thus: 
We shall, .., start from the centre, from the revelation of God in 
Jesus Christ, and ask ourselves in what light man is there 
revealed. Only then shall we take the various anthropological 
1Neither the scope of the thesis, nor the restricted treatment 
of Brunner, requires a full consideration of Christology. However, there 
are inevitably many Christological / soteriological themes that impinge 
directly and indirectly upon our subject. The study of a consistent 
soteriological system, for example, would conceivably produce a fairly 
comprehensive understanding of the object of salvation, i.e., man. 
A portion of Brunner's doctrine of Christology will be included, 
primarily in footnotes, It is hoped thereby to achieve a greater under- 
standing of our main pursuit, i.e., man in the imago Dei. 
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utterances of the Old and New Testaments, interpreting them 
in the light of this central knowledge, and adducing them to 
complete and confirm our conclusions.» 
Even though he claims a Christocentric approach, it is of a significantly 
-f r v yyi 
different order than, e.g., Barth's, inasmuch as it evolves from within 
the context of another presupposition.2 In his Man in Revolt, for 
instance, he states "... all that we intended to do in this book was to 
deal with a definite section of Christian doctrine, the subject of which 
is the presupposition for the Message itself. "3 The presupposition there, 
as well as in The Mediator, is the factor of the separation between God 
and man. Brunner says: 
` We can only really understand what the Bible means by the coming 
of God, and this unique event, when we interpret it from the point 
of view of the presupposition of the Bible itself. The presupposition 
of this movement is the gulf between God and man, the abyss which lies 
between the holy God and the sinful creature. The Incarnation of the 
Son of God is determined by Sin. God comes. He must 'come'. He 
will come, because the creature has turned away from Him.4 
According to Brunner, this presupposition is not developed in the 
Old Testament specifically in respect to the imago Dei doctrine.5 The New 
1Kegley, Theol. of Brunner, p. 80. The reference is David Cairn's 
translation of the text of Brunner's Dog. II, p. 53. It is used here 
because it seems clearer than Olive Wyon's translation. 
2We are suggesting that Barth's system does not similarly include 
other presuppositions, nor is our concern to compare and contrast the two 
approaches. We merely intend to indicate that our impression is that 
Brunner more openly acknowledges sources which are not exclusively 
Christological. He neither claims nor implies a "pure" Christology. Beyond 
this difference, however, their respective systems manifest a basic 
similarity; "sin" predetermines their doctrine of the imago Dei. 
3M.I.R., p. 479. 
g 
The Mediator, p. 291. Ital mine. We wonder if perhaps the pre- 
supposition of God's eternal love (cf. John 3:16) may not qualify as a pre- 
supposition as well as the gulf of separation. We will endeavour in the 
last chapter of this thesis to elaborate on that possibility. 
5Cf. M.I.R., p. 500. 
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Testament, however, adds another dimension to the doctrine. What matters 
to the Apostles, asserts Brunner, is the 
'material' realization of this God -given quality; that is, 
that man should really give the answer which the Creator intends, 
the response in which God is honoured, and in which He fully 
imparts Himself, the response of reverent, grateful love, 
given not only in words, but in his whole life. The New 
Testament, in its doctrine of the Imago Dei, tells us that this 
right answer has not been given; that a quite different one has 
been given instead, in which the glory is not given to God, but 
to men and to creatures, in which man does not live in the 
love of God, but seeks himself. Secondly, the New Testament 
is the proclamation of what God has done in order that He may 
turn this false answer into the true one.1 
The God -given quality, i.e., that the nature of man is his creation in 
the imago Dei, implies his responsibility erantwortlichkeit7. Brunner's 
differentiation between the Old and New Testament interpretations of the 
imago Dei has been discussed (pp. 280 -81 ). Inasmuch as the two 
Testaments utilize the doctrine differently, one might infer that, at 
least in respect to the imago Dei, the presuppositions were also different. 
We have not, however, noted that Brunner comments on the validity of the 
New Testament utilization of the doctrine in its relation to a different 
presupposition. It appears that he allows the "material" interpretation 
of the New Testament, with its implicates of separation, loss, and fall, 
to reduce the Old Testament interpretation to mere formality. 
Finally, we take note of the relation between revelation and exper- 
ience in Brunner's system relative to the Christian doctrine of man. He 
maintains that the truths given through revelation ".,, are not accessible 
to experience, ... "2, by which he apparently means they are not derived 
1Dog. II, pp. 57 -8. 
214,I,R., p. 61. If the translation were unambiguous at this point, 
we would challenge the propriety of saying that revelation is not accessible 
to experience - if that implies that it is received entirely other than 
through such human faculties. The German, however, does not specify the 
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from experience. Brunner does not suggest a contradiction between revela- 
tion and experience, but a superiority of the former. Doctrine can, and 
does, incorporate into its conclusions the knowledge gained from 
experience. "At this point," says Brunner, "as at all others, the 
Christian truth includes 'natural' knowledge; this means, all that man 
can know from observation and thought apart from faith. "1 In respect to 
the tension between the two spheres of knowledge, "The only possible 
attitude is a dialectical one, which - if we may say so - takes into 
account, from the very outset, the theological nature of man. "2 
Having offered this brief presentation of Brunner's presuppositions 
in respect to the imago Dei, especially in respect to the material interpre- 
tation, we are prepared to consider more deeply the implications of the 
fall, i.e., man's turning away from God. 
b,3.b. The Contradiction. 
The above heading, similar to Brunner's own term, Conflict 
rWiderspruch7, is a comprehensive title; beneath it are subsumed the 
various implications of the fallen nature of man. We have considered 
the dimensions of responsibility and relation primarily from the perspective 
of their origin (supra, Sec. a.2., pp.2 83 ff). Here, however, we will 
explicate Brunner's interpretation from within the contradiction. 
b.3.b.1.In Terms of the Knowledge of Responsibility and Being 
It is not only that all men are responsible that specifies their 
humanity; according to Brunner, it is also the "... knowledge of responsibil- 
ity /das Wissen um die Verantwortlichkeit7 that makes every human being a 
preposition precisely. The text is: ".., obwohl sie den Menschen von den 
keiner Erfarhrung zugänglichen Wahrheiten der Offenbarung her versteht, damit 
in keiner Weise dem, was man erfahrungsgem54r vom Menschen wissen kann, ..." 
1M.I.R,, p. 61. 2Ibid,, p. 62. 
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real human being - ,,, , "1 There is a difference between one who simply 
is responsible by virtue of his being human, and one who knows of his 
responsibility. Knowledge is a critical element of the Christian faith.2 
In respect to knowledge and understanding, fallen man is characterized 
by Brunner as one who has lost the Word. The consequence of that loss is 
the forfeiture of true humanity with its special connotations of meaning and 
origin, and the nature and content of human existence as responsibility.3 
Read in isolation from the system, the following statement from Brunner may 
misleadingly imply that the Christian faith is primarily a new dimension of 
cognitive awareness; he says, "The Christian faith is so utterly simple; 
it is nothing less than the renewed understanding of the meaning of 
responsibility. "4 However, an awareness of the inextricable inter -relation 
between knowledge and being in Brunner's system will prevent that misunder- 
standing. Because the Word which comes is not only a matter of cognition, 
but is also creative, Brunner asserts that ",., the knowledge of true human 
existence is no mere matter of knowledge, it is at the same time a new 
being."5 It "... is both existence and knowledge. "6 The critical and 
creative truth is no mere matter of anamnesis, as Brunner says, but the 
truth of existence is disclosed only by an 
.., anagenesis which is based upon faith in the Incarnate Word of 
God; thus it is only an act of knowledge which is at the same 
time an act of life . This new knowledge is at the same 
time a new being, the true being of man.7 
The expanding characterization of fallen man suggests the following 
1M,I.R., p. 61. 2Cf. Ibid., p. 51. 
3Cf. M,I,R,, pp. 51 -52, where the converse is expressed in terms 
of the revelation, the disclosure of true humanity in Christ. 
41bid ., p. 52. 51bid,, p. 81. 
6Ibid., p. 52. 71bid,, p. 66. 
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conclusions: first, all humanity is responsible, but fallen humanity 
apart from Christ is ignorant of the origin and meaning of responsibility. 
Fallen existence is therefore less than authentic.) Second, fallen 
existence, in respect to knowledge and being, is sufficiently perverted 
so as to require a re- creation, anagenesis. Third, the contradiction 
within man's understanding of responsibility and being is radical enough 
to preclude the possibility of his re- creation from within himself. It 
comes entirely from beyond himself, creating a new being commensurate with 
his origin.2 
Perversion of the knowledge of responsibility is simultaneously 
the perversion of being in Brunner's system. Therefore, he is able to 
assert that "... man does not only do wrong, he does not only commit 
1Cf. M,I.R., p. 94: "The fact that man is determined by God /ottbes- 
timmtheit7 is the original real nature of man [urspringliche, eigentliche7; 
and what we now know in man as his 'nature' is de- natured nature /enaturierte 
Natur7, it is only a meagre relic %kitmmerlicher Rest7 of his original human 
nature. Through sin man has lost not a 'super- nature' but his God -given 
nature, and has become unnatural, inhuman." 
2Cf, Ibid., pp. 82 -83: The Word "... descends to us from the 
heights of God, and lays hold of us from beyond ourselves, from beyond the 
contradiction to which we have fallen a prey, in order to show us what we 
have lost through the contradiction." It is, however, not only a matter of 
His showing us, an anamnesis, but "... man allows himself to be told his 
real state, he goes back to his Origin, in the 'recapitulation,' in the 
objective ' anamnesis' %bjectiven 'Anamnese'7 of this past, in the Cross of 
Christ." - M.I.R., p. 483. The anamnesis motif, according to Brunner's 
use, is obviously more than a matter of human remembering; and "objective 
anamnesis" is apparently his way of asserting that Christ assumes responsi- 
bility on our behalf to re- create our existence in conformity to the origin. 
It seems apparent that Brunner's use of "objective anamnesis" and 
anagensis (supra, p. 303, n.7 ) clearly implies a movement from the present 
to the past, a regression. It is not a bringing of the past forward into 
the present, nor a new creation in time, but a matter of transporting the 
present backward, and creating over again. This inclination is noted in 
his interpretation of Irenaeus, cf. The Mediator, p. 291, n. 1: Irenaeus' 
"... doctrine of 'recapitulation' is indeed unique in theology in the way 
in which it reveals the connection between Creation, the Fall, revelation, 
and redemption as a divine movement which is regressive." (Ital. mine) 
But, cf. supra, Chapter I, Sec. c.4. The interpretation of recapitulation 
305. 
sinful acts, but he is bad, he is a sinner. "1 Sin is descriptive of the 
essence of fallen man. That is to say, in addition to the assertion that 
it is of man's essence that he has been created by God, so also in respect 
to fallen man is sin an essential element of his nature.2 The essence of 
which Brunner speaks i.e. that man as a sinner, is a dynamic essence, not 
a static substance. The relation between this matter and the doctrine 
of original sin is the context within which Brunner makes the following 
statements: 
Man 'is' a sinner; but this 'is', because it refers to man, 
must not be confused with any other 'is'. Man's 'being' never 
ceases to be a 'being -in- decision' / ein- in- Entscheidun . 
Even as sinner man is not a soul- or reason -entity of some kind. 
... The whole problem of human existence is contained in the 
copula of this predicate, in the 'is', while the philosophers 
and theologians usually seek it in the predicate. To be a 
sinner means: to be engaged in rebellion against God. Sin 
never becomes a quality or even a substance. Sin is and remains 
an act.3 
The dynamic essence of man as being -in- decision is surely a pivotal 
factor in Brunner's system. It relates consistently and conspicuously to 
all the other dimensions of the system we have thus far noted, e.g., the 
imago Dei in relation to divine determination, being -in- relation, and 
being -in -love. These, and others which have been noted, are comprehensible 
only in a dynamic orientation. Not least, of course, does it elucidate 
Brunner's interpretation of man's essence in respect to his falleness, 
specifying, in dynamic terms, the perversion of man's origin. The 
perversion is not indicative of a substantial (substance) alteration, but 
a dynamic process. As Brunner says, 
there was essentially a movement forward, a bringing the past into the present. 
Note especially Wingren's comment, p. 86, n. 4 and cf. infra p.313f, n. 3, 
the quotation from Word of God, pp. 22 -23. 
1The Mediator, p. 142. 2Cf. Ibid., p. 145. 3M.I,R., p. 148. 
306. 
the fatality of the Fall consists , , , in the fact that 
every human being, in his own person, and in union with the 
rest of humanity, every day renews this Fall afresh /iesen Fall 
jeden Tag neu vollzieht , that he is in process of falling 
/Ibfall begriffen ist7 and cannot escape from it, that he cannot 
get back to his origin ursprung7, 
A secondary insight derived from the above pertains to the nature 
of the origin; our previous consideration of the origin (supra, Sec. a.1) 
is substantiated. The origin is a state of being, not in the substantialist 
sense, but in an active, dynamic dimension. The origin is man's being -in- 
decision in harmony with his Creator's intention. Conversely, the Fall is 
man's being -in- decision -in- contradiction. 
b,3,ó,2. In terms of Personal Disintegration 
According to Brunner, the substance /accident categories, operative 
in the church since Augustine and through the Reformation, are not adequate 
to articulate the centrality of personal being %Personsein7 The importance 
which Brunner attaches to this motif is indicated thus: 
God's action in man is not causal, and the being of man is 
not substantial. If, however, that is understood we shall then 
again return to the personal type of doctrine of the Bible - 
which seems so paradoxical to abstract thought - which simply 
places these two thoughts side by side: God alone must do it, 
but man must 'work out his own salvation with fear and trem- 
bling.' Faith comes from God alone, but if faith does not 
come into being man alone is to blame. God gives faith freely, 
from pure mercy, yet faith does not come into being save through 
the obedience of man. Every attempt to go beyond this dualism, 
which yet plainly expresses the priority of God, and to reach 
a unified formula, destroys the personal understanding /ersonhafte 
Verständnis7 of the relation between God and man and changes it 
into something material. The relation between God and man cannot 
be described by the formula of the sole causality of God, or of 
the sole operation of God, because God's creation of man has from 
the outset created the relation of 'over -againstness' /Verhältnis des 
1M.I,R., p. 172. 
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Gegenüberseins7 which - this is God's will - has the result that 
even the divine action in man always respects the fact that man 
is subject.1 
The integrity and responsibility of both God and man are explicated by 
Brunner, and the descriptive term is personal being. It is clear that 
Brunner is struggling with the matter of the God -man relation. He 
maintains that the preservation of the dualism ,/ uplizitat7, i.e., the 
"over -againstness" of God and man, is indispensable; to negate the 
duality is both to destroy the concept of personal being and to create 
a material structure of relation.2 Personal disintegration, therefore, 
1M.I,R., p. 541. This category of personal being is carried into 
soteriology thus: "The Incarnation takes place - not only but also - in 
order to restore the picture which has been destroyed; the Divine 
Incarnation - not only, but also, and necessarily - is the renewal of that 
which took place in the creation of man in the image of God. Human 
personal being alone is a suitable means of revealing the personal Being 
of God. The revelation of the Divine person in the God -Man is at the 
same time the revelation of the originally true, personal being of man." 
- M.I.R., P. 416. And cf. Word of God, p. 53: "Only in a human person 
can God perfectly reveal himself, for only man is created in the image 
of God, Only with a human person can we really have fellowship - . . 
We cannot really have fellowship with the God who does not reveal himself 
to us in a human person, because he does not really encounter us. He 
remains at a distance, in a transcendence, which excludes real fellowship." 
Quite obviously Brunner's latter statement has serious implications 
regarding the form of relation which God had with, e.g., Israel before the 
Incarnation. Brunner makes it clear, in the same reference, that he is 
speaking quantitatively; cf. his use of "really" above. He also makes 
it clear that the Incarnation manifests the severity of sin to a degree 
unknown to Israel, for which a satisfaction model of the atonement is 
required. 
We wonder (again) if perhaps more of the structure.of relation 
operative in Israel, and less of the "obstacle" structure of the Epistles, 
may not have produced a more biblical Christology. Further, is it 
possible to develop a more positive anthropology in terms of a biblical 
interpretation of the imago Dei, rather than the almost complete pessimism 
of the Western Church? We will return to these questions in the final 
chapter. 
2Brunner's articulation of the essential duality of personal being, 
and our preliminary attempt to specify a factor of immanence in the imago. 
Dei motif (cf. supra, Introduction, pp. 25 ff, and passim), i.e., in our 
word, "co- inherence ", appear to be mutually contradictory. Whether they 
are, in fact, will have to be considered at a later point. Certainly, 
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is not tantamount to total destruction; one cannot imply complete 
disintegration (if that signifies the destruction of the duality) and 
continue to speak of relation.1 Less than complete destruction, however, 
ought not to suggest only peripheral or minimal implications. Brunner 
states: 
Just as personality is constituted at the centre, so also 
the disintegration of the unity of personality /Desintegration 
der Persoreinh.eit7 starts from the centre. Through the Pall 
man loses the content of his personal being, existence in the 
love of God. 2 
Although the formal structure of responsibility remains, the 
content jnhalt7, i.e., existence in love, is lost. 
3 
This, as we have 
noted already, implies a radical reorientation in the God man relation - 
an existence in the wrath of God. Inasmuch as for Brunner responsibility 
/Verantwortlichkeit7 defines the very essence of human existence (cf. 
supra,, Sec, a,2,), similarly does love qualify that essence, as Brunner 
states: 
The meaning of all responsibility is love; for love is the ful- 
filling of all law. Hence man can be understood as issuing 
from love and made for love. Love is both the source and 
meaning of his life. , fallen man7 is aware of this to some 
extent, even if only dimly; but what he cannot know for himself 
however, we will not attempt to abrogate the duality entirely, nor ignore 
the positive contribution of Brunner's theme of personal being. But, we 
believe it is possible to articulate the co- inherence of the God -man 
relation without changing it into "something material ", as Brunner predicts 
must happen. 
1Brunner's differentiation between the Old Testament (formal) and 
New Testament (material) interpretations of the imago Dei is apt at this 
point. Cf, supra, pp. 280ff, 
2.011.I R., p. 229. And cf. supra,pp. 285ff., for our discussion of 
the love motif in terms of responsible relation. 
3Cf. Ibid,, p. 138, quoted supra, p.292. 
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is why this is so, and what the real content and meaning of love 
is.1 
Fallen man may indeed be ignorant of his life's center; he does not 
perceive the meaning of responsibility, or understand the lingering 
awareness of his existence in love. For, according to Brunner, "Genuine 
humanity has been taken away from our life. ... Responsibility and love, 
which were formally a unity, have been turned into a contradiction." 2 
Nevertheless, on the basis of the immutability of his formal structure, 
he remains man. The disintegration of personality pertains to the 
distinctive content thereof, i.e., existence in love.3 
1M.I.R., pp. 73 -74. The soteriological implication is stated as 
the reference continues, p. 74: "This is indeed the content of the revelation 
of God in Jesus Christ. Only in this revelation is the meaning of the word 
'love' rightly 'defined' for us by the Divine action; and in it alone is 
this love revealed to us as the ground and the end of our life. In it we 
perceive why, to whom, and for what purpose we are responsible." 
2lbid., p. 52. 
3Cf. Ibid., p. 229. The distinctive content is the same as the 
material, New Testament image. Disintegration at that level implies 
characteristics of a "past" which requires an act of reconciliation by 
Christ. This is how Brunner articulates that reconciliation: "God's 
primal word of love /7rwort der Liebe7 comes to me as a new event, by 
means of which God wipes out my past /Vergangenheit7 as though it had 
never happened, through His act of reconciliation. It is not I who go all 
the way back to God; He takes the whole consequence of my falling away 
upon Himself. God comes, so to speak, towards me, through all my apostasy, 
laden with the whole burden of my falling away, suffering from the whole 
curse which my fall has caused as an objective fact. My faith, therefore, 
can only go back the whole way because God's Word comes to me in this way: 
in Jesus Christ the Crucified, in God's act of atonement which blots out 
my past, my guilt. Hence faith is now no longer the simple childlike 
acceptance of the 'man made in the divine Image,' but it is first of all 
a painful process, in which I have to say 'No' before I can say 'Yes' 
that is, I must acknowledge my guilt and my sin, and I must admit the 
necessity for the Divine Atonement. We can only perceive in this Divine 
light what we really are; it is only in the Word of the Cross, which 
actually brings out our contradiction to our Origin - just as the Origin 
is actually present within it - that we see ourselves in our true light." 
- M.I.R., pp. 481 -82. An indication of Brunner's exclusive claims for 
Christianity, in respect to the ability of fallen man to see the dimensions 
of his contradiction is seen here: "He shows this however only to him who 
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The final facet of personal disintegration to be discussed is 
Brunner's concept of the self. Broadly speaking, of course, the concept 
of the self points us to the I -Self under which, as we have seen,1 
Brunner's entire characterization of man in the imago Dei could have 
been included. It is the self primarily in respect to dependence that 
we study here - especially in reference to its perversion. 
The "I" of man only properly finds its true "self" in the "Thou" 
of both God and fellowman. Thus, there is a created primal unity which 
manifests itself as a self- consciousness with an awareness of its being 
in the world, and simultaneously more than the world. The real problem 
of man is the disintegration of these two foci of the unity; that which 
was "... - given by the Creation - has been lost, and that instead of 
complementing and aiding one another, they are in conflict with one 
another. "2 Fallen man does not perceive that the fulness of his being 
is the living expression of both foci, i.e., both his being in the world, 
yet more than the world. The disintegrity of his falleness is his self 
deification, his self -centerdness, by which he loses the perspective of 
the divine dimension, i.e., his "self" in God. Man continues, however, 
to remain man in terms of this dipolar dimension; he remains homo 
religiosus. As Brunner says, "The dimension of eternity remains never 
unoccupied, even if only by the sense of insecurity and the anxiety which 
is 'in Him', to him who in faith accepts this Word of God and in so doing 
allows himself to be lifted to this higher plane, and thus attains that 
elevation above himself from which he can henceforth perceive himself 
both in his origin and in his contradiction." - M.I.R., p. 83. 
1Cf. supra, Sec. a.2., especially pp. 287ff. 
2M.I.R., p. 168. 
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accompanies it. "1 
That man has his "self" in God means, as Brunner asserts, that 
"Only in communion with God can man realize /ealizieren his independence 
/elbständigkeit7, his self, for indeed he has his self in God. Thus the 
realization filealizierung7 of the self is identical with complete dependence 
/Völligen Abhängigkeit upon God. "2 Genuine independence, according to 
Brunner's interpretation, is simultaneously his dependence. 
The "realization" of the self in God is, in Brunner's terminology, 
a relational term; it specifies a concrete actualization, more than a 
cogitive perception. Created by God in the imago Dei means, among other 
1M.I.R., p. 26. The partial, fragmentary awareness of eternity 
cannot, however, reconstruct the unity of the origin, nor is it sufficient 
to reveal the depth of the contradiction itself. Brunner says (M.I.R., 
P. 478) that the contradiction can only be understood "... from the stand- 
point of faith; that is, that in order to look into these depths we must 
take up that position above man which would be impossible to us in our own 
strength, namely, in the Word of God. This position is given to us by the 
Incarnation of the Son of God and by the Spirit of God; to take up this 
position means to believe. From the point of view of faith we can see 
him as he really is, namely, as one who stands between the creation in the 
image of God, the original union with God, and sin, the false independence 
of man." On the next page (479) Brunner asserts that the "... truth of 
the actual man /Tie Erkenntnis des wirklichen Mensche , ..., is not one 
which offers a picture which speaks for itself, but it is to the highest 
extent subjective, that is, it is one which can only be gained in the 
existential decision of faith Existenzentscheidung des Glaubens7." 
The residual dimension of eternity in the form of insecurity and 
anxiety is an especially familiar theme. Augustine's and Aquinas' beata 
vita, restoration of original righteousness (Luther), integrity (Calvin), 
and primal union (Barth) - these are variations of a similar theme, viz., 
creaturely dissatisfaction. In each of the above, however, such dis- 
satisfaction represents an inappropriate, illegitimate, human constituent. 
Irenaeus developed an alternative interpretation; creaturely dissatis- 
faction is proper for creatures - a constitutive mark of man's intended 
growth. The idea of self- deification (the epitome of dissatisfaction's 
expression) was not one that Irenaeus would have entertained. 
2Ibid., p. 290. 
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things, to belong to God, i.e., that one's "self" is in God. In the 
perfect actualization 5ealizieren7 of that created reality the idea of 
self -will is entirely inappropriate; the two are contradictory.1 Yet 
man lives precisely in that contradiction; his "self" is not actualized 
in God. Brunner states it thus: 
Man as sinner is in permanent revolt ldauernden Auflehnung7, in 
a rebellion %ufruhr7 (which he cannot now renounce by his on 
efforts) against his divine determination /Schöpfungsbestimmung7 
and thus against the nature given him by God. The divine 
Creation still exists in man, not in the shape of 'relics,' 
but as the primal element in human nature, inevitably but 
continually being denied afresh. %aber unvermeidlich verneinte 
Erst7.2 
There does remain, however, a genuine human independence which 
has to do with freedom. For, as we noted above, man is responsible 
existence ,erantwortliches Sein7 i.e., a being -in- decision (Sec. a.2.). 
To lose one's self created in the imago Dei is simultaneously to lose 
one's true independence ¡ abre Selbstdndigkeit7.3 Brunner makes it 
clear, however, that he is not implying that the loss of true independence 
is tantamount to the loss of humanity. 
1But, cf. M.I.R., p. 267. There, in respect to the self -will and 
fallen man, and its being overcome, Brunner says: "The highest discipline 
is that of belonging to God. Here all self -will /ller Eigenwille7 is 
taken away from man, and in this alone does he -become truly spiritual 
uhrhaft geistig7, genuine personality uhrhafte Persönlichkeit7. This 
is the kind of freedom which God gives to man; in this alone does He 
make him really human /igentlichen Menschen7." We challenge Brunner's 
assertion as being an indefensible overstatement. To whom (apart from 
Christ) may it be applicable, except as an approximation? Even in 
respect to Christ, it does not appear self- evident that "self -will is 
taken away ", but rather that there is a coincidence, a concurrence of 
wills, However, we recognize that for Brunner self -will is self - 
deification; he does not use the term as a potentially positive con- 
stituent of man. 
2Ibid., p. 169. 
3Cf., Ibid., p. 288. 
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the un- freedom, into which man falls through sin, is un- 
freedom in freedom /nfreiheit in der Freiheit7. ,,, Even the 
sinner is a human being, not an animal, not a thing; the form 
of his divinely- created existence /ottgeschaffenen Existenz7, 
existence -in- decision /Sein- in- Entscheidung7, has not been des- 
troyed. It is not sufficient to speak of mere desire as the 
Reformers do, we must speak absolutely of free will) 
Brunner's intention in the above is to refute what he calls the 
"Beelzeboul of determinism ". Only when that has been accomplished is it 
appropriate to introduce a negative qualification. Indeed, man is and 
remains man, including his being -in- decision. Freedom to decide, there- 
fore, is appropriately ascribed to him. Nevertheless, the following 
qualification is required: 
We no longer say: every kind of freedom is left to man save one 
but we now say: man has lost his real freedom Tigentliche 
Freiheit7. The very fact that he is still a human being qualifies 
this negation, it is freedom to sin, it is freedom for eternal 
death.2 
The qualification of the assertion that "we must speak absolutely 
of free will" in no way destroys that freedom. Rather it defines that 
freedom as a total perversion for which man remains responsible. In this 
way Brunner is able to maintain the formal structures of the imago Dei 
and at the same time to articulate its material perversion - a perversion 
which man is entirely unable to rectify.3 
1M,I,R., pp. 267 -68. Ibid., p. 271. 
3Cf, The Mediator, pp. 130 -131: "... the recognition of evil as 
guilt and sin means such a contradiction within existence that nothing 
within the sphere of history is capable of dealing with it. If evil is 
actual separation from God - and that is what we mean when we speak of 
sin and guilt - then that continuity with the divine has been broken, and 
there is no continuous way which leads back from man to God, there is no 
continuous process, not even that of mystical graces, to lead man back to 
his origin." And cf. Ibid,, p. 291, where Brunner insists that the 
Incarnation "... does not mean the perfecting of the Creation - this indeed 
would be movement within continuity - but the restoration of a fallen 
Creation." 
We have not discussed the continuity /discontinuity structure inas- 
much as it pertains especially to the field of soteriology, and thus exceeds 
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The assertion that to lose one's "self" and genuine independence 
may suggest images of an actual and historical, (or even an actual, non- 
historical) analogue.1 But the recognition of Brunner's concept of 
creation's goal, closely related to creation's supra- historical 
redemption, discredits that assumption.2 Brunner states the matter 
the limits of our thesis. Nevertheless, because there are peripheral 
implications in respect to fallen man, we will include a brief discussion. 
Brunner, in the above reference, articulates creation's incapacity for 
self -renewal in two ways. First, the contradiction between man's creation 
and its perversion precludes the possibility that there might arise a 
force from within the perversion itself to alter the structure. Second, 
he points to the necessity of going back, i.e., that man who has separated 
himself from his origin must return (cf. Sec. a.1.) to the source and 
foundation of his origin. But, the break within history cannot be healed 
from within history; a supra- historical event is required. Brunner says: 
"The good Creation lies beyond this visible world. The whole of history 
has been infected with the poison of sin. In the world of historical 
process there are no pure and sinless origins. It is not the empirical 
origin within time which is good, but Creation. The beginning within 
time, however, is for each individual an historical fact, and it is 
also connected with the whole of sinful history. This is the meaning 
of the doctrine of Original Sin." - The Mediator, p. 146. 
Another dimension of the same perversion is stated thus: "The 
past lies like a block of stone in the way between God and me. I could 
not go back, even if I wanted to, unless this block were removed out 
of the way. My past is so closely connected with me that there is no 
new present and no new future for me unless this past is annulled." - 
M.I.R., P. 481. But, says. Brunner, "The Word is now here in another 
form, not in the form of the Word of creation but in that of the Word 
of historical reconciliation and redemption; that is, of the Word that 
brings back the lost beginning and restores the broken connection. It 
is now there in a form which at one and the same time restores the original 
beginning and indicates what has happened in the interval." - Word of God, 
pp. 22 -23. 
1Cf. infra, Appendix C, and also supra, n. 3. 
2Part of the problem arises from misleading terminology. On the 
one hand, Brunner characterizes one of man's problems as his inability to 
"go back ". - cf. p.313, note 3, par. 3. On the other hand, and in our 
impression more consistent with Brunner's intention, is the statement that 
Christ "brings back the lost beginning ". -cf. Ibid. The difference between 
carrying fallen creation back to the beginning repristination) and that 
of bringing creation forward (completion) is, in our estimation, critical. 
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clearly in this way: 
The loss of man's true being through sin does not cancel the 
divine plan for the creation of a humanity founded on and unified 
in Christ. Each human being has been created for this humanitas; 
this ground of creation /chöpfungsgrund7, which is at the same 
time the goal of creation /''chöpfungsziel7, defines every human 
being the humanus, even in the midst of the contradiction of sin, 
and mankind as a whole, in spite of all its conflict's, as the 
one humanitas.1 
Here the ground /- Grund7 is at the same time the goal /- Ziel7; 
they coincide in Christ. He is the pre -creational and historically 
actualized completion of God's eternal intention. The divine plan is that 
which is before and ahead of man, rather than that from which man has 
departed.2 That, at least, is implied in the above, and also in the 
following: 
In Jesus Christ we see not only the picture of the true (ideal) 
/ahren7 man, but also the origin %Ursprun.7 and the goal %Ziel7 
of the humanity created by God, and destined by Him for communion 
with Him and with one another. The revelation of true divinity 
is both the revelation and the basis of true humanity, of man's 
true being and of true mankind.3 
Our subsequent attempt toward a restructured interpretation 
between origin and end, in reference to man, derives a measure of support 
from the above. That is, if Jesus is the first (and only) historical 
h 
actualization of the goal, then the fallenéss of man becomes descriptive 
of created existence, and not indicative of an actual origin from which 
he has fallen. But Brunner is less univocal than this present character- 
ization portrays. The ambiguity is discernible in the following: 
1M,I.R., pp. 329 -30. 
2Cf. Ibid., p. 360: "Even the divinely good origin, the divine 
Creation, is not the divine and blessed End. All that is gradually being 
prepared here, within the sphere of history, for the final End, shall there 
be perfected." And, cf. supra, p. 284. 
31bid., p. 329. 
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in the present sinful and godless condition of man, 
man must never be understood merely in the light of his 
being, but also in the light of what he ought to be. This 
sense of obligation is a fragmentary trace /ragmentspur7 
of the original aim of life for man.1 
Of course, a "trace" of an "aim" does not necessarily refer to a 
residual fragment of an actuality; we may, in fact, be pressing our own 
concern beyond the limits of Brunner's intention, and thereby reading 
conclusion into his system. On the other hand, Brunner does say 
The goal which has been shown to us in Jesus Christ is indeed 
also and in the first place the restoration of that which was 
at the beginning, but it is more than that; it is the eternal 
consummation which goes far beyond the Creation.2 
It is apparent that Brunner neither attempts nor desires to over- 
come the tension between the two themes. On the one hand his perpetuation 
of the dialectic may derive from his interpretation (and, the traditional 
one) of the redemptive work of Christ.3 On the other hand his conclusion 
in respect to the incapacity (and non -involvement, might we say?) of 
fallen creation further sustains the dialectic.4 
Brunner's interpretation of a Christocentric origin and end, 
in association with the subject of this section, i.e., personal disintegration 
quite effectively characterizes a structure in which creaturely historical 
1M,I,R,, p. 80. 
2Ibid., p. 79. Ital. mine. There is a notable similarity between 
Brunner's doctrine in respect to origin and goal (Christ), and Barth's 
statement: "Man's essential and original nature is to be found, ,,,, not 
in Adam but in Christ. " - "Christ and Adam ", p. 6. Cf. supra, Chapter IV, 
p. 237. In Brunner, however, the "origin and goal" are more perceptibly 
historicized, 
3As stated in the Introduction, and implied throughout, we question 
the propriety of a theology that evolves from a doctrine of falleness to which 
redemption must conform. We realize, at the same time, the importance of the 
New Testament doctrine of Christ's redemptive work - and its apparent retro- 
spective orientation (i.e., Romans 5; but cf. our discussion of Barth's 
interpretation, Chapt. IV, Sec. c.). 
4Cf. infra, Appendix C, Secs. 2.1 & 2; 3.1. 
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existence is of negligible value. This is perhaps the reasonable con- 
clusion of a too radical disjunction between Old and New Testament 
(formal -material) interpretations of the imago Dei.1 We noted (p. 306) 
the centrality of personal being, but discovered that only Christ manifests 
that quality, for in man it has been destroyed (cf. pp. 307ff). Existence- 
in-love, in its perversion, becomes existence in God's wrath. The true 
"self" of man is in God; but man has also perverted that relation. It 
remains, however, even though only in a "sense of insecurity and anxiety" 
(supra, p. 310). With the perversion of the self occurs a total perversion 
of freedom - freedom remains only in terms of man's capacity to sin. The 
material and discussion of this section, seen in the light of the relation 
between origin and end (cf, supra, p. 315), illustrates what, in our 
opinion, is essentially an Augustinian (Western) system. We say 
"essentially" inasmuch as there are obvious differences. But, insofar 
as the articulation of the "problem" of anthropology is defined basically 
in terms of "lostness ", it conforms in all significant respects with 
traditional formulations. 
c, Summary and Appraisal 
The imago Dei, in Brunner's system, in a term of relation between 
God and man. However, the relation is one which exemplifies the essential 
difference between Creator and creature. That is to say, God establishes 
the structures by which He can and will be related to that which He has 
created. Brunner draws upon the difference between the Old and New 
Testament interpretations of the imago Dei to clarify further the created 
structures of relation. According to him the Old Testament utilization 
of the term articulates a fundamental and indestructible responsible 
1Cf. supra, p. 300. 
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subjectivity. The New Testament, on the other hand, complements that 
interpretation but includes the factor of "lostness ". This, in turn, is 
the Christological presupposition. 
It is at this point that the function of the Incarnation becomes 
a central question. Whereas we are inclined to speak of that function 
not only, but also, in terms of an historical completion of a previously 
unaccomplished intention, Brunner adopts the more traditional redemptive 
model. On the one hand, Brunner emphatically denies the actualized 
existence of a pre -fallen, perfect human being; on the other hand, he 
retains the mythological value of the creation /fall accounts, giving them 
a degree of importance that jeopardises his entire system. 
The next major area of consideration was Brunner's concept of 
man in terms of responsible relation (Sec. a.2.). God is the one who 
calls; man is the one who answers. The implications of that seemingly 
simple characterization are both broad and profound. The call/answer 
motif first specifies the dependence of man, as a constituent of his 
being; secondly, it points to the dimension of inter -human relations. 
As a dependent being, man enjoys only limited (boundaried) freedom; it 
is circumscribed first by God who determines his limits, and secondly 
by the human "other ". Dependence is not determinism; rather, it is 
that which requires decision, again both in respect to God and fellow -man. 
Properly actualized, this is what Brunner calls responsibility -in -love. 
The entirety of Section b. is an interpretation of Brunner's 
picture of fallen existence. Again the question arose regarding 
the historicity /non -historicity implicates of his system. Brunner 
asserts that neither creation nor fall is an event within the time 
sequence. However, each impinges upon it (cf. supra, p. 293). The 
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question occurred again (and no answer was proposed) in what sense the 
supra- temporal realities exist. 
Brunner is the first theologian (in our knowledge) who so directly 
associates sin with the imago Dei (cf. pp. 294 -95). The primal sin, self - 
deification, emerges as an implicate of the image. Self- deification of 
the copy is possible only because it is a copy (cf. supra., pp. 295f). 
This is another point which we wish Brunner had developed in a somewhat 
different manner. For instance, he may have utilized that truth to 
articulate a dilemma intrinsic to creaturely existence (which he does) 
moving with God toward an "end" or "goal" which is always ahead of him 
(which Brunner does not do, at least consistently). Brunner associates 
man's existence in conflict, not with an existence always yet to come, 
but rather with an existence which God planned and from which he has 
departed. 
The first implicate of man's perverted existence studied was 
the theological one. Brunner maintains that the perversion of man's 
a, 
existence has two principle effects. First, there results an objective 
barrier between man and God; second, man's primal existence in the love 
of God has similarly been transformed into existence in God's wrath. 
This apparent objectification of terms (cf. supra, pp. 297 -98) may be 
consonant with, e.g., Romans 1 -3, but it ignores the general Biblical 
theme of God's long,suffering love, e.g., Rom. 11; Jn. 17. Brunner's 
own theme of "personal relation" severely qualifies such "objective" 
terminology. 
In respect to the specifically anthropological dimensions of 
fallen existence, Brunner's major presupposition is the gulf which 
separates God and man. Man, he says, (p. 3o1), has not given the proper 
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answer to God's call. Indeed, though man is created as responsible, and 
even though that constituent of his being remains, Brunner asserts that 
man does not (and cannot) know either that reality or its meaning. Having 
lost the Word, man has lost true humanity. His perverted existence is 
further characterized as one which can not re- orient itself from within, 
but must be re- created. The essence of fallen man is his existence as 
sinner; that means, according to Brunner, that man actively engages in 
rebellion against his origin. The dynamic interpretation of man's 
essence, both in respect to sin and to his origin, is a significant 
contribution. However, his attempt to isolate and differentiate the 
positive and negative factors of man's being, is unfortunate. Had he 
portrayed both factors as inherent constituents of creaturely existence, 
without speculating on a pre -fallen and post -fallen state of being, his 
dynamic interpretation would have been far more consistent and constructive. 
Our final consideration was the disintegration of personal being 
in terms of love and the self. God, asserts Brunner, always addresses 
man as a subject, respecting his personhood. However, we called into 
question the propriety of his interpretation of the dimensions of the 
fall, inasmuch as they seem to require an Incarnational model which 
replaces man. Nevertheless, his concepts of the Old and New Testament 
interpretation of the imago Dei make somewhat possible the retention of 
personal categories - this, in spite of a radical perversion (supra, 
pp. 30$-09). We are not convinced that one can properly speak of a 
more -or -less permanent formal structure while simultaneously asserting the 
perversion of its content (i.e., the material structure). But Brunner 
maintains that the real content of personal being, existence in the love 
of God, has in fact been lost. Fallen man lives under God's wrath 
(supra, p. 307 and cf. pp. 287ff). 
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Perversion of being also radically affects man's existence in 
terms of the "I- Self" . The loss of the self, which results from the self - 
deification of the "I" turns man in upon himself; he loses the perspective 
of his completion in God, and also human "others ". As a consequence, his 
understanding of dependence and independence is perverted. This is 
another factor of Brunner's system that we find creative, apart from its 
relation to the primal/fallen dichotomy, and its implicate of freedom 
only to sin, freedom for eternal death (supra, p.313). 
Perversion of man's being in reference to Christ as creation's 
Ground and Goal does not require the presupposition of an actualized state 
of being from which man has fallen. That is, man's perversion may indicate 
the intrinsic contradiction of createdness - a contradiction within which 
God is constantly operative in Christ, as the Ground and Goal of an 
eventual consummation. That theme, however, is incompatible with the 
traditional articulation of the-God /man relation, i.e., circumscribed by 
sin. Brunner's utilization of those creative possibilities is restricted 
by his adherence to Western tradition; the same is true of Barth. 
Brunner's doctrine of the imago Dei expresses several creative 
possibilities. Those we recognize as most significant in themselves and 
also in respect to the development of a reconstructed interpretation of 
the imago Dei theme are the following: 
One: his system has primarily to do with actual existence, i.e., 
it is relatively free from theoretical speculation. 
Two: a Christology which articulates a factor of completion, i.e., 
not only re- recreation. 
Three: a reasonable articulation of the essential difference between 
God and man. 
Four: the structure of being determined, both in relation to God 
and fellow -man, and its implicates of personal being. 
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Five: man's essential responsibility /Verantwortlichkeit7. 
Six: man as a being -in- decision, and a being -for -love, both 
in relation to God and fellow -man. 
Seven: the location of human contradiction precisely within the 
imago Dei (with qualification). 
Eight: the centrality of knowing the source and goal of human 
existence. 
Nine: the compatibility of experience and revelation. 
There are, on the other hand, several facets of Brunner's system 
with which we disagree. Those which relate most clearly to the heart of 
the imago Dei doctrine, are these: 
One: implications - implicit and explicit - of a state of being 
from which man has fallen. 
Two: the objectification of both God's wrath and the barrier 
created by the fall. 
Three: an unreconstructed differentiation between the Old and New 
Testament interpretations of the imago Dei. 
Four: the element of discontinuity, first, in respect to Christ's 
relation to man; second, in respect to man's participation with God - 
i,e,, its impossibility; third, between the Old and New Testaments. 
Five: sin primarily as self -deification. 
Six: sin as the primary presupposition descriptive of God's 
relation to man. 
Seven: the rigid soteriological procedure, i.e., that first one 
is convicted of sin, then one perceives the God of love. 
Eight: the primarily retrospective orientation of salvation. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE IMAGO DEI: 
A RECONSTRUCTED INTERPRETATION 
A "reconstructed" interpretation of the imago Dei may suggest a 
fairly comprehensive rejection of other interpretations of the theme. The 
writer's intention is not totally to reject all other interpretations, 
nor does he deny the validity of all facets of any. The intention of 
this final chapter is to select, from a broad range of themes related to 
the imago Dei, what appear to be the most critical facets of the doctrine. 
Summarily stated, it will have been seen that the following three pairs 
of terms characterize the writer's perspective: (l).relation /substance; 
(2) personal /impersonal; (3) future /past, although these terms, per se, 
have not been employed explicitly. The first term of each pair (i.e., 
relation, personal, and future) illustrates the general interpretative 
tendency of this chapter. 
That the biblical phrase, imago Dei, signifies not merely a 
quality or characteristic of either God or man, but especially the 
structure of relation between them is the writer's presupposition.) It 
has become clear that this is not the hermeneutic presupposition of tradition- 
al theology (excepting Irenaeus); generally, the image theme has implied 
man's capacity, endowment, potential, or destination. The Irenaean system 
is distinctive in its utilization of the theme as illustrative of 
the dynamic 
relation between God and man. The superimposition of the Irenaean type or 
1The presupposition has been stated and amplified in 
the Introduction, 
pp. 24 -26. 
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"model" on the other systems studied (i.e., Chapters II -V) has had two 
effects; one, it has provided the method of evaluation in terms of questions 
posed. Secondly, it has made necessary the consideration of otherwise 
secondary issues, i.e., existence /non- existence, nature /grace - the various 
dualisms so characteristic of Western Christianity. 
The term co- inherence (cf. supra, pp. 26f, 104) expresses what we 
believe to be the personal, relational and forward or future perspectives 
as process and goal. 
/ implied in the biblical phrase, imago Dei, The task of this chapter will 
be to explore the possibilities inherent in the phrase, and to recognize 
the God -man structure of relation which it implies. 
The following questions are most relevantly associated with the 
study of the imago Dei as a symbol of the relation between God and man:1 
(1) what is the function of the creation narrative(s) in respect to the 
God -man relation implied in the phrase, imago Dei? (2) what is the 
intention of the "fall" account as related to the first question? attendant - 
ly, does the "fall" signify a change in the structure? (3) what is Christ's 
relation to the dimensions of questions (1) and (2)? i.e., does He more 
directly correspond to the structures of creation or fall (if they are 
separable)? (4) finally, and in association with questions (1) - (3), 
what may be asserted regarding the significance of man in respect to the 
imago Dei symbol? These questions circumscribe the scope of the present 
chapter, and closely related material from preceding chapters will be 
utilized, both positively and negatively. For the purpose of the thesis, 
however, it will suffice to utilize the foregoing illustratively; a specific 
assessment of each respective theological system and its comparison with 
others exceeds our objective. 
1God's relation to other forms of creation will not be discussed; 
the imago Dei theme requires only the consideration of His relation to 
humanity. Subsequent use of the phrase, creaturely historical existence, 
refers only to man, and then especially to his temporal life. 
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The four questions posed above, the interpretation which they will 
subsequently receive, and the answers proposed, will make sufficiently 
clear the presupposition(s) of the writer. To say that he has some, and 
that they effect his work, is superfluous. To thoroughly articulate them 
is entirely beyond both his ability and the dimensions of the thesis.l The 
second function of the questions is to provide a method by which to proceed. 
Questions (1) - (3) will serve as our major outline, while question (4) 
(the significance of man) underlies each of them. 
a. Creation 
a.l. Continuity vs. Discontinuity 
Barth emphatically asserts, and rightly so, that creation, per se, 
is not revelatory. That is, one must first come to some degree of under- 
standing of the God who creates before creation (as act and existence) 
assumes its proper religious significance. On the basis of one's relation 
to the Creator (i.e. faith) one is enabled to apprehend the significance of 
both the act - creation, and of the result of that act - existence. 
Realizing that the creation narratives are not at all the first expression 
of Hebrew literature, that they are relatively late, highlights the signifi- 
cance of the faith expressed. The narratives accomplished their intention, 
i.e., to further enunciate the magnificence of the Hebrew's God who was 
already acknowledged as Lord of the nation. Their history was itself the 
history of God's activity and presence among them. 
1Presuppositions are a composite of both conscious and unconscious 
factors which emerge out of one's entire history and being, and are shaped 
by his present no less than his aspirations in respect to the future. In 
this sense one's presuppositions are akin to his world -view, his 
Weltanschauung. Our own compressed version is that it is right for man to 
hope; i.e., it is faithful, reasonable, and constructive. Hope in this 
context includes implicates of the past, present, and future. Cf. Barth, 
Doi. Outline, pp. 50 -52 for his discussion of Christian presuppositions. 
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Their history was that of the covenant relation with God. It was 
God who had formed the nation; it was He who had promised and given the 
land. He had led them from their bondage in Egypt. It was out of their 
faith and their experience that the creation narrative emerged.1 The 
significance of this understanding is the realization that the narrative 
has always been doxological.2 We emphasize that point in order to express 
two related conclusions: one, inasmuch as for the Hebrew the narrative is 
doxological, subsequent utilization of the texts for the purpose of articulat- 
ing the structure of primal relation is questionable.3 The second conclusion 
ccczcern.S 
is more difficult to express; it roams the proper function of Christology 
in respect to creation. The factor of discontinuity predominates in Western 
systems. That is to say, the figure of Christ tends (in our estimation) to 
overwhelm the significance of God's saving work and relation prior to the 
Incarnation. Augustine, for instance, replaces the doxological motif with 
the beata vita theme which is exclusively related to the redemptive work 
of Christ. The nature /grace dualism in Aquinas' system exemplifies the 
radical disjunction between creation and Christ. More specifically in terms 
of the imago Dei, Luther's interpretation employs the factor of original 
righteousness which characterized created nature; in his doctrine, Christ 
becomes the image of God to rectify the destruction caused by the fall - a 
radical disjunction. Calvin's utilization of the categories of nature/ 
1Cf. supra, pp. 7, 14 -15, where the narrative's relation to Israel's 
faith is more fully explicated. 
2Cf. . supra, p. 5. 
3This reservation applies to the theological systems which articulate 
a doctrine of an historic creation /fall. It applies equally to later 
theologies, (e.g. Barth and Brunner) which replace an historic interpretation 
with conjecture in respect to primal pre -history (Barth) and primal origin 
(Brunner). 
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supernature (not unlike Aquinas' nature /grace dualism at this point) 
similarly minimizes the significance of creation's doxological character. 
Finally, Barth and Brunner in their respective ways also depreciate the 
genius of the creation accounts by means of their Christocentric interpreta- 
tion. 
The disjunction in Barth's interpretation arises from an over- 
emphasis of Christ's revelatory function; that Christ, according to Barth, 
manifests the meaning of creation and that creation is a re- creation of 
intra- trinitarian relations (supra, pp. 225 -26) strongly implies that the 
revelation apprehended by the Hebrew people was not only incomplete, but 
quite insignificant. His assertion that both Paradise and Israel illustrate 
the incapability and unworthiness of man for fellowship with God (supra, 
pp. 246 -47) surely ignores a considerable portion of the Old Testament, e.g., 
the many Psalms of praise and confidence (Pss. 23, 121), the response of 
Abram (Gen. 12), and the indestructible faith of Job. Brunner is somewhat 
less guilty of this apparent theological distortion than his predecessors; 
yet, his de- historicizing of the creation narrative simultaneously results 
in a de- emphasis of the reality and historicity of God's relation with Israel, 
which was so eloquently articulated in her creation account.1 
Irenaeus alone managed to formulate a structure of relation between 
Creation and Christ that manifests a strong factor of continuity,2 thus 
recognizing the value and import of the Hebrew narrative. His system may 
be naive, and it is certainly less sophisticated than e.g., Aquinas'. Never- 
theless, it contains elements that recommend it for further consideration. 
1Cf. supra, CHAPTER V, pp. 295ff. 
2It should be pointed out 
continuity, but it occurs beyond 
supra- historically. 
that Barth and Brunner also assert a 
the sphere of creaturely existence, i.e., 
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Particularly germane in the present context (i.e., the factor of continuity 
between Christ and Creation) is Irenaeus' doctrine of recapitulation.1 
According to Irenaeus creation itself is dynamic; it points beyond itself 
toward a completion to be finally attained in Christ. The futurist element 
of the narrative culminates in redemption; but, it is a redemption inherent 
in creation, and conforms essentially to the same structure of relation. 
As Irenaeus stated: Christ gathered up "... not some other creation, but 
that original one of the Father; ... . "2 
Irenaeus's statement is perhaps more relevant to Christology than 
to this study of creation, but it also suggests implications in respect to 
the latter. Primarily, it asserts that the creation to which Christ came 
was not entirely inimical, or alien. In a sense, He assumed flesh which 
was not dissimilar from that of creation.3 We believe it is important to 
state that factor without equivocation, especially inasmuch as our Western 
tradition (especially post- scholastic)4 severely minimizes its importance. 
For example, Luther's doctrine of the loss of original righteousness as a 
natural endowment (not a donum superadditum) implies the necessity of a re- 
creation.5 Calvin is more explicit in respect to the rejection of continuity; 
he asserts that the suggestion that Adam was related to the incarnate Christ 
1Cf. CHAPTER I, Sec. c.3. 
2Irenaeus, A.H., V, xiv,2. Cf. supra, p. 86, and cf. also our 
reference to Wingren, supra, pp. 86f., n.4. 
3Cf. supra, pp. 86 -89 for illustrative material and our discussion. 
4Somewhat surprisingly the philosophical theories of Augustine and 
Aquinas managed to sustain a degree of continuity; their systems presupposed 
an irrefragable bond between God and created existence, though not of the 
personal quality which we recognize. 
5Cf. CHAPTER III, p. 198. 
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is "silly and distorted ".1 Finally, Brunner's assertion illustrates the 
epitome of diremption: The Incarnation "... does not mean the perfecting 
of the Creation - this indeed would be movement within continuity - but the 
restoration of a fallen Creation. "2 
The discussion thus far has been limited to the subject of creation 
in general, i.e., not yet including the subject of man, for methodological 
reasons. Essentially, we want to re- affirm the dignity and propriety of 
Israel's faith, exhibited in the creation narrative. We find it both un- 
necessary and erroneous to disparage her pre -Christian confession, or the 
penultimate (pre -Incarnational) stage of revelation. St. Paul, whose 
Christology was in no sense "low" or undeveloped, confidently referred to 
Abraham as a model of Christian faith (Rom. 4.). Further, in reference to 
his on people, he said: "They were adopted as sons, they were given the 
glory and the covenants; the Law and the ritual were drawn up for them, and 
the promises were made to them. They are descended from the patriarchs and 
from their flesh and blood came Christ ... ." (Rom. 9:4 -5).3 Apparently 
St. Paul was not aware of the disjunction recognized by later expositors. 
Of course, it is true that we have cited texts which refer to a covenant 
people and have not confined our remarks specifically to the Creation /Christ 
theme; nevertheless, even St. Paul's own utilization of the Adam story (Ro. 
5) does not attempt to articulate the disjunction so prevalent in Western 
theology 
1Cf. CHAPTER III, p. 208. 
2Brunner, Mediator, p. 291; cf. supra, CHAPTER V, pp. 313ff. 
3And cf. Ro. 11:25 -32. It will hopefully be realized that our use 
of biblical texts is not meant to suggest "proof ", but only additional warrant 
for the points under consideration. Cf. C.H. Dodd who says, "The new 
community is still Israel; there is continuity through the discontinuity. 
It is not a matter of replacement but of resurrection." - The Founder of 
Christianity, (London: Collins, 1971), p. 90. 
4E.g., Barth's interpretation, supra, Chap. IV, Sec. d.3. 
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There is another factor closely related to the subject under 
discussion; and, it is yet another with which we disagree in respect to its 
traditional interpretation. It was previously stated that the theme of 
creatio ex nihilo would not be a constituent factor of a reconstructed 
interpretation, nor indeed of the thesis itself.l However, its treatment 
(exploitation ?) in Western theology warrants some comment. 
a.2. Creatio ex nihilo 
Summarily stated, the statement in Gen. 1:2 is a theological 
confession of God's sovereignty, His possession of all that is. In the 
context of Israel's religious /historical experience it symbolized the 
singularity of His Lordship - even if there were other "gods ", to Jahweh 
alone was worship properly ascribed. However, the narrative emerged from 
faith; Jahweh had previously revealed Himself as the nation's Lord through .
election and exodus. Creatio ex nihilo was for Israel a confession of 
faith; it was not a theory of cosmogenesis, nor yet an articulation of 
the God /world structure of relation.2 
As creatio ex nihilo (only marginally asserted in the creation account) 
expressed Israel's prior faith, so also may the doctrine be meaningfully 
employed today. Contemporary theology has finally deferred the question 
of cosmogenesis to science; neither the act of creation, nor the nihilo 
which preceded are "burning issues" of the Gospel proclamation. Therefore 
the doctrine serves an elaborative function. That is, a precedent awareness 
of a "friendly" God with whom relation is recognized may be enhanced by the 
knowledge both of His eternal priority and His sovereignty as an implicate 
1Cf. Introduction, p. 21, n.l. 
2A thorough re- evaluation of the traditional interpretations of the 
theme is unnecessary. It seems evident, however, that the utilization of 
the concept to refute dualistic theories (successfully) simultaneously 
minimized its profound simplicity. Cf. supra, Chaps.II, Secs. a & b; III -A, 
Sec. b.; IV, Secs. a. & b. Each system respectively asserts the irrefraga- 
bility factor, but loses the element of relation and faith. 
of His act of creation. 
stresses the priority of 
the truth of creation.1 
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Barth's utilization of the theme, for example, 
the Christian faith, viz., that Christ reveals 
But then follows his theoretical speculation on 
the existence of the nothingness from which God created, and its subsequent 
effect upon it. The faith and personal relation -values of the doctrine 
are lost in the process of fanciful speculation. 
Creatio ex nihilo is a testimony to the power of God - but it is 
loving power. It expresses the assurance that coincides with St. Paul's 
confession in Romans 8:38 -39. It supports and enlarges upon the security 
of one's faith relation; it asserts that He who loves in Christ has no 
opponent. Both the act of creation and creation itself belong to Him 
for prior to that act and its result there was nothing.2 Therefore, 
although the doctrine of itself is somewhat neutral, in the context of 
faith it signifies a proper factor of dependence between God and creation. 
This was, as we noted, Irenaeus' interpretation of the phrase; for 
him it articulated the critical difference between the Unoriginate and the 
originate. Irenaeus, however, devoted little attention to the specification 
of the relative difference; difference expressed the structure of relation. 
"... God is first in all things, ... alone Unoriginate ...: while all other 
things remain in subjection to God. Now subjection to God is incorruption, 
and the continuance of incorruption is the glory of the Unoriginate."3 
Further, the Creator ex nihilo is simultaneously the one "... by whom every- 
thing is sustained; merciful, compassionate and most tender, good, just, God 
1Cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. a. 
2This is not Barth's Das Nichtige ist nicht das Nichts; and his "third 
way of knowing" is admittedly beyond our comprehension. Perhaps it would 
be more precise to say, nothing was, rather than, there was nothing - or 
simply to say nothing. Barth's theory is discussed in Appendix B. 
31renaeus, A_H., IU,xxxviii,3 - quoted in full supra, p. 37. 
Irenaeus, unlike others we have discussed, did not qualify the above asser- 
tion with a doctrine of fall and corruption. 
of all, ... . 9 1 This emphasis is most consonant with the doctrine's 
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function in the creation narrative. Of course, its validity is contingent 
upon one's interpretation of the fall, sin as self -deification, and the so- 
called inversion of the structure of the God -man relation - issues yet to 
be discussed. 
The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo emanates from Israel's faith, 
signifying God's sovereignty and Lordship. It elaborates and enlarges 
upon Israel's conception of His power, signifying creation's dependence 
upon Him who is dependable. This emphasis is essentially the interpretation 
adopted by Irenaeus, though not by Western systems. The doctrine serves 
an important, but peripheral function in this attempted re- construction. 
It indicates, however, first, that there is a viable alternative to traditional 
interpretations, and second, that the God -man relation is more uniform than 
sin -oriented systems infer. There are definite implications in respect to 
the imago Dei, e.g., the factor of difference and dependence, but these will 
be more appropriately discussed at a later point. The next subject, subordin- 
ately related to the above, is a discussion of creatio continua. 
a.3. Creatio continua 
Creatio ex nihilo precedes a consideration of creatio continua inas- 
much as the latter is irrelevant apart from an understanding of the former. 
This is true, of course, only in reference to theology; there is considerable 
speculation regarding the processes of creation, its dynamic evolution, change, 
decay, and growth outside and apart from theological consideration. Never- 
theless, from the perspective of theology a doctrine of creation out of 
nothing precedes an understanding of the theological implications of its 
1Irenaeus, Proof, 8, quoted supra, p. 39. 
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continuing process. Alternately, however, creatio continua is considerably 
more relevant not only in regard to the imago Dei,but also in respect to our 
contemporary social, psychological, historical and scientific climate. 
Obviously, we will not attempt to relate the doctrine specifically to each 
of them, but a recognition of their insights will qualify the following 
consideration. 
a.3.a. As Historical Occurrence 
Essentially, creatio continua is an historical concern. It relates 
to the questions: is something happening? if so, what? why - that is, is 
there a reason, purpose, or goal? Beyond the purely historical dimension 
(with its scientific orientation) emerges the theological one, which is no 
less historical. The same questions are asked but from a slightly different 
perspective; to the questions, is, what, and why, is added another - who? 
The answer - at. least the beginning of an answer - is: He who created ex 
nihilo. Yet another question has been introduced by the Church;l it is 
the question, where? 
If one believes that something is truly happening, and that its 
happening is significant, and if one takes seriously the traditional inter- 
pretations, it would appear that the truly significant "happening" is not 
occurring on the level of creaturely historical existence. Although that 
conceptualization of creatio continua is, in our estimation, an illegitimate 
one, its introduction into theology requires its consideration. Although 
the propriety and rationale of traditional interpretations will be considered 
n 
in a section devoted to the fall and fallen`ess, some of the conclusions will 
be presupposed here. 
11t is cumbersome continually to repeat qualifications to specify 
the distinction between my own, Irenaean, and Western interpretations. 
Therefore, generalizations will refer to those systems we have studied in 
Chaps. II -V; "Church ", traditional, popular, are terms which will describe 
those systems. Irenaean, and my own, will be more exactly specified. 
Therefore, the generalized terms, Church, traditional, and popular, will be 
used to specify the systems studied in Chaps. II -V. 
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The creation narratives are replete with implications in respect to 
creatio continua. The abundance of created forms, the elaborate provision 
for life and its perpetuation, the procreative ability of all life forms - 
perhaps even God's sense of satisfaction ( "it was good ") implied its con- 
tinuation. If one concluded nothing more, at least it would seem apparent 
that creation is dynamic, bursting with motion, struggle and pain (unless 
one subscribes to a theory of paradisial non -mortality). While it may be 
difficult to reconcile the possibility of struggle - success and failure - 
with a notion of creation's perfection, there is nothing in the accounts 
to suggest that primal history was devoid of the pathos of growth. Rather, 
it would seem necessarily inevitable. 
That it has seemed neither necessary nor inevitable to traditional 
interpretation, however, has been made obvious. A doctrine of creatio 
continua has indeed been maintained in various ways ranging from the 
Augustinian method of an other -worldly "harmony" to a Barthian "primal 
union" and Brunner's "primal origin ". Each has this in common: a supra- 
temporal, supra- historical plateau of "happening" only tangentially related 
to the plane of creaturely historical existence.1 
1Previous discussion of creatio continua or closely related implicates 
are as follows: Augustine: blessedness is to adhere to God (pp. 115 -116), 
but even initially though man had a certain capacity to adhere, finally it 
will be impossible to fall away (pp. 143 -44). Aquinas: man is created 
for the beata vita (o. 175) which was never fully possessed (p. 176) but 
which, through a donum supperadditum will be accomplished by God (Appendix 
A, Art. 4.1.1. et passim). Luther: original righteousness was the primal 
gift that permitted a life in harmony with God (pp.195 -96), whereas its 
loss (p. 196) requires a different structure of God -man relation (pp. 197 -98). 
Calvin: man was created for the pursuit of virtue, the contemplation of 
eternal life, whereas his failure has un- manned him (p.210). Barth: 
creation's completion is not its conclusion, i.e., there is creatio continua 
toward an already anticipated and divinely actualized consummation (pp. 
230 -31), but creation's participation is a mere interim existence (p. 254, and 
Chap. IV, Sec. e.3.). Brunner: man's participation in dynamic creation 
is the contradiction of his being which is overcome by and in Christ (pp. 
295 -96 & pp. 300f.). 
The above is obviously subject to qualification, and is only a 
generalized characterization. 
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That something is happening is obvious; things are not as they were 
yesterday in spite of many similarities. History does not repeat itself. 
That is not to say, of course, that historical variation, change, and 
movement necessarily imply progress, that is, improvement. The unavaila- 
bility of complete data, arbitrary criteria, and subjective interpretation 
make such judgement entirely impossible. Nevertheless, it does not 
therefore and necessarily follow that the problems of data, criteria, and 
judgement require a static concept of history, or a theory of its imaginary, 
insignificant, or vacuous quality. But, mere happening, if that much is 
granted, does not answer the question, what? 
a.3.b. As Authentic Occurrence 
In response to that question one could say, minimally, something - 
with no further elaboration. Even that is important - that something is 
occurring and that one perceives it indicates at least that there is life. 
And although it may not be true to say that where there is life there is 
hope, at least one can assert the contrary (disregarding for the moment the 
Christian doctrine of resurrected life). Is it possible, however, to 
assert more - more, that is, than simply "something" is happening? Is 
there, in other words, a significance, a meaning inherent within historical 
process? Beyond the considerations of a theological dimension,1 one would 
still have to recognize the import of life itself. The ambiguity of human 
response to need or tragedy does not negate that affirmation. A nation's 
1 "Beyond consideration of a theological dimension" means beyond 
specific consideration, i.e., doctrinal factors. It is doubtful that 
there is any segment of life or history toward which God is neutral, i.e., 
a passive and detached observer. Consequently, there is no dimension of 
life which may be appropriately described as apart from a theological 
dimension. Cf. e.g., Ps. 104, Acts 17:24 -28. 
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internal social perversity and apathy does not entirely impugn the authenti- 
city of its humanitarian response at a different level, or in another 
culture. This illustrates the general recognition of the basic and minimal 
right to life, a recognition apart from which social response itself is 
incomprehensible. 
That something is now that was not before is the simplest indication 
of creatio continua, and on the basis of that indication it seems fair to 
suggest that creation itself participates in the process of historical 
occurrence. What then are the implications of that participation? There 
is, to be sure, the ineluctable movement of time itself with its implicates 
of aging, dying. But more, there is the creative drive to utilize the 
moments of time toward the fulfillment of one's purpose, the completion of 
one's desires, the attainment of one's hope, the preservation of one's being. 
Even apart from a clearly definable goal or purpose exceeding one's on 
conception, creatio continua seems to be a self -evident definition of the 
way things are. 
Are those implicates compatible with the Christian faith? Having 
asserted first that something is occurring, and second that humanity 
participates in that historical process - does it in fact follow that the 
participation of historical existence has a legitimate place and function 
which is somehow conformable to the purpose of God? It is at this point 
that the final two questions, i.e., why and who, merge; they are inseparably 
related. That statement is liable to serious qualification; it is not a 
universally agreed -upon assertion. That traditional theology has effectual- 
ly separated the two is a conclusion derivable from the strLc ture of God's 
relation to historical existence noted above, p. 334, n.l. The questions, 
why and who, were joined, but on a plane which totally transcended the 
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relatively impotent level of historical existence. That is not the 
dimension of inseparability to which we refer; rather, the indivisibility 
of purpose (why) and agent (who) must pertain to historical humanity lest the 
first two questions, (is and what), become religiously irrelevant in spite of 
their reality. For instance, to suggest that authentic history is occurring 
beyond and in spite of humanity is not only to depreciate the significance of 
humanity's struggling existence, but also to assert that God does not 
authentically participate in that struggle. 
The abstraction of God from historical struggle is the concomitant 
of a theology whose major orientation is sin, an orientation against which 
the factors of continuity, creatio ex nihilo, and creatio continua stand in 
opposition.) At this point Augustine's concept of existence /non- existence 
(though, not necessarily his application) is valuable. 
there is no existence apart from Existence i.e., God. 
It asserts that 
Similarly, there 
is no creation (as process) apart from God, but that simultaneously implies 
His authentic (co-inherent) participation. The word, co- inherent, proposed 
in the Introduction (pp. 26 -27),2 does not seem unwarranted or presumptuous 
in the light of material considered thus far. However, the "fall" has not 
been considered, the "event" which customarily inverts the initial order of 
relation. 
1This theme was introduced and discussed supra, p. 3, et passim. 
That sin is the hermeneutic principle operative in the West has been 
illustrated in Chaps. II -V. Interestingly, as the systems evolved and more 
closely approached the consideration of personal relation, they magnified 
the "distance" between God and creation, abstracting Him from its process. 
For instance, there was a greater association (though metaphysical and im- 
personal) in Augustine's existence /non- existence categories than in Barth's 
supra- historical "primal union ", or in Brunner's conceptualization of 
"objective guilt ". Luther should perhaps be at least partially excepted; 
his system included provision for an authentic suffering of God in Christ's 
life and death. 
2We are not concerned to defend the propriety of the word co- inherent. 
However, it may profitably serve to express a structure of relation which has 
been practically ignored by traditional theology - that is, apart from its 
Christological function. Obviously, it is applicable in that context; it 
is similarly applicable, however, in the broader Creator /creation context. 
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a.3.c. As Purposive Occurrence 
The two questions, why and who, with which we began cannot exhaustive- 
ly be examined either in this particular section, nor within the scope of 
this chapter. The second has been partially considered, while the first 
has been neglected. In respect to creatio continua, the question of 
purpose assumes a very definite theological connotation. But, that is 
not to minimize the knowledge of purpose which, if not explicit in creation, 
is at least discernible within it.1 
We have been using the term, struggle, to define the quality of 
historical occurrence. It may be well to qualify the tern, using the word 
hope. It was suggested in the Introduction (p. 31) that hope is a secular 
symbol of humanity's intuition of a favorable end. Hope, in this sense, 
does not cause but merely explains the motivation for continued struggle. 
Certainly, fear is also a strong motivational force but it is to be con- 
sidered as secondarily related, not as hope's alternative. 
Returning to the question - the purpose or goal of hope's struggle - 
we want to assert two things: one, between secular and sacred hope there is 
more proportion than disproportion including the tentative implications of 
universality; two, creation's struggle is at least partially explicable 
within itself. The disproportion factor in respect to sacred /secular hope 
is a familiar theme of Western Christianity, reaching its zenith in the doc- 
trine of double predestination. The evidence in favor of disproportion is 
significant, although not altogether unambiguous. The inclination to 
isolate a single constitutive factor of the imago Dei, e.g., the will, 
1This is closely related to the subject of natural versus revealed 
theology. We do not challenge the pre -eminence and indispensability of 
revelation, nor will it be necessary to articulate the complexities of that 
debate. 
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rationality, righteousness, rectitude, analogia relationis, or responsi- 
bility, created the climate within which is seemed more reasonable (with 
some Scriptural warrant) to assert difference more than similarity. 
Depravity was natural, historical, and universal; conversely, regeneration 
was supra -natural non -historical and individualistic.1 
Of the several systems evaluated in the preceding chapters, that 
of Irenaeus alone unequivocally articulates the dimension of proportion. 
According to him historical creation itself implied a redemptive function, 
more properly, a recapitulative function. Creation's hope and purpose, he 
maintained, were synonymous; the synonymity derived from the recognition 
that the factor of proportionality was God, an immanent God. Man was 
created in the imago Dei, God "... receiving from Himself the being of His 
creatures, ... . "2 Even more specifically related to our subject is 
Irenaeus' conceptualization of historical existence - it was characterized 
as preparatory for man's ultimate perfection, the attainment of maturity. 
For the purpose of illustrating an Irenaean theme which is more comprehensive 
than would be appropriate to discuss here, we cite an especially represen- 
tative text: 
... the Hand of God is truly and plainly exhibited, whereby Adam 
first and afterwards we are framed; there being also but one and 
the same Father, Whose Voice from the beginning to the end is 
present with His Creature; and the substance of our frame being 
clearly indicated by the Gospel: we are not now to seek for any 
other Father than This; nor any other Hand of God, but 
this, which from beginning to end fashions and frames us unto life, 
and is present with Its own creature, and completes it after the 
Image and Likeness of God.3 
1Cf. e.g., Augustine's interpretation, supra, pp. 149 -50. We do 
not suggest that there are no variations or qualifications, for instance, 
those noted in Barth's Humanity of God. 
2lrenaeus, A.H., IV,xx,l, quoted supra, p. 43, and cf. p. 44. 
31bid., V,xvi,l, cf. supra, pp. 80 -81. 
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Indeed, Irenaeus does not specifically mention hope, either here 
or elsewhere, nor does he consider the possibility of a disparity between 
the sacred and the secular. On the one hand that may derive from a 
particularly naive assessment of creation; it seems more likely, however, 
that the factor of proportionality derives from a recognition that there is 
only one world, one creation, and one Lord who effectively works to accom- 
plish His purpose. 
The recognition of proportionality, i.e., between sacred and secular 
hope and its struggle is critical - the reason for its inclusion here - from 
two points of view. First, its assertion may allow the church to be more 
qualified in its doctrine, and simultaneously more perceptively aware of 
the authentic importance of historical existence, (we may dare even to 
suggest that it is right to be human). Second, the kerygma will be (cr may 
be) freed from its supra -natural, other -worldly orientation to become more 
recognizably an event of historical significance. 
The second facet of hope's struggle, i.e., that it is at least 
partially explicable within itself, requires less elaboration. Basically, 
what is implied is that hope's focus is at least to some extent relevant 
to historical existence. Negatively expressed, it asserts that creation's 
consummation is not exclusively oriented beyond itself (e.g., heaven). 
Positively expressed, it asserts that the exercise of hope and its historical 
fulfillment are justifiably temporal, i.e., their validation is at least 
partially within time. The problematic of duality - temporal /eternal, heaven 
and earth - is a real problem, and one which is inherent in respect to this 
consideration. The problematic, however, has been asymmetrically distorted 
by traditional theological systems which have rigidly compartmentalized 
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divinity and humanity. 
1 
A thorough analysis of the materials obviously 
exceeds the limits of this chapter; but perhaps a question will suffice to 
indicate the writer's inclination. In the light of the Incarnation, the 
covenant, John 17, Mt. 25, etc., is it either legitimate or reasonable to 
accentuate the God /man distinction? Perhaps it would be well for theology 
rather to risk error toward an emphasis of the God /man co- relation.2 
That which is to be maintained in respect to either extreme is an 
essential relation. Unless, however, God becomes "lost" toward one or 
the other, (which He is not likely to allow), the task is toward the attain- 
ment of a balance, a coherence. That is to say, neither the sole causality 
of God, nor the complete passivity of man represents a viable alternative. 
Rather, what is to be attempted is the articulation of a structure that 
recognizes the inseparability of the divine and human. This is the 
recognition that historical existence cannot attain its purpose apart from 
God (if indeed, there is a purpose without Him), but neither can God attain 
His purpose without creation (insofar as creation is His purpose). 
If that is granted, then the assertion that hope's struggle is 
partially self -authenticating is affirmed. A new problem immediately 
occurs, however, i.e., the determination and the attainment of a "proper 
1The 1972 meeting of The Society for the Study of Theology at 
Oriel College, Oxford, devoted itself to a discussion of such dualism. 
One of the most creative papers at that meeting was prepared and delivered by 
John Zizioulas from New College, The University of Edinburgh. By means of 
the terms, "capacity /incapacity" he was able to articulate an ontological 
structure of being, both human and divine. The two realities, i.e., God 
and the world, are not merged, but they are inseparably related. 
2That risk is, in fact, being assumed by many, most notably by those 
theologians associated with process theology. Charles Hartshorne's The 
Divine Relativity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1948) is 
devoted to the exploration of God's "surrelativity ". The work of Norman 
Pittenger reflects a similar theme, especially the books, God's Way With 
Men, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), and God in Process (London: 
SCM Press, 1967). 
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balance ". First, it should be acknowledged that a perfect coherence is 
incompatible with creaturely historical existence;) creaturely imperfection 
should not, therefore, be maximized. Second, related to the first, is that 
such a balance assumes a form commensurate to the total personality of each 
individual. Christ is indeed the exemplar of perfect coherence, illustra- 
ted not only in His orientation toward God, but equally in his orientation 
toward humanity. The greatest commandment, He said, is: "You must love 
the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul and with all your 
mind." And, "The second resembles it: You must love your neighbour as 
yourself." (Mt. 22:37 -40). This is the ideal toward which man is to strive. 
An approximation of success is totally impossible and unattainable in 
reference to systems which radically depreciate hope's human orientation. 
The major biblical references to the imago Dei (those other than 
Christ -as- image) reflect the latter orientation._ This is surprising in 
the light of the divine perspective proposed by traditional theology. Brunner's 
categories of responsible relation is the clearest exception to that judge- 
ment, at least apart from its contradiction /iderspruch7. Barth's system 
gives the impression of a creaturely perspective (i.e., the male- female 
conceptualization) until that category is obscured by his complementary 
theories of nature's relation to nothingness (cf. p. 235 et passim) and 
primal pre -history (cf. Secs. e.2. & 3.).3 
1Irenaeus' concept of growth- toward -image is relevant here, as is 
the ambivalence of existence noted in Romans 7:14 -25. 
2The various textual themes are: murder (Gen.9:6); lying and immoral 
behavior (Col. 3:9 -10); head covering (I Cor.11:7); cursing men created in 
God's image (Jas. 3:9). 
31n spite of Aquinas' otherwise static constructs, his utilization 
of the dynamic implications of the preposition ad illustrates the importance 
of historical process. Cf. Chap. III, Part A, Sec. c.2. We questioned 
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The articulation of balance remains a legitimate task of theology, 
a task which requires profound appreciation of individual variation and 
capacity. The question itself however, i.e., the possibility of hope's 
struggle to be self -authenticated must be revised. On the basis of a co- 
inherent God -world relation (if that is granted) there is no self- actualiza- 
tion. Neither God nor man can be abstracted from historical process and 
achievement. Hartshorne expresses a similar thought thus: God 
will promote the highest cosmic good, come what may. But it 
does not in the least follow that what God will do to promote 
the cosmic good will be uninfluenced by our actions and fortunes, 
or that how he will think and feel about the world will in no 
way reflect what is going on in the world.' 
God will accomplish His purpose, His intention for creation and man 
"come what may ". The last phrase alludes to a theme that has been con- 
spicuously absent from this first major section, viz., that history has not 
been a thoroughly harmonious co- operative venture, an uncomplicated and 
unconfused association of God and man toward the attainment of history's 
final consummation.2 The implicates of disharmony, complication, incoherence 
and confusion - the negativities of historical existence commonly called sin - 
are inextricably and appropriately associated with a study of the God -man 
relation implied in the imago Dei theme. And although traditional theology 
has inappropriately made sin the constitutive issue, its interpretative 
principle, nevertheless a reactionary subordination of the theme is equally 
illegitimate. We will attempt in the following section to create at least 
an outline of a modification. 
the validity of his specification of the term's non -ontological implicate 
(p. 185), but appreciated the note of historical movement which he also 
expressed (pp. 186ff). 
'Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, (1964 edition), P. 44. 
2A "final consummation" which transcends history's boundaries will 
be assumed, without explicit elaboration. Cf. I Cor. 15:50 -58. 
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b. The Imago Dei and the Problematic of Creaturely Incoherence 
The presence of imago Dei in the title asserts that we are dealing 
with a situation in which both God and man are inextricably involved. 
"Problematic" signifies not only the imperspicuity of the issue, but also 
the tentativity of its interpretation, while the word "Incoherence" indicates 
the relation between creaturely incoherence and divine intention.1 It may 
be objected that "creaturely incoherence" is too neutral, too passive a 
term to express the depth of human depravity, the heinousness of sin. 
Indeed, it is. But, it does not appear self -evident that the proper task 
of theology is either to explore the dimensions of depravity or to maximize 
its proportions.2 The cklarrcatures of the church's preoccupation with sin 
are justified inasmuch as there has been an inordinate amount of attention 
devoted to the subject, in addition to the highly questionable articulation 
of the consequent structure of God's relation to the world and man. 
What then may be proposed in terms of a reconstruction? What are 
the criteria appropriate to the development and understanding of a doctrine 
of creaturely discontinuity (i.e., sin)? Basically, fundamentally, it must 
conform to the God -world, God -man structure of relation implied in the imago 
Dei, and explored in the preceding section. Secondly, and this factor has 
not yet been specifically introduced, a reconstruction (in the Christian sense) 
must reflect an awareness of the centrality of Christ. That is not to say 
however, that Christology aptly corresponds to a pre- established doctrine 
1The word "incoherence" also illustrates, by contrast, the obverse of 
co- inherence. 
2The priority operative in this section is e.g., Isaiah's "What a 
wretched state that I am in: I am lost" - after he had seen the King, Jahweh 
Sabaoth (Is.6:5); or, Peter's "Leave me, Lord; I am a sinful man" - after 
he had witnessed Jesus' power, and was afraid. One's perception of God - as 
purpose, providence, love, goodness, power - is the pre -eminent foundation for 
an understanding of creaturely dependence, and its aberration. 
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of sin; neither, however, does it illEer that Christology is more relevant 
to creation's discontinuity than He is to the dimensions of its continuity.' 
The following inter -related assertions will make our objective clear: 
(l) God creates the world for and toward unobstructed personal communion; 
(2) human historical existence, its continuity and discontinuity, represent 
the process toward that end; and (3) human activity is ambivalent, i.e., 
constructive /destructive. It is the factor of ambivalence, especially in 
respect to human discontinuity and destructive inclinations that is our 
present concern. This indicates therefore the scope of the attempted 
reconstruction; sin primarily understood in reference to discontinuity within 
a co- inherent historical process does not imply a thorough -going reconstruction 
of the doctrine. Only the most directly relevant themes will be examined, 
i.e., those that clearly relate to the dynamics of historical existence. The 
word "sin" will be used to specify humanity's negative thrust, more in terms 
of its relational (co-inherent) connotations than in respect to its ethical 
overtones. 
b.l. Its Origin 
Obviously, one of the most perplexing problems of theology has been 
its attempt to understand the relation between "good" creation and its 
historical contradiction. The dilemma is at least partly to be understood 
as an implicate of theology's own misinterpretation of the creation /fall 
narratives in Genesis, i.e., the historicity of both creation and fall, and 
1Similarly, Zizioulas states: "... Christology should not be confined 
to redemption from sin but reaches beyond that, to man's destiny as the image 
of God in creation. There are, therefore, two aspects in Christology, one 
negative (redemption from the fallen state) and another positive (fulfilment 
of man's full communion with God; what the Greek Fathers have called theosis). 
Only if the two are taken together, can Christology reveal human destiny in 
its fullness." From John D. Zizioulas, "Human Capacity and Incapacity ", 
p. 16, an unpublished manuscript delivered to the Society for the Study of 
Theology, Oriel College, Oxford, April, 1972. 
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the time which separates them.l The aetiology of this theological 
misinterpretation is at least three -fold: (1) it provided a systematic 
structure for Christology /soteriology; (2) it preserved the doctrine of 
God's sovereign goodness; and (3) it ascribed culpability to creation 
(man). Concomitantly, there evolved (or were expanded) a substitutionary 
Christology, a God -creation disjunction, an exaggerated depreciation of man, 
and world, and creation, theories of double predestination, and a predominant- 
ly other -worldly perspective of faith. Paul Ricoeur expresses the problem 
thus: 
... the myth prepares the way for speculation by exploring 
the point of rupture between the ontological and the historical. 
... It is the holiness of God that reveals the abyss of sin in 
man; but, on the other hand, if the root of sin is in the 
'nature', in the 'being' of man, then the sin revealed by the 
holiness of God returns upon Him and accuses the Creator of having 
made man evil. If I repent of my being, I accuse God in the 
same moment in which he accuses me, and the spirit of repentance 
explodes under the pressure of that paradox. Thus, the myth 
appears at a high point of the tension in the penitential ex- 
perience; its function is to posit a 'beginning' of evil dis- 
tinct from the 'beginning' of creation, to posit an event by 
which sin entered the world and, by sin, death. The myth of the 
fall is thus the myth of the first appearance of evil in a 
creation already completed and good. 
The theme of penitence is not our immediate concern. What is 
especially valuable in Ricoeur's statement is the lucid articulation of 
the problem. That there is a "rupture between the ontological and the 
1This so- called misinterpretation is clearly articulated in the 
systems of Augustine through the Reformation. And although Barth and 
Brunner reject the historical factor, they utilize a similar ratiónale. 
For Barth the "good" creation is and has always been supra -historical. 
Brunner is more historically oriented, but existentializes the moments 
of creation /fall, and is therefore able to retain the element of historical 
diremption. 
2Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan, (New 
York, Evanston, London: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 242 -43. 
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historical" is assumed; but what then of sin's origin? If it is 
associated with man's nature and being, God is implicated. But, what happens 
if no rupture is granted, at least in terms of creation and fall? That 
emerges if one rather assumes a dynamic ontology somewhat consistent with 
historical process, i.e., creatio continua? What occurs in respect to 
creation /fall if the imago Dei does symbolize the "becoming" of man in a 
co- inherent relation with the Creator? Is God, in short, authentically, 
historically, ontologically implicated in creaturely contradiction? The 
material in Section a. has anticipated an affirmative answer; God is 
ontologically implicated. 
The most critical effect of that assertion is the recognition that 
sin is neither the problem of man (Augustinianism) nor the problem of God 
(Barth), but an historical problem of God and man simultaneously. The 
question of sin's origin, therefore, assumes a somewhat different orienta- 
tion. Rather than locating the origin within a paradisial setting, its 
origin becomes co- terminus and co- existent with creaturely existence. 
Augustine's interpretation of existence and non -existence (apart from his 
metaphysical, static, and impersonal constructs) is relevant and constructive 
at this point. The very createdness of creation signifies its association 
with non- existence; createdness is mutability, implying creation's tendency 
(evil) to decline from existence (God). Sin and evil are nature's vitiation 
(vitium naturae) but do not vitiate nature (vitium natura).l In a more 
dynamic context, non -existence represents humanity's perverse inclination 
toward regression by its tendency to idolize its past, paralyze its present, 
and no less importantly, by its presumptuous endeavor to create its future out 
1Cf. supra, Chap. II, pp. 123 -24, et passim. 
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of itself. As Augustine maintained however, so long as a thing remains, is, 
it is good.1 Slightly altered, we would say that so long as anything remains, 
it is becoming, it is in process, and that so long as God remains co- inherent- 
ly related to creation it is constantly becoming. This does not preclude 
creaturely incoherence, i.e., the negative potential of creation to pervert 
the process,2 though never entirely either collectively or individually.3 
We would say with John Hick that "The story of the fall does not 
describe genetically how our situation came to be as it is, but analyses 
that situation as it has always been. "4 The "fall" is an anthropological / 
K 
theological picture of falleriess, which may more adequately be expressed as 
creaturely ambi guity. The terms "fall" and falleriess logically imply that 
from which something has fallen, and that implication invites error and 
misinterpretation as evident in the preceding study. Nevertheless, to 
suggest a modification of the fall doctrine in terms of original and 
1Cf. supra, Chap. II, pp. 115 -16. 
2The dynamic struggle toward becoming is expressed in Ro. 8:22: 
"From the beginning till now the entire creation, as we know, has been 
groaning in one great act of giving birth." The "entire" creation, 
according to Paul, participates. 
3Absolute perversion of either historical process or oneself means 
not only that one totally rejects God, but also that God totally rejects 
an individual - eventualities yet to be discussed. 
4Hick, Evil and God, p. 181. 
51renaeus' interpretation is not entirely unambiguous in respect to 
this question. Cf. the relation between perfection /imperfection discussed 
in Chap. I, Secs. b.2.a. & b.2.b. In the light of his "child" theme, 
however, we concluded that he recognized a "valid" creaturely non -perfection. 
He said, for instance, "... He will overcome that which we are by our created 
nature." - A.H., IV,xxxviii,4. There was also the differentiation between 
inbreathing and the giving of the Spirit in his system, and his casting 
blame on the serpent, which indicate his understanding of the ambiguities 
of createdness. - cf. supra, pp. 61 -65. 
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historical ambiguity is not simultaneously to interpret the problematic of 
sin; it merely qualifies it and changes its locus. Neither, moreover, 
does the modification which includes God in the ambiguous process solve the 
dilemma. It is to that problematic and dilemma that we now turn. 
b.2. Its Historical Manifestations and Implications 
If the imago Dei is a symbol of a God -man structure of dynamic 
relation, oriented toward a divinely determined goal but including historical 
process, then it follows that the manifestations of sin and its historical 
implications similarly relate to the imago Dei. The major Augustinian 
tradition has described that relation in terms of loss, either partial or 
total. Barth and Brunner represent alternatives to the tradition, but not 
entirely successful ones. Barth simply divorces the imago Dei from an 
historical connotation, except for an innocuous male -female analogia 
relationis. Brunner's too -radical differentiation between Old and New 
Testament interpretations qualifies his otherwise valuable and constructive 
"responsibility" theme. Beyond that qualification however, Verantwortlichkeit 
expresses the dimensions of historical process against which to interpret the 
ambiguities (intentionally less radical than Brunner's Widerspruch) of 
creaturely existence. 
The dimensions of historical process and its ambiguity (i.e., sin) 
implicit in the imago Dei theme are manifest in various ways in each of the 
systems previously studied. Irenaeus presents an interpretation which is 
most consonant with a dynamic interpretation of history and of the imago Dei. 
Consequently, his articulation of sin in reference to the image theme is 
similarly compatible. A positive relation of unobstructed communion between 
God and man is the end, the intention toward which God creates man; conversely, 
to sin, to choose the negative pole of creaturely ambiguity, is to cast "... 
away all the good things which come from Him. "1 Disobedience, i.e., 
llrenaeus, A.H., V,xxvii,2. Cf. supra, p. 67. 
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departure from the terms and conditions of relation, brings death; but 
according to Irenaeus it is not a death illustrative of God's punitive 
reaction or His rejection of man. Rather, "out of pity" for the man, and to 
make sin itself mortal, God allowed death to intervene so that man, "... 
ceasing some day to live unto sin, and dying thereunto, might begin to live 
unto God. "1 Irenaeus also utilizes the theme of human arrogance to articulate 
historical ambiguity. Failing to recognize and appreciate the love with which 
God encounters him, man is inclined simultaneously to depreciate the value of 
his created dependence and disproportionately to maximize his on powers and 
potential.2 In this context, sin is despising the essentiality of the proper 
coherence, i.e., the indivisibility of the God -man structure of relation. It 
is, in other words, man's rejection of the way things are, a stepping out of 
relation into the void - but both are relative movements, i.e., neither is 
total, nor final.3 
In Irenaeus' system, as illustrated above, the focus of sin is con- 
spicuously associated with the imago Dei, which in turn expresses the relation 
between God and man directed toward the perfection of man's participation in 
the image. 
out of the 
arrogance. 
Sin in that context is the human inclination and attempt to step 
relation (i.e., to deny the image factor) resulting in death and 
Is it correct, however, to say that sin is an attempt to step 
out of a relation? Further, can it be said that the creaturely inclination 
precedes arrogance inasmuch as traditional interpretations are agreed that 
arrogance (pride) precedes, is the foundation for, the distorted relation? 
1lrenaeus, A.H., III,xxiii,6, and cf. supra, pp. 70 -71. 
2Cf. supra, pp. 82 -83. 
3Cf. supra, p. 91. 
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In respect to these questions it would seem more accurate to assert 
that sin is the historical manifestation of a distorted awareness or 
recognition of the image of God relation. Having previously maintained that 
sin's origin is co- terminus with createdness, it is impossible to presuppose 
man's full, complete, and perfect awareness of his proper relation to and with 
God - an awareness in spite of which he arrogantly separates himself. This 
is Irenaeus' thrust, i.e., that sin emanates from the "child's" incredible 
foolishness.l The perfect awareness of an ontological and co- inherent 
structure of relation, and hence, the perfect actualization of the imago Dei 
is that which lies before, ahead of man; "now we are seeing a dim reflection 
in a mirror; but then we shall be seeing face to face. The knowledge that 
I have now is imperfect; but then I shall know as fully as I am ]mown." 
(I Cor. 13:12 -13). 
Rather than sin being a human and self -assertive attempt to step out 
of relation, it is more an historical manifestation of human dimness and 
imperfection. That is definitely not to suggest, however, that dimness and 
imperfection thoroughly define human, historical existence; neither do the 
terms imply a rationale for irresponsibility. What is implied, however, is 
that the focus of human culpability is properly defined in terms of historical 
process. Man's awareness of his dimness and imperfection, his impotence and 
temporality - these and related implicates of createdness in association 
with the dynamic structure of historical existence express the symptoms of 
human ambiguity. Nevertheless, Although the symptoms may define human 
existence from one perspective - primarily a static one - they inadequately 
define it from another, i.e., the dynamic perspective. A man is not condemned, 
or held accountable for what he seems to be or is, but for what he does, not 
1Cf. supra, pp. 64 -68. 
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only out of recognition of his createdness, but especially out of an awareness 
of what he is called to become. This is the heinousness of sin, the 
rejection or refusal to participate in the forward -moving historical process, 
the seemingly inveterate tendency to idolize historical structures, to 
worship and serve "creatures instead of the creator" (Ro.1:25). 
That this tendency is born,, of dimness and imperfect awareness does 
not therefore mitigate human responsibility, that is unless one believes that 
God is not inseparably involved in historical process. God's involvement, His 
active, personal and powerful presence is that which legitimizes the sentence 
of condemnation. Cain's act of murder is despicable not only because of the 
act itself, but also that it represented Cain's attempt to eliminate the 
challenge of competition in order that he might continue to offer God less 
than the best. Zechariah was struck dumb, speechless, because he doubted 
God's ability to effect what He promised (Luke 1). The sin of Israel's 
Golden Calf was her eagerness to create a tangible god. These illustrations 
have one element in common - they represent a human tendency to circumscribe 
the dynamic dimensions of time and history, at the cost of sacrificing human 
responsibility and dignity. 
Sin is, in some respects therefore, a self -surrender; it is, however, 
surrender to the forces and factors of human creation which assume proportions 
which suggest that they both exist independently, and that they are more 
powerful than their human creators. In one respect they do, in fact, exist 
independently. Inasmuch as sin has historical and social implications, as 
soon as it has assumed concrete form (i.e., murder committed, a lie told, a 
failure to speak a necessary word of love) the effects are historically 
1This tendency is what Cox describes as acedia; cf. Harvey G. Cox, 
On Not Leaving It To The Snake, (London: SCM Press, 1968). 
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unretractable. In that sense the manifestations of sin exist independently. 
And inasmuch as the repercussions of sin often transcend the intention of 
the agent, they do become more powerful than their human creators. For 
this man is responsible. 
It has traditionally been asserted. that man's responsibility and 
culpability for sin exercised a maleficent effect on the imago Dei. None 
of the systems reviewed, however, exceeds Brunner's analysis of the 
disastrous effects incurred. Having asserted that sin is possible only 
because man is created in the imago Dei1 he proceeded to state that man's 
sin effectively perverted the structure of his relation to God. It is not 
merely a subjective impression of perversion; it is an objective fact. 
"This is the new attitude of God towards man, that He is angry with him on 
account of his sin." 
2 
There is a ".,, gulf between God and man, ... 5127 
abyss which lies between the holy God and the sinful creature. "3 
The writer's reaction to such a conceptualization of human 
responsibility has been made clear. Basically, the problem and error 
is that responsibility survives only in terms of total guilt, a position 
from which man is not only impotent to extract himself, but within which he 
is no longer dynamically and historically accountable. But man, understood 
as the being within whom God is constantly at work, and apart from whom there 
is no historical process, is far more responsible than in Brunner's system. 
He is responsible because God has chosen to work in, with, and through him. 
That God "counts on man" is that which makes him accountable and responsible; 
1Cf, supra, Chapter V, p. 294. 
2Brunner, M,I,R,, p. 133. And cf, supra, pp. 296 -98. 
3Brunner, The Mediator, p. 291. And cf. supra, p. 300. 
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conversely, one from whom another expects nothing cannot be blamed for his 
failure. Of course, that God "counts on man" is neither self- evident, nor 
is it a conspicuous theme of traditional theology. But, it is an apparently 
indispensable constituent of a dynamic interpretation of the imago Dei. 
The intention of the thesis has been accomplished according to its 
primary objective. The examination and survey of various systems in 
respect to the imago Dei was the subject of Chapters I through V, and this 
chapter has concentrated on a tentative reconstruction of the image theme. 
We have suggested that the imago Dei is a symbol of the co- inherent 
structure of relation between God and man. In our reconstruction, the 
theme has assumed dynamic historically oriented connotations unlike the 
interpretations previously examined. The category of sin which dominated 
the other interpretations, (apart from Irenaeus') has been studied, and 
its origin and implications evaluated. 
It could legitimately be asserted that the imago Dei is not 
primarily a Christological theme, in spite of the realization that the 
traditional interpretations (including Irenaeus', with qualifications) 
have concentrated upon its Christological implications. A thorough -going 
Christocentric interpretation of the imago Dei inappropriately minimizes 
God's relation to humanity, e.g., Israel, and inordinately maximizes 
1The writer is not anxious to be drawn into the debate regarding 
the intention and efficacy, the inclusiveness /exclusiveness, of God's 
love, especially in Christ. He is content to leave that final judgement 
to the Father. It does seem incomprehensible and incredible, however, 
that God should have managed to "salvage" so pitifully few out of the 
multitudes of the world's entire population. Even assuming (which no 
one does) that all Israelites and all Christians of all times represent the 
total number of the saved, the number is quite insignificant in relation to 
all men of all time. Furthermore, the apparently popular notion that only 
true Christians will ultimately,be saved suffers not only in respect to 
the same charge of incredibility, but also from its own inability 
categorically to define the true Christian. It would seem both possible 
and proper that one should first confess humble ignorance and then lean 
slightly toward universalism, 
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the factor of sin, viz,, as that which requires a particular model of 
Christology. A thorough consideration of Christ's relation to the 
imago Dei motif, broadly defined, exceeds both the objectives and the 
limits of the thesis. Nevertheless, there are some especially relevant 
and compatible Christological concepts which ought to be considered in our 
reconstruction. 
c. The Imago Dei and Christ 
The writer is uncomfortably aware that the structure of this 
thesis, of this final chapter, and the remarks above in respect to the 
"place" of Christology in the system, may imply a depreciation of Christ. 
That is, one might infer that the system prescribes the structure to which 
Christ must conform. It is the question of presuppositions, i.e., mental 
attitudes and thought -forms which are powerfully and inevitably operative 
in the process of interpretation and articulation. There is a system, 
of course, a structure to which Christ must and does conform. He does 
not appear in time as radically unrelated to time; even His uniqueness 
is to some extent at least recognizably human, i.e., it does not 
infinitely transcend the structures of historical existence, and its 
factors of continuity. 
The so- called Christocentric interpretations of Barth and 
Brunner for instance, manifest a peculiar disdain for those structures 
(i,e,, human and historical), the consequence of which is the obere of 
their intention.l, The proper order of relation is most profoundly 
1The propriety of that Christological methodology is seriously 
challenged by Pannenberg; he calls it "Christology from above ". Cf. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and 
Duane A. Priebe, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1968), pp. 33 -37. 
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expressed in Gal. 4:1 -11; the factors of continuity (e.g., child to heir, 
adoption, ignorance to knowledge) are conspicuous. "When the appointed 
time came, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born a subject of the Law, 
to redeem the subjects of the Law and to enable us to be adopted as sons." 
(vss. 4,5).1 
The issue as to whether a system is Christocentric is decided on 
the basis of the central significance He assumes in a given system; the 
propriety of any given characterization of that centrality, i.e., its 
authenticity, is the relation it bears to one's perception of the whole. 
On that basis therefore Christology is a study which is relative to all 
other manifestations of God's relation to the world. That does not 
imply a subordination of Christ; neither does it permit, however, that 
Christ should be understood as one who illustrates God's radical 
departure from structures of relation operative from the beginning.2 
Our task is not to challenge all other Christological formulations; 
it is merely to explore some of the Christological implications which seem 
to emerge from a dynamic interpretation of the imago Dei. One of the 
operative presuppositions will be that Christ, His work and being, are 
1The Son's relation to human and historical structures is clear; 
He is born of a woman, under the Law. The "appointed time" , Z) 7 / &)from 
Tov 1:04,, ß , indicates God's appreciation of temporality. That is, time 
is neither inimical nor insignificantly related to the accomplishment of 
His purpose. Cf. Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, p. 380. But cf. Barth's 
disjunctive interpretation, supra, p. 239, n. 1. To "redeem" (É5a.r o "a q ) 
the subjects of the Law should not be interpreted to imply that subjection 
to the Law was in fact an objective state of affairs, as e.g., asserted by 
Brunner (cf. supra, pp. 297 -98). A perverted understanding of one's 
relation to the structures of historical existence does not create structures 
commensurate to the perversion. To redeem therefore, is not literally to 
"buy back ", but rather expresses the idea of deliverance, release. 
2Cf. supra,, Sec. a.3. 
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more coherent to than incoherent from historical process. Toward the 
accomplishment of the task, and in the light of the presupposition, these 
two topics require consideration: Christ's person and work, and His 
presence. 
c,1, His Person and Work 
In a thoroughly dynamic assessment it is impossible concisely to 
differentiate between one's person (being) and work (act),2 An approximate 
differentiation is possible, of course, taking into consideration that at 
a given moment a man is both more and less than he seems to be. That is 
to say, he is more than he seems to be in the light of the fact that he is 
"becoming"; on the other hand he is from that perspective, less than he 
will be. Nevertheless the Scriptural witness to the person and work of 
Jesus manifests a degree of coherence that makes a differentiation even 
more arbitrary, The implications of that realization in respect to the 
imago Dei are profound. Jesus is the one in whom being and act consistent- 
ly coincide; there is no distortion or disjunction between who He is and 
what He does. 
3 This is illustrated in Jesus' response to John's question: 
"Are you the one who is to come, or have we got to wait for someone else ?" 
1The words "coherent" and "incoherent" are chosen because of their 
relation to the word "co- inherent" which we have used to define the God/man 
structure of relation, All three words include the idea of relation, 
connection. 
2The philosophic implications of the terms, act and being, will 
not be explored for two reasons: one, we have chosen from the beginning 
to avoid discussion of philosophy, and its introduction at this point would 
be inconsistent; two, we believe it is possible to restrict the scope of 
the thesis, concentrating specifically on theological issues, without 
sacrificing quality. 
The use of present tense verbs, e.g., He is, He does, in respect 
to Jesus is simply to postpone the question of His living presence until 
Sec, c,2,, infra. 
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Jesus' response was: "Go back and tell John what you hear and see; the 
blind see again, and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, 
and the dead are raised to life and the Good News is proclaimed to the 
poor;" (Mt. 11:3 -5). His work indicated, at least to some, who He was. 
The answer was appropriate at that time, in that situation. 
But in another context and setting, Jesus blessed Peter for his 
confession: "You are the Christ ... the Son of the Living God "; Jesus 
realized that Peter's recognition was not the conclusion of empirical 
evidence ( "flesh and blood ") but a revelation from the Father (Mt. 16:16 -17). 
Whatever else may be possible to conclude from Peter's recognition, this 
much seems certain: his assertion that Jesus was for him the Christ, the 
Son of the Living God, did not imply that Jesus was no longer a man among 
men. Being "Christ" represented His difference within the structures of 
relation, coherence - not Christ's distinction from them. 
We have said that the imago Dei is a symbol of the dynamic 
structure of God's co- inherence with man, and that the dynamic implies 
movement toward a goal or consummation, including historical activity. 
In reference to that definition, it could be said that Jesus is the perfect 
and complete concrete actualization of that co- inherent structure and of 
the goal. Christ's miracles indicate His orientation toward humanity; 
His recognition of the Father's revelation to Peter illustrates His 
orientation toward God. There is a perfect balance and coherence manifest 
in the person and work of Christ, a perfect attainment of the intent of 
the imago Dei. His orientation toward the Father indeed preceded His 
orientation toward the earth, but the former required the latter. That 
is to say, as the complete actualization of the imago Dei, there was a 
uniformity, a coherence in Christ's love; neither orientation precluded 
the other. 
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D.D. Williams expresses much the same conclusion, saying: 
.., the imago dei should not be conceived as a special qual- 
ity, but as the relationship for which man is created with his 
neighbour before God. The image of God is reflected in every 
aspect of man's being, not as a special entity but as the meaning 
of the life of man in its essential integrity. But surely this 
can be most clearly grasped if we say that love is the meaning of 
the imago dei.1 
Love is not the meaning of the imago Dei, but rather its expression.2 
Beyond that however, William s brief articulation is significant. He 
describes the primarily human perspective of the phrase, imago Dei, its 
essentially dynamic thrust, its all- inclusiveness, and the factor of 
integrity (coherence). The person and work of Christ conform* to each 
of the above factors, apart from the first, i.e., the primarily human 
perspective. It may be advisable to qualify that definition of per- 
spective. 
To say that the imago Dei is essentially an anthropological term 
is appropriate only when one intends to include the ambiguities of human 
existence, i.e., creaturely incoherence, sin. But in respect to the 
Christological implicates of the term there are no ambiguities; con- 
sequently, it is gratuitous to articulate priorities. Indeed, it may 
also be misleading to state, as we did above, that Jesus' orientation 
toward the Father preceded his orientation toward the earth, i.e., man. 
The term priority seems relevant only in respect to His rejection of 
inauthentic factors of human existence, e.g., greed, hypocrisy, usury, 
1Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love, (Welwyn, 
Herts.: James Nisbet & Company, 1968), p. 134. 
2Our saying that love is the expression and not the meaning of 
the imago Dei may be a pedantic distinction. But the word love is 
inadequate because of its over -use and misuse. 
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lust, etc, This realization therefore adds a dimension to our under- 
standing of the term. Jesus, as the complete actualization of the dynamic 
thrust, reveals the indivisibility of the human/divine relation, and 
simultaneously exposes creaturely incoherence, sin. We attempted in the 
preceding section to define sin in reference to the imago Dei, especially 
in terms of its perversion of historical process. Now, in reference to 
the person and work of Christ, another dimension has been added, both in 
terms of a "model" of perfection, and also in respect to that which is 
traditionally described as salvation. 
This is perhaps the most critical topic of the chapter, for 
salvation is the key to the Christian faith. Unfortunately, however, 
the broad focus of salvation has been delimited by Western theology, and 
circumscribed by its boundaries to the extent that it no longer expresses 
a dynamic movement or relates to the imago Dei except as its replacement. 
Mowinckel stated that 
,,, the history of revelation in reality is also history of sal- 
vation. The plan of God is ultimately his plan of salvation; the 
intent of creation is salvation, the full realization of God's 
goal; 'all things were created through him and for him' (Col. 
1:16). For salvation in its full biblical meaning is not only 
salvation from, but also salvation to something. It is the 
realization of the kingdom of God.1 
We do not want to suggest that the interpretation of salvation 
offered by Mowinckel, or that salvation similarly defined in respect to 
the imago Dei represents the exclusively correct and complete ones.2 
1Sigmund Mowinckel, The Old Testament as the Word of God, p. 40, 
cited in part, supra, p. 15. 
2Cf. Zizioulas' statement, supra, p. 345, n. 1. 
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What is intended, however, is that a more dynamic interpretation which 
takes seriously the factors of historical coherence should assume its 
place beside the others, to complement and perhaps to qualify them. The 
alternatives are not of the either -or variety, i.e., one does not have 
to choose to interpret salvation either as release or as fulfillment and 
wholeness. The latter is the focus of the imago Dei and therefore is 
that which we want to examine. 
Explicit and specific references to the imago Dei are few in the 
New Testament; even fewer are those that relate specifically to its 
soteriological function. Implications of completion and fulfillment are 
evident in the two references in Colossians (1:1 -20; 3: 9,10). The first 
reference identifies Jesus as the image, while the second associates the 
image with the creator. The themes of Christ's perfection and centrality 
expressed in Col. 1 are similar to those which we have previously described. 
In addition, however, there is the clear statement of creation's participation 
with him, not of its co- operation, but rather in its consummation. "He is 
the Beginning" and the "first to be born from the dead, so that he should 
be first in every way; because God wanted all perfection to be found in 
him" (1:18 -19). 
Colossians 3 conveys the theme of renewal and unity. Having 
enumerated the vices of unrenewed life the author says: "You have 
stripped off your old behaviour with your old self, and you have put on a 
new self which will progress towards true knowledge the more it is renewed 
in the image of its creator; and in that image there is no room for 
distinction between Greek and Jew," etc. (3:9 -11). 
Consummation, renewal, unity - these are familiar themes, and 
their relation to the imago Dei has been made apparent. What remains 
to be articulated is their soteriological import. One should not 
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overlook the verb tenses in the references above; they are predominantly 
present and future. Of course one would not want to make overmuch of 
that fact, but that realization considered in the total context of the 
dynamic intent of the imago Dei becomes a critical awareness. It 
implies that soteriology is a present event, inseparably related to the 
consideration of the presence of Christ.1 
c,2. His Presence 
The question regarding the death and decay of Jesus' body 
becomes relatively insignificant in respect to the greater issue of His 
saving presence. It may indeed be a valid subject for debate as to 
whether or not, and in what sense He is present unless He actually and 
historically and verifiably rose bodily from the grave; we do not imply 
a minimization of the question's significance, but we will not comment 
except insofar as there are implications in respect to the imago Dei. 
We have maintained that the imago Dei symbolizes God's co- 
inherent presence in historical existence, and further that His presence 
has always been in process of historical actualization, i.e., assuming 
concrete form through and within historical creaturely existence. The 
1This topic impinges upon the resurrection theme. Without 
becoming involved in the various interpretative techniques, i.e., the 
resurrection as history, as myth, as kerygma, the writer's on under - 
standing in respect to the imago Dei implicates of the resurrection is 
that Jesus, as the perfect actualization of the Father's intention for 
man, is alive. 
Cf. the insight of a sociologist /theologian, Peter L. Berger, 
A Rumour of Angels, (London: Penguin Press, 1970), and especially this 
from p. 114: "The discovery of Christ implies the discovery of the 
redeeming presence of God within the anguish of human experience. Now 
God is perceived not only in terrible confrontation with the world of man, 
but present within it as suffering love. This presence makes possible the 
ultimate vindication of the creation, and thus the reconciliation between 
the power and the goodness of the creator. By the same token, it vindicates 
the hope that human suffering has redeeming significance." 
363. 
expression or actualization of His presence, however, has been subject 
to the ambiguities, the incoherences of creaturely existence. Therefore 
His presence has been imperfectly perceived; in a sense He has 
m 
acconíodated Himself to the limits of createdness, both in terms of His 
self -expression, and also in respect to human perceptual limitations.1 
The perfect actualization of God's presence is, at least from 
the perspective of the imago Dei, the unambiguous expression and mani- 
festation of unobstructed communion. That is to say, if the imago 
bears implicates of co- inherent relation, than a perfect historical 
manifestation of that relation will simultaneously require a "mode" 
through and within which there occurs the event of human -divine communion. 
Perfectly actualized, the event is a thoroughly reciprocal event; it 
is a dynamic encounter between God and man, an encounter through which 
both humanity and divinity (man and God) participate.2 A reciprocal 
event is one in which the inappropriate dualities disappear, i.e., 
creaturely ambiguities and incoherences. This does not imply that the 
authentic differences between human and divine are obliterated, but it 
does infer that there are no radical distinctions.3 
One may be quite prepared to agree that God's presence was once 
perfectly actualized in history, and that its actualization in Jesus 
1Cf. the Irenaean theme: "God .., was indeed able Himself to 
bestow on man perfection from the beginning, but man was incapable of 
receiving it: for he was a babe." - A.H. IV,xxxviii,l, cited supra,, p. 61. 
And cf. Heb. 1:1 -4. 
his is a notable theme of Barth's Humanity of God, but not his 
major interpretation. 
3Against Barth, cf. supra, Chap. IV, Sec. c., pp. 236ff. For the 
differentiation between distinction/difference cf. supra, p. 36, especially 
n. 2. 
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Christ revealed a co- inherent relation between the human and divine. 
One may even recognize an inseparable dipolarity of orientation manifest in 
Christ, e.g., Jn. 6:34: "My food is to do the will of the one who sent 
me, and to complete his work," and that the authentic sphere of His 
activity was with man,1 How therefore, may one articulate the reality 
of that same on -going saving presence? Is it, in fact a "saving presence "? 
Traditional interpretations of the imago Dei have derived considerable 
soteriological insight from the theme, but always based on the presupposition 
of a disjunction. The imago Dei has been fractured, with the result that 
in respect to historical existence and soteriology there are in a sense 
two images, the one defaced, lost, depraved (human), the other full, 
complete, supra- historical (divine). Brunner's delineation between Old 
and New Testament interpretations is the clearest expression of the so- 
called fracture. 
Irenaeus, surely more than any other, recognized the factor of 
soteriological presence implicit in the image theme. His utilization of 
the recapitulation motif is a creative and constructive expression of the 
dynamic, eternal and eternally related saving presence of God in and 
through the creative process and historical existence. Christ, in 
Irenaeus' system, stands as the perfect completion of the imago Dei, a 
completion which is simultaneously particular (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth) 
and universal (i.e., trans- historical salvation). Recapitulation 
recognizes the incoherences of creaturely existence, and the consequent 
necessity of its (i.e., humanity's) completion from beyond itself; but 
1Cf Jn. 17:4; Mt. 25:35 -46 (the "in so far as ... you did it to 
me" passage; and Mk, 2:23 -28. Cf. also our discussion of the subject in 
reference to Brunner, supra, pp. 321 -23, and in reference to Barth, pp. 
261 -63, 
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at the same time recapitulation recognizes the inclusion of historical 
existence. That is to say, Christ's recapitulative work was from 
"beyond" in as much as He transcended the liabilities inherent in 
creaturely existence (i.e., sin); yet, His work was as Man, within and 
intrinsically related to the structures of historical existence.1 
The articulation of Christ's on -going saving presence is partially 
accomplished by means of the New Testament (indeed, Biblical) emphasis on 
adoption and incorporation; that particular emphasis is directly related 
to the imago Dei concept as developed most explicitly in Colossians. 
"All things were created through him and for him" (1:16); "he holds all 
things in unity" (1:17). "In his body lives the fullness of divinity, 
and in him you too find your own fulfilment" (2:10). "You have been 
buried with him, when you were baptised; and by baptism, too, you have 
been raised up with him through your belief in the power of God" (2.12).2 
The presence of Christ was an "incorporating presence" (cf. Jn. 
17:26 et passim). Its relation to the imago Dei theme indicates its 
universal perspective and its corollary, His present, i.e., concrete 
and historical presence. The writer's intention has been primarily to 
explicate the cosmic scope of the image theme, without particular emphasis 
on the more restrictive, exclusivistic implicates of the Christian faith 
and message; this latter theme has been sufficiently explicated in 
1Cf. supra, Chapter I, Sec. c.4. The Church's struggle to 
articulate the relation between the humanity and divinity of Christ is 
less problematic for Irenaeus in as much as nature and super -nature are 
more coherent than disjunctive. 
2There are many parallel texts which express the broad perspective 
of this theme, and which elaborate upon it. Many of them are considered 
in the context of Baptism and the Lord's Supper in Hans Kong, The Church, 
trans. Ray and Rosaleen Ockenden, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), pp. 
203 -241. 
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traditional doctrine. The two emphases are not inherently contradictory, 
of course, but stand in a complementary relation. The critical con- 
tribution of the imago Dei motif is to assert that although Christ was 
the first and only concrete, perfect actualization of the image, His saving, 
incorporating, forgiving, and empowering presence remains within historical 
creaturely existence. The imago Dei theme stands as a symbol of God's 
relation to the world - in the world - reminding the world that its goal 
and completion is not exclusively from within itself (as a closed whole) 
but that its very existence and goal are permeated by the incarnate 
presence of the divine.1 
The distinctive quality of Christianity in reference to the 
cosmic scope of the imago Dei, is at least in part, its awareness of the 
co- inherence of God, and the centrality of Christ. That awareness opens 
the horizon of historical existence, completing (subject to human factors 
of incoherence) the circle of communion between Creator and creation. It 
manifests the doxological import of creatio ex nihilo, and coincides with 
a dynamic interpretation of creative process, i.e., creatio continua. 
One's recognition of God's dynamic, loving, and saving presence also 
humbles creation in the face of its own perversion, a perversion from which 
humanity is powerless to extricate or heal itself. The depth of that 
perversion acquired its most unmistakable expression in its futile attempt 
1This is properly a related, but separate field of study. It has 
been explored by several theologians, e.g. Ronald Gregor Smith, John Knox 
(The Church and the Realit of Christ), Johannes B. Metz, (Theology of the 
World , Dietrich Ritschl, Memory_and Hope), and Joseph Haroutunian (God 
With Us). The most recent, and perhaps the most creative study is that 
of Ray S. Anderson, "Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God ", 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1972). 
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to reject the only historically actualized perfection of its goal, viz., 
the crucifixion of the Incarnate Christ. The futility of the attempt, 
and simultaneously the symbol of God's indestructible and on -going 
purposive relation, is manifest in the resurrection. 
Christians, therefore, are conscious of their dependence, a 
consciousness which is celebrated through its acts of worship, its sacra- 
ments, prayers, and devotion to the Word. The Church's consciousness, 
however, is not one of introversion; rather, it remains faithfully 
attentive to the multiform signs of the imago Dei. It waits expectantly, 
interprets hopefully, serves and is served, speaks and is spoken to - 
in all things simultaneously subject to historical existence, yet knowing 
that its goal is beyond. It exists as God's witness in the world that 
man's hope - even including his so- called secular aspirations - is valid, 
though not complete within itself. The church opens the horizons of 
history with its proclamation that hope has been (in Christ), is being (in 
Christ) and finally will be eternally authenticated (in Christ). "We 
are God's work of art, created in Christ Jesus to live the good life as 
from the beginning he had meant us to live it" (Eph. 2:10). 
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APPENDIX A 
The Thomistic conceptualization of nature and grace, their respec- 
tive essence and relation, is more than peripherally related to Thomas' 
doctrine of the imago Dei; therefore a careful consideration of those 
themes as they impinge on our understanding of the image of God would seem 
appropriate. On the other hand a thorough explication of nature -grace 
would inevitably draw us further from our central concern than seems ad- 
visable. Therefore, in order to present the essential material apropos 
nature -grace as it relates to the imago Dei we will consider some of the 
technical material relevant to the subject. 
Our intention is to discern the specific being or essence of both 
nature and grace, not however as an independent study, but expressly in 
order that the imago Dei, and its relation to each, might be more fully 
appreciated. Our questions, for instance, - what is nature, and "natural" 
to man? what relation to image does nature bear? is the image of God of 
nature or grace? - these questions underlie all of the following material. 
On Nature and Grace 
1.1. In the Summa St. Thomas offers a three -fold definition of human 
nature. First, he states, "... there are the principles of which nature 
is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers 
of the soul, and so forth. "1 We have seen that among the powers of the 
soul:, that of intellectuality is of greatest import to our study; we have 
called this man's cognitive aptitude (supra, p. 188). St. Thomas asserts 
that this quality of nature has "... been neither destroyed nor diminished 
by sin. "2 
1Summa, II-I Q.LXXXV 1. 
2Summa, II -I Q. LXXXV 1. The rationale for this assertion is 
stated thus: "... sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that 
he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin." 
Ibid., Q. LXXXV 2. 
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1.2. That the aptitude of man is not necessarily synonymous with its 
actuality; and, that potentiality is primarily preparatory, we note in 
this statement: "Man is made to the image of God, because he is created 
with an intelligence. Only intelligent beings are said to be made to his 
image; they only can be called his sons, and can be adopted through grace. "1 
1.3. Is such potentiality a quality of the nature of man, and if so, 
is man thereby enabled to achieve his end, i.e., the beatific vision? The 
answer to the first will have to be affirmative - man's intellectual capa- 
city is constitutive of his being. On the other hand, it would not be 
true to suggest that the utilization of such potentiality will of itself 
warrant the accomplishment of man's end. John Sullivan's summary state- 
ment is instructive: 
Man is naturally capable of grace, and of the knowledge and 
vision of God because he is made to the image of God: this is 
the constant refrain of Thomas. However, this potency of the 
natural divine image for the gifts of grace is of a very special 
nature. 'The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent 
above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach 
it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance 
with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable by nature, having been 
made in the image of God ...'. "2 
1.4. Summary: Intellectuality, the central factor of the imago Dei, 
is an abiding quality of man's nature, not affected by sin.3 Its primary 
focus, however, is beyond the management of mundane affairs; its fullest 
potentiality is directed toward adoption by God, the beatific vision. 
Nature is not sufficient to attain the divine goal, but serves as the 
necessary preliminary for that attainment. 
1Aquinas, III Sentences x.ii.2.iii, cited in Gilby, Texts, 292. 
Cf. Sullivan, Image, p. 234: "Man precisely as he is a natural image of 
God, that is by reason of his intellectuality and its powers, is capax 
Dei, capable of knowing and loving God as he is in himself, but super- 
natural revelation is required for the activation of this divine capacity." 
2Sullivan, Image, pp. 233-34. Ital. mine. Cf. Summa, III Q.XXIII 3. 
3That conclusion is subject to challenge; it will be modified 
shortly. 
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2.1. The second factor which Thomas offers as definitive of human 
nature is an "... inclination to virtue, ... . "1 St. Thomas enlarges 
upon this theme in Article 2 and says that it is by means of his rational 
nature that a man may be said to act in accord with reason, and this is 
to act virtuously.2 The major emphasis is related to the structures of 
order rather than to categories of personal relation. 
2.2. It may be edifying to note references regarding the distinction 
between perfect and corrupt nature as it relates to this theme of virtue. 
St. Thomas states: 
... man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, 
do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous 
gift [uperadditione gratuiti doni7, though not without the help 
of God moving him. Now to love God above all this is natural /on- 
naturale7 to man and to every nature, ... . And the reason of this 
is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according 
as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since all things 
act accordi as the are naturall fit as stated in Ph s. ii. ... 
Hence in the state of perfect nature naturae integrae /man re- 
ferred the love of himself and of all other things to the love 
of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and 
above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature [aturae 
corruptae7 man falls short of this appetite of his rational will, 
which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private 
1Summa, II -I Q.LXXXV 1. Of the several forms of virtue the one 
that concerns us is that of man's love for God, which is the foundation 
for all other virtues. St. Thomas cites Augustine in his definition of 
virtue, saying, "Augustine defines virtue as a good quality of mind, whereby 
life is lived aright, which no one uses ill, and which God works in us 
apart from sin.a This definition is complete, even leaving out the last 
clause, and applied to every human virtue. Virtue brings an active 
faculty to its full activity." Aquinas, Disputations, de Vert tIbus in 
communi, 2, cited in Gilby, Texts, 217. 
a "The definition was composed by Peter Lombard from phrases of 
St. Augustine, Cf. Sentences, II. xxvii.5." 
Note also that sin and vice are posed as virtue's antithesis: 
"Sin, the direct opposite of an act of virtue, is a disordered activity; 
vice, the direct opposite of virtue, is the condition of a thing out of 
its proper natural bearings." Summa, II -I Q.LXXI 1, cited in Gilby, 
Texts, 233. Sin is here seen as the manifestation of disorder, while vice 
is the precedent disordered condition from which sin emanates. Conversely 
therefore, virtue is the proper order from which ordinate activity emanates, 
i.e., love for God. And cf. Summa, II -I Q.LXXI 2. 
2Cf. Summa, II -I Q.LXXXV 2. 
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good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must 
say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift 
of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God 
above all things naturally, although he needd.d God's help to 
move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, 
even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature.l 
According to the above, properly ordered nature inclines itself 
(by nature) to the love of God above all things, and conversely, an in- 
ordinate or disordered nature is diverted from the primary focus, the love 
of God, to its private end and good. 
2.3. The concept of proportionality is of critical importance regard- 
ing this theme, i.e., man's inclination to virtue, and is introduced by 
St. Thomas thus: 
... in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of 
the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish 
and do the good proportionate /proportionatum7 to his nature, 
such as the good of acquired virtue /irtutis acquisitae ; _ 
but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue virtutis 
infusee . But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short 
of what he could do by his nature so that he is unable to ful- 
fil it by his own natural powers. 
Man, as he lives in his corrupt nature, is a qualitatively dif- 
ferent being from man who lived in the perfect state; the former retains 
a proportional capacity for acquired virtue, but significantly diminished 
vis -a -vis his perfect archetype. The original sufficiency of man's oper- 
ative power has now become a relative (not absolute) insufficiency whereby 
man is apparently unable even to accomplish ends commensurate with his 
nature. It is difficult to ascertain whether "nature" itself has been 
transformed or simply that a disordering limitation has intervened which 
renders his natural capacity for virtue less potent; however, the evi- 
dence seems to favor the latter.3 
1Summa, II -I Q.CIX 3. The question of nature's primal need for 
grace will be considered shortly. However it should be stated at this 
point that the statement that man, in his perfect nature, did not need 
grace in order that he might love God sublimely and naturally is not 
paramount to saying that by nature man can achieve his perfect end. Cf. 
supra, Article 1.2., and Summa, II -I Q.II 3: "... the perfection of the 
rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of 
its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural 
participation of Divine goodness." 
2Summa, II -I Q.CIX 2, .Ital. mine. 
3Cf. Aquinas, Contra Impugnantes Dei, 6, cited in Gilby, Texts, 291. 
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2.4. Regarding the question as to the dependence of nature on grace 
we note the explicit statement: 
Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for 
a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its 
own proper endowment,; and beyond which it is powerless, except 
by a superadded form, ... . And thus the human understanding 
has a form, viz., intelligible light, which of itself is suffic- 
ient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz., those we can come 
to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things /altiora 
vero intelligibilia7 the human intellect cannot know, unless it 
be perfected by a stronger light, viz., the light of faith or 
prophecy which is called the li t of race lumen : atiae , 
inasmuch as it is added to nature naturae superadditum 
The natural endowments of intellectuality are not sufficient to apprehend 
those realities which transcend the capability of sense. If therefore, 
it be granted that the beatific vision belongs to the category of "higher 
intelligible things" it must be concluded that both pre- and post -fallen 
man were dependent upon superadded grace. However, according to Thomas, 
man's propensity or inclination toward virtue, though diminished by sin, 
continues to remain as a constituent element in the nature of man. Indeed, 
that inclination is, and always has been, dependent upon the donum super - 
additum of grace for the attainment of the beatific vision, though the 
inclination, per se, even apart from grace, remains. 
3. The third and final good of human nature is "... the gift of or- 
iginal justice rriginalis justitiae7, conferred on the whole human nature 
in the person of the first man, ... . "2 Original justice, original recti- 
tude, is of a different quality from that of either the principles and pro - 
perties, i.e., the powers of the soul (cf. supra, Article 1) or that of man's 
1Summa, II -I Q.CIX 1, and cf. Ibid., I Q.XCIII 8: The meritorious 
knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a 
certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. XII., A.12: Q. LVI., 
A.3; Q.LX., A.5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to 
understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said 
that the image of God abides ever in the soul; whether this image of God 
be so obsolete, as it were clouded, as almost to amount to nothing, as in 
those who have not the use of reason; or obscured and disfigured, as in 
sinners; or clear and beautiful, as in the just; ... ." And cf. also 
Summa, II -I Q.II 3, Rep. Ob. 1, and II -I Q.CXIV 2: "... no created nature 
is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless 
there is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace." Ital. mine. 
2Summa, II-I Q.LXXXV 1. 
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inclination to virtue which we have just discussed. These latter continue 
in man and qualify his being; the former, original rectitude, "... was 
entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent, ... . "1 
3.1. Because there is a clear relationship between rectitude and ration- 
ality, impinging on the imago Dei, the implications of original rectitude 
need now to be considered. That relationship is explored by St. Thomas 
in the following: 
... the very rectitude [ectitudo7 of the primitive state, 
wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as 
others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. vii. 20, 
God made man right. For this rectitude consisted in his reason 
being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to 
the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second 
and the third; ... . Now it is clear that such a subjection of the 
body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from 
nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; ... . So it 
is clear also that the primitive subjection by virtue of which 
reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but 
was a supernatural endowment of grace; ... .2 
There is an apparent contradiction between the relation of recti- 
tude and rationality discussed above and that discussed in Article 1 
where it was asserted that the properties and powers of the soul, e.g., 
intellectuality, were undiminished by sin. Above, however, it is stated 
that the subjection implicit in rectitude is the cause of first, the lower 
power's subjection to reason, and second, the body's subjection to the soul. 
If therefore rectitude is not of the nature of man, but a property of grace 
which is superadded initially and subsequently lost, so also would we con- 
clude that the secondary and tertiary subjections would have been adversely 
affected. Furthermore, it is explicitly stated that the subjection of 
... the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from 
nature." (Ital. mine). 
3.2. Toward a resolution of this apparent discrepancy we note Aquinas' 
amplification in terms of "accidents ": 
... original righteousness, in which the first man was created, 
was an accident 2iccidens naturae7 pertaining to the nature of 
the species, not as caused by the principles of the specie, 
but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. 
1Summa, II -I Q.LXXXV 1. 2Summa, I Q.XCV 1. 
3Summa, I Q.0 1, Ital. mine. And cf. Summa, I Q.XCVII 1: "... a 
thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this 
sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. ... 
For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigour of 
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Therefore, the accident of original righteousness (rectitude) is not of 
the substance (nature) of man; it merely pertains to him. 
3.2.1. Further, regarding the quality of an accident and its relation 
to being and grace we note: 
As Boethius (pseudo -Beda) says (Sentent. Philosoph. ex Aristol.), 
the being of an accident is to inhere [ccidentis esse est inesse7. 
Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because 
by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather 
than to be a being (Metaph. vii.). And because to become and to 
be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking no accident comes 
into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to 
be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in 
act with this accident. And thus grace is also said to be created 
inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e., are given 
a new being out of nothing, i.e., not from merits, according to 
Eph. ii.l0, ... .1 
Our conclusion is that the nature of man, and the powers of reason and 
of the soul, remain proportional to nature even granting the loss of the 
supernatural gift of rectitude. The appreciation of the clear dualism 
between nature and grace in the thought of St. Thomas affords a systemati- 
cally acceptable resolution of the apparent contradiction introduced above 
in Article 3.1. Apart from dualistic presuppositions however, one may 
protest, not perhaps the systematic consistency, but surely the validity 
of the superimposed extra- biblical philosophical structures. 
4. We have attempted to illustrate the dissimilarity between grace 
and nature, and yet to explicate the relation between them. Having ex- 
plored the constitution of nature and its relation to grace, we shall 
reverse the perspective and elucidate the relation of grace to nature. 
4.1. As St. Thomas presented a three-fold definition of nature, so also 
does he propose a tripartite characterization of grace in his "Treatise on 
Grace" entitled "Of the Grace of God as Regards its Essence ". He states: 
immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, 
whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as 
it remained itself subject to God." Then in Rep. Ob. 3 he states: "This 
power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift 
of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt 
and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of 
which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, 
... ." And cf. Summa, I Q.0 1. 
1Summa, II -I Q.CX 2, Rep. Ob. 3. 
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According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken 
in three ways, First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed to 
say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e., 
the king looks on him with favour. Secondly, it is taken for 
any gift freely bestowed, ... . Thirdly, it is taken for the re- 
compense of a gift given gratis, inasmuch as we are said to be 
grateful for benefits. Of these three the second depends on 
the first, since one bestows something on another gratis from 
the love wherewith he receives him into his good graces. And 
from the second proceeds the third, since from the benefits 
bestowed rg atis arises gratitude. Now as regards the last two, 
it is clear that grace implies something in him (Ital. mine) 
who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the 
acknowledgement of the gift. But as regards the first, a dif- 
ference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace 
of man; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine 
will, some good in the creature flows from God's love, whereby 
He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the 
will of man is moved by the good pre -existing in things: and 
hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, 
but pre -supposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is 
clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a 
good cause in the creature, but not co- eternal with the eternal 
love. And according to this difference of good the love of God 
to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common, 
whereby He loves all thi s that are (Wis. xi. 25), and thereby 
gives things their natural being. But the second is a special 
love, whereby He draws the rational above 
tion of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and 
according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since 
it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, 
which is Himself, for the creature.1 
Divine grace, in the first sense, is a benevolent disposition 
of God toward man, which in its expression seems to become reified, i.e., 
"... grace implies something in him who receives grace." (supra). 
As a consequence there is an existent good both recognizable and lovable 
which precipitates one's love for another; conversely, God is considered 
to depend on no such good of the creature, but upon Himself to create the 
good by His act of grace.2 The dualism between nature and grace is sustained, 
1Summa, II-I Q.CX 1. 
2Cf. Summa, II -I Q.CX 1: "... when a man is said to have the grace 
of God, there is signified something bestowed on man by God." And cf. 
Ibid., Rep. Ob. 1: "... what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed 
to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in man is caused by the Divine 
love, ... ." 
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but at what cost, we may ask, to nature? 
4.1.1. St. Thomas addresses himself generally to that question speaking 
of the difference between operating and co- operating grace. In respect 
to operating grace God is spoken of as sole mover; but from another per- 
spective the mind which is moved also moves, which movement is attributed 
to the soul; this is designated as co- operating grace. The interior act 
of the will of which God is prime mover is operating grace, whereas the 
exterior act, commanded by the will, and attributed to the will is co- 
operating grace. Of this Thomas says, "... because God assists us in 
this act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with 
respect to this that we speak of co- operating grace. "1 It would appear 
that the will's ability to co- operate is entirely and completely dependent 
upon operating grace; co- operating grace better specifies a semantic dis- 
tinction than what the phrase would suggest to us, i.e., an actual occurrence 
of co -labor or co- activity in which both God and man significantly partici- 
pate. 
4.1.2. The limitation of nature is further specified in Summa, Q.CXIV 
where Aquinas affirms the divine ordination of human nature (at least inso- 
far as its capability is concerned) to eternal life, but only "... by the 
help of grace; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal 
life. "2 
4.1.3. "Meritorious of eternal life" is a phrase that may imply the struc- 
tures or relation of co -labor and co- activity which we, in Article 4.1.1., 
suggested were conspicuously absent. The constitution of merit vis -a -vis 
grace is definitively articulated by St. Thomas in a later question. He 
suggests that meritorious work is to be understood either as it proceeds 
from free -will, or from grace. The distinction of origin requires the 
further elaboration: 
If it Seritorious wore is considered as regards the substance 
of the word, and inasmuch as it springs from free -will, there 
can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But 
there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: 
1Summa, II -I Q.CXI 2, and cf. Summa, II -I Q.CX 2, Rep. Ob. 2: 
"Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner 
of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as white- 
ness makes a thing white, and justice, just." 
2Summa, II -I Q.CXIV 2, Rep. Ob. 1. 
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for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, 
God should reward him according to the excellence of his power. 
If, however, we speak of a meritorious work ropera meritoria7, 
inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving 
us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting 
condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power 
of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to 
John iv. 14: ... .i1 
The merit of free -will is congruous or commensurate only on the 
basis of its proportionality which is applicable exclusively within the 
sphere of nature, and which does not attain to the supernatural sphere of 
rve/, 
eternity. Alternate1; the work which springs from the gift of super - 
added grace exceeds the proportionality of nature and therefore worthily 
conforms to the structures of the eternal. However, inasmuch as there is 
a congruity on the basis of proportion, it should not be suggested that 
there is a basic incompatibility between the two spheres of reality, nature 
and grace, even though nature's function may appear to be entirely passive.2 
4.2. Summary. That which at first appeared to be a reification of 
grace (4.1.) is now seen, on the basis of further evaluation, to be an 
unjustified deduction. It is seen that grace is first a disposition of 
God toward man, and secondly on the basis of the material in Article 4.1.1., 
grace is the activity of God toward man by which He moves man toward Him- 
self. This would seem entirely compatible with what was said about the 
imago Dei as being nature's capax Dei. Man's capacity for God is a po- 
tentiality for relation which is conditioned by God. It does not seem 
possible however, because of Aquinas' clear delineation of operating and 
co- operating grace, to speak of man's capax Dei (apropos the image) as a 
property which inheres in man; the capacity would appear to be more a naked 
potentiality. Aquinas says, "Rational natures are poised between alterna- 
1Summa, II-I Q.CXIV 3. 
2Cf. Summa, II -I Q.II 3. Not all of nature attains to the uni- 
versal, asserts Aquinas; only the rational nature "... in as much as it 
apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related 
to the universal principle of being." And cf. Summa, II -I Q.CIX 5, cited 
in Gilby, Texts, 297: "Since deeds of natural power are not deserving of 
eternal life, because they are not proportioned to it, the higher power 
of grace is necessary." 
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tives. God moves the human spirit to good; nevertheless it could resist. 
It is God's doing, then, that a man prepares himself to receive grace. "1 
core 
The alternative' between which man is poised to receive or reject grace; 
the former man can do only by the help of grace and therefore his acceptance 
is not the product of an inherent property or, it would also appear, the in- 
dependent exercise of a capacity. Man's capacity for God, according to 
St. Thomas, is primarily a neutral and passive constituent of his being by 
which he can recognize (by grace) God when He presents Himself, or reject 
(by himself) Him if he so desires.2 
The principle of merit further clarifies the disjunction between 
nature and grace, as was indicated in Article 4.1.4. Nature and grace 
specify two separate and distinct spheres of reality, though the distinction 
is not, from God's point of view, absolute. That is to say, the disposition 
of God for the ultimate good of man can be "naturalized" and continue to 
retain its proper proportionality. On the other hand the highest tendency 
of nature cannot of itself transcend its natural bounds; there is congruity 
but not condignity.3 
5. Conclusion. Nature, we have seen, is the created sphere of 
reality which stands apart and distinct, yet dependent upon the other 
sphere of reality which is God, and which we have discussed from the per 
spective of grace. Within the sphere of nature, our primary interest has 
been oriented toward man, the highest in the order because of the quality 
of intellectuality. As regards the imago Dei, intellectuality is the cri- 
terion which specifies man's potentiality for relation (supra, Article 1.2). 
Intellectual potentiality is therefore constitutive of man, but not there- 
fore inevitably productive of his chief end, the beatific vision. 
Our consideration of virtue suggested that insofar as the imago Dei 
is concerned, at the time of man's original perfection he was capable of 
loving God above all things because as yet his capacity for knowing Him was 
1Aquinas, I Quodlibets, iv,7, c&ad 1,2, cited in Gilby, Texts, 300, 
and cf. Ibid.: "That men can freely prepare themselves does not dispense 
with the need for divine help, any more than the fact that fire burns makes 
an originating thermal principle redundant. God moves all things according 
to their proper modes of operation, and so, by sharing in the divine motion, 
some things act from necessity, but others from liberty." 
2Aquinas, Exposition, de Trinitate, ii.3, cited in Gilby, Texts, 11. 
3Cf. Summa, II -I Q.CIX 9. 
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unencumbered by the disorder of sin (supra, Article 2.2.). The conceptual- 
ization of proportionality impinges upon this consideration in that St. 
Thomas delimits the possibilities of man's capability; meritorious know- 
ledge is the donum superadditum of grace - it exceeds the proper pro 
portionality of nature (cf. Articles 2.3., and 2.4.) . 
The gift of original rectitude in which man was created, and by 
means of which the entire life of man was properly ordered (i.e., subjection 
to God and consequent subjection of lower powers to the power of rationality) 
was noted to be not of nature but of grace. Therefore it is possible to 
conclude that the addition or retraction of grace does not transform nature, 
although this is not to suggest that nature is unaffected.1 Superadded 
grace permits, in a sense, the higher capability of man, i.e., his intellec- 
tuality, to transcend the limits of nature (supra, Articles 3.1., 3.2., 
3.2.1.). 
Finally we explored the relation of grace to nature (Article 4.) 
and were further impressed by St. Thomas' careful delineation of the con- 
stitution and relation of the two realities. In Article 4.1.1. where the 
issue of operating grace as over -against co- operating grace was studied, 
we suggested that in respect to the co- operative potentiality of man, the 
precedent power of operating grace effectively eliminates the possibility 
of co -labor and co- activity. The relation between the two is clearly 
that of absolute dependence and subordination. The merit which may 
result from the activity of man is not proportional to the quality of merit 
which is determinate of man's eternal life, the beatific vision (cf. Article 
4.1.3.). 
1Cf. Aquinas, Disputations, II de Malo, 11, cited in Gilby, Texts, 
266: "As daylight from the sun is diffused into the room, so the light of 
grace is infused into the soul by God. Although grace is beyond the 
nature of the soul, there is, nevertheless, in every rational creature the 
readiness to receive grace, and from grace the vigour to act accordingly. 
Sin is like an obstacle interposed between the soul and God: your ini- 
quities have separated between you and God." Lisa. lix. 21. Later in 
the same reference Thomas elaborates on the relation between sin and grace: 
"Since the aptness for grace is part of human nature's good estate, we can 
now appreciate how sin diminishes nature. And because grace perfects 
nature, heightening mind and will and the sensitive parts which serve reason, 
we can appreciate also how sin, by depriving us of grace and clogging our 
natural abilities, also hurts nature." 
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The imago Dei as constituted by the grace of God is an accident 
(cf. Articles 3.2., 3.2.1.) of nature, i.e., it has no being per se, and 
therefore it could not be suggested that the image of God is a quality 
which inheres in man. Therefore we have suggested that in the thought 
of St. Thomas Aquinas the imago Dei is a "naked potentiality" - we might 
also say, a latent affinity - which defines the quality of man's intellec- 
tual capacity to apprehend and utilize the superadded gift of grace. The 
effect of grace, and its focus, is therefore beyond and above nature; the 
relation between God and man occurs primarily in the higher sphere of 
reality, the sphere of the divine. 
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APYhNDIX B 
Barth's Concept of Nothingness 
1. Barth asks the question in C.D., III /3, P. 349: "What is real 
nothingness Nichti e ? In this question objection may well be taken to 
the word 'is'. Only God and His creature really and properly are. But 
nothingness is neither God nor His creature. Thus it can have nothing in 
common with God and His creatures. But it would be foolhardy to rush to 
the conclusion that it is therefore nothing, i.e., that it does not exist." 
1.1. At this point Barth offers one of several attempted justifications 
for the assertion that nothingness "is ", though each attempt revolves around 
a single theme, namely, that because God has taken account of it, therefore 
it is. The same reference continues: "God takes it into account. He is 
concerned with it. He strives against it, resists and overcomes it. ... 
In the light of God's relationship to it we must accept the fact that in a 
third way of its own nothingness 'is'. All conceptions or doctrine which 
would deny or diminish or minimise .5i17 this 'is' are untenable from the 
Christian standpoint. Nothingness is not nothing. 2Das Nichtige ist 
nicht das Nichts7." 
1.2. The penultimate sentence is formidable. One wonders how to 
comprehend the so- called "third way" of existence to which Barth appeals. 
He offers no Scriptural warrant in this section, which seems to be a 
conspicuous omission if, in fact, belief in the existence of nothingness 
is a fundamental Christian tenet. 
2. Barth continues his explication of nothingness, further substantiat- 
ing its existence and place in Christian doctrine. In C.D., III /3, pp. 
351 -52, he says: "God is ... holy, and this means that His being and 
activity take place in a definite opposition, in a real regation, both 
defensive and aggressive. Nothingness is that from which God separates 
Himself and in face of which He asserts Himself and exerts His positive will. 
Nothingness has no existence and cannot be known except as the object of 
God's activity as always a holy activity. The biblical conception, as we now 
recall it, is as follows. God elects, and therefore rejects what He does 
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not elect. God wills, and therefore opposes what He does not will. He 
says Yes, and therefore says No to that which He has not said Yes. ... 
It is only on this basis that nothingness 'is', but on this basis it really 
'is'. ... It has no power save that which it is allowed by God. It, too, 
belongs to God. ... It 'is', not as God and His creation are, but only 
in its own improper way, as inherent contradiction, as impossible possibility. 
... That which God renounces and abandons in virtue of His decision is 
not merely nothing. It is nothingness, and has as such its own being, 
albeit malignant and perverse. A real dimension is disclosed, and existence 
and form are given to a reality sui generis, in the fact that God is wholly and 
utterly not the Creator in this respect. Nothingness is that which God 
does not will. It lives only by the fact that it is that which God does 
not will. But it lives by this fact. For not only what God wills, but 
what He does not will, is potent, and must have a real correspondence. 
What really corresponds to that which God does not will is nothingness." 
2.1. The problematic in the above seems evident. On the one hand Barth 
must assert that nothingness has no existence, at least in the manner in 
which, e.g., God and creation exist. Barth would not want to imply 
either that nothingness shared an existence, prior to creation, of the same 
order as God's, or that nothingness is a creation of man. What does evolve, 
however, is the positing of an existence which occurs as a result of God's 
creative decision. That is to say, when God chooses to create something, 
that which He chooses not to create assumes an existence. But, we seriously 
question the validity and wisdom of ascribing the term existence to that which 
God has chosen not to create. Cf. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 
(London: Collins, Fontana Library, 1968), pp. 141 -142, and especially this 
on p. 142: "When a human being makes a choice it is presupposed that the 
alternatives between which he chooses exist as facts or as possibilities 
independently of himself. Thus, in choosing good we must reject evil. But 
it is far from clear that this necessity applies to God, creating ex nihilo 
and in absolute freedom." Even Hick's criticism, i.e., that human choices 
involve existing alternatives, is not self -evident. However, we would agree 
with the specific point of his criticism - that God, creating ex nihilo, 
is bound by no existing alternatives. Furthermore, we doubt that that 
which in fact is created, by God's choice, necessarily results in the coincident 
existence of the antithesis. 
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3. Of primary concern is the effect which nothingness is considered to 
exert on creation. And for the sake of presentation, we simply grant the 
validity of its existence. In Dogmatics in Outline, p. 55, Barth asserts 
that "Everything outside God is held constantly by God over nothingness." 
If we were to criticize that assertion, we might question the "location" 
of nothingness. If we assume that nothingness is "outside God ", then it too must 
be held over nothingness. But, perhaps we are being too pedantic. Let it 
be assumed that the "everything" is creation, and that it is held "by God 
over nothingness ", which is not creation. Then we need to inquire what 
effect it may have on creation. Barth's opinion is expressed in C.D., III /3, 
p. 354: 
3.1. "The grace of God is the basis and norm of all being, the source 
and criterion of all good. Measured by this standard, as the negation of 
God's grace, nothingness is intrinsically evil. It is both perverting and 
perverted. In this capacity it does not confront either God or the 
creature neutrally. It is not merely a third factor. It opposes both 
as an enemy, offending God and threatening His creature. ... By reason 
of this character, whether of sin, evil, or death, it is 
inexplicable as a natural process or condition. It is altogether inexplic- 
able. The explicable is subject to a norm and occurs within a standard. 
But nothingness is absolutely without norm or standard. The explicable 
conforms to a law, nothingness to none. It is simply aberration, trans- 
gression, evil. For this reason it is inexplicable, and can be affirmed 
only as that which is inherently inimical. ... The controversy with 
nothingness, its conquest, removal and abolition, are primarily and properly 
God's own affair." 
3.2. On the basis of the above it is apparent that nothingness is the 
antithesis of grace, and that it assumes modes of existence which we know as 
evil, sin, and death. Yet, Barth says, it is totally inexplicable; it 
defies norms and standards. Does it not seem, however, that Barth has 
attempted to explicate, to define, that which he says is inexplicable? As 
to its relation to creation, nothingness approaches that which God has 
created as an active and powerful foe; it perverts that which it touches. 
And finally, it exists as that against which creation stands helpless and defense- 
less; the proper combatant, indeed the only one, is God. Man's vulnerability 
to nothingness, and his culpability in reference to it, e.g., evil, remain our 
underlying questions. 
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3.3. The vulnerability of creation (man) to nothingness is defined 
in the following: "The creature is threatened by the possibility of 
nothingness and destruction, which is excluded by God - and only by God. 
If a creature exists, it is only maintained in its mode of existence if 
God so wills. If He did not so will, nothingness would inevitably break 
in from all sides." Dog. Outline, p. 56. Again is noted the assertion 
that the two principle combatants in the arena of existence are God and 
nothingness. And cf. C.D., III /1, p. 110: "Creation means the irruption 
and revelation of the divine compassion. Once and for all the Word of God 
went out against the rejected and vanished reality of an alien and hostile 
creature." John Hick suggests that herein Barth associates himself with 
a questionable philosophical school of thought. Cf. Hick, Evil and the 
God of Love, pp. 185 -193, and especially this from p. 192: "From the 
point of view of twentieth -century logic, the notion of meontic non -being 
is an example of the inveterate tendency of the human mind to hypostatize or 
reify language." On the following page he says, "By postulating a previous- 
ly existing situation within which God acts, and of whose character He must 
in acting take account, Barth is halfway towards a Manichaean dualism." 
The propriety or impropriety of Barth's philosophical tendencies exceed 
the scope of our thesis. Nevertheless, Hick's criticism impinges on the 
theological issue under discussion. Barth's system clearly articulates 
creation's vulnerability to evil (nothingness) - but, in such a manner 
as to make its (i.e., man's) responsibility incomprehensible. 
3.4. Finally, we cite one reference which anticipates a further discussion 
of man's culpability in the face of nothingness. Barth states: "When 
the creature crosses the frontier Li.e., "the positive will, election and 
activity of God" - quoted in context above p. 233, n.2 from the one side, 
and it is invaded from the other, nothingness achieves actuality in the 
creaturely world." - C.D., III /3, p. 350. We recognize only an inference 
of man's role in the struggle - i.e., when "the creature crosses the frontier ". 
However, there is no specific and unambiguous determination regarding man's 
active or passive participation. One statement, however, seems to indicate 
a passive participation: "Nothingness is the past, the ancient menace, danger 
and destruction, the ancient non -being which obscured and defaced the divine 
creation of God but which is consigned to the past in Jesus Christ, in whose 
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death it has received its deserts, being destroyed with this consummation 
of the positive will of God which is as such the end of His non -willing. 
Because Jesus is Victor, nothingness is routed and extirpated." - C.D., 
III /3, p. 363. Again, the struggle occurs above the level of humanity; 





Historical or Non -historical 
1. A fully comprehensive examination of the historicity /non -his- 
toricity of primal existence would exceed the requirements of the 
thesis. The inclusion of only a few references will suffice to illus- 
trate Brunner's thought on the subject. Brunner's rejection of an 
historic Paradise, and also of a "perfect" primal human being, conforms 
with the conclusions of science. - Cf. M.I.R,., pp. 393 -94. "It is not ", 
states Brunner, "that we think that a 'first man' of this type 5.e., 
justitia originalis7 ever lived anywhere at any time - this idea is 
merely the historical husk concealing the kernel of the Biblical 
message - but this original righteousness - being in the love of God 
who gives and who loves us first - is that for which God creates man." - 
M.I.R., p. 104. The "kernel ", it would appear, has to do both with an 
original righteousness and with a certain dimension of love. Original 
righteousness is not original in the sense of its belonging to a preced- 
ing period of historical time; rather, it refers to a "being in the love 
of God" - for which man was created. 
2. In respect to the historical occurrence of man's "being in love ", 
the following statement is instructive: "It is not some human being who 
happened to live in the far -off and dim ages of pre history who is the Adam 
created in the Image of God; it is you, and me, and everybody. The Primi- 
tive State is not an historical period, but an historical moment, the moment 
of the Divinely created origin, which we only know in its connexion with its 
contrast, with sin." - M.I.R., p. 111. Inasmuch as the "origin" refers to 
a non -historically actualized existence, so also does Adam imply a non - 
historical figure; he becomes, as it were, historical in the life of every 
man. The "moment" of the origin is repeated for each historical individual. 
It is an existential moment. 
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2.1. On the other hand, Brunner sometimes speaks in a contradictory 
manner. He says, for instance, "Seen from a negative point of view; 
that from which sin turns away is not merely a demand, but a God -given 
being. The life originally given to man is being in the love of God. 
This gift, not merely a divine task, is prior to our empirical sinful 
existence." - M.I.R., p. 104. It is not a demand; it is not a task. 
Still, it is not an historical actuality. One wonders what it may be. 
Cairns raises similar questions, and says: "It does seem to me that we 
are faced by a clear alternative. Either we regard our original existence 
as a divine intention for us, not cancelled by sin, but temporarily balked 
by it. So doing we would equate it with the material image. Or else, 
if we insist on regarding it as an actual gift, we think of it as consist- 
ing in our endowments, still possessed under sin, and in particular that 
existence in personal relation with God which even God continues to give 
us under sin." Cairns continues: 
2.2. "Brunner claims that his view preserves the essential truth that 
'is hidden under the mythical conception of a primitive state of integrity 
in Paradise.' If, however, the content be reduced to the material contained 
under the above alternatives, it may well be asked whether the truth stated 
here could not be expressed without using the concepts of 'integrity' or 
'original humanity' at all." - Kegley, Theol. of Brunner, p. 90. The 
internal quote from Brunner is from Dog. II, p. 74. It appears to us that 
Cairns' objections, though valid, do not go far enough. In addition to 
the unnecessary confusion which the use of such semi- historical terms (e.g. 
original, primal) must inevitably produce, more importantly the actual 
historical existence of man is threatened. Further, it would seem that 
man's religious experience is relegated to supra -human realms. At least, 
the question of the relation between man's historical existence and his 
relation to God appears to require the creation of a new structure of 
relation. 
3. Brunner's comment in respect to the above problem asserts that if the 
Church had approached the imago Dei concept through the understanding of the 
New Testament "... it would have been preserved from teaching that the origin- 
al existence of man was an actual state which could be described, in the 
sense of a status integritatis." The issue, according to Brunner, is not 
so much that the church taught the concept of an "actual state ", but that 
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the actual state was one of integritatis. Later Brunner says, "It was 
not the distinction between these 'perfect' beings and Primitive man which 
created difficulties, but the distinction between them and those redeemed 
by Christ, because the starting -point of the former was already so high." - 
M.I.R., pp. 84 -85. There is an even more important objection to this 
doctrine; the problem is not only one of degree - not, that is, that the 
"former were so high" - but moreso the implication that man was created 
for restoration. Our own impression is that man was created for completion. 
The word "restoration ", by definition, is the act of restoring to a former 
state or position. It requires, therefore, a theory of that former state 
to which something is restored. In the light of the fact that Brunner 
rejects an historic Paradise (supra, Arts. 1., 2.) the use of "restoration" 
and its synonyms is not only grammatically inaccurate, but deceptive as well. 
The word "completion" is not offered as a completely satisfactory alternative; 
its introduction is merely to illustrate the "problem ", and also to indicate 
the emphasis we intend to pursue in the following chapter. 
3.1. That suggestion is, in fact, implied by Brunner when he says, 
"... freedom to be able to say 'Yes' or 'No', points to an imperfection in 
the Primitive State in contrast to the perfection of the End. The freedom 
peculiar to the Primitive State was - according to Augustine's profound 
distinction - the freedom of the non -peccare posse; the freedom which 
belongs to the final state of eternal bliss is the freedom of the non -posse 
peccare; it shares in the divine freedom itself." - M.I.R., p. 264. Cf. 
supra, Chapter II, Sec. d.2. 
4. We have not been able to state unambiguously Brunner's position 
in respect to the question of the historical /non- historical dimensions of 
man's origin. Nevertheless, it is evident that Brunner emphatically denies 
the doctrine of an initial (original), totally perfect, existence of man 
within the dimensions of history. He continues to employ the terms which 
suggest the contrary, but he re- interprets them in an existential sense. 
In our estimation, that is not entirely satisfactory. We will be returning 
to this issue in our final chapter. 
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